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1.1 General background 
 
Paul Benacerraf and Hilary Putnam (1983, p. 3) have divided 
philosophers of mathematics into those who “promulgate certain 
mathematical methods as acceptable” and those who “want to 
describe the accepted ones”. This work will without doubt fall into 
the latter category. In general, I think philosophers should be 
careful about telling mathematicians how to do their jobs. This is 
not to say that the accepted results and methods of mathematics 
should be considered sacrosanct. Nor is it to say that philosophy 
cannot offer anything of interest to mathematicians. I disagree on 
both of these counts. There should always be room for healthy 
interaction between mathematicians and philosophers of 
mathematics. Nevertheless, the philosophical disposition of this 
work is definitely that of an anti-revisionist. After all, 
mathematical truth is the subject matter, and philosophical 
accounts of it should be careful not to neglect the way mathematics 
is actually practised. Here I am not interested in creating a new 
concept of mathematical truth as much as I am in explaining the 
one most of us already have, whether implicitly or explicitly.  
As one consequence, interesting philosophical theories such as 
intuitionism will not be among the subject matter. Intuitionist 
mathematics is revisionist: it claims that there is something 
fundamentally wrong with mathematics as it is commonly 
practised. I cannot agree with that. I think that mathematics 
contains some of the most important knowledge that human 
beings have. In addition to examining this knowledge and the 
conditions for it, philosophers of mathematics should take heed of 
the way this knowledge is acquired and passed on. This is not to 
say that we should reject revisionist philosophies like intuitionism 
– but it is to say that we must have very good reasons for 
introducing them. As of now, we should be safe in using classical 
mathematics as the starting point. 
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There is an oft-quoted passage by David Lewis (1993, p. 15) 
about philosophical revisionism (the rejection of classes, in 
particular) in mathematics: 
 
…Mathematics is an established, going concern. Philosophy is as shaky 
as can be. To reject mathematics on philosophical grounds would be 
absurd. […] Even if we reject mathematics gently – explaining how it 
can be a most useful fiction, “good without being true” – we still reject 
it, and that’s still absurd. […] I laugh to think how presumptuous it 
would be to reject mathematics for philosophical reasons. How would 
you like to go and tell the mathematicians that they must change their 
way, and abjure countless errors, now that philosophy has discovered 
that there are no classes? Will you tell them, with a straight face, to 
follow philosophical argument wherever it leads? If they challenge 
your credentials, will you boast of philosophy’s other great 
discoveries: that motion is impossible, that a being than which no 
greater can be conceived cannot be conceived not to exist, that it is 
unthinkable that anything exists outside the mind… 
 
Perhaps Lewis is being somewhat droll here, but as well as making 
clamorous exaggerations, I think he makes valid and important 
points. In contemporary philosophy of science there is a visible 
emphasis on what may be called the sociological aspect. Rather 
than following the Carnapian ideal of neatly structured formal 
scientific theories, we are now more convinced that the actual 
practice of science should also have its mark in the philosophy of 
science. Overall, this is a healthy development, even though it has 
sparked off less than healthy theories where philosophy of science 
has become a bastardized form of sociology of science. But even 
before this development, philosophers of science were noticeably 
reluctant to suggest much revisionism in, say, physics. They would 
discuss the sense in which concepts like “force” or “electron” exist 
and function, but they would generally not make much of an effort 
to contribute materially to the actual theories of physics. The 
success of physics has spoken volumes to philosophers. The two 
most important developments in 20th century physics, quantum 
theory and general relativity, have had a vast influence on 
philosophy of science in general; one cannot find a modern book 
on philosophy of science where these two developments have not 
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made a profound impact. Both the methods and results of modern 
physics have been crucial in giving us the modern paradigm for 
science. 
For mathematics this has been different. Even if we neglect the 
numerous straight revisionist attempts (intuitionism being the 
most famous of these), there remains a distinct history in which 
philosophical theories of mathematics have not been required to 
conform to the practice of mathematics. This is not to suggest the 
connection between mathematics and philosophy has not been a 
two-way street. Certainly mathematical discoveries like non-
Euclidean geometries have had an important effect on the 
philosophy of mathematics. Yet this effect is not comparable to the 
one that discoveries in physics have had. To mention an example 
that is certain to become familiar in this work, Gödel shattered 
Hilbert’s dream of complete and uniform formalism, yet formalism 
in philosophy has retained considerable popularity after Gödel’s 
results. Of course the philosophy of mathematics rarely conflicts 
with the actual results of mathematics. The phenomenon is more 
complex than that. It simply seems to be the case that the 
philosophers of mathematics do not give the same kind of status 
for their subject matter as the philosophers of physics do. They are 
more inclined to think that their object of study is a separate 
theory, something to be interpreted – even revised – 
philosophically. The actual methods used by mathematicians, in 
particular, seem to carry little or no importance for surprisingly 
many philosophers of mathematics. 
Here the quote from Lewis has the most relevance. We seem to 
have a great deal of humility toward the methods and practices of 
physicists, but in mathematics we reserve a different, much more 
powerful and revisionist, role to philosophy. It is hard to see the 
reasons behind the difference in approaches. Perhaps it is because 
most philosophers of mathematics are more familiar with 
mathematics than philosophers of physics are with their subject. 
Modern physics requires, as well as a great deal of expertise, access 
to a lot of expensive equipment. Mathematics, for the most part, 
only requires the expertise. In this way most philosophers cannot 
understand the nature of modern physical inquiry as well as the 
nature of mathematical inquiry. As a result, philosophers of 
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mathematics will be more confident to use their expertise to 
suggest revisionist theories about mathematics – or so goes one 
theory concerning the implicit consensus opinion. Whether the 
theory is right or wrong, its implication is hardly something we 
should be ready to accept. I think that philosophers should apply 
to the practice of mathematics the same kind of humility as they do 
to that of physics. 
 
Is there any philosophical relevance to all this? After all, 
mathematical practice is not perfect, and it is sensible to think that 
philosophical theories of mathematics should be evaluated on their 
own merits. If a revisionist philosophy is needed, then that is what 
we should focus on. This is of course true, but way too simplistic. 
As a result of constantly surfacing mathematical revisionism in 
philosophy, it is easy to forget that none of the revisionist theories 
have had even nearly the kind of success that classical mathematics 
has enjoyed. I dare to say that extremely rarely, if ever, has 
philosophical revisionism meant development in the practice and 
results of mathematics. Whatever conventions we have in 
mathematics, and whatever their origin may ultimately be, they 
have proven to be highly successful. If we were to reject these 
conventions, it would have to be for a thoroughly convincing 
reason – and it is an understatement to say that no such reason has 
been established so far. Against this background, we can only use 
the starting point that our best contemporary theories of 
mathematics are the best theories of mathematics there are. 1 They 
are not perfect, of course, but it is safe to assume that the flaws are 
more likely to be resolved by mathematicians than by 
philosophers. Any revisionism over mathematical practices and 
concepts must be handled with this in mind.  
One such concept is truth. It is one of the most fundamental 
underlying conventions in mathematics. Take a textbook of 
elementary logic, and one finds it full of expressions like “truth-
                                                           
1 This is not to say that this work is limited only to classical mathematics. 
Subjects such as Hintikka’s and Sandu’s IF logic and Kripke’s arguments 
applying Kleenean logic will also be addressed, especially their 
implications for the question of truth. 
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tables” and “truth-preserving inferences”.2 It is the latter that we 
are after in mathematics when we define rules of proof. Rules of 
proof are, of course, the way we reach theorems from axioms and 
as such they are the most important tools of a mathematician. That 
is the implicit near-consensus we have about mathematics: it is a 
systematic pursuit of true sentences, starting from true axioms and 
using truth-preserving rules of proof. However, when we move to 
philosophy, this suddenly becomes highly controversial. One of 
the most important forms of revisionism in philosophy of 
mathematics of the latter part of 20th century has been extreme 
(strict) formalism (nominalism), and its ontological conclusion, 
Hartry Field’s (1980) fictionalism. According to it mathematical 
objects do not exist, and the formal axiomatic systems that form 
the core of mathematics do not refer to anything outside them. In 
other words, for the extreme formalist rules of proof and axioms 
are all there is to mathematics. Instead of defining proof as truth-
preserving inferences, we simply start from the rules of proof. In 
this way truth for the strict nominalist is deflationary, an empty 
concept: whatever we mean by it, it is already included 
exhaustively in the concept of proof. 
When discussing extreme formalism, one question of course 
comes immediately into mind: without any outer reference, how 
do we know which axioms and rules of proof to accept? One main 
purpose of this work is to show that we do not. In this work that is 
called the problem of theory choice, and I will try to show it to be 
the most fundamental problem with strict formalist philosophy of 
mathematics. Simply put, I will argue that when taken to its logical 
conclusion, extreme formalism implies completely arbitrary 
mathematics: we would have no reason to prefer one set of axioms 
and rules of proof over another. That is a staggering conclusion, 
but we will see it is the only one that can be plausibly made if we 
reject all outer reference from mathematics. Fortunately it never 
comes to that, since mathematics without any outer reference does 
not make sense. We need to explain why we prefer some rules of 
proof and some axioms to others, and without any concept of 
reference this cannot be done. In this work I will argue that 
                                                           
2 One can use Suppes 1959 as a point of reference. 
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without any outer reference, mathematics as we know it could 
simply not be possible: it could not have developed, and it could 
not be learnt or practised. Sophisticated formal theories are the 
pinnacle of mathematics but, philosophically, they cannot be 
studied separately from all the non-formal background behind 
them.  
This way, what might seem like a completely formalist theory 
of mathematics turns out to be nothing of the sort. It could not 
have existed without a wide pre-formal background, which we will 
see when we examine mathematical practice in general.3 Formal 
systems are not of the self-standing type that extreme formalism 
seems to claim. My purpose in this work is to show that the 
formalist program uses the actual practice of mathematics as a 
ladder that they later discard. This by itself is of course perfectly 
acceptable, and it mirrors the way we strive for formal axiomatic 
systems in mathematics. What is not acceptable is how they refuse 
using the ladder. 
When it comes to the question of truth and proof, this could not 
be any more relevant. The deflationist truth of extreme formalism 
equates mathematical truth with formal proof. However, as we 
will see, that strategy requires that we take mathematics to concern 
only formal systems. Once we look at the wider picture, we see 
that outer criteria are needed to avoid arbitrariness. Theory choice 
must be explained, and this requires reference outside formal 
systems of mathematics. Philosophers have tried to explain this by 
a wide array of concepts – usefulness, assertability, consistency 
and conservativeness, to name a few – but ultimately none of them 
have been satisfactory. The only plausible way to answer the 
problem of theory choice, I will argue, is by appealing to truth. 
                                                           
3 What I refer to as pre-formal mathematics in this work is more often 
discussed as informal mathematics in literature. The choice of terminology 
here is based on two reasons. First, I want to stress the order in which our 
mathematical thinking develops. We initially grasp mathematics through 
informal concepts and only later acquire the corresponding formal tools. 
Second, the term “informal mathematics” seems to have an emerging non-
philosophical meaning of mathematics in everyday life, as opposed to an 
academic pursuit – which is not at all the distinction that I am after here. 
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1.2 Another approach 
 
In the end, all of the above comes down to the question of 
reference. If we follow extreme formalism in that mathematical 
theories have absolutely no outer references, we will end up with 
the position that mathematics is arbitrary fiction. Deep down, 
under this interpretation, going through a mathematical proof is 
similar to solving a Sudoku puzzle. Although this goes against the 
image most of us have about the nature of mathematics – as well as 
all the practical applications – the formalist program has one clear 
strength: it avoids the daunting ontological problems we are faced 
with in the philosophy of mathematics. If we accept that 
mathematical theories have references, the understandable 
consensus is that we must specify what these are. On this matter, 
however, non-formalists have found very little to agree on. 
Platonism, structuralism, empiricism, naturalism and many other 
suggestions have been presented – and all of them have been 
shown to be problematic in one way or another. The conclusion for 
strict formalists has been that references in mathematics are not 
possible, and mathematics must be a fiction. In particular – against 
the main thesis of this work – mathematical truth is deflationary.  
The approach for the extreme formalist, hence, is to minimize 
the ontological commitments in order to make mathematics as 
philosophically unproblematic as possible. In this work I want to 
suggest another approach, one that is necessitated by the failure of 
extreme formalism. While ontologically minimal, extreme 
formalism makes mathematics impossible as a human endeavour – 
which is much more alarming than any intricate philosophical 
problems. In a nutshell, I will argue that if extreme formalism were 
correct, mathematics could not have developed in the first place – 
nor could it be practised today. It must not be forgotten that 
mathematics is a human endeavour just like all other sciences. If 
something is essential to mathematics as a human endeavour, we 
would seem to have good reason to believe it is also a factor in the 
philosophy of mathematics – or at least something we should 
expect a theory in philosophy of mathematics not to conflict with. 
As well as providing an explanation for the formal theories that are 
the core of mathematical knowledge, philosophical accounts of 
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mathematics must be able to explain why we prefer certain 
theories to others, why they are useful in practice, and how we are 
able to teach and learn mathematics. When it comes to 
mathematics as a science, this is of course something everybody is 
ready to agree on. In fact, it is so obvious that most philosophers of 
mathematics seem content not to grant any importance to it. For 
the majority of philosophers, mathematics seems to consist of 
formal systems – often using Peano arithmetic (PA) as the example 
– and the philosophy of mathematics concerns the ontological and 
epistemological status of these systems.  
As central as those questions are, to me they only seem to cover 
half the picture. It is obvious that besides formal systems, 
mathematics as a human endeavour has a large informal element. 
Textbooks of mathematics are not written in completely formal 
languages and all kinds of informal examples are used in learning 
mathematics. The communication in mathematics is facilitated 
everywhere by informal elements. Indeed, it should be safe to say 
that in order to understand mathematics, we as human beings must 
use these informal elements. In addition, the history of 
mathematical thinking of course reveals that formal axiomatic 
systems of mathematics are a rather late development. The Peano 
axiomatization of arithmetic, for example, was only published in 
1889, millennia after arithmetic was first used to great success. 
These informal – pre-formal – elements have made mathematics 
possible to use and learn whether we consider individual or the 
wider historical development. 
Yet the pre-formal element has been largely neglected in the 
philosophy of mathematics. It has been widely assumed – and not 
just among formalists – that these are matters for psychology and 
sociology, and not of much interest to philosophers. In this work I 
must argue against that. These pre-formal elements are the very 
reason why mathematics makes sense to us. Not surprisingly, they 
also have a central position in the whole problem of mathematical 
reference. When we acknowledge that formal theories have been 
designed to correspond to our pre-formal mathematical ideas, we 
immediately recognize that the latter are in fact the reference of 
formal mathematics. Rather than think of, say, the natural numbers 
as defined by the axioms of PA as fiction, we can consider them 
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referring to our pre-formal notion of number – and arbitrariness is 
avoided. 
That is the first stage of mathematical reference, and when we 
speak about the truth of formal mathematical theories, at this first 
stage we are concerned with them corresponding to our pre-formal 
ideas. Of course, in order to avoid arbitrariness, the pre-formal 
ideas themselves must have references, and that second stage is the 
question of Platonism, structuralism and other ontological theories. 
In a way, by introducing pre-formal thinking into philosophy we 
are admittedly only moving the problem of reference to another 
level. However, this is giving the strict formalist too strong a case. I 
will argue that the non-formalist does not need to specify her 
ontological and epistemological positions. All she needs to show is 
that some theory of reference – and truth – is needed in the second 
stage for a philosophical theory of mathematics to make sense. In 
this work I defend Alfred Tarski’s (1936) T-scheme as a theory of 
truth fitting both of these two stages. Tarskian truth is semantical 
and the connection of formal and pre-formal mathematics seems to 
be a semantical one, as well: we understand formal sentences by 
what they mean pre-formally. 
It will be seen that Tarskian truth in the first stage – over formal 
mathematics – is not deflationary. What Tarskian truth in the 
second stage refers to is a whole other question – but it is also one 
we do not need to answer in order to refute extreme formalism and 
deflationism. There exists a reference for formal mathematics, and 
when it comes to the question of truth and proof, it will be enough 
to complete the argument here to show that there must exist one 
for pre-formal mathematics, as well. If we examine mathematics as 
a wider phenomenon, we will see that there is only one 
philosophical theory of mathematics that conflicts with this – and 
that is extreme formalism with its irrevocable problems of 
arbitrariness. Other than repudiating that kind of strict formalism, 
I will argue, the deep ontological questions of the second stage can 
be left unanswered in a work about truth and proof. 
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1.3 Truth and proof 
 
The denial of deflationism leads us to a difference in the concepts 
of truth and proof. For the strict formalist, truth and proof are of 
course equivalent concepts: a sentence of mathematics is true if 
and only if it is provable, and as such truth is a deflationary 
concept. But it is not often acknowledged that even for the 
Platonist this is the case for the most part – practically for all 
sentences. After all, proof is the way we establish true sentences in 
mathematics, whatever our philosophical leanings may be. The 
possibility of errors in our proofs aside, there are only two kinds of 
sentences where truth and provability do not coincide for the 
Platonist. The first type is formed by unsolved problems like 
Goldbach’s conjecture. Platonists, and most other non-formalists, 
believe that even though we have neither proved nor disproved 
them, they are either determinately true or determinately false. The 
extreme formalist, on the other hand, believes that sentences only 
become true or false once we prove or disprove them; before that 
we cannot think of them having determinate truth-values.  
Unsolved problems are of course the main challenge for many 
mathematicians, but as far as mathematical sentences go, they only 
form a minuscule set. For the most part, the difference between the 
formalist and non-formalist cannot be seen in the extension of 
truth, that is, the classes of true and false sentences. Both the non-
formalist and formalist believe that we acquire true sentences by 
proof, and apart from revisionists like intuitionists, they also agree 
on the rules of proof. The main difference is that while the 
Platonist thinks our proof methods are valid means of finding out 
true sentences, the formalist believes that truth and proof are the 
same concept by definition. Still, the extensions of true and false 
sentences are almost completely the same for the formalist and 
non-formalist. Mainly, it is only in the intensions that there is a 
difference, in addition to the status of yet unsolved problems. 
While the latter is a philosophically interesting question, the 
former is all about philosophy. For the practising mathematician it 
does not make much of a difference whether we consider truth to 
be deflationary or not. This makes the intension of truth seem 
unproblematic mathematically: if we had a way of solving all the 
1. Introduction 21 
 
 
problems of mathematics, the extensions of truth and proof would 
match. In such circumstances, it would be difficult to argue for a 
non-deflationary notion of truth based on anything other than 
purely philosophical basis. 
That brings us to the second type of sentences that cause a 
difference between the non-formalist and formalist: undecidable 
sentences. While Goldbach’s conjecture could be proved in the 
future, there are sentences that cannot be proved or disproved 
even in principle. Famously, Kurt Gödel (1931) proved that in every 
consistent formal system containing arithmetic there are such 
sentences. That already by itself is mathematically and 
philosophically highly interesting. Consistent formal systems are 
always incomplete. But the real philosophical catch is that such 
Gödel sentences can also be seen to be true. In short, given some very 
reasonable basic truth-theoretic assumptions, the Gödel sentences 
are true but unprovable. This way even the extension, as well as 
the intension, of truth will always differ for the formalist and non-
formalist. That is why Gödel’s incompleteness theorems are 
absolutely essential to the question of truth and proof in 
mathematics: they give us the only known explicit case of a 
difference between truth and proof. If that indeed were the case, it 
would already show that truth is a substantial, not a deflationary 
property. 
However, when we say that the Gödel sentences are true, we 
are obviously talking about truth in a context different from proof 
in formal systems. From the first glance it is obvious that we mean 
semantic truth: looking at the construction of Gödel sentences we 
see that they have the semantic content: “this sentence is 
unprovable”, which indeed is the case by Gödel’s proof. That is 
what we mean by the truth of Gödel sentences: they are true 
through their meanings. But this is something seemingly very 
different from the rigid rules of proof we are accustomed to in 
mathematics, and it immediately raises two questions. First, if not 
in the original formal systems, in what kind of expanded systems 
do we establish the truth of Gödel sentences? Second, are we 
entitled to call such semantic properties truth in mathematics?  
The apparent truth of Gödel sentences was already noted by 
Gödel himself, but he left open the question of the underlying 
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conditions concerning truth. It is from the later work of Stewart 
Shapiro (1998) and Jeffrey Ketland (1999) that we get an exact 
argument concerning the whole process of establishing the truth of 
Gödel sentences. These are called semantical arguments in the 
literature, based on the fact that the truth of Gödel sentences is 
established in a Tarskian semantic expansion of the formal system. 
In this work it is through them that we will get into the bottom of 
the question of truth and proof in mathematics. Keeping in mind 
the existence of pre-formal element in mathematics – and how it is 




1.4 Tarskian truth 
 
So what can be our motivations for expanding formal systems of 
mathematics with Tarskian truth, or indeed to include a truth 
predicate in the first place? These are both important questions, 
since Tarskian truth is very problematic for the formalist project – 
even if we ignore the semantic arguments concerning Gödel 
sentences. Against extreme formalism, Tarski’s T-scheme for truth 
presupposes a relation between languages and the objects they 
refer to. In Tarski’s own words:  
 
Semantics is a discipline which, speaking loosely, deals with certain 
relations between expressions of a language and the objects (or “states of 
affairs”) “referred to” by those expressions. (Tarski 1944, italics in the 
original) 
 
This kind of relation can be of two kinds: either it is language-to-
language, or language-to-world. In Tarski’s conception the definition 
of truth for an object language L1 must be given in a metalanguage 
L2. The truth predicate for L2, in turn, must be given in another 
language L3. Famously, Tarski (1936) proved that no classical 
formal language could contain its own truth predicate, due to 
Liar’s paradox.4 As such, if we want to include a truth predicate, 
                                                           
4 “This sentence is false.” 
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we are committed to a hierarchy of languages. Moreover, if 
consisting only of formal languages, this hierarchy does not 
collapse: at no level will a language Lm provide a truth predicate for 
a language Ln, where n ≥ m.  
Hence, if one is restricted to classical first-order two-valued 
formal languages, he must also be committed to an infinite 
hierarchy of languages in order to include a truth predicate. More 
specifically, the strict formalist philosopher of mathematics is 
committed to this – for him all the relations between languages 
and objects are in fact relations of the language-to-language type, 
as there exists no outer reference for the sentences of mathematics. 
Tarskian truth turns out to be highly problematic for the formalist, 
and that is why we need to have a clear justification for its 
introduction. Perhaps the most common anti-Tarski argument 
goes: “why do we need such a semantic truth predicate in the first 
place?” That question is particularly relevant in mathematics. This 
is something we must be able to deal with, and in this work I will 
use the existence of pre-formal thinking to justify it. Tarskian truth, 
I will argue, introduces nothing new when we consider the full 
picture of mathematical thinking. Keeping this in mind, it is not 
surprising that strict formalism runs into problems like infinite 
hierarchies with it, remembering how it only considers one part of 
the whole phenomenon of mathematics. 
If one is not committed to strict formalism, there are far less 
problems with Tarskian truth. In particular, the hierarchy of 
languages can be collapsed. There are two ways of doing this. One 
can either move from formal to informal languages – where Tarski’s 
undefinability result does not hold in the strict sense5 – at some 
point in the hierarchy, or one can hold some level in the hierarchy 
to be of the language-to-world type. Philosophically these two 
strategies are largely equivalent, since we seem to have no way of 
describing the world outside language. This makes the job a lot 
easier for the non-formalist. Rather than try to explain a 
problematic relation between mathematical languages and 
                                                           
5 Of course the Liar’s paradox also exists in informal languages like 
English, but at the same time we also get new tools to recognize it as a 
paradox. 
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mathematical reality, we can concentrate on characterizing the 
connection between our formal and pre-formal mathematical 
languages. This will already give us enough tools to go through 
everything needed for a Tarskian expansion to formal systems. 






However, we cannot escape the language-to-world relation 
completely. In fact, the above strategy only works if such a relation 
is assumed to exist. If we do not postulate any relation between a 
language and some reference outside the language – that is, names 
and the objects they denote – there does not seem to be any 
difference between formalism and non-formalism. Why should we 
worry about an infinite hierarchy of languages if there is no 
alternative? If languages are all there is to mathematics, surely 
there is nothing ontologically or epistemologically problematic in 
defining new languages, even ad infinitum – in principle, even 
though obviously not in practice. Seen this way, the infinite 
hierarchy of languages would simply be a fact concerning classical 
formal languages. For the strict formalist this is certainly extremely 
inconvenient – after all, we are talking about an infinite hierarchy 
here – but it would not be enough to refute his position, if 
formalism were otherwise feasible. 
What, then, is the biggest problem for the formalist? It turns out 
to be the exact thing that is also the main strength for him. As we 
know, strict formalism requires no ontological commitments. Only 
formal mathematical systems exist, and mathematics is the study 
of them, and only them. Ontologically this is obviously as 
economical a position as there can be. But we should not be blindly 
concerned only about the ontological status. There are two 
important ways in which the lack of reference is devastating for 
the formalist program. 
The first one of these is the relation to informal languages. In 
this work I will stress the importance of pre-formal thinking, and 
the role of Tarskian truth in its connection to formal theories. In 
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this way, mathematical truth is postulated primarily as the 
Tarskian relation between formal and pre-formal mathematics. 
What proof is to formal mathematics, truth is to pre-formal. We 
deal with mathematical proofs syntactically, but at the same time 
we as human beings think about them semantically. We cannot 
deny pre-formal thinking, and its need for semantical truth. 
However, this alone is not enough to show a substantial difference 
between truth and proof. Even though the existence of pre-formal 
mathematics cannot be reasonably contested, there is always the 
possibility that when it comes to truth, it is essentially superfluous; 
whatever we can achieve with truth, we could also achieve with 
proof alone. This is where the semantical arguments of Shapiro 
and Ketland have the most importance. They show that Tarskian 
truth as an expansion to formal languages is not conservative. 
Adding Tarski’s T-scheme to a formal system T will give us a new 
true sentence, one that wasn’t true by proof in T. This is of course 
the Gödel sentence of T. With Tarskian truth we establish new 
truths, and that will prove to be extremely problematic for the 
strict formalist, especially since the introduction of pre-formal 
thinking into philosophy also serves as the perfect justification for 
introducing Tarskian truth. 
The second problem that the lack of reference causes for 
formalism is one that does not require semantical arguments, or 
indeed any sophisticated philosophical devices. It is a fact that 
mathematics is very important to other sciences, perhaps even – as 
in Quine’s (1995, p. 40) thinking – indispensable. Science as we 
know it could not exist without mathematical theories. But the 
matter goes even deeper than that. It could be plausibly claimed 
that human thinking as we know it could not exist without some 
mathematical knowledge. There are numerous mathematical 
applications in everyday life that have nothing to do with the 
modern theories of physics, or indeed any other science. Even the 
least mathematical among us constantly express ideas with 
quantities and geometrical objects. Yet we can be surprisingly 
quick to forget that we only employ a very small fraction of all the 
possible mathematical theories, whether in science or in everyday 
life. The sum of 2 + 2 could be any natural number, yet we only use 
theories where 2 + 2 = 4. But if mathematics has absolutely no 
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reference, what reason do we have for picking one theory over 
another? It must be remembered here that this reference does not 
have to mean anything resembling a Platonic universe of 
mathematical ideas. Simply put, if we believe that 2 + 2 = 4 rather 
than 2 + 2 = 3, we must believe in some kind of reference.6 
So there must be something, whether we know it or not, that 
makes us think of the reference of 2 + 2 as the same as that of 4, 
rather than that of 3. Obviously it is the Peano axiomatization (or 
some other axiomatization of arithmetic) that does the job for 
mathematicians, and that has lead the extreme formalists to the 
strange conclusion that Peano axioms could be all there is to 
arithmetic. In this way mathematical theories are thought of only 
as conventions, with nothing to tie them to any outer reference. But 
this means ultimately arbitrariness and the Peano axioms are 
definitely not arbitrary: they were carefully designed to correspond 
to our best arithmetical knowledge. If they were arbitrary, either 
we could change them without it damaging our arithmetical 
thinking and its applications, or we have by sheer chance 
stumbled, from all the infinite number of possible axiomatizations, 
upon one that works so brilliantly for us.  
Mathematics without any reference means arbitrary theories, 
and this must never be forgotten. One common extreme formalist 
strategy is to claim mathematics to be a fiction, but praise it as a 
“useful” fiction.7 But by itself this means nothing. Quite clearly 
mathematics is useful, but the real question is why some theories 
are more useful than others. I will argue that even the slightest 
tendency toward choosing one theory of arithmetic over another 
can only be justified on the basis of some theory of reference. Of 
course with actual mathematics we go far beyond such tendencies: 
most mathematicians would be ready to assert mathematical 
theories to be true, and the objects denoted in them to exist. But 
even if we do not accept such viewpoints, it is impossible to accept 
arbitrariness. As far as mathematics as a human endeavour is 
                                                           
6 It must be noted that I do not mean to use “some” as a hedge word here. 
My point throughout this work is that the relevant dichotomy is reference 
against no reference, rather than no reference against Platonist reference. 
7 See Field 1980, p. 15. 
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concerned, I claim that arbitrariness is the worst possible situation 
for a philosopher, and it is one of my main purposes here to show 
that this is exactly what the strict formalist will end up with. In this 
work I will not try present a comprehensive epistemological and 
ontological theory of mathematics to replace formalism, and in that 
way the approach taken here is largely destructive. However, I will 
argue that to introduce Tarskian truth and reference, we only need 
the knowledge that some such non-formalist theory must be 
accepted – and that is equivalent to rejecting extreme formalism 
and the arbitrariness of mathematics.  
What arguments can we have for strict formalism in which 
mathematics consists only of conventions? Formalists often point 
out the introduction of non-classical logics and non-Euclidean 
geometries as examples of the conventional nature of our 
mathematical knowledge. What were once thought to be necessary 
truths have more recently been found out to be, at least in the non-
Euclidean case, just unnecessarily limiting postulates. However, 
this as such is no argument for conventionalism. Obviously most 
non-formalists do not claim that our mathematical knowledge is 
perfect. A many-valued logic could turn out to be less problematic 
than our classical two-valued one, but this is different from saying 
that the rules of classical logic are arbitrary. Likewise, non-
Euclidean geometries turned out to have important physical 
applications, but this does not mean that Euclidean geometry is not 
correct in its own realm of planes and three-dimensional spaces. 
Mathematics develops, just like any other science. Physicists no 
longer claim that Newton’s physics is true, but there is no denying 
that it is closer to truth than, say, Aristotelian physics. Why should 
we think any differently when it comes to mathematics? 
 
 
1.6 Non-classical languages 
 
While the overall attitude in this work is a non-revisionist one, this 
should not be thought to influence the arguments by default. 
Whenever a revisionist theory seems to have more potential when 
it comes to the question of truth and proof, it will be taken into 
consideration. For example, even though this work uses classical 
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mathematics and two-valued logic as its starting point, the results 
will not be limited to them. Since Gödel’s incompleteness theorems 
have an important role, obviously the arguments based on them 
will not be applicable to mathematical languages in which the 
incompleteness results do not hold, or take a significantly different 
form. But that will only be one part of the arguments here. In the 
realm of classical logic Tarski’s undefinability result shows us that 
formal languages cannot contain their own truth predicates. 
Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem gives us an explicit case of an 
unprovable sentence, and with Tarskian truth we can establish that 
the unprovable sentence is in fact true. This is how the semantical 
argument goes, and it shows that mathematical truth is not 
deflationary in two-valued first-order languages. Consequently, it 
might seem that without Gödel’s result the deflationist would not 
be harmed, and a many-valued or higher-order logic could 
provide him with a refuge.  
However, the matter is not as simple as that. Although Gödel’s 
theorem gives us an explicit case of the difference between truth 
and proof, the difference itself exists independently of Gödel’s 
results. Truth is not deflationary, and Gödel sentences are a 
symptom, not the cause of it. In this Tarski’s undefinability result is 
essential. If formal systems cannot contain their own truth 
predicates, we must commit to an infinite hierarchy of formal 
languages in order to include a truth predicate. This by itself is 
highly problematic for the formalist: for one, it would already 
demolish the esteemed ideal of presenting mathematics (or at least 
important parts of mathematics) as a single formal system. But here 
many-valued logics may have stronger potential. Saul Kripke 
famously used Kleenean logic to define a truth predicate for a 
language L, within L. More recently Jaakko Hintikka has claimed 
that his and Gabriel Sandu’s IF-logic can escape Tarskian 
undefinability and the need for a hierarchy of languages. These are 
important developments in the question of mathematical truth, 
and they – as well as higher-order two-valued logics – will be 
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1.7 The basic theory of mathematics 
 
In a work like this where mathematical truth is claimed to be the 
subject matter, it is important to clarify just which mathematical 
theories we are discussing, and how the results can be applied to 
other theories. Here arithmetic, in particular the first-order Peano 
axiomatization of it, is considered to be a suitable candidate for the 
first, most basic, theory of mathematics. The choice is only a matter 
of convenience, and no philosophical importance should be 
attached to it. Gödel used arithmetic to clarify the set of 
assumptions needed to go through his proof of incompleteness. 
Since Gödel’s work is central for the purposes here, it makes sense 
to follow him and study formal mathematical systems containing 
arithmetic. In a strict sense, the subject here could be actually seen 
as arithmetical truth and not the wider concept of mathematical 
truth in general. 
However, I claim that this is not the case. Arithmetic is used as 
an example, but the conclusions should be more or less directly 
applicable to other mathematical subjects. From time to time I will 
use logic, set theory and geometry in examples, which should 
widen the scope, but mostly this work will remain a study of 
arithmetical truth. Should this be considered a weakness? 
Certainly arithmetical truth by itself is important enough as a 
subject, but I am also confident that most of this work concerns a 
wider range of mathematical theories. Pre-formal mathematical 
thinking, for example, is a general phenomenon. In fact, aside from 
the Gödelian arguments, nothing in this work concerns only 
systems containing arithmetic – and most of the interesting 
mathematical systems contain arithmetic, anyway. This question 
will not be given much attention later on – I trust that the reader 
will agree about the projection of the results here into other fields 
of mathematics. If not, I am happy to concede that the scope of this 
work is in fact arithmetical truth. 
Nevertheless, arithmetic as the primary mathematics is by no 
means a consensus choice, and a word should be said about that. It 
could be claimed that the semantic argument, for example, cannot 
be used if we do not choose arithmetic as our basic mathematical 
theory. Basically, there are two competing choices for primary 
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mathematics: logic and set theory. Of course we could first define 
natural numbers via sets, or follow Frege’s and Russell’s logicist 
ideal, but that would not change anything of substance here. We 
would still be defining natural numbers, and the conclusions 
would be exactly the same.8 In this work I do not claim that the 
objects of arithmetic – rather than those of set theory or logic – 
exist, or that the sentences of arithmetic are more likely to have 
objective truth-values. As was said, arithmetic is used for Gödel’s 
sake – nothing further is meant by that choice. 
 
 
1.8 The limitations of the approach here 
 
Above I have presented the rough philosophical and mathematical 
framework for this thesis. Later on, more exact formulations will 
be given for all the central concepts of this introduction. However, 
some important themes – like pre-formal mathematical thinking – 
are too complex and intractable to be given exact definitions. Any 
such effort would be artificial, and even if successful, more or less 
achieved by smoke and mirrors. Even though pre-formal thinking 
and the reference of mathematics will be crucial concepts in this 
work, I do not claim to give anything close to a comprehensive and 
consistent description of them. As for pre-formal thinking, it 
undoubtedly requires a psychological theory behind it to be fully 
clarified. For the reference of pre-formal sentences, we would need 
to answer all the metaphysical and epistemological problems in 
philosophy of mathematics. In other words, to complete the theses 
here, I would not only need to explain the epistemology and 
ontology of mathematics, but the psychology of it, as well. 
Fortunately, no such thing is needed for the task at hand: the 
theses in this work are valid if we agree that there is some form of 
semantical pre-formal thinking, and mathematics has some 
reference. Obviously the best way to show the latter is by showing 
the opposite viewpoint, extreme formalism, to be absurd. As for 
the former, I think only a minimum of evidence is needed, and that 
evidence is available to all of us with access to textbooks of 
                                                           
8 See Enderton 1977 for ways of doing this. 
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mathematics – any textbooks of mathematic. It is simply a fact that 
mathematics is universally taught with the help of all kinds of 
informal tools, from the use of visual aids to verbal explanations. 
As I see it, this is actually much better evidence for pre-formal 
thinking than any single psychological theory could be. Theories 
about learning mathematics have been notoriously fallible, but no 
feasible psychological theory can suggest that human beings 
process mathematics completely formally. 
Simply put, the aim of this work is to show that mathematical 
truth is a substantial, not deflationary, property. I will try to show 
this with the very minimum of psychological, ontological and 
epistemological burden – which means that I will not use 
arguments based on any particular ontological theory in 
philosophy of mathematics, or any psychological theory. That will 
be seen in the negative nature that the answers to questions like 
mathematical reference will have. The main argument against 
strict formalism is that no reference makes no sense, and hence we 
must accept some theory of reference, whatever it may be. This 
could mean Platonism, but it could also mean a weak form of 
naturalism or empiricism. Although in the end of Chapter 6 I will 
introduce an outline of an ontologically and epistemologically 
unproblematic account of non-formalist philosophy, ultimately in 
this work I must leave that question open. 
Similarly, for pre-formal mathematics I will suggest an account 
– including some tentative examples – but ultimately I want to 
leave the psychological questions of mathematics open. My 
account of pre-formal thinking may be faulty, and the examples 
mistaken, but that is not the point here. These are only introduced 
as quasi-heuristic means of clarifying my position concerning 
formal and pre-formal mathematics. Granted, if I believed there to 
exist thoroughly convincing psychological theories that were 
directly relevant to the subject here, I would be tempted to use 
them – even if it meant limiting the applicability of this work. The 
same goes for philosophical theories of ontology and epistemology 
of mathematics. The lack of such theories in both fields makes that 
temptation easy to resist – hence I will argue for my position from 
the very minimum of evidence. For reference in mathematics this 
means trying to refute extreme formalism. For pre-formal thinking 
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it means simply noting the fact that all mathematical 




1.9 The structure of this work 
 
The main thesis of this work is that mathematical truth is a 
substantial property, and hence truth and proof are different 
concepts. We will need quite a few steps to arrive at that 
conclusion, and what follows is a rough outline of the structure 
that the argumentation takes. In Chapter 2 I present a brief 
philosophical and mathematical background for the work, 
including definitions of the central philosophical concepts and 
introduction to the relevant content of Gödel’s incompleteness 
theorems and Tarskian truth. In defining such a central 
philosophical concept as realism as “anti-formalism”, I have tried 
to make the formulations suitable for this work in particular. I 
hope that any unorthodoxy in the definitions will be seen to be 
justified later on when the whole context is revealed.  
Chapter 3 consists of an overview of the recent debate 
concerning semantical arguments for the substantiality of truth. 
The approach here has been to make a critical semi-chronological 
presentation of the arguments from all sides: Hartry Field, Stewart 
Shapiro, Jeffrey Ketland and Neil Tennant. Only the aspects of the 
debate relevant to this work are considered, and all along the 
presentation I will be taking a critical part into the discussion. In 
the end of the chapter I will present my own conclusions, 
according to which the semantical argument of Shapiro and 
Ketland is valid and by expanding formal systems with Tarskian 
truth we can establish the truth of Gödel sentences. Thus there are 
true sentences that are not provable, and truth and proof are 
different concepts. However, Tennant is also correct in stating that 
there are other ways than Tarskian truth to arrive at the same 
result. That is why the key question is not the validity of 
semantical arguments, but the plausibility of the expansion we use. 
Here Tarskian truth beats Tennant’s arbitrary-looking soundness 
principle – in fact, I will argue that Tarskian truth is not an 
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expansion at all, but rather a very natural part of mathematics once 
we recognize that in addition to the formal part, human beings 
also use pre-formal mathematical thinking.  
In Chapter 4 the phenomenon of mathematical thinking is 
studied in a wider context in order to justify the conclusion made 
in the end of Chapter 3. The purpose is to put formal mathematical 
systems into their own proper place: as a crucial achievement and 
perhaps the ultimate tool of mathematics, but far from being the 
complete picture. Mathematics is a human endeavour, and we 
must not ignore the way mathematics is practised, learnt and 
taught. We as human beings use pre-formal – semantical – 
mathematical thinking all the time, and this enables us to 
understand mathematics. Human beings do not process 
mathematics completely formally as computers do. We 
comprehend mathematical ideas in our pre-formal thinking, and 
the formal theories are a way of making these ideas maximally 
unambiguous. Proof is of course the method by which we acquire 
new theorems in the formal systems, but the rules of proof cannot 
be arbitrary. They have been designed to correspond to our pre-
formal ideas of truth. It is in this domain of pre-formal thinking 
that we see the truth of Gödel sentences. As the semantical 
arguments show, Tarskian truth is all we need for that, and it 
corresponds well with the pre-formal thinking in mathematics. 
That is why the semantical arguments are valid, and mathematical 
truth is substantial. Of course this would be the case even without 
Gödel’s incompleteness theorems and the semantical arguments; 
their importance lies in giving us an explicit sentence to study the 
problems with.  
All the arguments up to and including Chapter 4 presuppose 
the use of classical two-valued first-order logic. From Tarski’s 
undefinability result we know that such languages cannot contain 
their own truth predicates, and to include truth we must commit to 
a hierarchy of languages. In Chapter 5 we are concerned with other 
logics as the basis for mathematics. Three logical theories in 
particular are studied for the possibility of including a truth 
predicate for a language L within L: two-valued second-order 
logic, Saul Kripke’s use of Kleenean many-valued logic, as well as 
Jaakko Hintikka’s and Gabriel Sandu’s IF logic. As the most 
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modern development, IF logic is given the most detailed treatment, 
and many of the problems with the other approaches can already 
be seen in it. In an IF-language one can indeed have a materially 
adequate truth predicate for that language. The problem is that we 
cannot show this predicate to be such within IF logic. The only 
successful approach would be to define, and to be able to 
recognize, the truth predicate completely within the used 
language. This problem is called, after Philippe De Rouilhan’s and 
Serge Bozon’s suggestion, the monolingual speaker problem. In order 
to avoid hierarchies of languages, a completely monolingual 
speaker of a language would have to be able to establish 
everything needed for the truth predicate for that language. This is 
not possible in any of the three approaches. In addition, all of the 
approaches have their own specific problems, ranging from the 
intractable concept of logical consequence in second-order logic to 
the use of set theory in Kripke’s argument. The hierarchies of 
languages cannot seem to be escaped, even with many-valued or 
higher-order logics. However, in the end of the chapter I will argue 
that with the help of pre-formal languages we can collapse the 
hierarchy at any point. Moreover, this is what we actually do when 
talking about truth in mathematics. 
For deflationist truth there is one remaining haven: extreme 
formalism, or strict nominalism, that Field’s fictionalism suggests. 
If we insist that formal systems and their rules of proof are all there 
is to mathematics, we cannot discuss Tarskian – or any other – 
expansions that require reference for formal mathematical 
sentences. In such context pre-formal mathematics would be 
philosophically superfluous, and all the arguments in this work 
vacuous. However, with all the other philosophical theories of 
mathematics there is room for reference, and hence also room for 
Tarskian truth. In Chapter 6 I will try to show that extreme 
formalism as a philosophical position is untenable. The most 
important question here is ultimately that of reference. If we deny 
all reference for formal mathematics, we have no way of answering 
the question of theory choice: why we prefer some formal systems 
to others. Without any reference, formal mathematics can only be 
seen as arbitrary fiction. That would not only make the scientific 
applications of mathematics a miracle, but also render mathematics 
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as a human endeavour impossible. Extreme formalism is an 
impossible point of view once we look at mathematics in a bigger 
picture. In addition, I will argue that the milder forms of 
nominalism, such as geometric strategies and modal 
reconstructivist approaches, are not really nominalist at all in the 
strict sense we are concerned with in this work. In all of them 
mathematics includes a reference, however weak it may seem, and 
as such they are compatible with Tarskian truth. In the end of the 
chapter I will suggest a rough outline of ideas for a non-formalist 
philosophy of mathematics that does not run into the 
epistemological and ontological problems of Platonism. This is not 
meant to be a fully constructive argument, but rather a framework 
sketched in order to illustrate that the non-formalist options range 
much wider than the usual Platonism-nominalism dichotomy 
suggests. 
In this work my argument is that mathematics without any 
reference for the formal sentences does not make sense, and the 
existence of reference – together with pre-formal thinking – allows 
us to use Tarskian truth in an unproblematic fashion. However, 
there exists an interesting argument to the opposite direction: that 
the analytic truth of arithmetic implies that there exists a reference 
for it, even a Platonist one. This neo-Fregean argument of Crispin 
Wright and Bob Hale is the subject of Chapter 7. Neo-Fregeanism 
has many technical problems which will be discussed here, but the 
most crucial weakness is the epistemological rationalism it 
requires. The analytic truth concerning natural numbers that 
Wright and Hale use is in fact, I claim, a definition of natural 
number. For one that does not accept epistemological rationalism, 
it is extremely problematic to infer objective existence from a 
linguistic fact that a definition essentially is. Instead of Platonism, 
we are in danger of succumbing into its exact opposite: extreme 
formalism where mathematics consists only of such linguistic facts. 
Hence the neo-Fregean strategy of truth-first, reference-second 
fails. Neo-Fregeanism is only successful when we can have 
antecedent justification that there exists an objective reference for 
natural numbers. Øyvind Linnebo has proposed a Fregean strategy 
where semantic values of numerals (names of natural numbers) 
work as this reference. This way, we can avoid both Platonism and 
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formalism. Augmented with a theory about the origins of 
mathematics, I propose this to be a promising route to take in the 
wider ontological and epistemological questions concerning the 
philosophy of mathematics. 
Chapter 8 deals with various slightly tangential subjects not 
addressed in the first seven chapters. These include non-standard 
models, another semantical argument and other Gödelian 
arguments. In the very final chapter of this work the concept of 
substantiality (robustness) of truth is discussed. In it I have tried to 
make explicit an underlying argument of this work: we do not 
need to know the exact nature of mathematical truth in order to be 
able to talk about it. In fact, from this work one will not find 
comprehensive arguments for Platonism, empiricism, naturalism, 
structuralism or any other metaphysical and epistemological 
theories of mathematics. Yet the study on truth and proof here 
should not be on any weaker basis than in more complete 
philosophical pictures of mathematics. Aside from the 
substantiality of truth, that is the main thesis (sort of metathesis) of 
this work: we can know there is a difference between truth and 
proof without knowing what truth exactly is. Simply put, if such a 
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2. The Background 
 
2.1 The Problem of terminology 
 
As is the case in many areas of philosophy, there is worryingly 
little consensus on much of the central terminology in the 
philosophy of mathematics. Terms like realism and Platonism on 
one side of the spectrum, and formalism and nominalism on the 
other one are used interchangeably. There is a noticeable tendency 
for the nominalists to define their position negatively as “non-
Platonism”, and for the realists to define theirs as  “non-
formalism”. This is usually augmented by targeting the extreme 
version of the opposing viewpoint. Perhaps some of this can be 
attributed to more general human frailties, but certainly much of it 
stems from the subject matter. While there is an almost universal 
agreement concerning the accepted methods of working 
mathematicians, the philosophers of mathematics have found 
remarkably little to agree on.9 Hartry Field, for example, is a 
fictionalist. According to him mathematics is just a fiction; 
mathematical objects do not exist and mathematical sentences10 do 
not have objective truth-values. Thus it seems that when we say 
that a mathematical sentence ϕ is true, we are only really saying: 
“from our accepted axioms, with our accepted rules of proof, we 
can derive ϕ”. Nothing in this refers to anything objective, if we do 
not count the very weak sense in which mathematical conventions 
                                                           
9 This also includes criticism on those accepted methods, as intuitionism 
and revisionist logics have shown us. 
10 Throughout this work, mathematical propositions will be talked of as 
sentences. There is some tradition of using the word “proposition” in 
philosophy and the word “sentence” in mathematics, the difference 
essentially being that a sentence s is always in some specific language L, 
while a proposition p is the content of s that can also be expressed in other 
languages. This way s is the sentence putting forth the proposition p in the 
language L. With the formal languages we have in mathematics the 
difference largely vanishes, since we are almost always working in the 
context of a specified language. In any case, it will not be of much 
importance in the problems considered in this work, and whenever 
sentences are essentially language-dependent, this will be acknowledged. 
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can be considered to be objective. This point of view is called 
extreme (strict) formalism. Granted, mathematics is a useful fiction, 
but a fiction nonetheless. Or so Field argues.11 Roger Penrose, on 
the other hand, is a Platonist. He believes that there exists an 
independent world of abstract mathematical objects and relations 
between them, and by practising mathematics we are able to gain 
knowledge of this world.12 When we say that a sentence ϕ is true, 
we are making a statement about the state of affairs in that world. 
If we are correct, the sentence ϕ corresponds to that state of affairs. 
Such diverse viewpoints are of course nothing unusual in the 
history of philosophy. What makes the matter interesting is the fact 
that Field and Penrose are both contemporary and actively 
publishing philosophers.13 With such extreme points of view still 
around, it is hardly surprising that most of the intermediate 
positions seem to be covered, as well. Therein lies the 
terminological trap: when a nominalist speaks about objectivism in 
mathematics, there is a good chance he is referring to the Penrose-
type Platonist realism. Similarly, a realist is bound to argue against 
the Field-type extreme formalism. Most of the actual philosophical 
viewpoints, however, belong somewhere between the two extreme 
positions. This has the unfortunate consequence that more 
moderate points of view get less exposure, as most of the criticism 
is concentrated on the radical positions. At its worst this picking of 
easy targets has an effect on whole arguments, but at the very least 
it is a problem in understanding the terminology. What a 
nominalist means by “realism” will not always coincide with the 
realist’s own definition, and there remains little hope for any 
debate to be fruitful. 
To avoid problems of that kind, I want to be clear about the 
central assumptions and terminology in this work, although the 
                                                           
11 See Field 1980 (first chapter) and 1998. While Field is clearly a fictionalist 
over mathematics, there is some controversy whether Field’s philosophy 
can be considered to be extreme formalism. We will return to that in 
Chapter 3.1. 
12 See Penrose 1989, pp. 146-151. 
13 Penrose is of course primarily a physicist, and perhaps secondarily a 
mathematician, but his later work is largely philosophical. 
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arguments presented here are compatible with most philosophical 
accounts of mathematics. In fact, the only notable exception is 
extreme formalism. As long as we are ready to agree that there is 
something more to mathematics than the formal axiomatic systems 
– that is, something objective – the arguments here can be applied. 
It need not be much – we certainly do not need to assume a whole 
independent world of abstract ideas – but it will be necessary to be 
able to speak of reference to something outside the formal 
mathematical theories. Whatever formal mathematics is, it is a 
formalization of something, and not a completely independent 
arbitrary set of axioms and rules of proof. That is the only 
assumption needed for now. It will not be used as an axiom, 
though, and Chapter 6 of this work is about justifying this 
assumption – that is, arguing against the position of extreme 
formalism. Until then it is my purpose to show that the only 
philosophical viewpoint that contradicts with the arguments in 
this work will be extreme formalism. This will cause both explicit 
and implicit tendency to use seemingly realist-flavoured 
terminology. However, that by itself must not be confused with 
advocating Platonism, or even some milder form of realism. Nor 
should it be thought that the arguments here are somehow 
dependent on the used terminology. It is simply a terminological 
requisite for this work that we are able to speak of concepts like 
existence, objects and reference in a non-formalist way. In addition, 
it must be remembered that there is also a deep-entrenched custom 
of using realist terminology among practising mathematicians. 





Although mathematics existed before ancient Greece, it is from 
Plato that we have got the first more or less systematic 
philosophical account of mathematical thinking. Remarkably, it is 
also quite a popular one today, especially among working 
mathematicians. But when a philosophical term lives for more than 
two millennia, it is bound to go through significant changes in 
meaning. That has also happened to Platonism: it is not uncommon 
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to call mathematical realism “Platonism” even though our 
mathematical and philosophical thinking has no resemblance to 
that of Plato’s. That is why throughout this work Platonism simply 
means the position of Plato with regard to the philosophy of 
mathematics.  
Mathematics in Plato’s time was a direct continuation of the 
Pythagorean tradition, and his philosophy of mathematics is 
properly understood only in that context. For the Pythagoreans, 
mathematics was a curious mixture of science and religion. The 
now traditional paradigm for mathematical thinking, that is, the a 
priori pursuit of necessary universal truths, was already present in 
the Pythagorean philosophy.14 In this sense, the status of 
mathematical thinking for the Pythagoreans – with the obvious 
differences in scope and formalism – was largely the same as it is 
for us. Their philosophy of mathematics with its mystical and 
religious character, however, is a whole other matter. Essentially, 
numbers were gods for the Pythagoreans, and as such something 
eternally beyond our physical world.  
The influence of the Pythagorean tradition on Plato’s thinking 
was overwhelming. When Plato updated the mysticism of 
Pythagoras to his own brand of rationalism, the nature and 
importance of mathematics changed little. In Plato’s philosophy 
gods (in this respect) were changed into a world of ideas.15 They 
were abstract, that is, completely non-spatial and non-temporal in 
their essence. To mention the most obvious example, geometry – 
the paradigm of mathematics at the time – was concerned with 
abstract objects, while physics was concerned with their spatial 
resemblances.16 In this sense, any real knowledge was always of 
the mathematical type, and it was completely a priori in its nature. 
Hence, in this sense, Plato’s philosophy had not drifted far from 
that of Pythagoras. Mathematical knowledge was the model that 
all real knowledge followed. While it did not concern gods any 
more, ontologically and epistemologically it was not far off. 
                                                           
14 See Jones 1980, pp. 34-39 and Boyer 1985, pp. 65-66; pp. 115-127. 
15 Here Parmenides and his idea of eternal existence were a great influence 
on Plato, as is visible in the dialogue Parmenides. 
16 See The Republic 527a-b. 
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When we use the word “Platonism” in the philosophy of 
mathematics, this history should be remembered. Often Platonism 
is used as a synonym for mathematical realism, which I understand 
here as the wider philosophical position that mathematical 
concepts and truth refer to something objective – something 
outside the work of human mathematicians. But mathematical 
Platonism, properly understood, is the philosophical viewpoint 
that mathematical objects exist in an ontologically independent world 
of abstract ideas. Of course postulating a whole eternal world for the 
objects of mathematics is maximal in its ontological commitments, 
and thus highly problematic for most modern philosophers. For 
Plato, however, this was obviously no problem. In his philosophy, 
all knowledge – not only that of mathematical truths – concerned 
such a world. This is an important point to remember. In Plato’s 
philosophy mathematical knowledge was the model for all real 
knowledge, and it did not differ in character from any other forms 
of real knowledge. Of course here a modern Platonist in 
mathematics thinks very differently. For him to think that 
mathematical knowledge concerns an ontologically independent 
world means that mathematics is totally different from most – 
perhaps all – other types of knowledge. As we will see, that is a 
highly problematic position, and not something that most realist 
philosophers of mathematics would be ready to agree with. 
With the gradual death of Platonism in general ontology and 
epistemology, one would have expected to see its disappearance 
from the philosophy of mathematics, as well. Instead, mathematics 
has proved to be the last refuge for a Platonist. Not only are there 
still active Platonist philosophers of mathematics, but more 
importantly, Platonism has also remained the archetype for realist 
philosophy of mathematics – up to the point where the two terms 
are used interchangeably. This is an equivocation we must be able 
to banish from the philosophy of mathematics for good. To believe 
that sentences of mathematics have objective references should in 
no way imply that these references are objects or relations in a 
Platonist world of ideas. That is why throughout this work I will 
speak of Platonism only as it was characterized by Plato himself: 
the position that mathematical objects exist in an ontologically 
independent world of ideas, and the truth of mathematical 
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theorems depends only on the state of affairs in that world. While 
Platonism is obviously one form of realism, mathematical realism 
can mean a number of different positions, many of them much 
more ontologically economical. If we reject Platonism, we do not 
need to advocate the view of mathematics as a fiction consisting of 





Perhaps the weakest form of mathematical realism is defined by 
W.V.O. Quine’s (1966) famous indispensability argument. 
According to him, mathematics is an indispensable part of 
scientific theories, and mathematical objects exist in the same way 
as scientific objects do. Consequently, a mathematical theorem is 
true in the same way as a theorem of, say, physics is true. Quine’s 
position is notoriously vague in its holism, but it seems sensible to 
call Quine’s indispensability argument realism when it comes to 
mathematical objects, and the truth of mathematical theorems. Of 
course his brand of realism is quite different from Platonism, and 
many mathematicians would be quick to dismiss Quine’s 
understanding of the nature of mathematics. Perhaps most 
importantly, in Quine’s account the connection between 
mathematics and empirical sciences could be conceived as a two-
way street: new empirical findings in science could change the 
truth-values of mathematical statements. Certainly most 
mathematicians would not be ready to agree with this. 
Nevertheless, in Quine’s theory mathematical objects exist as 
independently of human conventions as anything does.17 In other 
words, in the Quinean interpretation, mathematical realism is just 
a branch of scientific realism in general. As I see it, when we brand 
a philosophy of mathematics “realism”, we must include both the 
Platonist and the Quinean variation. In fact, we must include all 
                                                           
17 Obviously one could claim that nothing exists independently of our 
thinking in Quine’s philosophy. This criticism is not wholly unjustified, 
but Quine’s account still seems to be best understood as a form of realism.  
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philosophical accounts that contain any reference to something 
outside our mathematical thinking.18 
This makes realism a vast and varied field, but there does not 
seem to be any other way of doing the taxonomy. The only 
possible definition seems to be the weakest one: realism is the 
philosophical viewpoint according to which at least some 
mathematical objects exist independently of our thinking. That is 
called realism in ontology in the literature. Since the topic of this 
work is mathematical truth, we will be more concerned with 
realism in truth-value, that is, the position that the truth of 
mathematical statements does not depend only on our thinking.19 
But first we must try to clarify what we mean by the vague 
concepts “mathematical objects” and “mathematical sentences”. 
This is no small matter: in fact, a definition would be too much to 
ask. Mathematics has expanded vastly in the last centuries and 
what we consider objects of mathematics are different from, say, 
what Newton did. Yet the nature of mathematical objects need not 
be any different. The best solution here is picking one area of 
mathematics as the paradigm case for us to study. The most 
popular choices for such “first mathematics” in the literature are 
logic, set theory20 and arithmetic (number theory). For reasons that 
will be evident later on, I choose the last one. From now on, unless 
otherwise mentioned, mathematical objects will mean the objects 
                                                           
18 The term “objectivism” could be better in this respect. In this work 
realism and objectivism are used synonymously. 
19 Whatever difference there may be between realism in ontology and 
truth-value, they should not matter in this work. See Shapiro 1997, pp. 36-
38 for clarification over the two types of realism. Although realism in 
ontology may seem like a much stronger position, it should be 
remembered that since mathematical objects need not be of the Platonist 
type, the difference is not necessarily significant. 
20 Unless otherwise mentioned, by set theory throughout this work I refer 
to the usual Zermelo-Fraenkel (ZF) set theory expanded with the axiom of 
choice (ZFC). It must be noted that we can define arithmetic in ZFC, so at 
least set theory as a choice of basic mathematical theory could in no way 
change the arguments here. 
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of arithmetic, first-order Peano arithmetic (PA) to be exact.21 These 
objects are the natural numbers (0, 1, 2, 3, …). Similarly, 
mathematical statements will mean the sentences of arithmetic. 
With this, and a final touch of replacing the vague term “our 
thinking” with something more concrete, we should be ready to 
give the definition for mathematical realism. 
 
Realism (objectivism): there are mathematical sentences that 
are true if and only if they refer accurately to some entities or 
relations independent of the work of human mathematicians. 
 
What this definition is saying is that according to realism, some 
mathematical statements have objective truth-values. Of course 
this does not need to concern all mathematical sentences. Complex 
numbers, for example, are often not considered to exist, even in 
realistically inclined circles. Here our choice of arithmetic as the 
                                                           
21 Peano arithmetic was constructed by Giuseppe Peano in 1889. It is the 
theory of natural numbers defined by the following five axioms: 
 
(1) Zero is a number. 
(2) If n is a number, the successor of n is a number. 
(3) Zero is not the successor of any number.  
(4) If two numbers have equal successors, they are themselves equal. 
(5) If a set S of numbers contains zero, and for every number in S its 
successor is also in S, then every number is in S. (This is called the 
induction principle.)  
 
The Peano axioms are often also called Dedekind-Peano axioms due to 
Richard Dedekind’s earlier similar work in the axiomatization of 
arithmetic. The most famous other axiomatization of arithmetic is the one 
presented by R.M Robinson in 1950, and denoted Q in literature. The main 
difference is Robinson’s exclusion of the induction principle as an axiom. 
Although Q is a weaker theory than Peano axioms, the results considered 
in this work follow from both axiomatizations. Instead of the second-order 
axiom (5), we can also present the induction principle as a first-order 
induction schema, thus getting a first-order axiomatization of arithmetic, 
called PA in literature. From now on, unless otherwise mentioned, we will 
be concerned with first-order Peano arithmetic. 
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paradigm case seems helpful: if there are mathematical sentences 
that have objective truth-values, statements concerning natural 
numbers seem like a safe set to start from.  
Realists believe that there is something outside the work of 
mathematicians that makes mathematical sentences true or false; 
that it is not a mere convention. It is important here to use the 
weaker concept “entity or relation independent of the work of 
human mathematicians”, instead of a full-fledged Platonist 
ontology. Aside from a Platonic idea, this could mean, among 
other things, similarity in the physical structure in the brains of 
human beings (a kind of naturalism), or the Quinean view that 
mathematical facts are just one class of scientific facts in general. 
What is meant here by “the work of human mathematicians” is 
basically the end product of mathematical thinking: what 
mathematicians write on paper. This does not include the thought 
process and creativity behind that end product. Simply put, a 
textbook of algebra is a work of human mathematicians, while all 
the thought process behind that writing is not. This is a necessary 
clarification to make. Mathematical objects could be dependent on 
our thinking, but still be something more than conventions. If, for 
example, human beings turned out to have a common physical 
disposition toward thinking in certain mathematical ways – like 
most of us have a physical disposition toward seeing colours – this 
must be considered to be something outside the work of human 
mathematicians. Mathematical sentences would have objective 










As the complement of the above definition of realism, formalism 
means anti-realism in the philosophy of mathematics.22 According 
to formalism, mathematics is only a human creation that does not 
refer to anything objective, and the paragon of human creation in 
mathematics is the formal system. The concept of formal system is 
most often associated with David Hilbert. In the intuitionism battle 
of the early 20th century, Hilbert proposed reducing the (for the 
intuitionists) problematic methodology of abstract inferences and 
ideal statements in mathematics to the universally accepted 
finitistic proof methods and real statements. Real statements mean 
finitistically meaningful statements of the form ))()(( xgxfx =∀ , 
where f and g are some simple functions, usually interpreted to 
mean primitive recursive.23 A mathematical system (that is, a set of 
mathematical sentences, or axioms and rules of proof) consisting 
only of real statements will be called a formal system.24 
Hilbert wanted to show that just like complex numbers were 
conservative over real numbers, abstract inferences were 
conservative over finitistic proof methods. The way that the use of 
                                                           
22 It could be (quite justifiably) argued that the array of philosophical 
theories is much wider than the realism/formalism dichotomy I endorse 
in this work. The approach here does not mention such philosophical 
theories as constructivism, empiricism, intuitionism and fictionalism, 
which are usually considered to be alternatives to formalism and realism. 
However, the classification here serves a purpose. The subject of this work 
is mathematical truth, and the main question concerning that will be 
whether truth refers to something objective or not – that is, whether we 
consider mathematics to be realist or formalist under the definitions here. 
23 Primitive recursive functions are the smallest set of functions that 
include the zero-function 0)( =xf , the successor function 1)( += xxf  and 






, and that is closed under 
composition and recursion. A set of functions S is closed under 
composition if every composition of the functions in S is also included in 
S. Similarly, a set is closed under recursion if every function formed by 
recursion from the functions in S is included in S. 
24 The terms “theory” and “formal theory” are often used for the same 
concept. 
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complex numbers did not lead to any new algebraic identities 
concerning real numbers, Hilbert wanted to show that the abstract 
proof methods and ideal statements could not be used to derive 
any real statements that could not be proved with finitistic proof 
methods. This way, for all the abstract methods used by 
mathematicians, there would always be a completely formal, 
finitistic equivalent. In essence, were this Conservation program of 
Hilbert to be successful, mathematics could be completely reduced 
to formalism.25  
It might seem obvious that concerning the foundations of 
mathematics, Hilbert was a formalist. But this is not so simple. It 
must be remembered that Hilbert was trying to defend all the non-
formalist methods that working mathematicians use. His quest on 
this occasion was not creating a new foundation for mathematics, 
but rather defending the classical mathematics against the 
intuitionist “putsch”. In this sense, Hilbert’s program does not 
imply any ontological theory about the existence of mathematical 
objects. However, even though he as a prolific working 
mathematician did not reject the use of ideal statements and 
abstract proof methods, he thought that mathematics could have a 
completely formal foundation. Whatever means mathematicians 
have of proving theorems, Hilbert believed that there is always a 
completely formal, finitistic, equivalent. Simply put, all the 
contemporary mathematics could be reduced to mere deriving of 
strings of symbols from other strings of symbols according to 
specified rules of syntax – for that is what a formal system is 
essentially about.26 This should also give us a clear conception of 
the central idea of formalism: ultimately, mathematics is always 
equivalent to rules of symbol manipulation. Any trust in Occam’s 
razor would seem to imply that this is indeed all that mathematics 
really is, even if that is something Hilbert himself would not have 
agreed on. 
                                                           
25 See Smorynski 1977, p. 822 for the mathematical details, and Detlefsen 
1986 for a philosophical overview. The original work can be found in 
Hilbert 1970. 
26 This includes the obvious feature of formal systems that they can always 
be presented in completely formal languages. 
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That last viewpoint is the extreme position of formalism, but 
some weaker interpretations of Hilbert’s program are at least as 
valid. Formalism concerning mathematics, it can be argued, 
consists of at least three different points of view. First, we have the 
stance that mathematics should be presented, as far as possible, in 
formal axiomatic systems for maximal clarity and deductive 
power. All mathematicians and philosophers of mathematics are 
likely to accept this version of formalism. Second, there is the 
position that formal systems are the objective of mathematics. 
Theories are not truly mathematical until they can be axiomatized. 
Finding out the best axiomatizations is of course one of the main 
concerns of mathematics, but unlike in the first type of formalism, 
in this second type only formal systems are considered to be 
acceptable presentations of mathematical theories. This is more or 
less the Hilbertian (1970) idea of formalism and, although more 
limiting, still not a difficult one to accept. Indeed, this is the goal 
most mathematical theories strive for. The third, and by far the 
most controversial, type of formalism is the philosophical doctrine 
that mathematics as a subject only concerns formal systems, 
without any reference to anything outside them. While the milder 
types of formalism are ways of presenting mathematical 
methodology, this third type is highly committing philosophically. 
For Hilbert formal systems were the ultimate tool, perhaps even 
the essence of mathematics. But for him it was not all there was to 
mathematics. 27  
                                                           
27 Although quotes like the following certainly suggest that Hilbert’s 
formalism was of a considerably strong flavour: 
If the arbitrarily given axioms do not contradict each other through their 
consequences, then they are true, then the objects defined through the axioms 
exist. That, for me, is the criterion of truth and existence. (In Meschkowski 1973, 
p. 56, quoted in Smorynski 1977, p. 825) 
While this reserves a crucial role for formal systems, Hilbert all along 
speaks of existence and truth of mathematical objects. I believe this quote  
expresses Hilbert’s optimism in his Conservation program, and the role he 
hoped formal systems would play. However, he did this in order to 
defend mathematics, not to introduce a limiting system of strict formalism 
(see Reid 1970, pp. 155-157). 
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This third type, what I call extreme, or strict, formalism, is the 
type we are concerned with in this work. From now on, unless 
otherwise stated, formalism in the philosophy of mathematics will 
mean this extreme type, for which we are ready to give a 
definition: 
 
(Extreme) Formalism: to say that a mathematical sentence is 
true involves no reference to any entity outside formal systems. 
Hence, a mathematical sentence is true in a formal system S if 
and only if it is provable in S, and mathematical truth cannot be 
discussed in any other context. 
 
When we remember that formal systems are the ultimate work of 
human mathematicians, we clearly see that this definition of 
formalism is the definition of anti-realism as presented in the 
previous chapter. Rules of proof are the way we reach theorems 
from axioms, and for the extreme formalist this is the only way of 
acquiring, and recognizing, true sentences. Keeping in the wider 
tradition of realism and anti-realism over concepts, formalism is 
often called nominalism in the literature. The possible difference 
between the two terms is not likely to be important here, and the 
two terms will be used synonymously. Some nominalists, such as 
Charles Chihara (2005), are ready to extend mathematics beyond 
formal systems, which would imply that nominalism and 
formalism are two different positions. In addition, nominalism 
over physical concepts is a different matter from nominalism over 
mathematical ones. For these reasons formalism seems like the 
preferable term, although it carries the potential confusion with 
Hilbert-type moderate formalism. This will be a subject later on in 
this book (Chapter 6.3), but for now it suffices to say that I do not 
think that these differences are important, and there should not be 
any problems using the terms nominalism and formalism 
interchangeably. Basically, either mathematics refers to something 
outside the work of human mathematicians (ultimately something 
outside formal systems) or it does not. It is hard to see any neutral 
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ground, and I do not see how a nominalist could accept such a 
reference and still remain a nominalist.28 
 
 
2.5 Soundness and completeness 
 
Realism in truth-value and formalism are both answers to the 
question: what does it mean to say that a mathematical statement 
is true? The obvious follow-up question is how we can find out 
which mathematical statements are true? Of course the whole point 
of mathematics is to use rigorous rules of proof to obtain new 
theorems, and – whatever we mean by truth – the trust in these 
rules of proof is founded on them preserving truth. This is the 
standard way of describing our logic, and hence, our mathematics. 
Although the modes and methods of mathematical practice are 
largely universal, there still does not exist a full consensus on the 
accepted rules of proof (that is, the accepted inferences in logic). 
Intuitionism in the late 19th and early 20th centuries was based on 
exactly such a conviction: Henri Poincaré and later L.E.J. Brouwer 
argued that the rules of proof used in mathematics were in fact 
flawed.29 More recently, similar arguments have been made based 
on many-valued logics. Nevertheless, the motivation behind all 
these logics is that they are supposed to preserve truth. Whatever 
rules of proof we accept, we believe that with them we will end up 
with true theorems from true axioms. 
What does that mean in the framework of realism and 
formalism? Obviously rules of proof belong to the domain of 
formal systems. Indeed, formal systems consist only of axioms and 
rules of proof. Hence, as far as truth and proof are considered, the 
formalist position is quite simple: rules of proof and axioms are all 
there is to mathematics. Any talk of proof preserving truth is 
                                                           
28 Here I take the direct approach to understanding nominalism: as the 
word itself suggests, instead of mathematical objects only their names exist. 
This position is also called fictionalism in literature. Nominalism in 
mathematics is sometimes also understood specifically as the position that 
sets do not exist. 
29 See Dummett 1977 for a good introduction on intuitionism. 
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redundant, for truth is equivalent to proof. Whatever our rules of 
proof are, according to the formalist position, they must always 
preserve truth. As such, truth would be an empty, deflationary, 
property – in extreme formalism truth “deflates” completely into 
proof. 
The realist position is a more difficult one, and philosophically 
much more interesting. If we believe that there exists an outer 
reference for the statements of mathematics, we must clarify what 
the relation between this reference and our formal systems is. The 
question can be divided into two parts. First of all, we should want 
our rules of proof to preserve truth, that is, to be valid.30 In addition 
to the rules of proof being valid, we want the axioms of the formal 
system to be true. These two conditions put together are called the 
criterion of soundness. A formal system is sound if and only if only 
true sentences (theorems) can be derived in it. Secondly, we should 
want our rules of proof to be such that all such theorems can be 
derived with them. This is the criterion of completeness, and it is the 
converse of soundness. A formal system is complete if and only if 
all true sentences (theorems) can be derived in it, that is, for every 
sentence ϕ in the language of the formal system, either ϕ or ¬ϕ is a 
theorem.31 At this point we should not worry ourselves about the 
nature of truth, or the epistemic status of axioms. Whatever truth 
may be, soundness and completeness are the two features that the 
realist would hope from our formal systems. One direct 
consequence would be that such formal systems would also be 
consistent: for no theorem ϕ could its negation ¬ϕ also be provable. 
What about the formalist? The mathematical essence of 
Hilbert’s program was to show that formal systems could be 
                                                           
30 To be exact, this means that by the rules of proof it is impossible for the 
axioms to be true and a theorem to be false. 
31 In logic and mathematics there are many different forms of 
completeness. The one given here is used for reasons that become 
apparent in the next chapter. The main idea is that every well-formulated 
sentence we can construct in a language must be a theorem, or else its 
negation must be a theorem. This is a very natural criterion to have, 
especially when we remember that we are dealing with sentences of 
arithmetic, that is, statements concerning natural numbers. 
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shown to be complete and, equivalently, consistent. Had it 
succeeded, it would have presented a strong argument for 
formalism: once we agree on the axioms and rules of proof, we 
could (in principle) have automata filling in the formal systems 
with theorems, and do the job completely. For the formalist 
soundness comes automatically, and with completeness formal 
systems would be just the kind of perfect tool Hilbert wanted them 
to be. It would not have solved the problem of truth and proof for 
good – after all, we would still need to agree on the axioms and 
rules of proof – but at least it would have eliminated the possible 
occurrence of true but unprovable sentences. Whatever the set of 
all true sentences is considered to be, it would be equivalent to the 
set of all provable sentences once we find the proper formal 
system. Metamathematical and philosophical questions aside, this 
would make it very hard to distinguish between truth and proof as 
concepts. The question of realism and formalism would still exist 
in the question of theory choice (that is, the choice of axioms and 
rules of proof), but the subject matter of formal systems would be 
sound and complete. For the formalist of Hilbert’s (the second) 
type this would have been the ultimate success. The extreme 
formalist would still have questions to answer, but her case would 
definitely have had extra strength, as well. 
 
 
2.6 Gödel’s incompleteness theorems 
 
Of course Hilbert’s dream was not to be realized. His optimism for 
finding a consistent, complete and totally formal basis for 
mathematics was dealt a devastating blow in 1930 when Kurt 
Gödel presented two theorems that proved Hilbert’s program to be 
impossible. Gödel showed that all consistent formal systems of 
arithmetic are in fact incomplete. Gödel’s two incompleteness 
theorems are as follows32: 
 
                                                           
32 For the proofs of the theorems, see Gödel 1931 or Smorynski 1977, pp. 
826-828. 
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First Incompleteness Theorem: Let T be a formal system that 
contains33 arithmetic. Following the so-called fixed-point 
theorem, in the language of T there can be constructed a 
sentence ϕ : )(Pr ϕϕ
T
¬↔ , where PrT is the provability 
predicate of T, that has the following traits34: 
 
(1) If T is consistent, then T ϕ . 
 
(2) If T is consistent35, then T ϕ¬ . 
 
                                                           
33 This means that there is a known embedding from PA to T. An 
embedding from some system S to T is a function that preserves the 
arithmetic characteristics (such as addition, multiplication and ordering) 
of the objects of S in T. For example, if TS→:f  is an embedding from S 
to T and cba =+  in S, then )()()( cfbfaf =+ in T. This embedding 
property is needed for the logical operations, among other things. 
34 The notation ϕ  means the natural number that is the code of the 
sentenceϕ . For his proof, Gödel needed a way to encode sentences of 
formal systems into natural numbers. This is also the reason for the 
condition of containing arithmetic. Such an encoding is called Gödel-
numbering in literature, and there are various ways of doing it. For details, 
see Gödel 1932, p. 157. 
35 To be more specific, this includes an additional condition that T should 
be ω-consistent (see Gödel 1932, p. 236 and Smorynski 1977, pp. 851-852). 
This concept of Gödel means, in the case of formalized arithmetic, that the 
following two conditions are never simultaneously satisfied for any ϕ: 
 
(1) T├ )(xxϕ∃  
(2) T├ )0(ϕ¬ , )1(ϕ¬ , )2(ϕ¬ ,… 
 
In other words, this means that a sentence cannot be true for some x at the 
same time as it is false for every x. Obviously, this is what we should 
expect from any mathematical system, so this additional condition should 
not worry us. Indeed, J. Barkley Rosser proved in 1936 that the 
requirement of ω-consistency can be dropped from Gödel’s proof. For 
Rosser’s Theorem, see Rosser 1936 or Smorynski 1977, pp. 840-841. 
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Second Incompleteness Theorem: Let T be a consistent formal 
theory that contains arithmetic. Then T ConT, where ConT is 
the sentence asserting the consistency of T.  
 
In other words, all consistent formal mathematical systems 
containing arithmetic contain sentences that can neither be proved 
nor disproved within that system. In addition, such a system 
cannot prove its own consistency. We remember that Hilbert’s 
Conservation program was based on the belief that the abstract 
proof methods and ideal statements that mathematicians use are 
conservative over the finitistic proof methods and real statements 
of formal systems. This Conservation program is equivalent with 
his Consistency program of showing that such a formal system 
containing the abstract proof methods and ideal statements is 
consistent.36 Gödel showed this latter program to be impossible: if 
such a formal system T is consistent, we cannot prove this 
consistency within T. At the same time he demolished the 
Conservation program. In short, Gödel proved that the formalist 
program could never be complete. This is the first important 
philosophical conclusion of his incompleteness theorems. The 
second one is that such a troubling Gödel sentence ϕ, while 
unprovable, is nevertheless true under very reasonable truth-
theoretic assumptions. 
The second conclusion will be the subject of the next chapter. 
Let us now look at the direct implications of the first one. It is clear 
that the second of Gödel’s theorems demolishes Hilbert’s program. 
We know unassailably that all consistent formal systems 
containing arithmetic are incomplete, and in addition unable to 
prove their own consistency. Because of this Hilbert could not 
succeed in justifying the abstract proof methods and ideal 
statements. But it also seems to have the graver consequence of 
making our very rules of proof doubtful. After all, completeness 
and consistency are two of the main qualities we would hope to 
include in our concept of proof. In extreme formalism, 
mathematics consists only of axioms and rules of proof. Thus the 
implication of Gödel’s theorem to formalism seems to be that, 
                                                           
36 See Smorynski 1977, p. 824. 
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taken as one consistent all-including formal system, mathematics is 
incomplete. In addition, if such a system were indeed consistent, 
we cannot possibly know this.  
This alone is a remarkable result. The subsequent discussion on 
Gödel’s theorems and formalism has been very active and varied, 
up to the point where the direct consequence of incompleteness is 
not often fully acknowledged. But there seem to be no two ways 
about it: if extreme formalism is correct, and all our mathematical 
knowledge can be presented as a single formal system, Gödel’s 
incompleteness theorems have the inescapable consequence that 
mathematics is either inconsistent or incomplete. When switching 
from proof and disproof to the concepts of truth and falsity, this 
obviously means that under the formalist interpretation there are 
mathematical sentences that are neither true nor false, which goes 
against the law of excluded middle. For a realist, it is of course 
only the proof method (and the axiomatization) that is incomplete. 
For a formalist, it is the whole of mathematics.37 At least 
tentatively, the realist conclusion seems much easier to accept. But 
we will get to the bottom of this soon, and in Chapter 4.2 these 
considerations will be given a detailed treatment. 
 
 
2.7 Is the Gödel sentence true? 
 
Now we know that the sentence φ is undecidable in the formal 
system T – but there is more to this. In Gödel’s proof the 
unprovable Gödel sentence is formulated to be self-referential with 
the usual diagonal38 procedure as )(Pr ϕϕ
T
¬↔ , where PrT is the 
provability predicate of T. In words, this means that φ is true if and 
only if it cannot be proved in T. But that φ cannot be proved in T is 
exactly what the part (i) of the first incompleteness theorem tells 
us. So looking at the meaning of φ, it must be true. This already 
                                                           
37 If we give up the requirement of single formal system, we still end up 
with the very strong consequence that whole areas of mathematics are 
either inconsistent or incomplete. 
38 The method of self-reference also used in Liar’s paradox, Russell’s 
paradox and Cantor’s diagonal slash.  
56 2. The Background 
 
 
makes the Conservation program impossible. The sentence φ is a 
real statement (this can be seen from the way it is constructed, plus 
from the fact that it is a sentence of a formal system), and it is true. 
Yet Gödel showed that we could not prove its truth with formal 
proof methods, that is, finitistic derivations. This is a direct 
counter-example to the Conservation program: our abstract proof 
methods and ideal statements give us the opportunity to see at 
least one additional real statement to be true, which was exactly 
what Hilbert wanted to show to be impossible. 
However, so far we have not specified what it means to say that 
φ is true. Clearly we have jumped ahead in the matter, and 
assumed that we have defined what we mean by truth. As will be 
seen, this is not such a simple question. Our pre-philosophical 
intuitions immediately suggest the truth of φ, but truth without 
definition is an empty concept here. In fact, the definition for truth, 
and the need for the concept of truth, turns out to be one of the 
more important questions in the philosophy of mathematics, and 
most of this work concerns that problem. Meanwhile, however, it 
certainly looks like φ (usually called the Gödel sentence39 G of T, or 
G(T), in the literature) is true – because φ says so. If it is indeed 
true, but not provable – and all this under reasonable assumptions 
– that would already be enough to show that truth and proof are 
different concepts. It would also imply that extreme formalism 
could not suffice; that there are sentences of mathematics which 
are true, but the truth of which escape the strict formalist 
interpretation. At the very least, Gödel sentences give us an 
explicit case to study – if there is a true unprovable sentence, G 




                                                           
39 We talk here about “the Gödel sentence”, but actually every such formal 
system has infinitely many unprovable sentences like the one given here.  
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2.8 Gödel sentences and Tarski 
 
Now there are two questions we have to ask about the truth of 
G(T). First of all, since not by proof in T, how do we establish that 
the Gödel sentence is true? For now, we should be confident of 
having a good idea what proof is. What do we know about truth? 
The second question concerning the truth of G(T) follows directly 
from the first one. Once we clarify how we see its truth, we have to 
find out where we see its truth, that is, in what kind of 
mathematical (or other) system do we establish that the sentence 
G(T) is true? Obviously it is not in the formal system T itself, when 
we follow the formalist conception that provability equals truth in 
formal systems. But T is the only system we have examined in 
proving Gödel’s incompleteness theorems. Are we changing the 
game by talking about other systems, and if so, what consequences 
does this change have? 
Both of these questions are central to the philosophy of 
mathematics, and thanks to Gödel’s work, we now have an explicit 
sentence through which to look at the matter. It is obvious that we 
do not see the truth of G(T) as proof of G in T; this is the very thing 
that Gödel proved. The way G(T) was constructed, it seems just as 
obvious that we establish its truth through the meaning of G(T), 
that is, semantically. There seems to be very little doubt over this.40 
We said that “G(T) states that it cannot be proved in T”, and since 
it indeed cannot be proved in T, it must be true. This is easy to 
understand because we can change positions from the formal 
sentence G(T) into its semantic content. In the process, however, 
we also quite clearly switch from truth as proof (that is, syntactical 
truth) to semantical truth. 
How does this fit into our previous domain of formal systems? 
One solution could be denying us the right to talk about 
mathematical truth beyond that of proof in formal systems. In the 
traditional formalist view, truth in formal systems is defined as 
provability; truth and proof are the same concept. The ones who 
maintain this position can claim that Gödel only showed that 
                                                           
40 See Gödel 1958, p. 241 for his own argument to this direction. 
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formal systems are incomplete, not that the formal concept of proof 
is incomplete. The basis for this line of thought is the (correct) 
observation that we do not establish the truth of G(T) in T, but in 
another, broader, system. Because in extreme formalism formal 
systems are all there is to mathematics, there is no way we can see 
the truth of G(T) in a broader system, as well as no way of seeing 
the truth of “G(T) in T”. For a proponent of such strict formalism, 
we simply have no justification of speaking about truth outside the 
context of formal proof. Even though formal systems are always 
incomplete, we have no other way of establishing truth-values of 
sentences, and hence the formal proof method can in fact be 
complete, although only in this reduced sense. This way, all true 
sentences can still be considered provable; neither G(T) nor ¬G(T) 
is provable, ipso facto neither of them is true.  
 
However, there are three big problems with this line of thinking. 
The first thing that strikes the eye is the apparent emptiness of the 
argument. If proof defines truth completely, of course all true 
sentences are provable, and vice versa. Yet if this turned out not to 
be the case, we could never find it out with the strict formalist way 
of thinking. Without any outer reference, all formal systems are 
complete in the reduced sense. No matter what our formal systems 
are, they exhaustively prove all the true sentences. But surely this 
is too drastic a result for most formalists. Not all formal systems 
can be equally good. Outer reference cannot be ruled out this 
easily, and we cannot dismiss the possibility of true but 
unprovable sentences.  
Secondly, the conclusion that neither G(T) nor ¬G(T) is true 
goes against the most basic premise of two-valued logic. Gödel’s 
proof is established in two-valued first-order logic, and this 
reduced sense of completeness would conflict with the choice of 
logic it was based on. This way, in order to include a new concept 
of completeness, we would need to go deep into revising our 
notion of logic. Such strategies can have potential – they will be the 
subject of Chapter 5 in this work – but they go beyond Hilbert’s 
conception of formalism in mathematics. 
Thirdly, following Gödel’s proof, it seems that we immediately 
do establish the truth of G(T). We have not specified what we mean 
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by truth, let alone have a theory for it, but it seems instantly 
obvious that if there is a consistent formal system T containing 
arithmetic, the sentence G(T) is true in some system “T + theory of 
truth”. Rather than deny this, we should concentrate on explaining 
it, even if the truth of Gödel sentences turned out to be an illusion. 
Since we clearly use the semantic content of G(T) in the process, we 
should start unravelling these problems from the semantic notion 
of truth introduced by Alfred Tarski (1944).  
 
Tarski’s theory of truth41 was based on his “Convention T” being 
materially adequate, that is, giving all the true sentences of an 
object language. This means T-instances of the form:  
 
“P” is true if and only if p.  
 
Here we have to distinguish between the two languages that “P” 
and p are in. “P” is a sentence in the object language, and p tells in 
our metalanguage the proposition expressed by “P”. The classic 
example is: 
 
 “Snow is white” is true if and only if snow is white. 
 
Here snow is white is in the metalanguage (in this case English) and 
“Snow is white” can be replaced by any sentence expressing the 
same proposition. This depends, of course, on the object language. 
                                                           
41 There are many ways of addressing Tarski’s scheme in literature. Some 
call it a definition of truth, while others call it more cautiously an 
“adequacy condition”. The latter line of thinking is that Tarski’s scheme 
does not define truth, but rather gives us a form that all cases of true 
sentences take. As far as mathematical truth is considered, I think we 
should be safe in using both terms. If a scheme is adequate for enlisting all 
the true (as well as false) sentences, it should be more than satisfying as an 
account of mathematical truth. In a mathematical sense we could call it a 
definition, although an implicit one. Truth would be defined by all the 
instances of true sentences. What the concept “truth” ultimately means is a 
metaphysical question and potentially a very complicated one. This will 
be discussed later on. 
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For example, in the object language of Italian, the T-scheme takes 
the form: 
 
 “La neve è bianca” is true if and only if snow is white. 
 
Now we can use the T-scheme to our Gödel sentence G(T), 
remembering that the informal semantic content of G(T) was “G 
cannot be proved in T”: 
 
 G(T) is true if and only if G cannot be proved in T. 
 
This seems to illuminate our “seeing” the truth of G. We can now 
take notice of some of the upcoming problems. It is indeed the case 
that G cannot be proved in T, but it must be noted that this is a 
sentence of our metalanguage, English. It is not in T anymore, and 
one might argue that we are changing the game by changing the 
language. So while it seems that G is indeed true, it is not true in T. 
However, if we do not equate truth with proof like the formalist 
does, will it make sense to speak of “truth in T” in the first place? It 
seems that we only have “proof in T”, while truth is always in “T 
expanded with a theory of truth”? The fundamental question here 
seems to be whether we are prepared to expand formal systems 
with a theory of truth in the first place. If we are, we seem to be 
able to establish a true sentence that is not provable. If not, we 
must equate truth with proof, and neglect the apparent semantical 
truth of Gödel sentences. But that means dispensing with truth 
altogether, and dispensing with semantical thinking in 
mathematics, as well as facing all the problems we noted above. In 
the next chapter we will see explicitly how formal systems can be 
expanded with Tarskian truth in order to establish the truth of 
Gödel sentences, and all the questions here will get an 
unambiguous treatment. 
Before that, we must consider the possibility of defining truth 
within T, in which case we would have no need to expand the 
formal system. One of the most important results concerning truth 
and logic is Tarski’s (1936) undefinability theorem of truth. Tarski 
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showed that interpreted formal languages42 (in the realm of 
classical first-order logic43, and having enough expressive power to 
satisfy the fixed-point theorem of self-reference) could not include 
their own truth predicates. To be exact, they cannot be extended 
with a truth predicate without the occurrence of liar’s paradox.44 
This is an important result, because it shows us that the Tarskian 
theory of truth must be formulated in the metasystem (and the 
metalanguage). Moreover, Tarski showed with this undefinability 
result that a truth predicate in classical formal languages commits 
us to an infinite hierarchy of languages. The truth predicate for an 
object-language L1 is given in a metalanguage L2, and the truth 
predicate for L2 in another language L3. Crucially, this hierarchy 
never collapses: at no level will a language Lm provide a truth 
predicate for a language Ln, where n ≥ m. 
Without this result there would have been the possibility that 
Tarski’s T-scheme is equivalent to some predicate of the object 
system, which would conflict with the undefinability result, and 
hence free us of the need for metalanguages. In that case, the T-
scheme would have been obsolete in formal languages. But it is 
not, and we see that in order to speak of the truth of sentences like 
G(T), we have to step outside the system they were formulated in. 
This makes expanding the formal system necessary if we want to 
include any account of truth45 – that way it should also help us a 
great deal in justifying the use of a Tarskian theory of truth.  
The only alternative is dispensing with truth altogether, and 
that approach has many difficult problems. For one, it can be 
                                                           
42 Unless otherwise mentioned, throughout this work we will be 
concerned with fully interpreted languages, that is, languages in which all 
sentences are either true or false through their meanings. Since the focus 
here is on arithmetic, this means that we are discussing standard models 
of PA. In Chapter 8.1 I will consider the significance of non-standard 
models in this context. 
43 In Chapter 5 I study the possibility of defining a truth predicate within 
the object language in other logics. 
44 Informally, “This sentence is false”. 
45 Aside from the one where truth is categorically defined as a translation 
of proof – but this is also something we can only do outside the formal 
system, or otherwise Tarski’s undefinability result is contradicted. 
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considered that such a truth predicate xxTr ↔)(  exists, even in 
classical formal languages where it causes a paradox. We can 
define it completely formally and reach Tarski’s undefinability 
result. In this way, it is not the introduction of truth predicate that 
gives birth to a hierarchy of languages that does not collapse. 
Instead, the truth predicate is a way to show that there exists such a 
hierarchy of languages that does not collapse. To avoid this, the 
language in question would have to have a specific ban of 
formulating a truth predicate, which is something not expressible 
formally within the object language. 
We see that it is very difficult for the formalist to outright deny 
us the use of Tarskian truth. Even more importantly, in this work I 
will argue that Tarskian truth is in fact philosophically the proper 
theory of truth for mathematics. We will see that when we 
consider mathematics in a wider picture than just the formal 
systems, the formalist conception of truth as proof – and nothing 
else – is already highly insufficient, Gödel or no Gödel. To make 
sense of the reference between formal and what I will call pre-
formal mathematics, Tarskian semantical truth is the perfect 
vehicle. Indeed, it will be seen that without a semantic conception 
of truth and its appeal to reference we would have no way of 
escaping arbitrariness in mathematics. These matters will be 
discussed in detail later on in this work. First we must see what 
kind of damage Gödel sentences and Tarskian truth do to the 
extreme formalist case. 
  
3. The Semantical argument 63 
 
 
3. The Semantical argument 
 
3.1 Field’s nominalism 
 
The current discussion on what Neil Tennant (2002) aptly calls 
“Deflationism and The Gödel Phenomenon” consists mainly of 
two debates. In the first one, Hartry Field (1999) argues that 
mathematical truth is a deflationary, not substantial, property. 
Applied to formal systems, truth means proof, and only proof, and 
as such the property “truth” is empty. However, Stewart Shapiro 
(1998) uses Gödel’s incompleteness theorem to argue that this is 
not the case: with a semantical notion of truth we can see that there 
are true sentences that are not provable – the Gödel sentences – 
and hence the two concepts are not one. This is called the 
semantical argument against deflationism in mathematics. 
The second debate started with Jeffrey Ketland’s (1999) answer 
to Field, and was followed by Tennant’s (2002) reply to him (and 
Shapiro). The two discussions are similar and largely overlapping, 
but it is important to examine both. My approach here is to take a 
critical look at these arguments as what they are: parts of debates. 
This should give us a comprehensive and detailed overview of the 
competing viewpoints. The part considered in this chapter 
concerns only ordinary first-order two-valued logic. Arguments 
based on second-order logic and many-valued logics will be 
examined in Chapter 5. 
As we know from Tarski’s (1936) work, when we limit 
ourselves to classical first-order logic, formal mathematical 
theories cannot include their own truth predicates. This was an 
extra incentive for Tarski to pursue his semantic theory of truth. In 
fact, Tarski (1969, pp. 418-423) already thought that Gödel’s 
incompleteness theorems, together with his own semantical 
conception of truth, showed that truth and formal proof are 
different concepts. He believed that a meta-theory (in a 
metalanguage of the formal system) could be constructed so that 
we can explicitly say that G(T), a sentence of the object-system T, is 
true. This meta-theory would of course have to include the object-
theory (the formal system T), but also Tarski’s truth definition. 
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This goes well with everything that was said in the last chapter of 
the previous chapter, when we remember that T must be 
consistent. Against the deflationist thesis, for consistent formal 
systems containing arithmetic, Tarskian truth seems to give us the 
ability to establish a new true sentence.  
One of the main opponents of this position has been Field. His 
most famous work is the book Science Without Numbers (1980), 
targeted against the contention of Hilary Putnam (1971) and Quine 
(1966) that mathematics is indispensable for scientific theories. In 
Quine’s famous indispensability argument mathematics is 
considered to be an integral part of science, something without 
which science as we know it would be impossible. Quine held this 
to be a convincing argument against mathematical nominalism. 
Field’s argument against indispensability was that mathematics is 
in fact conservative over nominalist scientific theories, and as such 
Quine’s argument fails. His example was showing that Newtonian 
mechanics could be presented in a way that did not include 
mathematics.46 In this strict nominalist – fictionalist – account no 
ontological commitment to mathematical entities is made, and all 
talk of them is essentially fiction. Hence, when applied to formal 
systems, it makes no sense to speak about the truth of 
mathematical sentences outside the proof of them. Mathematics 
consists merely of conventional axioms and rules of symbol 
manipulation, and what we mean by truth is defined 
exhaustively47 by the rules of proof. This is deflationism about 
mathematical truth. 
 
At this point we should look at the various terminological 
questions that Field’s philosophy presents us with. Nominalism 
and fictionalism are without doubt views that can be attributed to 
Field, as apparent from Field 1980. After that the matter becomes a 
bit more vague. In Field 1980 (p. 1), he writes:  
                                                           
46 We will return to some of the merits and weaknesses in Field’s program 
later on in Chapter 6.4. See also Shapiro (1983) and Hale 1987, pp. 102-122 
for critical assessments of Field’s program. 
47 Meaning that all cases of true sentences are given to us by the rules of 
proof. 




In defending nominalism I am denying that numbers, functions, sets or 
any similar entities exist.  
 
In the same book he continues (p. 15):  
 
What makes the mathematical theories we accept better than these 
alternatives to them is not that they are true [...] but rather that they are 
more useful. [...] Thus mathematics is in a sense empirical but only in 
the rather Pickwickian sense that it is an empirical question as to 
which mathematical theory is useful. (Italics in the original.) 
 
In Field 1998 (p. 295), he writes: 
 
Anti-objectivism has considerable plausibility for the typical 
undecidable sentences of set theory. It has much less plausibility for 
the undecidable sentences of elementary number theory 
 
As I see it, these quotes suggest three different philosophical 
theories. The first quote seems to describe strict fictionalism and 
extreme formalism. The second one implies that Field is actually 
not an extreme formalist, since there are empirical reasons for us to 
accept some mathematical theories over others. Finally, the third 
quote suggests that Field is an extreme formalist over set theory 
while suggesting a mild form of realism – or at least remaining 
cautious – concerning arithmetic. Add to that the fact that in the 
first quote numbers and sets are lumped together as something 
fictitious, and it becomes clear that we can make several 
interpretations of Field’s philosophy. 
The second quote seems particularly problematic. If all 
mathematical entities are fiction, how can one explain the 
usefulness of certain mathematical theories? We will return to this 
problem in Chapter 4.1, but for now it suffices to point out that 
empirical usefulness seems to conflict with the whole concept of 
fictionalism. After all, if there are good reasons for thinking that a 
sentence ϕ is useful, can these same reasons not be seen to suggest 
that it is also true? Moving to the third quote, how do we 
distinguish between natural numbers and sets as mathematical 
objects, and which do we consider to be philosophically more 
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important?48 These are all difficult questions that deserve closer 
examination – which they will receive in Chapter 6 of this work. 
However, at this point we must make a choice and attribute a 
specific philosophical viewpoint to Field. Since he is most adamant 
in his fictionalism, nominalism and the rejection of substantial 
truth, I will consider them to be the central elements of his 
philosophy. Also, because he (Field 1999) defends deflationism in 
the debate we are about to go through, I believe we can attribute to 
Field the philosophical position that proof and truth are the same 
concept, that is, extreme formalism.49  
  
When we compare Tarski’s and Field’s views, it must first be 
pointed out that in Field’s philosophy there is no need for a 
Tarskian definition of truth in mathematics. It should come to us as 
no surprise that he sees little philosophical worth in the notion of 
semantic truth, or semantics in the philosophy of mathematics 
altogether. For Field these are completely heuristic devices; 
philosophically they are superfluous.50 One implication of this is 
that undecided (or undecidable) sentences cannot be thought to 
have determinate truth-values. Under this conception, Fermat’s 
Last Theorem51 only became true in 1994 when Andrew Wiles 
proved it; before that it did not have a determinate truth-value. 
                                                           
48 See Field 1998 (pp. 294-306) for his analysis on the question. 
49 If mathematical entities are fiction and mathematical truth plays no role, 
which I consider to be the two most important facets of Field’s philosophy 
as far as the subject of this work is concerned, I do not see a problem with 
this characterization of Field. Indeed, in Field 2001, p. 317 (see Chapter 6.6 
of this work), for example, he quite clearly suggests that mathematics is 
not about anything, which I can only understand as extreme formalism. 
We will return to his philosophy later on in this work, but for now, I 
believe the terms extreme formalism, fictionalism and deflationism can all 
be used for the philosophy of Field. 
50 See Field 1999, footnote 3. 
51 The statement according to which for an integer n > 2, the equation 
nnn cba =+ has no solutions when cba ,, are non-zero integers. 
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Needless to say, this kind of viewpoint must hold truth and proof 
to be the same concept.52 
Unsolved problems, like Fermat’s Last Theorem used to be, are 
only one kind of undecided sentences. The other kind can of course 
be seen in the undecidable Gödel sentence G(T). The important 
difference becomes apparent when we think about the truth-value 
of Fermat’s Last Theorem before Wiles’ proof. While we had a 
good guess – like we now have a good guess about the truth of 
Goldbach’s Conjecture53 – we had no way of establishing the truth 
of it. Hence, it is a sentence that was, in the extreme formalist 
account, undecided for a long time and became true in 1994. Gödel 
sentences, however, are different. As Tarski proposed, and our 
informal account in Chapter 2.7 suggests, G(T) is at the same time 
undecided in T and true, although the latter only in an expanded 
system. If this indeed turned out to be the case, and we would be 
justified in making the expansion, it would obviously contradict 
with Field’s deflationism.  
This discussion relates closely to the one on the general nature 
of truth. In the deflationist account of Paul Horwich (among 
others)54 truth is not a robust, metaphysically substantial property. 
Deflationism has an interesting history in philosophy, and its most 
famous original proponents include Frank Ramsey, A.J. Ayer and 
Rudolf Carnap55. It comes in many guises and names; one 
deflationist is not necessarily bound to agree with another. There is 
also a difference between deflationism over truth in general, 
                                                           
52 See Field 2001, pp. 332-343. The point of view that Field opposes to (at 
least for set theory) – that sentences can be thought to have determinate 
truth-values even though we have no guaranteed way of establishing 
them – is called semantic realism in literature. The most notable opponent 
of semantic realism has been the intuitionist Michael Dummett. See 
Dummett 1978, Chapter 1 for his position, and Hale 1977 for criticism. We 
will return to semantic realism later in this work. 
53 The statement according to which every even integer greater than 2 is 
the sum of two primes. 
54 See Horwich 1998, 1-8 for an outline of a general deflationist account of 
truth.  
55 Carnap 1956 provides an illuminating account of deflationism in its 
original form. 
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scientific truth and mathematical truth. All this makes deflationists 
a heterogenic group, perhaps more so than is usually recognized. 
However, following Quine (1990), one central claim of the more 
recent deflationism is that Tarskian theories of truth are 
disquotational, that is, the T-scheme of Tarski only adds quotation 
marks around the sentence and then calls it a definition (or an 
adequacy condition) of truth. To say that “snow is white” is true 
(in the object language), according to them, asserts nothing more 
than saying snow is white (in the metalanguage) does, and the 
mentioning of truth is redundant. Take the T-scheme: 
 
 “Snow is white” is true if, and only if, snow is white. 
 
For the deflationist, simply saying “snow is white” carries all the 
information that the T-scheme does, and the whole need for 
different languages and definitions of truth vanishes. Hence the 
name deflationism: the assertion of the truth of a sentence is 
deflated into the mere assertion of the sentence, thus making truth a 
redundant concept.56 
When it comes to mathematics, the natural way to deflate truth 
would seem to be equating it with proof.57 After we prove a 
sentence ϕ in a formal system T, saying that ϕ is true does not give 
us any new information. Whether we agree on deflationism 
generally or not, in the philosophy of mathematics it seems to have 
a lot going for it. After all, provability is the thing we are after in 
formal mathematics, and truth could be considered merely a 
translation of this. If formalism is all there is to mathematics, and 
we could explain why we prefer some formal systems to others, 
                                                           
56 Here one must distinguish between redundant in the sense that the 
phrase “…is true” can be left out, which was the original deflationist view 
of Ramsey (1927), and what Michael Williams (1999) calls “extended” 
disquotational truth where truth serves a purpose, but is still deflationary. 
Field’s approach is the latter. 
57 This is the approach I will take, but there are various ways of 
understanding deflationism, even about mathematics. See Ketland 1999, 
pp. 69-79 for a good overview of the different types of deflationism in 
mathematics. 
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this would seem to complete the philosophical picture with very 
little ontological burden. However, there remains the problem of 
Gödel sentences, where a theory of truth does seem to give us new 
information on true sentences. This so far vague argument has 
been made exact, independently of each other, by both Shapiro and 
Ketland. We will now move on to them. 
 
 
3.2 Shapiro’s semantical argument 
 
Shapiro and Ketland have been the main modern critics of 
deflationism in mathematics. Shapiro’s argument is based on the 
claim that if deflationism were correct, truth would have to be 
conservative over formal theories, that is, adding a truth predicate 
to a formal theory could not give us any new true sentences. To be 
exact, if we add a theory of truth to our formal system T, this new 
augmented system T’ must not allow us to derive the truth of any 
theorems that were not derivable from T alone. If truth were not a 
conservative property, then there would be some theorem γ the 
truth of which can be derived from T’ but not from T. This would 
mean that it is logically possible that all the axioms of T are true 
but γ would be false in it. However, it would not be logically 
possible that all the axioms of T’ were true but γ would be false in 
it. Thus, truth would have to be a robust, and not an insubstantial, 
property; after all, the addition of truth predicate made γ¬  
impossible. The move from T to T’ clearly added something to the 
system.58 
Shapiro’s argument up to this point seems to be valid. If this 
indeed turned out to be the case, then deflationism runs into 
trouble – for we can now see that adding Tarski’s truth definition 
to a consistent formal system T makes us able to see the truth of 
the Gödel sentence G(T). Let us take a consistent formal system 
containing arithmetic T (in a language L), and add Tarski’s T-
scheme (or if that fails, some other adequate truth condition) as an 
                                                           
58 See Shapiro 1998, pp. 497-507 for the full argument.  
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axiom59 to the system. We can move to examining this new system 
T’ (in a language L’). Now T’ would be conservative over T when 
it comes to proof, because no new rules of inference were included 
in the augmentation. Hence, if all the axioms and theorems in T 
were true, then in T’ with an adequate truth condition we would 
be able to establish their truth. So in the system T’ it would hold 
that: 
 
(1) T’├ ))()(Pr( xTrxx →∀ ,  
 
where Tr(x) is the truth predicate of T’ and Pr(x) is the proof-
predicate of T. Effectively, (1) says that all the theorems of T are 
true in T’. Now let us take any contradictory statement Λ  of T 
(like 10 = , which is clearly contradictory in arithmetic). Clearly 
one of the T-sentences would tell us that T’├ )(Λ¬Tr , for T is 
assumed to be consistent. Because it is the case that T’├ )(Λ¬Tr , 
we get from (1) that T’├ )Pr(Λ¬ . But )Pr(Λ¬  is equivalent with 
the sentence ConT, expressing the consistency of T. Now if the 
conservativeness claim of the deflationists were true, it would 
follow that T├ ConT. However, Gödel’s second incompleteness 
theorem states that T ConT. This leaves us with two options. 
Either our initial assumptions formalized as (1) are wrong, or T is 
not conservative over an adequate truth predicate. Looking at the 
way (1) was formulated, the initial assumptions do not seem to 
have anything troubling in them. Hence, the problem must be with 
the conservativeness assumption, and deflationism fails. This is 
Shapiro’s semantical argument against deflationism in a nutshell. 
                                                           
59 This is possible either by adding all the T-sentences as axioms, or by 
Tarski’s own way of adding the truth definition as a set of rules. The latter 
would have the obvious advantage of always being finite. See Tarski 1944 
for details. An important matter concerning the truth-predicate will turn 
out to be whether we want it to apply the schema of mathematical 
induction to formulas containing the truth predicate. Shapiro’s argument 
rests on the assumption that this is indeed the case. We will return to the 
potential problems concerning this shortly. See Halbach (2001) for more on 
the different ways of expanding formal systems with a theory of truth. 
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Of course, through all this we have been talking about a 
consistent formal system T containing arithmetic, and at this point 
we must return to one of the central assumptions behind Gödel’s 
incompleteness theorems: consistency. For Field (2001, pp. 343-350; 
2006), that is a recurring problem in claiming G(T) to be true, and 
thus with the whole semantical argument: we can only know the 
truth of G(T) if we can know that the system T is consistent. This is 
something, Field argues, that we cannot convincingly state of our 
mathematical systems, and hence the semantical argument does 
not hit its target.60  
This should not surprise us. Gödel’s second incompleteness 
theorem states that consistent formal systems containing arithmetic 
cannot prove their own consistency. If we follow extreme 
formalism in equating proof with truth, we should be pretty 
confident in claiming that no consistent formal system containing 
arithmetic can ever be established. Gödel proved this. So strictly 
speaking, Field’s argument here does not add anything that we did 
not already know. However, it does remind us of an important 
assumption. We assume that Peano arithmetic is consistent, or at 
least that there could exists some other adequate formal system of 
                                                           
60 To be exact, here Field is concerned with “our fullest mathematical 
theory”. Although this concept includes the original Hilbertian idea of 
single-system formalism, it is more convenient to use formalized (Peano) 
first-order arithmetic instead for the sake of simplicity. Making this choice, 
I accept the possibility of proving sentences of PA outside PA, that is, 
essentially in our fullest mathematical theory. However, such a theory 
would have its own Gödel sentence, and we would be back at the starting 
point. The differences between single-system formalism and milder 
versions of it will be a subject in the next chapter. For Field’s treatment of 
the concept of “fullest mathematical theory”, see Field 1998. His tentative 
suggestion for the concept (p. 302) is “the set consisting of all our explicit 
mathematical beliefs, plus perhaps those mathematical sentences we could 
easily be brought to believe explicitly, plus perhaps their logical 
consequences”. This should give an idea of what Field means, as well as of 
the vagueness that the concept ends up having.  
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arithmetic that is consistent. Since we obviously cannot prove it, 
this assumption is the best we have.61  
How big a problem is this for the semantical argument? The 
consistency of PA is something we cannot hope to establish 
indisputably due to Gödel’s proof, and that way the truth of Gödel 
sentences might seem to escape us forever. However, it must be 
remembered that we are not talking about just any old property of 
formal mathematical systems. If arithmetic turned out to be 
inconsistent, surely it would present us with much graver 
problems than incompleteness does. In inconsistent systems we 
can prove any theorem, including ConT, G(T) and ¬G(T). Moreover, 
if we do not believe in the consistency of our mathematical 
theories, we cannot believe in any of the proofs we acquire with 
them, whether it is Fermat’s Last Theorem or an elementary 
theorem about addition. This way, the lack of consistency proof for 
PA should not be thought to imply in any sense that it is somehow 
likely that PA is in fact inconsistent. In the strict formalist sense, 
Field’s criticism still remains unanswered – since we cannot know 
of consistent formal systems that they are consistent – but could 
we ever practise arithmetic without believing it to be consistent?  
Field (2001, p. 349) acknowledges that it is of course reasonable 
to hope that our theory of arithmetic is consistent, and hence G(T) 
true, but this does not make for a strong case for it actually being 
so. Strictly speaking Field may be right, but here I must strongly 
disagree with the strict sense being the relevant sense. I think that 
Shapiro’s argument carries only the slightest of burdens because of 
the unprovability of consistency. In fact, it seems that, overall, 
Field damages his own case more than that of Shapiro’s. It is true 
that the semantical argument does not apply if there cannot be 
such things as consistent formal systems containing arithmetic, 
that is, if PA and all other adequate axiomatizations of arithmetic 
are inconsistent. But here something very strange must happen for 
us to end up with the belief that there are in fact no consistent 
                                                           
61Some mathematicians, however, are ready to accept Gerhard Gentzen’s 
(1936) ordinal analytic proof of this. It should also be noted that there are 
efforts to express consistency in ways that avoid the second 
incompleteness theorem. See Detlefsen 1980 for an example. 
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formal systems containing arithmetic. Field admits that it is 
reasonable to hope, and even have “positive belief”, that arithmetic 
is consistent; I claim that we must have positive belief for it to be 
so. After all, that we can claim 2 + 2 = 5 to be false follows from the 
very same belief in consistency as the truth of G(T).  
If we go deep enough in our skepticism and doubt the 
consistency of all systems of arithmetic, what would be the point of 
discussing arithmetical truth and proof in the first place? Indeed, 
this is particularly damaging for the extreme formalist case. For the 
realist there always remains the possibility that our formal systems 
are fundamentally inconsistent, but we can trust them as long as 
they somehow give us true sentences. But for the strict formalist, 
proof is the only method of acquiring and recognizing true 
sentences. If we do not believe that the rules of proof and axioms 
are consistent, we cannot believe in any of our arithmetical 
statements, whether it is that 2 + 2 = 5 is false or G(T) is true. 
Clearly there must be limits to how far we can go in the fear of 
inconsistency. 
Certainly there does not exist a generally accepted proof for the 
consistency of PA – that is not the question here. However, as far 
as human knowledge goes, the consistency of arithmetic and the 
Peano axioms have to be among the least unreasonable 
assumptions. While we should be safe in making the assumption, 
of course it is still important to make it explicit. In this work, PA is 
assumed to be consistent, as is commonplace in mathematics and 
the philosophy of mathematics. To be more precise, we are 
assuming that some axiomatization of arithmetic is consistent. 
Perhaps PA is inconsistent after all, but the arguments throughout 
this work are not tied to it, but rather the more allowing concept of 
“consistent (and adequate) formal system containing arithmetic”. 
Essentially, we are assuming that there is some way of correcting 
PA, or another theory of arithmetic, to be consistent. As I see it, 
following the account above, this amounts to nothing more than 
assuming that we can state that 2 + 2 = 5 is false. 
Finally, we must remember that Gödel’s incompleteness 
theorems do not hold for inconsistent formal systems. Obviously 
we would never even know that G(T) is not provable if T were not 
assumed to be consistent. Shapiro’s argument would not be valid, 
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but there would not be grounds for any such argument in the first 
place, since Gödel’s proof of the existence of undecidable sentences 
would not apply. Field’s point is that we cannot unassailably know 
that our formal systems containing arithmetic are consistent, and 
in this he is correct. But of course we can assume that there are 
consistent formal systems, and Shapiro’s argument retains the 
exact same weight. If there can exist even one formal system 
containing arithmetic that is consistent, then by expanding it with 
Tarskian truth we establish a true unprovable sentence. Of course 
in philosophy and mathematics one can never be too careful, but 
this is definitely one question where the burden lies in showing all 
formal systems of arithmetic to be inconsistent. Safe to say, if the 
opposite were true – that is, if all axiomatizations of arithmetic 
were inconsistent (or inadequate) – mathematics and the 
philosophy of it would have much more serious problems than the 
ones considered in this work. To deny the truth of G(T) based on 
the lack of consistency proof is to deny the possibility of talking 
about truth and falsity of all arithmetical statements, whether we 
understand the concepts as deflationary or not. That should be 
reason enough to move on to other issues. 
There is one more thing we need to address here. One possible 
way around Shapiro’s semantical argument is that we construct 
arithmetic in another formal system, and we can prove the Gödel 
sentence in this new system. One candidate for this is set theory. 
But this approach does not provide us with anything new. First of 
all, it is not at all certain that we could prove G(T) in set theory (for 
example). But more importantly, even if we could, this new system 
would still contain arithmetic, and thus have its own Gödel 
sentence G(T)’ which could not be proved. If a consistent formal 
system has enough expressive power to contain arithmetic, Gödel’s 
incompleteness theorems apply, and there is no way around them. 
So far Shapiro’s argument seems to be very powerful. One must 
always be careful not to make fantastic claims based on Gödel’s 
incompleteness theorems, as we will see in the final chapter of this 
work, but it cannot be said that Shapiro makes that error. He 
makes an explicit argument of what we already considered to be 
intuitively obvious earlier: semantic truth gives us a way to see 
truths that we cannot acquire with formal proof. These are very 
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special kind of, and in mathematical practice rather uninteresting 
truths, but truths nevertheless. Mathematical deflationism seems to 
be in deep trouble if we include Tarskian truth, and Shapiro has 
shown us exactly why this is the case. 
 
 
3.3 Counterarguments beyond consistency 
 
At this point, I think we can be confident to set aside the problems 
concerning the possible inconsistency of arithmetic. Let us now 
move on to other criticisms of Shapiro’s argument. Field’s (1999, 
pp. 533-534) other answer to Shapiro is concerned with a perceived 
ambiguity between the notions of metaphysical and expressive 
thinness. To see this we must examine what Field means by these 
concepts, and what his basic concept of deflationism is. Field 
claims that instead of “metaphysical thinness”62, Shapiro argues 
against “expressive thinness”, and that is something Field does not 
disagree with. Truth is, in Field’s (ibid., p. 533) account, a device 
for making “fertile generalizations”. These are of the kind: 
 
Everything the Pope has said so far has been false. Hence, everything 
that the Pope says is false.  
 
Thus we commit ourselves to the truth (or falsehood, rather) of 
remarks that we have not heard. Since we do not know what these 
remarks will be, we cannot disprove them, and so our original 
sentence has more expressive power than what could be attained 
without the concept of truth (falsehood). This is what Field accepts 
as the main feature of the notion of truth: it has expressive power 
that we would not have without it, and that is why truth is not 
expressively thin. 
Deflationism, following that account of truth, is the notion that:  
 
                                                           
62Another deflationist Jody Azzouni gives a rather eloquent and telling 
description for metaphysical thinness: “truth is not a metaphysically 
substantial property, and it has no nature.” (Azzouni 1999, p. 540.) 
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…truth is a purely logical notion applicable only to sentences we 
understand, and serving solely as a device of generalization…(ibid., p. 
534).  
 
The example of the Pope’s utterances illuminates this viewpoint 
well, although the concept of “understanding” looks somewhat 
obscure, at least when it comes to mathematics. We will return to 
that, but let us grant Field this definition and see what follows. 
Field accepts Shapiro’s argument that T’ is not conservative 
over T, but points out that the argument depends on the way we 
add the truth predicate to T. Perhaps it is best to quote Field on 
what he means by this (only the symbols are translated to fit the 
ones used in this work). The following is Field’s conception of the 
truth predicate: 
 
(i) [Let us assume] that for each of the finitely many atomic predicates 
p of T, T’ licenses the usual general rule about how the truth of any 
sentence of form ),...,( 1 nttp depends on the denotations of ntt ,...,1 ; 
and that for each method of composing sentences out of simpler 
sentences, T’ licenses the usual general rule how the truth of 
compound depends on the truth of the components. (ibid, p. 534). 
 
What Field refers to is basically the usual Tarskian scheme of truth, 
with induction over the structures of formulas containing the truth 
predicate. Shapiro accepts this, and a truth definition like (i) is 
indeed conservative over T.63 But according to Shapiro (1998, pp. 
497-498), this is not sufficient, for it lacks the property of 
mathematical induction. We also want our truth definition to 
include generalizations over truth, such as “all the theorems are 
true”. This requires mathematical induction over formulas 
containing truth, and is not included in a notion like (i). 
So something more is needed for Shapiro’s account to succeed. 
Field (Field 1999, p. 535) formulates it as follows: 
 
                                                           
63 See Halbach 1999 Lemma 2.1 for proof that Peano arithmetic with full 
induction over formulas involving the truth predicate is conservative over 
PA. 
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(ii) [Let us assume] that T’ allows mathematical induction on 
formulas containing the truth predicate. 
 
This is the decisive step in Shapiro’s argument, for he made use of 
the statement “if all the axioms and theorems in T were true, then 
in T’ with an adequate truth condition we would be able to 
establish their truth”, that is, T’├ ))()(Pr( xTrxx →∀ . 
It is the truth predicate containing both (i) and (ii) that Shapiro 
wants, and with it we can know arithmetical truths that we 
otherwise could not, those of Gödel sentences. That is why, 
Shapiro argues, truth is not a metaphysically thin concept. Field 
(ibid., p. 536), however, thinks that this is only a case of making a 
generalization like the one he did with the utterances of the Pope. 
As such it would not be a problem for the deflationist, since truth 
is certainly not claimed to be expressively thin. What Field and 
Shapiro disagree on, according to Field, is whether such 
generalizations are metaphysically thin. 
Before we go any further, a couple of ambiguities must be 
clarified. Field’s original concept of deflationism was the 
viewpoint: “…truth is a purely logical notion applicable only to 
sentences we understand, and serving solely as a device of 
generalization…”, aided with the example of the Pope’s utterances. 
There are two difficulties in this. Firstly, there is an obvious 
difference between mathematical and empirical induction. 
Mathematical induction is hardly similar to the case of the Pope, 
for we know for sure that if the induction principle holds, then 
proof by mathematical induction is just as valid as any other 
method of proof. Of course, while empirical induction at its best 
gives us probable knowledge, mathematical induction over natural 
numbers is in fact completely deductive. Generalizations over the 
Pope’s utterances are not generalizations in the same sense, and 
the difference is an important one here. We commit to the 
falsehood of the Pope’s future statements, but of course there 
remains the possibility that our commitment is mistaken. That is 
also the reason why truth is not expressively thin. However, when 
proving a sentence φ(n) with mathematical induction, there is no 
possibility of φ(n) being false for some n. With mathematical 
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induction we know the future cases to be true, while with empirical 
induction that is just a tentative prediction. As such empirical 
induction is merely a heuristic device, and can be conceived as 
metaphysically (although not expressively) thin. But mathematical 
induction is one form of mathematical proof. With it we do not 
make predictions concerning the truth of sentences, we establish 
them. The difference here is important, as it could very well lead to 
the difference between expressive and metaphysical thinness. In 
this sense, when it comes to mathematical truth, Field’s example of 
the Pope’s utterances is highly misleading. 
Secondly, the notion “sentences we understand” needs to be 
clarified. In fact, when it comes to formalist mathematics, I can 
only conclude that Field means something along the lines of being 
well-formulated or provable. Any semantical account of 
understanding should not enter into the picture here, because that 
would right away warrant a semantical account of truth, which is 
of course the very thing that Field is trying to avoid. If Field does 
mean provability, then truth would mean generalizations of the 
type “we can prove A(x) for x = a, x = b, x = c. Hence A(x) is true for 
}{ cbaSx ,,=∈ ”. But this property is not a very interesting one, and 
hardly the kind of truth mathematicians are after. It is a 
metaphysically thin notion of truth, however, and it resembles the 
falsehoods of the Pope’s utterances. However, in this case truth 
would also be expressively thin. We must now extend the above 
example indefinitely, that is, “we can prove A(x) for x = a, x = b, x = 
c. Hence A(x) is true for }{ ,...,,,, edcbaSx =∈ ”. When the set S is 
infinite, we seem to have an analogy to Pope’s utterances: we 
commit to truth of future cases. But where in mathematics do we 
see truth used in such manner? Clearly this is not a proof, but a 
conjecture. Goldbach’s conjecture has been showed to be hold for 
all natural numbers 1810≤n , but no mathematician would claim it to 
be true for all n based on that. Such empirical induction does not 
belong to mathematics. However, that does correspond to the way 
Field uses truth to predict the Pope’s utterances, and it makes truth 
a metaphysically, but not expressively, thin property. 
Unfortunately for Field, there does not seem to be anything in 
mathematics that corresponds to such a notion of truth. 
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In any case, mathematical induction is a whole other matter, 
and over formulas containing the truth predicate it gives us the 
truth of G(T), a sentence of PA. Moreover, it does not do this by 
conjecture. If truth is still metaphysically thin when it unassailably 
gives us a new truth of PA, then it is beginning to seem that proof is 
also metaphysically thin – a point of view perhaps acceptable in 
extreme formalism, but certainly not one that is likely to convince 
doubters. It amounts to claiming that truth is metaphysically thin 
because everything in mathematics is metaphysically thin. Such a 
concept of metaphysical thinness is hardly interesting anymore, 
although it could very well be just what Field is after in his 
fictionalism. If that is the case, however, it is hard to see the point 
of going into any debates on truth and proof in the first place. 
 
So it seems that mathematical induction, not the different notions 
of thinness, is the key question here. As we saw from Shapiro’s 
argument, it was the principle T’├ ))()(Pr( xTrxx →∀ that made T’ a 
more powerful system than T. This is not a T-instance of a sentence 
of T, so the theory of truth needs to do more than enumerate all the 
T-instances. Namely, it must be able to express that it does 
enumerate all the T-instances. There are two arguments for this. 
According to Ketland, this is a direct consequence of the Tarskian 
theory of truth, for Tarskian truth is defined as giving us all cases 
of true sentences.64 The other one is the point (ii) that Field argues 
against, mathematical induction over sentences containing the 
truth predicate. 
By now we can forget the Pope’s utterances as a false lead for 
the deflationist. As far as the point (ii) of Field is concerned, the 
situation looks somewhat more promising for him. Rather than 
deal with metaphysical and expressive thinness, he can question 
the justification for mathematical induction in the first place. 
Indeed, Field’s (1999, p. 537) other argument is that we can expand 
T with a truth predicate also in ways that are conservative – as 
long as these ways do not include the principle of mathematical 
induction over formulas containing the truth predicate. Field 
                                                           
64 See Ketland 1999, pp. 79-91 and Tarski 1956 (Definition 23) for more on 
this. 
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argues that nowhere in a theory of truth should we include 
mathematical induction over it. In short, truth is truth and 
arithmetic is arithmetic: mathematical induction is a property of 
the latter, why should it also be one of the former?  
For Shapiro the principle of mathematical induction is essential 
to mathematical truth, and this was used in his argument against 
the conservativity of truth. It is essential to truth because we want 
to be able to show that if the axioms of a system S are true, and the 
rules of inference of S preserve truth, then all the theorems of S are 
true. But Field (ibid., p. 538) claims that this contention is not 
acceptable. He states that because we want to be able to show that, 
the induction principle is something just added to the theory of 
truth for our convenience. Therefore, Shapiro’s argument is wrong 
to rest on such weak assumption. What Shapiro would need, 
according to Field, is to show that the induction principle follows 
only from the nature of truth. 
Of course for Field truth is deflationist, so the induction 
principle will not be likely to follow from truth only – by definition 
nothing follows from deflationist truth only. In fact, he (ibid.) 
correctly points out that the induction principle follows from a 
property of arithmetic, namely that natural numbers are ordered 
and always have finitely many predecessors. As such, the 
induction principle would be essential to all predicates of 
arithmetic, not just truth. Since the induction principle would not 
be an essential quality of truth, but rather a quality of arithmetic, 
Shapiro’s argument would fail. After all, we could formulate truth 
as another predicate – one that does not conform to mathematical 
induction.  
However, here Field seems to neglect the main part of Shapiro’s 
argument. Obviously truth is not only a predicate of arithmetic. 
With truth we could establish the truth of Gödel sentences, which 
we could not do in PA alone. This should be enough to convince us 
that truth is not a predicate of arithmetic. In fact, already by 
Tarski’s undefinability result, no predicate of PA is equal to the 
truth predicate of PA. That arithmetical truth has the property of 
mathematical induction common with the arithmetical predicates 
should not be a problem. Indeed, we must remember that we are 
talking specifically about arithmetical truth here. Surely there 
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cannot be much controversy in including the induction principle in 
the concept of truth when it comes to arithmetic. For Bertrand 
Russell (see Russell 1920, pp. 20-28) this was actually the definition 
of natural numbers: natural numbers are the set that satisfies the 
principle of mathematical induction. If natural numbers can be 
defined as the set that satisfies the principle of mathematical 
induction, we should not have any problem including 
mathematical induction over the truth of them. In fact, whatever 
we want from arithmetical truth, for it to satisfy one of the Peano 
axioms (for that is what mathematical induction is) seems to be one 
of the weakest possible assumptions.65 
There does not seem to be any reason why the notion of 
arithmetic truth could not draw from arithmetic. In fact, the 
opposite viewpoint would seem quite peculiar. Volker Halbach 
(2001, pp. 187-188) has pointed out that nothing in a theory of 
arithmetical truth depends only on the nature of truth. All the T-
sentences depend also on the nature of numbers. This is an 
important point: the class of the true sentences of PA of course 
depends on the nature of natural numbers. As it turns out, 
mathematical induction is a crucial property of natural numbers. 
To claim that the truth of natural numbers could not include 
mathematical induction over formulas containing the truth 
predicate seems totally unacceptable from this background.  
However, all this must not be confused with truth being a 
property of the natural numbers, like Field seems to claim in his 
counterargument. Truth is still a property of the expanded system 
of PA added with Tarskian truth; it simply includes one important 
property of PA, that of mathematical induction. It seems that 
Shapiro is partly guilty of causing this confusion. He argues (1998, 
pp. 500-501) for the induction principle as something that follows 
from arithmetic. He does this to show that adding the truth 
predicate to arithmetic does not change the subject, because we can 
use the induction principle to the truth predicate. He quotes 
Shaughan Lavine (1994):  
 
                                                           
65 A similar point has been made by Hyttinen & Sandu (2004, p. 417). 
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…to define a property of natural numbers is to be willing to extend 
mathematical induction to it…  
 
Obviously we should be ready to accept this, but it indeed helps to 
make truth prone to Field’s treatment of it as just another property 
of the natural numbers. If truth were (in principle) 
indistinguishable from other properties, Field would have a case 
that truth is indeed metaphysically thin. But this is not the case. 
When we moved from T to T’ (and from L to L’), we added 
something new to the system. Shapiro wants to show that we did 
not change the game, and hence ends up implying that 
arithmetical truth is a predicate of the natural numbers. Of course 
it is a predicate concerning natural numbers, but it is not a predicate 
of T; it is one of the expanded system T’. 
It seems obvious by now that a theory of arithmetical truth 
should be able to draw from both truth and arithmetic, and when 
we talk about arithmetical truth, we are always concerned with the 
expanded system T’. Field claims that truth itself should be 
enough, while Shapiro sometimes seems to give the impression 
that arithmetic itself is enough.66 We must expand the scheme of 
mathematical induction from T to T’ for the semantical argument 
to hold, and this way we are of course changing the game a bit.67 
But if the deflationist theory of truth is inadequate, as Shapiro 
argues all along, what is wrong in changing the game, especially as 
the change is this insignificant?  
 
In another facet of the same subject, Jody Azzouni (1999, pp. 402-
403) claims that what Shapiro is doing does not really concern 
deflationist truth, since the deflationist does not need such truths 
and generalizations as Shapiro’s T’├ ))()(Pr( xTrxx →∀ . According 
to him, a theory of truth has no need to establish generalizations 
about truths. Sentences like this go beyond the scope of 
deflationary truth, and so Shapiro’s argument does not hit its 
target. Perhaps one might be ready to consider Azzouni’s criticism 
                                                           
66 It must be stressed that these are not actual arguments of Shapiro, only 
impressions a that less than careful reader can get of them. 
67 See Ketland 2005, p. 78 for his argument to the same effect. 
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to be valid, but only if we had some reason to believe that 
deflationary truth is indeed what mathematical truth is – the 
success of Hilbert’s program would have been at least a step 
toward that direction. For those who think that mathematical truth 
could be something else than deflationary truth, it seems rather 
limited that we cannot speak about truths in a theory of truth. In 
fact, T’├ ))()(Pr( xTrxx →∀ in particular sounds like a very 
important theorem of arithmetical truth. While Azzouni grants 
that the theorem is obvious, he does not see any reason to regard it 
as a part of a theory of truth. It might not be, but it is hard not see it 
as something that should at least follow from an adequate and 
satisfactory theory of arithmetical truth.  
Looking at Field’s and Azzouni’s criticisms, it might seem that 
the theorem T’├ ))()(Pr( xTrxx →∀  simply looks too appropriate 
for Shapiro’s purpose. However, there is always the possibility that 
the best solution also happens to be the most convenient one. That 
we can use the principle of mathematical induction like Shapiro 
does is admittedly very convenient, but that does not necessarily 
make it problematic. In fact, just the opposite seems to be the case. 
Considering the result “if axioms of a system S are true, and the 
rules of inference of S preserve truth, then all theorems of S are 
true”, we would be hard pressed to find it unintuitive or otherwise 
problematic. As far as philosophical conclusions go, there cannot 
be many more plausible ones, and any satisfactory theory of 
arithmetical truth should include it as a consequence. Just because 
this result could not be acquired within S does not mean it cannot 
be justified by other means, like here by adding a Tarskian theory 
of truth. 
For the deflationist there seem to be two options left. Either 
there is the path proposed at least implicitly both by Field and 
Azzouni of simply sticking to arithmetical truth as proof in PA. 
Truth cannot include mathematical induction – in fact, it cannot 
include anything except the T-instances of the theorems of PA. 
This is extreme formalism, and by default we are simply forbidden 
to add a non-deflationary theory of truth to it. Truth in such 
systems is only a translation of proof, and it is obviously 
deflationist. Other than noting the suspiciously arbitrary nature of 
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denying the use of mathematical induction over truth, in this 
context there is nothing more to be said about such formalist truth. 
When all the other counterarguments fail, the strict formalist can 
still claim that formal systems are all there is to mathematics, and 
hence acquire immunity against any strategy that includes 
expansions to formal mathematics. However, this denial of all 
expansions only works when we accept that formal systems are 
indeed all there is to mathematics. Unfortunately for the 
deflationist, when we think of mathematics as a human endeavour, 
we will find that such extreme formalism does not make sense. 
That will be a main subject for the rest of this work.  
Aside from extreme formalism and the rejection of all 
expansions, the other remaining option for the deflationist is to 
find alternative means of establishing generalizations like T’├
))()(Pr( xTrxx →∀ . It could be the case that we do not need a 
substantial theory of truth to arrive at that crucial generalization. 
This is an interesting possibility, and Neil Tennant’s argument for 
it will be examined shortly. But before that, it must be pointed out 
that there is also a third option for the deflationist. Volker Halbach 
(2001, pp. 188-189) has proposed that even though deflationism 
runs into problems with conservativeness, it could still be correct 
on the grounds that deflationism does not require conservativeness. 
This is an interesting idea. Essentially, Halbach is saying that the 
deflationist cannot define truth in a way that would remain 
conservative, but this is no problem. For Halbach, it is enough for 
deflationist truth that it succeeds in its purpose, that is, providing 
us with generalizations of the T’├ ))()(Pr( xTrxx →∀ kind. The fact 
that these generalizations are not conservative over the formal 
system T does not matter; that deflationist truth has substantial 
consequences is “merely a secondary effect”. In this way, Halbach 
concludes, deflationist truth is “not innocent, but that does not 
mean that it is wrong”. 
Halbach’s position is very different from Field’s. While Field’s 
argument for deflationism seems to be refuted by the lack of 
conservativeness, Halbach’s is bound to prevail against just about 
any counterargument. In fact, the argument looks suspiciously too 
strong. Whatever follows from deflationist truth, it will not matter 
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as long as it also serves its purpose of enumerating all the 
theorems of arithmetic as true (and stating this). Thus establishing 
the truth of Gödel sentences is simply another “secondary effect”, 
and not part of the deflationist truth. But surely this is too 
simplified. If our theory of truth has as its secondary effect new 
true sentences, on what grounds can we distinguish between this 
secondary truth and the primary one we were defining? The 
difference between primary and secondary effects seems very 
much arbitrary: after all, they both follow from the same theory of 
truth. In this way, Halbach’s position resembles that of Azzouni’s: 
they limit the domain of deflationist truth in ways that the 
arguments like Shapiro’s cannot touch. It is misleading to say that 
deflationist truth defined this way is not innocent – I would say it 
has been granted full immunity from prosecution. The problem is 
that this immunity is given in an arbitrary fashion.  
 
 
3.4 Why not deflationary truth? 
 
Jeffrey Ketland (1999) has provided independently of Shapiro a 
similar semantical argument against deflationism. His argument is 
fundamentally the same as Shapiro’s, so we will not go through its 
details. But Ketland has some interesting things to say based on the 
argument, and we should take a look at them. Most importantly, 
there is one question that we need to answer: when it comes to 
arithmetic, substantial or not, why should we prefer a Tarskian 
theory of truth to a deflationist one? This is where we ended up 
with the arguments of Field, Azzouni, and in a different manner, 
also Halbach. The deflationist can claim that even though Tarskian 
truth is not conservative, this is not a problem since the deflationist 
can insist that deflationary truth is the only correct theory of truth. 
To make full use of the semantical argument, we will need to show 
that deflationist truth is not acceptable as a theory of mathematical 
truth. 
To this effect, Ketland points out that we should abandon 
deflationist truth based on the very fact that it is incomplete. As we 
know from Gödel’s theorems, in a deflationist theory of truth we 
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cannot have such desirable theorems as “For any closed formula γ
, γ¬  is true if and only if γ  is not true” in consistent formal 
systems containing arithmetic. A deflationist theory of truth fails in 
many such cases, Ketland (ibid., pp. 85-86) argues, because the 
formal system cannot prove its own consistency. Of course one 
such case is the Gödel sentence G(T). The truth of G(T) is forever 
outside the bounds of the formal system it was formulated in. 
According to Ketland, deflationary truth is simply not satisfactory, 
because so much of what we expect from a theory of truth does not 
follow from it. We must remember that the main purpose of 
Tarskian truth is to provide an adequate definition of truth – which 
is something that deflationist truth fails to do. 
However, once we add Tarski’s theory of truth to the system, 
this is no longer a problem. In a manner similar to Shapiro, 
Ketland (ibid., p. 87) shows that G(T) is deducible from this 
strengthened theory: if T is the original consistent formal system 
containing arithmetic, and TS Tarski’s theory of truth, then 
T∪TS├ G(T). This corresponds to Shapiro’s argument, and the 
difference in details is not important. When we recognize the truth 
of the Gödel sentence, we obviously do not do it within the formal 
system. Gödel proved that consistent arithmetical systems cannot 
prove their own consistency and are incomplete. If we equate truth 
with proof – as deflationists do when it comes to mathematics – the 
deflationist theory of truth must be incomplete as well. This is 
obvious even without the semantical arguments. But like Shapiro, 
Ketland (ibid., pp. 87-88) argues that the Gödelian results show 
that a non-conservative, Tarskian, theory of truth “significantly 
transcends the deflationary theories”. Only the Tarskian theory of 
truth is adequate, because with it we can deduce the truth of the 
Gödel sentence, as well as that of other sentences requiring 
consistency. For Ketland that is one main reason to prefer Tarskian 
truth to deflationism. 
Both Ketland and Shapiro make a convincing case. Tarski’s 
theory of truth transcends the deflationary theories, which 
certainly helps to make it more appealing. When all the deflationist 
smoke has settled, it clearly is a drawback for a theory of 
mathematical truth that it turns out to be incomplete. Keeping this 
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in mind, Tarskian truth over arithmetic seems much more 
appealing than deflationism. But even so, the deflationist might 
have one more weapon in his arsenal. He could claim that the 
Tarskian theory of truth, while neither redundant nor incomplete, 
is nevertheless false when it comes to mathematics. Mathematics is 
about proof in formal systems, one could claim, and proof in 
formal systems only. In this way, the Gödel sentence would not 
actually be true, and the substantialist would be making false 
claims all along. The truth of Gödelian sentences would be a mere 
illusion: we would not be justified in making any declarations over 
truth that go beyond proof in formal systems – and if we reject all 
expansions to formal systems, that indeed must be the case. 
That is why we should also make it clear that there is another 
reason for us to choose Tarski’s semantic conception of truth: the 
fact that human beings use semantical thinking when they deal 
with mathematics. This is something that both Shapiro and 
Ketland fail to emphasize adequately, and it will be one of the 
main theses of this work. I will argue that the existence – and 
importance – of semantical thinking in mathematics should by 
itself be enough to justify the use of a semantical theory of truth. 
The formalist program and its followers may have distracted us, 
but the fact is that there exists overwhelming evidence of pre-formal 
mathematical thinking. Both historically and in terms of individual 
development it is the most basic mathematical thinking we have. 
Mathematics as a human phenomenon is not simply symbol 
manipulation in syntactic formal systems. In the upcoming 
chapters I will argue that Tarski’s theory of truth gives us an 
adequate conception of truth for this pre-formal mathematics. A 
deflationist one, for the reasons that Shapiro and Ketland have 
made clear, does not.  
This should be, more than the incompleteness of deflationist 
truth alone, justification for us to expand formal systems with a 
semantical notion of truth. As was noted in the previous chapter, 
while deflationist truth is not an expansion over proof when it 
comes to formal systems, Tarskian truth clearly is. If we 
categorically reject all expansions to formal systems, there is not 
much the anti-deflationist can do. The deflationist can 
undoubtedly use this as an argument against semantical truth, and 
88 3. The Semantical argument 
 
 
it seems that when all the other counterarguments are dealt with, 
that is indeed what they will return to. Without any justification 
for the expansion, the semantical arguments seem to be powerless 
against what I call the final deflationist thesis (FDT):  
 
(FDT): If formal systems are enough for mathematics, we have 
no reason to introduce expansions like semantical 
theories of truth. 
 
It is impossible to deny the power of conceptual simplicity in FDT. 
If one gives Occam’s razor the sort of power it is often given, the 
formalist has a seemingly convincing case. If we consider formal 
theories like PA to be successful, as most of us are likely to, why 
should we worry about expansions to them? Indeed, I do not see 
any reason why FDT as a philosophical thesis is not valid. I will 
argue, however, that it is not sound: formal systems are not enough 
for mathematics. Although PA might seem like everything there is 
to arithmetic, when we examine mathematics as the full picture – 
including the pre-formal mathematical thinking – that is not the 
case. In fact, in that full picture of mathematics, Tarskian truth is 
not an expansion at all. Tarskian truth carries no extra conceptual 
weight simply because mathematics as we understand it could not 
exist if extreme formalism were correct. 
That question will get a detailed treatment in this work, but let 
us put it on hold for a while. As far as the semantical arguments 
are concerned, the main advantage of Tarskian truth in arithmetic 
is its adequacy – to be precise, the ability to establish the truth of 
Gödel sentences. This is Ketland’s and Shapiro’s argument, and the 
deflationist’s best reply so far seems to be ignoring it, and insisting 
on formal proof being everything there is to mathematical truth. 
However, after all the considerations so far, there is still another 
way out for the deflationist, one that looks much more promising. 
Neil Tennant (2002) has argued against Shapiro and Ketland that 
semantical truth, and the semantical argument we have followed, 
need not be semantical after all. Tennant defends the deflationist 
point of view (even though he’s not a deflationist himself) by 
claiming that whatever we can express with truth predicates in the 
semantical argument, we can also express without them. What 
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appears to be semantical in the argument could also be achieved 
by completely deflationist methods. Essentially, according to 
Tennant, the arguments of Shapiro and Ketland are valid, but they 





Tennant (2002) does not argue against Shapiro or Ketland on the 
basis that their contention of semantical truth is wrong. Instead, he 
admits that it is more or less valid, but not the only valid one. 
Tennant aims to show that the semantical argument can also be 
reached in a deflationary way. He claims to present another way of 
recognizing the truth of Gödel sentences (or, to avoid reference to 
truth, recognizing that they should be asserted, rather than denied), 
one without any reference to truth predicates. This way, truth 
would not need to be a substantial property, and Tennant would 
refute what he calls the “substantialist dogma”. 
Tennant (ibid., pp. 562-564) correctly points out that this 
“optional way” of coming up with the semantical argument cannot 
be just adding the truth of Gödel sentences as a new axiom in the 
expanded system T’. The semantical argument is powerful because 
it tells us why asserting G(T) is the right thing to do, that is, why 
we informally see the truth of it. It is this point that Tennant wants 
to reach with his argument, only by different means. He must 
avoid the use of a truth predicate, but still be faithful to the 
deductive structure of the semantical argument. This rules out a 
few possible solutions, as Tennant remarks, including ones using 
the consistency of T as the first principle of expanding T.  
 Of course some kind of expansion to T is needed in order to 
establish the assertability of Gödel sentences. What Tennant (ibid., 
p. 573.) offers as the least powerful but still sufficient expansion to 
carry out the semantical argument is the following principle of 
uniform primitive recursive reflection (URp.r.):  
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(URp.r.): Add to T all sentences of the form 
)()))((( mmnprovn
T





 is equal to the earlier provability predicate )(Pr y
T
. 
Three things are required of URp.r.. First, it has to be sufficient for 
carrying out reasoning similar to the one in the semantical 
argument. Second, it must not be stronger than what is needed, 
and certainly not stronger than the addition of a truth predicate. 
Third, it cannot have any implicit connection to a truth predicate. 
Actually, URp.r. is really just a specific case of the so-called 
soundness principle. Solomon Feferman (1998, p. 233) has proposed 
the soundness principle (SP): 
 
 (SP): ψψ →)(
T
prov   
 
as a possible expansion of T that would suffice. Since in this work 
we have been dealing with primitive recursive functions ever since 
Hilbert’s program, I am confident that we can move from URp.r. to 
SP without any danger of damaging Tennant’s case. Feferman 
thinks of SP as the “means of expressing faith in the correctness of 
T without any new predicates at all”. I think that this is an 
appropriate description, and one that sounds intuitively like a 
promising candidate to replace Shapiro’s T’├ ))()(Pr( xTrxx →∀ . In 
SP, truth of the sentence is just replaced with the mere assertion of 
the sentence. Since this is exactly what the deflationist program is 
all about, we should be making the right choice of expansion. 
The structure of Tennant’s (2002, pp. 576-578) argument is as 
follows. Let ϕ again denote G(T). We can start examining our 
original Gödelian construction T├ )(Pr ϕϕ
T
¬↔ . To give us some 
tools to manoeuvre with, we can define the provability predicate in 
the following equivalent ways: 
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Here z belongs to the set of derivations (codes of proofs) in T. Now 
let x be an arbitrary derivation. First Tennant (see ibid. p. 577 for 
details) shows that in the system expanded with soundness, from 
Gödel’s incompleteness theorem we know that x cannot prove ϕ  
in T. To this Tennant introduces the following representability 
theorem: 
 




Applying that theorem, we get: T’├ ))),(,(( ϕxprovyprovy
TT
¬∃ . But 
we must remember that x was arbitrary, and hence the sentence 
holds for all x, that is, T’├ ))),((( ϕxprovprovx
TT
¬∀ . Now equipped 
with his URp.r. Tennant can conclude that in the expanded system 
T’├ ),( ϕzprovz
T
¬∀ . Since the Gödelian construction can take the 
following form: 
 
 ),()),(( ϕϕϕ zprovzzprovz
TT
¬∀↔¬∃↔ ,  
 
Tennant finally arrives at T’├ϕ , where T’ is T∪URp.r . So 
T∪URp.r├ G(T).  
Those are the important technical steps in Tennant’s argument. 
However, as Ketland (2005, pp. 81-82) points out, there is really no 
need for them. Accepting the soundness principle will 
automatically enable us to prove the Gödel sentence G(T). As we 
constructed it, G(T) is true (or assertable) if and only if G(T) is not a 
theorem of T. If we assume that T is sound, then G(T) is true if it is 
a theorem of T. Hence G(T) is not a theorem of T, and G(T) is true. 
So the soundness assumption implies G(T), and we have no need 
for the more complicated argumentation of Tennant.  
 
Now what should we make of Tennant’s argument? Granted, he 
does not use reference to a truth predicate anywhere in it. But he 
                                                           
68 See Tennant 2002, p. 560 for the theorem. This is based on the idea that if 
something is not provable, this unprovability can be proven.  
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does use his URp.r. which enabled him to talk about the assertability 
of all the sentences of T. Since it is a form of the soundness 
principle, the strength of Tennant’s argument ultimately lies only 
on the strength of that assumption. Unfortunately for Tennant, 
soundness is in fact a very strong assumption. For Shapiro and 
Ketland, the soundness principle followed from Tarski’s theory of 
truth. Tennant simply assumes soundness to hold. Which 
assumption should we consider more acceptable? This question 
will be examined in the next chapter.  
Before that, however, there is another question we must ask 
about Tennant’s argument: how exactly is it an argument for 
deflationism? As I see it, and as Tennant himself mildly suggests 
(ibid., p. 579), the question is not really about choosing between 
substantialism and deflationism, but rather between substantialism 
and prosententialism. We know that SP is not derivable from T 
(without making T inconsistent), as Löb’s theorem, following 
directly from Gödel, tells us.69 Since T is assumed to be consistent, 
there is no problem, and SP is a true expansion of T. But how 
strong an expansion is it? A deflationist cannot say things like “all 
the theorems of T are true”, as Shapiro pointed out (or, rather, “all 
the theorems of T can be asserted”). But equipped with SP, the 
deflationist can show in T’ that any theorem of T can (and should) 
be asserted. This is not the same thing, but just how big is the 
difference? Tennant (2002, p. 574) claims that it is not much; what 
the anti-deflationist says about T in the metalevel is shown by the 
deflationist, and SP states this. 
However, there is one problem here. It is different to state 
explicitly that “all the theorems are x” from presenting a scheme 
that shows “for any theorem it holds that x”. The difficulty lies in 
that SP may consist of infinitely many instances, and there might 
not be an exhaustive way of stating this finitely. To replace the 
schematic principle of SP, there are two possible ways of stating 
the involved principle explicitly, according to Tennant. One could 
either:  
 
                                                           
69 See Tennant 2002, p. 574 or Löb 1955 for details.  
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(ii) use a prosentential device, saying, instead something like 
“For every sentence that T proves, tthat.” 
 
Here tthat is a prosentential extension of English, referring to some 
new quality that captures the property of “all T-theorems being 
assertable”.70 Essentially, this is a way to remark that our language 
may not have all the expressive resources that are needed in order 
to speak about meta-mathematics. All this may sound far-fetched, 
but that is not necessarily the case. As Tennant (ibid., p. 575) points 
out, philosophers have been ready to change the fundamental 
concepts of classical logic. Surely introducing new concepts is not 
any more radical? 71 
Ultimately, as far as deflationism in considered, the argument 
may come down to choosing between truth and some other 
expression tthat. At this point the first question we must ask is why 
we could not use the concept that already exists in our language, 
instead of inventing artificial ones? If tthat is simply a translation of 
truth, the prosentential argument can hardly be any better than the 
Tarskian one. Indeed, there is a big problem in such prosentential 
devices behaving too much like Tarskian truth. One very 
problematic matter with Tennant’s soundness principle turns out 
to be the very feature it was introduced for: it performs the same 
function as Tarskian theory of truth in establishing the assertability 
of Gödel sentences. While Tennant only looks at the desirable 
results of his approach, there is also an important undesirable 
result for the deflationist. As we saw, adding the soundness 
principle gives us the new assertable sentence G(T). Even if we 
                                                           
70 Robert Brandom (1994) has written extensively about such prosentential 
account of truth. 
71 There is a parallel to this in the famous Tonk-discussion of A.N. Prior 
and Nuel Belnap, concerning the introduction of new logical connectives. 
See Prior 1960 and Belnap 1962 for details. 
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avoid all reference to truth, the soundness expansion causes our 
assertability property to be substantial. The whole point of 
mathematical deflationism was of course that no expansions to 
formal systems are needed – but if we do allow expansions, 
certainly they cannot cause truth/assertability to be substantial. 
Whatever we want from our assertability property, substantiality 
would have to be very low on the list. In any case, it cannot be a 
tool for the deflationist any more. 
If Tennant were correct, it would certainly make for an 
interesting case. But even so, that is no reason for us to abandon 
our underlying contention of semantics in mathematics. It does not 
really make a case for the deflationism of Field’s type, a fact that 
Tennant is quick to acknowledge himself. As far as Field is 
concerned, Tennant’s argument must be equally unacceptable, 
because it uses the consistency of formal systems and the results of 
mathematical induction in the same way. Indeed, Tennant is not a 
deflationist, and believes that truth is a substantial property. As he 
points out (2005, p. 89), his was an effort to show that Shapiro’s 
and Ketland’s arguments do not suffice to refute deflationism. But 
that does not mean that deflationism is correct.  
Tennant’s argument seems to have an air of translation around 
it, and that should immediately alarm us. Prosentential devices 
must be something other than direct translations of the existing 
concepts in order to be useful. This means that they should at the 
very least not lead to the exact same properties as the concepts 
they were meant to replace. But Tennant’s argument does exactly 
that. We will see the deep problems of translation-based solutions 
in philosophy when we deal with various nominalist theories in 
Chapter 6. Tennant’s argument seems to fall into this category. 
Tennant undoubtedly does give an alternative for a Tarskian 
account of truth, but only by replacing truth (not directly, it must 
be noted to Tennant’s advantage) with other principles that were 
not included in the original formal system T. But one must 
question the motivation behind such endeavours. Surely 
everything would be less complicated and more intuitive by 
including an account of truth, a concept we are already familiar 
with. 
 
3. The Semantical argument 95 
 
 
3.6 Why soundness over truth? 
 
However problematic such prosentential approaches may be, the 
real burden of Tennant’s argument concerns the reasons why we 
should expand formal systems with soundness principles rather 
than Tarskian truth. To justify a soundness principle, it would 
obviously have to be a weaker expansion. Ketland (2005) concedes 
that Tennant’s argument is valid, but he contends that assuming 
the soundness principle is in fact a stronger logical commitment 
than introducing the notion of truth. Ketland points out that there 
is a logical difference between accepting each theorem of 
arithmetic, and accepting the proposition that all the theorems of 
arithmetic are true/assertable. The latter (the soundness principle) 
is logically stronger than the former, which is the approach we 
take with Tarskian truth. While both approaches have the equal 
result of us accepting that “all the theorems of PA are true”, with 
truth we arrive at the stronger notion – with the soundness 
principle we assume it. This way Ketland (ibid., p. 75) sees that 
there is no reason to choose the soundness principle over truth as 
our choice of extension for T.  
Hence Ketland (ibid., 76-77) thinks that Tennant has 
misunderstood his and Shapiro’s argument.72 For him there is 
nothing strange in that a soundness principle will suffice to carry 
out the semantical argument (or the reflection argument, as 
Ketland calls it). It is the justification of the soundness principle that 
is important, and that is what his and Shapiro’s arguments are all 
about. While Tennant adopts his reflection principle without any 
justification at all, Ketland and Shapiro were trying to show how 
such principles follow – with the help of mathematical induction 
over formulas containing the truth predicate – from a truth-
theoretic expansion to formal systems like T. This is an important 
matter, since Tennant’s counterargument is based on semantical 
                                                           
72 As Ketland points out, Solomon Feferman (1991) had introduced largely 
the same argument already in 1991. It is only for the sake of convenience 
that we have concentrated on Shapiro’s and Ketland’s versions of it; 
Feferman’s argument was not followed by the kind of discussion that the 
later ones did. 
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truth not being the only way to establish the truth (assertability) of 
Gödel sentences, which is something that Ketland did not claim it 
to be.73 What Ketland wants to emphasize is that the soundness 
principle (and its variation, Tennant’s reflection principle) is 
available for him and Shapiro because they justify it with a 
Tarskian theory of truth. It is not available for Tennant because he 
just assumes it without any argument. Thus Tennant’s 
counterargument fails.  
That is an important point, and I will argue that Ketland is 
ultimately correct. But still, in one sense, Tennant is right. Gödel’s 
incompleteness theorems do not immediately imply a substantial 
notion of truth. There are other alternatives in expanding the 
formal system, one of which is the soundness principle. In an 
extremely important way, that changes the question. We no longer 
need to ask whether we can establish the truth (or assertability) of 
Gödel sentences. We undoubtedly do, and there are various ways 
of expanding the formal systems to do this. The question now 
becomes: which expansion is the most plausible one? 
 
I think we can learn a lot about the weakness of Tennant’s position 
from one harmless-looking claim in his article. Tennant (2002, pp. 
560-561) points out that our talk of self-reference when it comes to 
the Gödel sentence is misguided. Thus it is, according to him, 
incorrect to say that G(T) states its own unprovability. Rather, in 
Gödel’s construction we just have proofs from ϕ  to )(Pr ϕ
T
¬ and 
                                                           
73 It must be noted that Ketland also claims that if a Tarskian theory of 
truth is even one way of recognizing the truth of G(T), it is enough to 
refute deflationism, since deflationist truth was supposed be conservative. 
If deflationism over mathematical truth were correct, we could not be able 
to prove G(T) from the truth-theoretic extension of T. However, I do not 
agree with Ketland here. Since there are other ways of establishing the 
truth of G(T), this comes down to the question whether we are justified in 
expanding formal systems at all. If we are, then the question becomes 
which of the expansions is the most plausible one, as Ketland initially 
argued. This second line of thinking is much less attractive, because it 
seems to presuppose that Tarskian truth is in fact a correct theory of 
mathematical truth. 





¬  to ϕ . On this account ϕ  is only a fixed point for the 
predicate )(Pr x
T
¬ . Of course this much we knew already, and 
Gödel’s fixed-point theorem is instrumental in the proof of the 
incompleteness theorems. But why could we not talk about the 
Gödel sentence being self-referential? Surely Gödel formulated it 
knowing very well that self-referential sentences cause problems. 
Just because he found the syntax for formulating such a sentence 
without using imprecise terms such as “self-referential” does not 
change the fact that Gödel’s whole proof was done with such a 
self-referential sentence in mind. This might seem like an 
unimportant detail, but it prepares for the sort of argument that 
Tennant has in mind: any semantical reference is forbidden. But 
could Gödel ever have formulated the incompleteness theorems if 
he did not have a semantical understanding of the central concept 
of self-reference? We should keep in mind that Gödel knew exactly 
how paradoxes are reached in mathematics. This is particularly 
important because it mirrors the larger question of mathematical 
thinking: perhaps the semantical argument can be translated into 
non-semantical terms, but that should not be understood to imply 
that semantical thinking does not exist, or that the introduction of 
semantical truth is not correct. We must not forget that Tennant is 
re-formulating (or perhaps even translating) an existing argument 
– one which is built on a semantic notion of truth. To reach its goal, 
Tennant’s argument would need to achieve something beyond 
that: it should be in some way better than the semantical arguments 
of Shapiro and Ketland. 
That is an important question, because Tennant’s (2005, pp. 91-
92) main counter-criticism against Ketland is that the truth-
theoretic principles need justification as well. This is something 
that Ketland seems to overlook, and Tennant believes that 
justification for the soundness principles is easier to present. To 
this effect, he points out that from a Tarskian theory of truth we get 
stronger results (for example, concerning the consistency of the 
expanded system) than from the soundness principle, or from his 
own uniform primitive recursion reflection principle. Hence 
Tennant claims that his URp.r. produces the weakest expansion of T 
that is able to prove the Gödel sentence G(T). 
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This is Tennant’s (2005) final point: a Tarskian theory of truth is 
perfectly acceptable (we must remember that Tennant is not a 
deflationist himself) as a means of recognizing the truth of the 
Gödel sentence. However, unlike Shapiro and Ketland think, it is 
not the only means. And unlike Ketland later claims, Tennant 
argues that it is not the least strong assumption, either. Tennant 
points out that he can perfectly well assume the soundness 
principle (or URp.r.; it matters little in our discussion) without a 
theory to back it up, because it is a weaker assumption than the 
one Ketland makes in introducing Tarskian truth. The soundness 
principle only assumes that we trust our arithmetic systems, while 
Ketland and Shapiro assume them to be true. Or so goes Tennant’s 





What can we make out of all this? I think there are two important 
points to be made here, in addition to the ones that have been 
mentioned so far. First of all, Tennant seems to identify the 
strength of an assumption with that of its consequence. Surely a 
theory of truth could be a weaker assumption than a soundness 
principle, even if it did lead to stronger results concerning the 
expanded system – just like Ketland argued on the difference 
between accepting PA plus truth and accepting the soundness of 
PA. As far as the logical strength of the expansions is concerned, 
there really does not seem to be much of a difference between truth 
and soundness. In fact, as far as the sentences of PA are concerned, 
which is the most important aspect in the whole matter, they are 
equal. However, there is another, much more important sense in 
which to distinguish between the strengths of assumptions here. 
Tennant is concerned only with the logical strength of an 
assumption, but we must also consider the epistemological strength. 
Whatever the logical status between the expansions of truth and 
soundness may be, we must look at other aspects of justification 
behind them. Surprisingly, this matter is largely ignored in the 
current discussion, even though we are ultimately concerned with 
the epistemological and metaphysical status of the truth predicate. 
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For minimal logical strength, we could assume that each theorem 
is given to us by direct observation of the physical world. This 
assumption has absolutely no logical strength, but it is obviously 
an extremely strong assumption as far as the epistemological 
aspects of philosophy of mathematics are concerned. Logical 
strength alone cannot be the deciding factor when we are choosing 
between expansions. 
This brings us to the second – and I think, the most important – 
point. Just what arguments do we have in favour of the 
justification for each alternative, the soundness principle and a 
semantical theory of truth? The former, at least for Tennant, seems 
to be based only on the contention that it can do the same job that 
truth does, plus it is logically weaker. But how does it stand 
metaphysically and epistemologically? Where do we get the 
conviction that we should assert all provable sentences? Tennant 
claims that this is just equivalent to stating that we trust our formal 
systems. This is of course true, but by itself not satisfactory. 
Obviously we trust our formal systems, but Tennant’s soundness 
principle applies to all formal systems, not just the ones we want to 
accept in mathematics. To be of philosophical value, such a 
soundness principle would need to have enough expressive power 
to differentiate between assertable and non-assertable formal 
systems. As it is now, Tennant’s approach only moves that 
question to another level: it cannot explain why we want to assert 
certain formal systems and not others.  
This weakness becomes obvious when compared to Tarskian 
truth. When we claim with Shapiro that T’├ ))()(Pr( xTrxx →∀ , we 
are making a statement that the theorems of T are true in a non-
deflationary way: that the axioms of T are true, and the rules of 
proof valid. Importantly, for most formal systems S we would not 
be making this claim, since we do not trust all formal systems to 
give us true mathematical sentences. However, when we claim 
with Tennant that ψψ →)(
T
prov , we are in fact stating that in 
addition to T, for all formal systems S provability implies 
assertability. How can a soundness principle alone differentiate 
between an assertable and a non-assertable formal system? The 
soundness principle is suspiciously arbitrary in its nature: if 
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Tennant wants to apply it to the formal system T, what is there to 
prevent us from applying it to any formal system S? This question 
can be answered only by going into meta-mathematical 
considerations over acceptable formal systems – but there we face 
the same problem all over again.  
In fact, how can we have any criteria of what results we want to 
assert over others, without any reference to truth, or something 
else beyond formal systems? What reasons do we have for 
accepting some rules of proof and axioms over others? I think 
these are important questions that the deflationist must answer, 
and if not truth, one needs to introduce some other criteria in order 
to save mathematics from arbitrariness. It is much too easy to 
follow mathematical practice in claiming arithmetic to be sound, 
without taking any notice of the fact that axiomatic arithmetic is 
designed to fit our pre-formal conception of what properties natural 
numbers should fulfil. Obviously we have not simply by accident 
stumbled on the Peano axiomatization of arithmetic. This is a point 
I want to make in this work. When we want to make sense of the 
epistemology and metaphysics of mathematics, we must study the 
whole phenomenon of mathematical thinking – not just the end 
product that formal systems are.  
Here we must return to the concept of pre-formal mathematical 
thinking. Just like pre-formal mathematics precedes formal 
mathematics both historically and psychologically, I will argue that 
a notion of truth precedes a notion of proof. In fact, I contend that 
truth is the feature of pre-formal mathematics that formal 
mathematics is designed to capture by proof. This is why I think 
Ketland is correct: the notion of truth is a more natural, more 
plausible assumption to make. This is the case historically, 
psychologically, pragmatically and epistemologically. No matter 
which way we look at mathematics, we cannot escape the 
impression that we are after very special kind of systems and 
sentences, and not the kind of arbitrary formal systems that the 
deflationist position leads to. The ball is definitely in the 
deflationist’s court to show how the concept of proof, as we have it 
in arithmetic, could have developed without any reference to truth, 
that is, ultimately without reference to any reason for asserting 
certain theorems over others.  
3. The Semantical argument 101 
 
 
If we accept a Tarskian account of truth, then truth is a 
substantial notion. The Gödel sentence is enough to show that 
there is an extensional (as well as the intensional) difference 
between truth and proof. There are other ways of establishing the 
truth (or rather, assertability) of Gödel sentences, but a semantical 
notion of truth is the most plausible and natural one. The reason 
for this is that we already have the notion of semantical truth, and it 
corresponds to our pre-formal mathematical thinking. This is one 
aspect of the problem that Shapiro, Field, Ketland and Tennant 
have all largely neglected. But I think it is an important one. In fact, 
it is one of the main theses of this work, and I will argue for it in 
the next chapters.  
 
To put the structure of my argument more formally: 
 
(1) In any consistent formal system T containing arithmetic 
there are sentences that can neither be proved nor disproved 
in T. This is Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem. 
 
(2) Such Gödel sentences G(T) can be seen to be true in a system 
T’, where T’ is an expansion of T that provides us with the 




(3) There are (at least) two possible solutions to include the 
soundness principle in T’. First, a semantical Tarskian theory 
of truth can be introduced (following Shapiro and Ketland). 
Second, a form of the soundness principle itself can be 
directly introduced (following Tennant). 
 
(4) Hence, us being able to establish the truth of G(T) does not 
directly imply that the notion of truth is substantial. G(T) 
can be asserted without any reference to truth, as Tennant 
showed by introducing a soundness principle. 
 
(5) However, the introduction of a soundness principle without 
any reference to truth is problematic. We would not seem to 
have any reason to assert one sentence over another, and as 
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such all formal systems would be equally sound. 
Consequently, the axioms and rules of proof would be 
ultimately arbitrary. This is the main problem of extreme 
formalism. 
 
(6) Introducing a semantical notion of truth carries no such 
burden of arbitrariness, because by doing it we are 
committing to the truth of assertable sentences.  
 
(7) Therefore, introducing Tarskian truth is a much more 
natural and plausible extension than the soundness 
principle. In fact, it is no extension at all when we consider 
the whole phenomenon of mathematical thinking. Our pre-
formal mathematics already includes the concept of truth, 
which the Tarskian account satisfies. 
 
(8) Because with a Tarskian notion of truth we can establish (in 
T’) that G(T) is true, and it is the most plausible of the 
competing strategies, truth and proof do not have the same 
extension, that is, they are not the same concept.  
 
(9) Therefore, the concept of truth is substantial, not 
deflationary. 
 
The important point about (9) is that it does not follow directly 
from Gödel’s incompleteness theorems. It follows from us already 
having a substantial notion of truth. Gödel’s first theorem is 
important because it gives us an explicit case of seeing this 
substantiality of truth. Therefore, the existence of our pre-formal 
mathematical thinking, together with Gödel’s incompleteness 
theorems, makes an extremely strong case for the substantiality of 
truth. 
 The debate over semantical arguments is still young and might 
take interesting new turns. The possible problems and solutions 
cannot be exhausted by the arguments we have just examined. But 
at the moment it certainly looks like the semantical argument 
really does give us a reason to think that deflationism either fails, or 




not because we could not assert the Gödel sentence without the 
notion of truth. Tennant is correct in claiming that a soundness 
principle will suffice for that purpose. However, his approach 
includes serious problems. Either one assumes the soundness 
principle without analysis, or he must present assertability 
conditions that account for the soundness. In neither case can we 
refer to anything outside the realm of formal mathematical 
systems, because if we do, we would be equally justified in 
expanding the systems with truth. The former case implies 
arbitrary trust in formal systems, so we must move into 
assertability conditions as the alternative to truth. We will see 
many serious problems with this approach.  
 
In the next chapters, I will argue that no expansion to mathematics 
is needed in order to carry out the semantical argument, as long as 
we acknowledge that mathematics does not consist only of the 
formal part. The pre-formal part exists, as well, it is absolutely 
essential for us to be able to practise mathematics, and it is 
philosophically important. This is something neither Ketland nor 
Shapiro have used in their arguments, and which should be 
acknowledged now. All along, they are concerned with finding the 
right expansion to formal mathematics. I will argue that this makes 
the substantialist project needlessly difficult. We should start by 
considering mathematics as a whole, not just the important tip of 
the iceberg that is the formal part. Then we will see that Tarskian 
truth is in fact no expansion at all: it fits astonishingly well with 
our pre-formal mathematical thinking. As we will see, it also fits 
well with just about any philosophical account of mathematics, 
whether it is Platonism, structuralism, empiricism or moderate 
formalism. The only one it does not fit together with is extreme 
formalism, where we categorically reject the possibility of 
expanding formal systems in the first place. These will be the main 
subjects of the remainder of this work. 
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4. Formal and pre-formal mathematics  
 
4.1 Assertability and arbitrariness 
 
As we have seen, if we want expand a formal system with a 
soundness principle, we must justify this somehow. Tennant’s 
claim was that we accept the soundness principle if we trust our 
notion of arithmetic proof. Although that initially seems acceptable 
enough, the matter is not that simple. We have not arrived on the 
rules of proof by accident, as becomes obvious from the briefest of 
looks at the history of mathematics. It would be all too easy to 
assume the soundness principle without any justification. In fact, 
we could straight away assume the assertability of all undecidable 
sentences and find an even more simple way of asserting the Gödel 
sentences.74 However, the only justification for doing this could be 
that we know them to be true. Similarly, in assuming a soundness 
principle, we are assuming implicitly that we know our 
arithmetical systems to be sound. But we can only do this because 
we know what the systems are and what kind of work has been 
done to make them possible.  
Without this knowledge we would only be dealing with some 
arbitrary set of axioms and rules of proof, and surely not all such 
systems are assertable. The problem with soundness principles is 
that they only work if we already assume the formal system in 
question to be sound. But not all formal systems of mathematics 
can be equally sound, and without any assertability conditions we 
cannot have any basis for asserting one such system over another. 
In this work I call this the problem of theory choice: with a 
satisfactory philosophical account we must be able to explain why 
we have chosen some mathematical theories over others. I will 
                                                           
74 Of course we could not actually do this, as there are undecidable 
sentences of which we have no way of knowing whether they are true or 
false. The most famous of these is the Continuum hypothesis: the sentence 
according to which there does not exist a set of numbers with cardinality 
strictly between that of natural numbers and real numbers can neither be 
proved nor disproved from the axioms of Zermelo-Fraenkel (ZFC) set 
theory, as shown by Gödel (1940) and Paul Cohen (1963). 
4. Formal and pre-formal mathematics 105 
 
 
argue that Tarskian truth serves that purpose well.75 If we hold 
formal arithmetic to be sound, that is because it has been 
developed to be such. Unfortunately for the deflationist, however, 
this process of development is contaminated by references to truth 
all over, starting from the rules of logic as “truth-preserving”, and 
ending with arithmetic giving us “true” information about the 
physical world. There is no way a mere soundness principle will 
do as an expansion: we cannot use a ladder, throw it away at the 
top and pretend that it never existed. The real question is not 
whether PA, or some other formal mathematical system, is sound. 
It is whether the deflationist can distinguish between the 
soundness of PA and that of some arbitrary formal system S, and 
still remain a deflationist. 
Of course one popular criterion of theory choice used to be 
consistency. However, not only are there consistent formal systems 
that we do not use in mathematics, but more importantly – by 
Gödel’s proof – we cannot prove the consistency of the ones that 
we do use. Paradoxically, consistency is at the same time too weak 
and too strong a requirement for formal theories to use as the 
criterion of theory choice. Certainly avoiding inconsistency can be 
– and is – one criterion of theory choice, but by itself it does not 
suffice. 
So we see that there is only one option for the deflationist if he 
wants to use soundness principles: he must present assertability 
conditions in order to escape the problem of arbitrariness looming 
in his argument. He must present us with reasons why we use the 
                                                           
75 This is of course not to suggest that Tarskian truth by itself is sufficient 
for solving the problem of theory choice. Rather, Tarskian truth is 
compatible with having a solution to the problem, while a deflationist 
theory of truth is not. When we add Tarskian truth to a formal system S, 
we claim that the theorems of S are true, but we are obviously only 
prepared to do this for the formal systems that we hold to be true. Thus 
the criterion of theory choice is something external to Tarskian truth, 
which is hardly surprising. Tarski’s theory of truth is a formal 
philosophical tool and should not be thought to help us in establishing the  
true axioms of mathematics. But it does give us the formal tools to handle 
the problem of theory choice, which is something that – I will argue in this 
chapter – the extreme formalist account of mathematics fails to do. 
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rules of proof we do, and why we have chosen the axioms we 
have. Importantly, he must do all this without any reference to 
truth – that is, ultimately, without any reference to objects outside 
formal mathematics. We must remember that truth is a much 
wider concept than the Platonist interpretation of it suggests. The 
problem starts with the very basic rules of logic. If we have a → b 
and a, why do we infer b instead of ¬b? It seems like a hopeless 
task to answer this question without any reference to notions 
outside formal mathematics, unless one accepts the option of pure 
arbitrariness.  
Crispin Wright (1992, pp. 95-107) in his neo-logicist program 
has studied the possibility, as well as the problems, of assertability 
conditions. Just why are we justified in concluding b from a → b 
and a? One idea suggested by Wright and others is that the rules of 
proof are such deep-entrenched standards in the mathematical 
practice that they need no outer justification. In other words, we 
are warranted to use them because of the very fact that they are 
rules of proof. In Wright’s terminology, such deep-entrenched 
statements are superassertible; they would “survive arbitrarily close 
scrutiny” (ibid., p. 48, Wright 1987, pp. 295-302). I think that there 
are two ways of interpreting this somewhat frustratingly vague 
characterization: either it can be thought of as conventionalism, or 
it can be interpreted as leaving the whole question concerning the 
origins of rules of proof and axioms open. Both interpretations 
have their problems. The former is obviously quite possible to do, 
but if we are to use conventions as the criteria for assertability, 
why should we neglect the convention of talking about the truth of 
mathematical sentences, and replace it with the non-convention of 
assertability? Just what conventions should we accept, and more 
importantly, how did we arrive at these conventions? 
Conventionalism has the troubling potential of becoming a 
philosophical explanation of everything. All current human 
knowledge can be thought of as conventions, which it 
undoubtedly is in a weak sense. It is a convention to think that the 
general theory of relativity explains the universe better than 
Newton’s mechanics does. However, outside post-modernist 
circles, one is not likely to find philosophers who that think this is 
only a convention, not based on anything objective. 
4. Formal and pre-formal mathematics 107 
 
 
It goes without saying that many mathematical statements are 
deep-entrenched conventions. However, even the most 
fundamental of our conventions have origins, and the real question 
concerns those origins of the conventions. What we know about 
the origins of our rules of proof is that they were intended to find 
out true mathematical sentences. From the Pythagorean times to 
most working mathematicians today, mathematics has been 
widely understood as a distinct pursuit of true sentences, aimed of 
course at understanding mathematics itself, but also at explaining, 
and predicting, the physical world in mathematical terms. The 
success of this venture has given the mathematical rules of proof 
justification, and it has made perfect sense to call the accepted 
theories true. When we dispense with truth, we also seem to 
dispense with that justification. If not aimed at finding out truths, 
can mathematical conventions be thought of as anything else than 
arbitrary statements that we have somehow chosen to believe 
about things like numbers and geometrical objects – in essence no 
different from such non-mathematical endeavours as numerology 
that are seemingly about the same objects? Today, almost all 
scientific theories rely heavily on mathematical tools. Could it 
really be the case that all these tools – so incredibly helpful, 
perhaps indispensable, in explaining the physical world – are in 
fact arbitrary, products of pure chance? 
How about the second interpretation: that we need to leave the 
questions of the origins untouched. Again, this is possible to do, 
although it basically leads to the demolition of philosophy of 
mathematics. But again, why dispense with truth? That is already a 
deep-entrenched mathematical practice, while assertability is not. 
This will be the main problem with any argument similar to 
Wright’s: if we use the accepted status of rules of proof as an 
argument for their justification, how can we neglect the accepted 
status of truth as the grounds for these rules? Any minimalist 
argument drawing from conventions must be careful with this. 
Minimalism is not a convention of mathematical practice. In fact 
Platonism comes closest to being the philosophical convention of 
mathematicians, at least as far as the working language of 
mathematics in considered. 
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Accepting assertability without any analysis does not look like 
a fruitful approach, and hence the assertability conditions must be 
somehow justified. Perhaps the first effort to find assertability 
conditions was Arend Heyting’s (1931) semantic of proof 
conditions. Michael Dummett (1977 and 1978) has also taken on 
such a project. One big problem with both of these accounts is that 
they are intuitionist assertability conditions, and not directly 
applicable to the classical mathematics considered so far in this 
work. That fact notwithstanding, neither of these accounts 
manages to avoid the problem of the origins of these assertability 
conditions. Intuition is the key concept in both of them, and even if 
one were ready to follow their account of mathematical intuition, 
there would still remain the question what causes our 
mathematical intuitions to be what they are. They simply do not 
give us any explanation why some sentences are assertable but 
others are not. That explanation would of course have to be 
completely independent of truth, including all the conventions that 
are based on the concept of truth. That last remark is very 
important. Otherwise, we could just take the easy way out: 
translate the word true as the word assertable. Quite obviously we 
cannot be after such translations in a deflationist pursuit of 
mathematics. 
Keeping this in mind, it seems that the challenge for the 
deflationist is nothing less than creating a complete account of 
mathematics from the scratch. Perhaps this sounds too hard, but 
for the initial purposes he only needs to justify the axioms and 
rules of proof of basic mathematics – say, set theory or arithmetic. 
And if that sounds like too arduous a task, it is only because that is 
the price any such radical revisionist must pay.  As of now, I have 
not stumbled upon a comprehensive account of assertability 
conditions that would be anywhere close to being an adequate 
replacement for a theory of truth. Indeed, most accounts defending 
assertability seem to run into the translation problem: they add 
nothing to the subject expect a new terminology dispensing with 
truth by translating it as assertability. But how we could ever hope 
to solve philosophical (in this case both epistemological and 
metaphysical) problems by translation?  
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What about usefulness and conservativity in physical theories 
as the criteria of assertability, which are the ideas behind Field’s 
formalism? At first this approach has a certain appeal to it since it 
seemingly avoids the problem of arbitrariness: instead of any 
purely mathematical criteria, it is now a physical criterion that our 
theory choice should follow. As long as mathematical theories are 
useful in physical theories, we should accept them. In Field’s (1980, 
p. 15) words:  
 
What makes the mathematical theories we accept better than these 
alternatives to them is not that they are true […] but rather that they 
are more useful: they are more of an aid to us in drawing consequences 
from those nominalistic theories that we are interested in. If the world 
were different, we would be interested in different nominalistic 
theories, and in that case some of the alternatives to some of our 
favourite mathematical theories might be of more use than the theories 
we now accept. Thus mathematics is in a sense empirical, but only in 
the rather Pickwickian sense that it is an empirical question as to 
which mathematical theory is useful. (Italics in the original.) 
 
Clearly not all mathematical theories are equally useful in the 
accepted physical ones, so arbitrariness is avoided. Or is it? When 
we take a closer look at the matter, it becomes obvious that this is 
all just an illusion. Take Field’s example of Newtonian mechanics. 
We are talking about a physical theory that actually required the 
development of calculus. Now let us think of the usefulness and 
conservativeness of calculus in Newtonian mechanics. Field (1980, 
1989) shows that calculus is indeed conservative over Newtonian 
mechanics76, ends up with deflationism and fictionalism in 
mathematics, and finally admits that calculus should be preferred 
because it is useful. But what he really has done is showing that a 
physical theory that required calculus can be afterwards presented 
in a calculus-free notation. In this way, of course it is calculus – and 
not some rival theory – that Field shows to be conservative over 
Newtonian mechanics. That calculus is useful in it is even more 
obvious. Does this tell us that we have a criterion for theory choice 
                                                           
76 Or claims to have shown. See Chapter 6.4 for problems with Field’s 
approach. 
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in mathematics? Quite clearly not, because with a different 
mathematical theory as the foundation, Newton (or someone else) 
would have ended up with a different theory of physics. 
So the problem of arbitrariness is not avoided. How can we 
know beforehand which theories of mathematics to use in physics, 
not to mention which theories to use in all the simple non-scientific 
applications?77 Clearly conservativeness and usefulness cannot be 
the answers here. Whether we manage to show our current 
mathematical theories to be conservative over physics or not, there 
remains the problem of accepting certain theories as the ones to 
use in physics in the first place. In a way, the question is moved 
from the theory choice between mathematical theories into choice 
between physical ones. Since modern physics is so thoroughly 
“contaminated” by mathematics, any study of the existing theories 
is redundant. If mathematical theories are conservative over 
physics in the first place, they are bound to be conservative over 
the physical theories they were used in, even developed for, as in 
Field’s own paradigm case. That they are useful in such theories is 
too obvious to have relevance on the question of theory choice. 
Some sort of counterfactual inference must be made here. What 
if our theories of physics had been developed differently, in a way 
that conflicts with calculus, or perhaps totally without 
mathematics? Clearly we would have no justification for using 
conservativeness as an argument for accepting calculus. But as it 
happens, we do accept calculus. However this is explained, it 
cannot be the case that conservativeness is the criterion of theory 
choice here. All mathematical theories are conservative over some 
theory of physics, although obviously most of them are that in a 
totally uninteresting fashion. If our best current physical theories 
had been developed in a non-mathematical way, Field could have 
a point. But conservativeness over thoroughly mathematical 
                                                           
77 In the Quinean-Fieldian tradition of discourse one almost gets the idea 
that mathematics is used solely in developed scientific theories. It must be 
remembered, however, that we are using mathematics even when 
counting apples – and that has nothing do with being conservative over 
theories of physics. We will return to this question of “non-scientific” 
applications later on in this work. 
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theories of physics cannot work as the criterion of theory choice in 
mathematics.78 
Either we must accept arbitrariness or we must make more out 
of Field’s notion of usefulness (and perhaps conservativeness) 
being, in a weak sense, an empirical question. However, in that 
case mathematics would be an essentially empirical science, and it 
would make sense to speak of references for mathematical 
sentences. Clearly these would not be the kind of references that 
we usually associate with mathematics, but it would make perfect 
sense to ask whether such useful mathematical theories are in fact 
true in the same manner as the theories of physics are. In Chapter 6 
we examine such problems more closely – let it suffice now to note 
that there is a strong air of contradiction in first claiming 
mathematics to be a fiction, and then presenting objective 
empirical criteria of theory choice for it. Usefulness and 
conservativeness over physical theories certainly seem to fall 
under that category. It does not suffice philosophically to say that 
some theories of mathematics are more useful than others, while 
maintaining that there is nothing that mathematics refers to – that 
is, nothing to cause this usefulness. Essentially, this is saying that 
we have criteria of theory choice, but they are not based on 
anything. It is comparable to simply saying that from two 
competing mathematical theories we use the “better” one. Why do 
we do this? Because “goodness” is the quality that decides the 
theory choice. The real question is, of course, why certain theories 
are better – or more useful – than their alternatives, and why could 
we not call this reason truth? Objective empirical criteria together 




                                                           
78 As Shapiro (2000a, footnote on p. 232) points out, many mathematicians 
hold that while Field’s program is Science Without Numbers, it is not science 
without mathematics. In this way, Field’s program is thought to mirror 
Newton’s mathematical structure of space and time, which makes it 
thoroughly mathematical. Reading through Field’s book, this impression 
is hard to avoid.  
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4.2 Undecidable sentences and formalism 
 
From all the considerations in Chapter 3, we should know enough 
about the semantical arguments and their position in the 
philosophy of mathematics. For the strict formalist, all the possible 
ways out seem to point in one direction: arbitrariness. But there is 
something ominous in that even for us non-formalists: after all, 
mathematicians actively pursue and study formal systems. Clearly 
we are all concerned with formal systems in mathematics, 
whatever our philosophical leanings may be. When we argue 
against extreme formalism, we must be careful not to affect the 
more moderate modes of formalism, which are indispensable for 
mathematics. That is why we need to take another look at 
formalism and the Gödel sentences. 
To avoid a common lay misunderstanding, it must be 
emphasized that the Gödel sentence G(T) is undecidable in the 
formal system T, but that does not imply that there are absolutely 
undecidable sentences: sentences undecidable in all formal 
systems.79 With a different axiomatization and an alternative 
Gödel-numbering we could prove G(T), while another sentence 
G(T)’ would be undecidable. That is the nature of Gödel’s first 
incompleteness theorem. It reveals the incompleteness of single 
formal systems, but not that of all formal systems. Or does it? If we 
are committed to formalism in a strict sense, should we not 
campaign for a single formal system containing all of mathematics? 
That is most likely what Field (1998) means when he talks about 
“our fullest mathematical theory”, and it seems to correspond to 
the original Hilbertian goal of providing a completely formal basis 
for mathematics. In that kind of single-system formalism there 
would indeed be fundamentally undecidable sentences, provided 
that the formal system is consistent. In addition, if we could 
establish the consistency of the system, we would know these 
                                                           
79 Or to put it another way, undecidable independent of the formalization 
chosen. Let it be noted that all along we will be concerned with formal 
systems to which Gödel’s incompleteness theorems apply, that is, 
consistent formal systems containing arithmetic. 
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sentences to be true.80 Basically, we would have arrived at 
absolutely true arithmetical sentences that could never be proved. 
This is a much stronger result than the semantical arguments give 
us. In them, we were only considering single formal systems, not 
all of formal mathematics. 
It should be noted that the question of absolute undecidability 
is treated here in a manner that already presupposes that we have 
agreed on the meaning of the concept. There are at least two 
important questions concerning this. First, as Gödel (1946) notes, 
there is a difference between decidability in the formalist sense and 
in terms of mathematical definability. While all formal systems are 
incomplete, and as such contain undecidable sentences, Gödel 
suggested the possibility that a concept of (transfinite) definability 
may enable us to show that every theorem expressible in, say, set 
theory is also decidable, thus achieving completeness in another 
way. Second, what do we mean by “absolute” here? Gödel’s 
suggestion above is a set-theoretical one taking ordinal numbers as 
the primitive terms and, as noted by Gödel himself, in that sense 
not absolute. Can we ever hope to agree on the concept of 
absoluteness when we disagree on so much else concerning the 
foundations of mathematics? To avoid getting the original question 
muddled up in these kinds of problems, important though they 
are, I want to stick to the formalist concept of finitist undecidability 
here. The reason for that is simple: I believe that it is closest to 
what Field interprets mathematics to be, and it is Field and 
extreme formalism that I am arguing against. We can imagine our 
“fullest mathematical theory” as a single formal system, and 
provided that it is consistent, conclude that there are undecidable 
Gödel sentences in it. For now, we are concerned with absolutely 
undecidable sentences in this sense. 
What could these sentences be? We know that from the axioms 
of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory one can prove neither the 
                                                           
80 It is hard to figure out how exactly this could be done, but that should 
not be considered a problem. If such a full mathematical theory did exist, 
it would most likely be at least generally accepted to be consistent. 
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Continuum Hypothesis nor its negation.81 Are the undecidable 
sentences of arithmetic of this nature, or perhaps the type of 
Goldbach’s conjecture? The short answer seems to be: we have no 
idea. Here we must remember the double role that the natural 
numbers play in Gödel’s proof. They are used as codes for 
formulas, but at the same time they are also natural numbers in the 
usual arithmetical sense. The undecidable Gödel sentence is still 
also a sentence of PA, a statement concerning natural numbers. 
Hence, there is a property concerning natural numbers that we can 
neither prove nor disprove in PA. 
 
If we consider the formalist ideal of having one “fullest” formal 
mathematical theory, this would mean that, as well as there being 
undecidable sentences in the theory, there would also be the 
corresponding sentences of arithmetic that would neither be true 
nor false. Natural numbers, those among the simplest and most 
primary of our mathematical concepts, would hold properties that 
are fundamentally undecidable. This is a startling prospect, and one 
could make at least three possible conclusions out of it. First, it is 
possible to infer that while mathematics is about formal systems, 
such all-purpose formal systems are not what we are after. Second, 
one can claim that our conception of formal systems in general is 
flawed. Third, one can accept that our mathematical knowledge 
will always have these particular gaps. 
The third option can be ruled out right away. With different 
axiomatizations and different ways of carrying out the Gödel-
numbering we end up with different undecidable sentences. Of 
course we are far from actually having any candidates for such 
                                                           
81This has been used by Putnam (1980) as an argument against objectivity 
of mathematical truths. Against that, it should suffice to point out here 
that objectivity should not be confused with the completeness of formal 
systems: we can have many ways of formulating undecidable sentences, 
and some of them might even be absolutely undecidable. Even if that were 
the case with the Continuum hypothesis, it would not imply that all 
mathematical sentences are similar in having no objective truth-value. 
Even Field (2001, p. 319) agrees that arithmetic truths can be thought to 
have objectivity. 
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fundamental formal systems, but one can imagine that a choice 
between the competing systems would not be unanimous. Such 
debate would then concern which sentences of arithmetic we want 
to render absolutely undecidable. The absurdity of such a situation 
should speak for itself. 
The second conclusion is a fact, but we can make many 
different things out of it. Formal systems are flawed – Gödel 
proved that – but do we have anything better? Should we abandon 
using formal systems in mathematics? Obviously not: axiomatic 
formal systems are in a way the ultimate achievement of 
mathematics, and just about everything we do in mathematics 
strives for such maximally unambiguous mathematical formalism. 
The fact that formal systems are incomplete is unfortunate for the 
formalist in the philosophy of mathematics, but for the working 
mathematicians it means very little. We know our axiomatizations 
of arithmetic to be incomplete, yet mathematicians do not give this 
a minute of thought when they are proving theorems of arithmetic. 
We cannot prove that our formal systems of arithmetic are 
consistent, but we see no problem in using contradictions as means 
of refuting assumptions. However, there is very little controversial 
in this: for all practical intents and purposes, arithmetic is complete 
and consistent.82 The possibility of running by chance into a self-
referential sentence like G(T) is negligible – which also works as a 
reminder of just how special a case the Gödel sentences are. If G(T) 
had turned out to be provable, and PA complete and consistent, 
nothing would have turned out differently in the arithmetical 
practice.  
Thus we are left with the first option. Formal systems should be 
used in mathematics as before, but we should not even make an 
effort to present the whole of mathematics as a single formal 
                                                           
82 Of course Gödel’s theorems do not state that PA is inconsistent, only 
that if consistent, we cannot establish this consistency within PA. PA 
could very well be consistent, and based on many considerations it indeed 
is. Gentzen’s (1935) proof is the most famous of these. But if consistent, PA 
is incomplete – that much Gödel proved. 
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system.83 Of course this is very much the status quo in 
mathematical practice. The logicist program of Frege (1884), 
Whitehead and Russell (1956) has been largely abandoned, and a 
uniform all-encompassing formalization of mathematics is 
something of a pipe dream. That is the situation within working 
mathematics: different fields of mathematics are more and more 
isolated from each other. But what should philosophers of 
mathematics make out of it? I think there is a lot to learn. Different 
areas of mathematics develop independently, although from a 
common background of accepted inferences, methods and 
notations. If our actual fullest mathematical theory were presented 
as a single work, it would certainly not be a single axiomatization. 
It would be a collection of axiomatizations, pieced together with a 
variety of informal meta-level explanations. In order for people to 
be able to understand this collection, the parts concerning the 
axiomatizations would also contain an abundance of informal 
clarifications and explanations. When we are talking about “our 
fullest mathematical theory”, we are talking about such a work – 
and we know this because that is how presenting mathematical 
theories is actually done.84 
Formal systems themselves are not problematic, and they 
survive the threat of Gödel’s incompleteness theorems. But we 
must realize the proper place of formal systems in the 
mathematical practice. Extreme formalists must end up endorsing 
single-system formalism, because they dismiss the role of all 
                                                           
83 Haskell Curry (1954, p. 204) has argued for this viewpoint on a formalist 
basis. In his “empirical formalist” account we can consider mathematics to 
consist of several (incomplete and possibly contradictory) formal systems. 
Furthermore, mathematics can include metatheoretic propositions. This 
could of course (although Curry does not mention it) mean a Tarskian 
expansion, among other things. Compared to extreme formalism, it might 
seem rather misleading from Curry to call his position formalism at all. 
But we should note that formalism expanded even slightly makes it far 
more appealing than the extreme position. 
84 One could use any mathematical textbook as a reference. The Bourbaki-
group has perhaps come closest to giving a completely formal 
presentation of mathematics, yet even their work is nothing like pure 
formalism. See Bourbaki 1970 for an example. 
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informal elements in mathematical thinking. Only at that point do 
we arrive at problems. If we accept extreme formalism, we 
suddenly expand the Gödelian result of “undecidable in T” into 
“absolutely undecidable”. Given the semantical arguments, and 
supposing that such an all-encompassing formal system would be 
consistent, this is a dangerously big success for the substantialist of 
truth. From a substantial notion of truth we move on to truths that 
could never be proved. That is a consequence we can hardly 
accept. For a non-revisionist substantialist, formal proof is still the 
way we establish true sentences of mathematics. Only the axioms 
and rules of proof are held to be true without proof (because 
something must be) – we cannot easily accept finding out other 
arithmetical truths that could never be proved. That would not be 
mathematical anymore, and it would contradict with the moderate 
versions of formalism. Single-system formalism not only destroys 
extreme formalism – it destroys sensible substantialism, as well. 
Clearly it is not such a single-system formalism that we want. 
Nor should it be just formalism we want, single-system or not. 
Mathematics as a human phenomenon includes the formal 
systems, but it includes an informal side, as well – although this 
fact is often ignored in the philosophy of mathematics. Probably as 
a result of Hilbert’s program and its esteemed formalist ideals, the 
philosophers of mathematics seem reluctant to recognize the role 
of informal thinking and presentation in mathematics.85 However, 
I claim that it is of great importance when we try to understand 
mathematics as a phenomenon beyond the formal systems.  
 
 
4.3 Tarskian truth and mathematics 
 
In a way, we have been putting the cart before the horse by 
concentrating on formalism and its problems. All along we have 
                                                           
85 It should be stressed once more that it was not Hilbert’s ideal to remove 
the informal elements from mathematics. As can be seen from Hilbert 
1925, his theory of formal proof was intended to be a clarification of the 
mathematical practice – which is something very different from extreme 
formalism. 
118 4. Formal and pre-formal mathematics 
 
 
been talking about truth in mathematics without having any 
philosophical theory of truth to base it on. Indeed, so far we have 
only specified that we are concerned with a Tarskian semantical 
notion of truth. Tarskian truth, however, is merely a condition of 
material adequacy: it gives us a condition that the definitions of 
truth must fulfil – it does not tell us what kind of property truth 
is.86 Tarskian truth is a very allowing concept philosophically, and 
while it is usually thought that Tarski’s is a correspondence theory of 
truth, the T-scheme can be used in many other ways, as well. It is 
important here to specify just what we mean by mathematical 
truth, and its relation to formal proof.  
I said we have put the cart before the horse, but this actually 
seems to be the correct order when it comes to mathematical truth. 
By an implicit – and after Hilbert, explicit – agreement, formal 
proof is the way we find out mathematical truths, apart from those 
of the axioms and rules of proof.  Whatever we mean by 
mathematical truth, there is an almost universal agreement on the 
methods of establishing true mathematical sentences. 
Mathematicians state that “Fermat’s Last Theorem is true”, and 
although there remains a lot to explain about that statement 
philosophically, nothing questionable is seen in the correctness of 
the statement itself – at least not in the non-revisionist circles. Most 
of us agree that mathematicians establish which sentences are true, 
and the philosophical question of mathematical truth is somehow 
distinct from this; aimed at explaining truth, not at deciding true 
sentences. For the most part, then, we are happy to agree on the set 
of true mathematical sentences, even though we may not agree on 
what truth actually is. This might seem paradoxical, but I do not 
think that it amounts to anything more than having a healthy 
respect toward our subject matter: the study of mathematics. It is 
only when the mathematical formalism becomes insufficient that 
                                                           
86 A comprehensive general discussion on Tarski’s definition of truth goes 
beyond the scope of this work. One of the most famous critics of the use of 
the T-scheme in truth is Putnam (1975). Jan Woleński (2001) has defended 
Tarskian truth against Putnam convincingly. See also Kirkham 1992, pp. 
141-210 for a good introduction to the general truth-theoretic discussion 
concerning Tarski. 
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we need to concentrate on the more fundamental philosophical 
questions of truth – like those of reference and objective truth-
values. But as we have seen, formalism is indeed in trouble, and 
we need to elaborate on our theory of truth in order to save 
mathematics from arbitrariness. 
My contention is that we cannot approach mathematical truth 
simply as one case of truth in general. Truth as far as observational 
activity is concerned is bound to have different characteristics from 
the truth of mathematics and other deductive disciplines. One 
problem with deflationist theories of truth like that of Horwich 
(1998), and also in part Field’s, is that they are more general 
accounts of truth that are only later applied to mathematics. But 
mathematical truth must get a study of its own, for reasons that 
should be obvious by the end of this work. The way one forms and 
justifies beliefs about physics is fundamentally different from the 
way we acquire mathematical ones. Mathematical theorems are 
not tested and corroborated empirically in the same way as the 
ones in other sciences are. All in all, mathematics both in its subject 
matter and as a human endeavour has many characteristics 
different from the empirical sciences. To respect that, we need an 
independent analysis of mathematical truth – just like we need an 
independent epistemology and ontology of mathematics.87 This is 
not to claim that mathematical truth is indeed ultimately 
philosophically different from physical truth; it only means that we 
cannot approach the two subjects in a similar manner. 
Coherence, for example, has been used as a criterion and even 
as a definition of general truth. When we consider mathematics, 
coherence means consistency, and as such it is so deeply 
entrenched into mathematics that we could not gain any new 
insight from introducing it as a criterion of mathematical truth, 
particularly in the context of this work. We know Hilbert’s 
Consistency program, and remember that Gödel’s incompleteness 
theorems only apply to consistent formal systems. We also 
                                                           
87 Of course the main opponent of this point of view is Quine (1990, for 
example). In Quine’s philosophy mathematical facts are simply one class 
of scientific facts, and they have the same ontological and epistemological 
status.  
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remember that we cannot establish the consistency of formal 
mathematical systems containing arithmetic. Considering all this, 
it seems that there is very little use in including consistency as a 
definition of truth, or a criterion of justification. As a definition it is 
impossible: knowing what we do about the consistency of formal 
systems, we could not establish any true formal theories of 
mathematics containing arithmetic. As a criterion of justification, it 
is redundant. Coherence would be an unwanted concept as a 
definition or a criterion of truth, but it would be that especially for 
the deflationist. Truth as proof is not the same as truth as 
consistency, although in the tradition following Cantor (1883) and 
Hilbert (see footnote 27 of this work) is often seen as such. The 
latter is obviously an impossible concept in formal systems 
containing arithmetic, while the first one is not.88 
 
Pragmatic theories of truth seem to be summarized in Field’s (1980, 
p. 15) contention that usefulness in physical theories should be the 
criterion for accepting and rejecting theories of mathematics. 
Although Field in his formulation did not see any need for the 
notion of truth in the first place, we can no doubt look at pragmatic 
truth as comparable to usefulness as a criterion of theory choice. In 
Chapter 4.1 we examined some of the problems of this approach, 
but there also other problems that follow from pragmatic truth. In 
turns, it can be either too strong, too weak or too obscure a 
requirement. Not all fields of mathematics have immediately 
apparent practical applications, yet we’d wish to retain the ability 
to speak about truth in them. In addition, for practical matters 
there seems to be little difference between proving something and 
showing it to be the case for up to large numbers. Goldbach’s 
conjecture, as we remember, has been shown to hold for all natural 
numbers 1810≤n . Pragmatically, this can be considered to be 
                                                           
88 It has to be remembered that consistency is a main feature when we talk 
about mathematical truth. We are concerned with consistent systems, and 
certainly wish that our mathematical theories were consistent. In practice, 
we implicitly assume that they in fact are consistent. But this should not be 
confused with consistency being suitable as a definition of mathematical 
truth.  
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almost as good as a proof for every n. Yet mathematically, it is no 
better than showing it to hold for every 10≤n . Pragmatic 
considerations can no doubt be fruitful in areas concerning the 
applications of mathematics, but they seem to have very little 
potential when it comes to mathematical truth – for that they 
simply seem too un-mathematical. 
All in all, from the competing general theories of truth, 
correspondence is the one theory we should concentrate on when 
it comes to mathematics. Correspondence can refer to many things, 
but at a first glance it admittedly seems to have an ominously 
Platonist flavour to it. The most natural way to understand 
correspondence is that true theorems of formal mathematics 
correspond to the state of affairs in some objective reality of 
mathematics, and that reality is easily interpreted to be Platonist. 
However, this does not need to be the case. If we use the starting 
point that mathematical truth is different from general truth, we 
see that correspondence can be understood as a more varied 
concept. 
Tarski (1936, p. 153) thought that his semantic conception of 
truth gave an adequate account of truth for the correspondence 
theory. In a correspondence theory of truth a sentence is true if and 
only if it corresponds to reality. In Tarski’s T-scheme this means 
the sentence of metalanguage corresponds to reality. Let us 
consider the classic example from before: 
 
“Snow is white” is true if and only if snow is white. 
 
Now in the correspondence-interpretation of Tarski, the T-scheme 
takes the form: 
 
“Snow is white” is true if and only if snow is white corresponds 
to reality. 
 
Of course Tarski’s T-scheme is only a condition of material 
adequacy for truth, that is, all the true sentences of the object-
language take the form of a T-instance in the metalanguage. It does 
not tell us anything about the nature of the correspondence, or 
how we can find out true sentences and justify believing in their 
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truth. In fact, it is far from being agreed upon in the truth-theoretic 
philosophy that Tarski’s conception of truth is indeed the 
conception of correspondence theory of truth.89 This is due to the 
T-scheme only giving the logical form of true sentences, that is, 
Tarski’s being seemingly only a logical (or quasi-logical) theory of 
truth. From atomic true sentences we by induction over the 
structures of the formulas arrive at complex true sentences, but 
nowhere in the T-scheme do we learn anything about the truth 
conditions of the atomic sentences. Some philosophers consider 
this a weakness of Tarskian truth – and it is a common basis for 
discounting Tarskian truth as correspondence, since a description 
of correspondence would need something beyond logical 
constants.  
That certainly may seem to be the case when we think of truth 
in general as a language-to-world correspondence: Tarskian truth 
itself does not impose truth conditions on the atomic sentences. 
However, when we consider mathematical truth, there are some 
other points that we must remember. It should first be noted that 
the logical nature of Tarskian truth can also be considered to be a 
strength: it gives us a framework in which to establish truth 
conditions and other problematic non-logical concepts. Obviously 
we would be surprised to learn that the truth conditions for 
mathematical sentences are the same as the ones for sentences of 
physics, yet Tarskian truth can be applied to both. This way the T-
scheme can be a great tool for any philosopher concerned with 
truth – at least when we do not claim it to be more than a tool.  
However, is it really the case that the T-scheme is totally empty 
of truth-conditions? It is clear that for a sentence like “Oslo is the 
capital of Norway” this is indeed so. Aside from the semantical 
content of the words in the sentence, there is obviously something 
that they correspond to that establishes the truth of the sentence. 
But in the special case of mathematical truth, it must be 
remembered that Tarski’s is a truth definition also suitable for a 
language-to-language correspondence, and in particular a “formal 
system-to-formal system” (formalist) correspondence. In a formal 
system T the theoremhood of a sentence is naturally decided by 
                                                           
89 See Kirkham 1992, pp. 170-173. 
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the axioms and rules of proof of T. When it comes to truth, this is 
established by the soundness principle ))()(Pr( xTrxx →∀ , and it is 
given in the meta-system T’ which, as we know, can be just T 
expanded with Tarskian truth. But obviously this is giving a truth 
condition for the sentences of T. In the system T theoremhood 
simply means being a theorem of T, while in the meta-system T’ it 
is at the same time the truth condition. Hence we establish truth 
conditions for the sentences of T already by introducing Tarskian 
truth, and nothing more. In moving from PA to “PA + Tarskian 
truth” we claim that all the theorems of PA are true. As well as 
giving an adequacy condition, adding Tarskian truth to a formal 
system of mathematics at the same time clearly gives us truth 
conditions.90 
That goes for the correspondence between formal systems, 
which is of course not what is usually meant by correspondence. 
But when it comes to formal systems of mathematics, Tarskian 
truth seems to be stronger than we thought: it is not free of 
establishing truth conditions for atomic sentences. For a 
correspondence theory this could be problematic, but it should not 
strike us as anything new. If we do not accept the Quinean (1951) 
rejection of the analytic-synthetic distinction, we immediately get a 
vast class of analytic sentences that are true without 
correspondence. As Jaakko Hintikka (2001, p. 6) has reminded us, 
we need to make a distinction between what is logically true, and 
what it is true due to the non-logical (and non-linguistic) facts of 
the world. This naturally also explains us why the T-scheme works 
as a truth condition in the formalist correspondence: the sentences 
of a formal system are true in the expanded system due to the very 
fact of them being sentences of that formal system.  
 If we take mathematics to consist only of formal systems, as the 
strict formalist does, we must commit to Tarskian truth also giving 
us the truth-conditions for sentences of mathematics. That is why 
we do not need any strong form of correspondence to go through 
the semantical argument. In fact, Tarskian truth added to formal 
systems of mathematics is enough to carry it out, just like Shapiro 
                                                           
90 Here we must remember that with Tarskian truth we are concerned 
with interpreted languages.  
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and Ketland have argued. However, in that case we do need an 
endless hierarchy of formal systems, and that is something we 
should be wary of.91 As we saw, with the mere addition of 
Tarskian truth, there is nothing to tie truth into anything outside 
formal systems, since the truth conditions are already given by the 
truth predicate. In this line of thinking one really must question the 
purpose of introducing truth predicates. After all, if we stick to the 
formalist correspondence, soundness principles will do the job as 
well as truth, as we know from Tennant’s argument. If all 
correspondences are of the formalist type, the Tarskian hierarchy is 
quite clearly formalist itself. In this way, the semantical argument 
only has the dubious achievement of showing that, for the 
formalist, Tarskian truth requires an infinite hierarchy of formal 
systems and languages – which is something that we already knew 
from Tarski’s undefinability result. 
  
However, mathematical truth is not limited to the formalist 
correspondence. It cannot be – that implies extreme formalism, 
which in turn implies, I argue, that mathematics is arbitrary. If we 
hold all correspondences of Tarskian truth to be of the formalist 
type, then Tarskian truth is just as arbitrary as Tennant’s soundness 
principle. If we hold one formal system to be true, what is there to 
prevent us from holding that all formal systems are true? Clearly at 
some point the Tarskian hierarchy of formal systems must be 
collapsed, and tied into (partly) non-formal elements – otherwise 
the formal systems remain arbitrary, as well as part of an infinite 
hierarchy.  
 Fortunately this is no problem, because Tarskian truth can be 
used in mathematics in a way that avoids arbitrariness. Indeed, 
                                                           
91 Remembering Tarski’s undefinability result for truth in formal (classical) 
languages, to give a truth definition for a system T, we must expand into a 
system T’. But to give a truth definition for T’, we must expand into a 
system T’’. This is called the Tarskian hierarchy, and it will go on ad 
infinitum in case we commit ourselves solely to formal languages. By 
introducing a (partly) informal metalanguage we can restrict the hierarchy 
of languages down to two levels: a formal first-order object language and 
its partly informal metalanguage. More about this will follow. 
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when we look at mathematics, it is instantly obvious that not all 
formal systems are claimed to be true. It is only a carefully selected 
group that we study in mathematics – and we focus on them 
because we think they are true, whatever we mean by truth. By 
formulating and accepting the axioms and rules of proof we 
commit to that. This way, just like Oslo being the capital of 
Norway, the theoremhood of a sentence is actually a non-logical 
fact depending on our choice of axioms and rules of proof. For a 
formalist correspondence the mere addition of Tarskian truth 
suffices to give truth conditions, but the choice of axioms and rules 
of proof goes beyond the formalist correspondence. As I have 
argued earlier, we cannot think of formal mathematical systems 
existing independently. Hence also in mathematics Tarskian truth 
can still be used in the general manner: we can think of 
mathematical theorems being true or false due to non-logical 
conditions, and Tarskian truth as giving the adequacy condition 
for this. 
 The formalist correspondence cannot be all there is to 
mathematics, and we must include two other kinds of 
correspondence in the account of mathematical truth. The first one 
is the correspondence from formal to pre-formal languages. The 
second one is the language-to-world type of correspondence. The 
latter is of course by far more problematic philosophically. We 
would need to answer all the most difficult questions in the 
philosophy of mathematics in order to clarify that correspondence. 
Fortunately, for the purposes of this work, we only need to 
establish that there exists such a correspondence, however weak it 
may be. As long as that is the case, we can use the first type of 
correspondence for the arguments concerning truth and proof. 
This is not at all problematic – in fact, the opposite viewpoint will 
lead to extreme formalism with its arbitrariness. This will be the 
subject of Chapter 6.  
As it turns out, the first type of correspondence – that between 
formal and pre-formal languages – is highly important 
philosophically, especially when it comes to the question of truth. 
The main problem of correspondence in mathematics is of course 
the seemingly Platonist flavour of it. However, with the help of 
pre-formal languages we can rid both Tarskian truth and 
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correspondence from such drastic ontological commitments. In 
Chapter 2.8 we tentatively formulated our intuition of “seeing” the 
truth of Gödel sentences as the following T-instance: 
 
 G(T) is true if and only if G cannot be proved in T. 
 
Since G cannot be proved in T is indeed the case, we concluded 
(tentatively) that G(T) is true. After that we have reached 
unambiguous ways of stating the matter, but all the time we have 
been talking about the same thing, the semantic content of G(T): 
that G cannot be proved in T. That is obviously not a sentence of T, 
or even of the expanded system T’ – it is a sentence of our pre-
formal language of mathematics. Ultimately, even with the explicit 
semantical arguments, that pre-formal idea of truth of G(T) was 
what we were after. Gödel (1931, p. 151) noted it immediately in 
his proof, also already noting that we establish the truth in a 
metasystem.  
 Thus, the semantical arguments have all along been a way of 
formulating our pre-formal idea concerning the truth of Gödel 
sentences. In the next chapters I will claim that most of 
mathematics is ultimately about the very same thing: finding 
formal presentations for the pre-formal ideas. It is the 
correspondence between formal and pre-formal languages that 
gives us the basis for the semantical arguments – but that is also 
the correspondence that mathematics as a human endeavour rests 
on. When it comes to the question of truth, it is this 
correspondence between the formal and pre-formal mathematics 
that we must start the study from: philosophically, the (possible) 
language-to-world correspondence comes later on.  
 That latter correspondence is of course the central 
epistemological and ontological problem of mathematics, but we 
do not need to explain it in order to use Tarskian truth. Formal 
languages were designed to make our pre-formal mathematical 
ideas maximally unambiguous. Whether or not we postulate a 
theory about the connection between our pre-formal ideas and 
mathematical objects, the connection between formal and pre-
formal ideas can be discussed. That is an important part of 
Tarskian truth, and correspondence, in mathematics. 
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 How does all this relate to the general philosophical discussion 
on Tarskian truth? As was said before, it is a matter of debate 
whether the T-scheme is (in any conventional sense) a 
correspondence theory of truth at all.92 This is connected to the 
debate whether the T-scheme is deflationary or not, which in turn 
mirrors the debate whether Tarski needs semantical concepts in his 
definition. These are all current topics of philosophy of truth, and 
providing a detailed presentation of them goes beyond the scope 
of this work. However, as far as mathematical truth is concerned, 
we can learn a lot from a point presented by Ilkka Niiniluoto (1994, 
p. 63) in the general truth-theoretic discussion. In his scientific 
realist account Niiniluoto claims that the T-sentences cannot be 
deflationary because, as a whole, they state something about the 
relation between a language and the world. This point of view had 
been contested earlier by Field (1972) who, in the usual 
disquotationalist way, claimed that the T-scheme merely gives us a 
list of true sentences. Once this list is enumerated, according to 
Field, we can eliminate truth from it, and see that the T-scheme 
stated nothing about the relation between the language and the 
world after all. 
 Even if Field’s point were valid, it would presuppose that the 
expressive power of the T-scheme applied to an object system S is 
exhausted by the list of true sentences of S. But we are not only 
talking about the true sentences of an object system S. Let us look 
at the T-sentence: 
 
  “Snow is white” is true in S if and only if snow is white. 
 
This is, of course, a sentence of the metasystem (in the 
metalanguage). The list of all sentences like this will certainly 
appear to be disquotational. However, in addition to such T-
sentences we also have generalizations in Tarski’s theory of truth. 
In most areas such generalizations will be finite and included in 
the list of T-sentences. At this point, however, we must remember 
that the subject matter here is truth in mathematics. We remember 
                                                           
92 See also Woleński 2001, pp. 67-68. 
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Shapiro’s sentence T’├ ))()(Pr( xTrxx →∀ , where T’ is PA expanded 
with Tarski’s theory of truth. Generalizations like this cannot be 
put down as finite lists, and here Tarski’s theory shows its power. 
We should also remember that it is exactly such generalizations 
that Field believes to be the only role for the concept of truth. 
Hence, this is clearly something we wish from a theory of truth.93 
But by now we also know that the truth of sentences of T in T’ is 
not deflationary to proof in T, because of the existence of Gödel 
sentences and the semantical arguments over them. In addition to 
being useful, which Field is ready to grant, truth is also substantial, 
unlike Field claims. 
 This is where we should apply Niiniluoto’s point.94 We have 
ended up with a substantial notion of truth, so it must indeed say 
something about the relation between language and the world – or 
in our case, between the formal mathematical theories and their 
reference, the pre-formal mathematics. After all the considerations 
so far, it should be easy to see what this relation is: it is accepting 
that T is sound – that the axioms and proof methods of T actually 
provide us with true sentences of mathematics. Clearly this 
relation is a semantical one, and it is not included in the T-
instances of the sentences of T. There exist non-formal references 
for the theorems of formal systems, and accepting the proof 
methods and axioms is the semantical connection between those 
references and the formal systems. That is what expanding formal 
systems with Tarskian truth implies. It is not a case of formalist 
correspondence where we arbitrarily decree the soundness of 
formal systems. Instead, it is a statement that we make about 
certain formal systems being sound because they correspond to our 
pre-formal ideas of mathematics.95 
                                                           
93 Although, as we saw, this particular generalization was rejected by 
Field. But his grounds for doing that were highly dubious. 
94 It must be noted that Niiniluoto is not talking specifically about truth in 
mathematics, so my use of his point here does not necessarily go together 
with Niiniluoto’s intended approach. 
95 This works also as an argument against Jean-Yves Girard’s famous 
criticism of Tarskian truth. Girard (1999, pp. 4-5) writes that: 
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 Of course this does not mean that the belief in soundness of 
formal mathematical systems leads to believing in a semantical, 
substantial notion of truth. We remember that Tennant’s 
soundness principle states the same thing: that our proof methods 
are valid and axioms are assertable. The problem with Tennant’s 
approach is that he uses the soundness principle as something 
distinct from other aspects of mathematics. In his account, for 
arbitrary proof methods and axioms, we simply decree their 
soundness. Without any theory around it, that assumption cannot 
be defended, since it cannot distinguish between the soundness of 
our desired formal systems and the soundness of all formal 
systems. Applied to our desired formal systems, the assumption of 
soundness is of course the most natural one we could make. In 
fact, could a working mathematician believe any differently? 
However, as a philosophical answer Tennant’s “detached” 
soundness principle comes down to two options. First, it is 
possible that our arbitrary proof methods and axioms have hit the 
bull’s eye, and they are indeed the ones giving us the correct 
sentences. Or second, it could be the case that various proof 
methods and axioms are sound, and ours happen to be among 
them.  
 It should be evident by now that we cannot accept either one of 
these positions. The second one fails simply because different 
proof methods will prove different sentences and be contradictory. 
If mathematics had no application whatsoever, this second point 
might not be a problem for the extreme formalist. But when we 
consider all the applications of mathematics, it is impossible to 
think that contradicting statements could be as useful. We 
essentially use one theory of arithmetic, and one theory of calculus, 
and this is the case for a good reason.  
                                                                                                                        
…the notion of truth à la Tarski avoids complete triviality by the use of magical 
expression ‘meta’: we presuppose the existence of a meta-world, in which 
logical operations already make sense.  
Indeed this is a problem if we stick exclusively to formal languages. But 
when considering the formal languages of mathematics with regard to 
their pre-formal ‘meta’-counterparts, the problem no longer exists. We do 
have a language prior to the  formal ones, and in that language the logical 
operations make sense.  
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 The first option obviously makes mathematics, and its 
applications, akin to religion or magic. Both approaches – indeed, 
any account of extreme formalism – remind one of stories of 
peasants going to town, seeing water taps for the first time, and 
buying a bag full of taps to take home to their villages. Formal 
mathematics works, but like a water tap, it works for a reason not 
visible from the end product. We cannot forget the background 
and simply use the formal part in the philosophy of mathematics; 
without the background we could have never developed the 
formal part in the first place. It is not the case that belief in 
soundness implies substantial truth and refutes extreme 
formalism. But I argue that it is the case that we can plausibly 
believe in soundness only if we reject extreme formalism and 
arbitrary soundness principles. 
 In this way, mathematics without any references to something 
outside the formal systems is impossible. The problem with 
Tarskian truth has been that philosophers tend to connect it with 
correspondence, and correspondence in philosophy of 
mathematics sounds ominously Platonist. But as Niiniluoto 
pointed out, Tarski’s T-scheme says something about the relation 
between formal mathematics and its reference. In deeper analysis, 
this turns out to be nothing more than the belief in the soundness 
of our proof methods and axioms. We use certain formal systems 
because we believe that they give true sentences, not because we 
believe that they correspond to a Platonist world of mathematical 
ideas. In addition to many other desired results, this also explains 
why we can disagree about the nature of mathematical objects 
while agreeing on which theorems are true.  
 In this practical sense, our conception of mathematical truth 
comes before reference: we have a good idea which mathematical 
sentences are true, even though we might not be entirely clear on 
the meaning of truth.96 The reference of mathematical theorems 
                                                           
96 This is not to suggest that truth comes constitutively before reference. 
That neo-Fregean line of thinking will be the subject of Chapter 7. The point 
here is that one does not need to agree on the philosophical questions 
concerning truth in order to agree on the set of true mathematical 
sentences. 
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can be thought to be any of the various positions that philosophers 
have introduced, yet we can still agree on the use of truth. 
Platonism, naturalism, empiricism, structuralism and other 
referential philosophies are all compatible with Tarskian truth. 
Whatever the “mathematical reality” formal systems refer to is 
thought to be, if we trust mathematics, we must believe that our 
proof methods and axioms are the way of finding out truths about 
it.  
 How can we be so sure that Tarskian truth is compatible with 
every major philosophical account of mathematics other than 
extreme formalism? What I propose is that the first level of 
“reality” we are talking about here is in fact the realm of our pre-
formal mathematical thinking, and pre-formal thinking is 
compatible with all the aforementioned philosophies. I also make a 
stronger claim: all philosophical theories of mathematics must be 
able explain pre-formal mathematical thinking as a phenomenon. 
Whether this second claim holds or not, the first one certainly will 
– and both of them are directly opposed to extreme formalism. 
Most importantly for the purpose of this work, substantial 
Tarskian truth itself does not require a Platonist framework, and 
the same goes for the semantic arguments based on it. All that is 
required is an account of pre-formal mathematical thinking.  
 In such an account, Tarskian truth can be used as the theory of 
truth between formal and pre-formal mathematical thinking – the 
meanings of the formal sentences being their pre-formal 
counterparts. In this way, truth is for the pre-formal mathematics 
what proof is for the formal systems. When we see the truth of 
Gödel sentences, we see it pre-formally. When in the semantical 
arguments we expand the formal systems to include Tarskian 
truth, we are only expanding them to include something that was 
already in our mathematical thinking. That is why the semantical 
argument is sound. Ketland claimed that truth beats soundness 
principles as an expansion because it is more natural. That is true. 
But I claim that this is the case because it is in fact not an expansion 
at all, once we look at the full picture of our mathematical thinking. 
 However, it must be noted that this is only the first level. Pre-
formal thinking exists, and – in Tarskian terms – it works as the 
metasystem for the object system of formal mathematics. Formal 
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mathematical languages are designed to be maximally 
unambiguous abstractions of our pre-formal mathematical 
thinking, and as such Tarskian truth fits the larger picture of 
mathematical thinking perfectly. In particular, it goes well with 
one crucial aspect of mathematical thinking: that formal 
mathematics also influences our pre-formal thinking. Pre-formal 
mathematics is not fixed and independent of the formal part; on 
the contrary, the formal results of mathematics often suggest 
revisions to our pre-formal thinking. Yet this does not mean that 
pre-formal thinking can become superfluous: whether such results 
lead to changes in axiomatizations is once again a question 
decidable only pre-formally. 
Still, pre-formal mathematics itself needs an ontology, and a 
metasystem, behind it – or else we face the same questions of 
arbitrariness all over, this time with regard to pre-formal 
mathematics. One is bound to ask what the references of pre-
formal concepts are, and that is the second level of Tarskian 
correspondence in mathematics. The familiar ontological and 
epistemological problems of philosophy of mathematics follow us 
there, and the full picture of correspondence in mathematics can be 
drawn as follows: 
 
(1) Formal mathematical systems (defines proof) 
 
(2) Pre-formal mathematics (defines truth of (1)) 
 
(3) The reference of pre-formal mathematics (defines truth of 
(2)). 
 
As we see, a full philosophical theory of mathematics needs to 
explain the connections from (1) to (2) and (2) to (3). Still, the mere 
existence of pre-formal thinking has philosophical importance, and 
I do not think that this has ever been fully pursued. Pre-formal 
thinking enables us to use the semantical argument, and as such it 
gives us an explicit case of a difference between truth and proof. 
But what is most important, it does this without troubling 
ontological commitments, since the connection between (2) and (3) 
can be left open. Of course there are other ways of defining 
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Tarskian truth for formal mathematical systems, most notably 
expanding them with set theory or second-order logic. However, 
these approaches are often attacked from the formalist camp with 
accusations of ontological wastefulness. Set existence in particular 
has been for a long time the paradigm case of problems in the 
ontology of mathematics, and second-order logic has been argued 
to run into similar problems.97 The problem with Shapiro’s and 
Ketland’s approaches was that they needed justification for using 
such expansions. Pre-formal mathematics, on the other hand, is not 
an expansion at all. We get all the set theory we need for Tarskian 
truth simply because it is already a crucial part of our 
mathematical thinking. To formal theories like PA set theory is an 
expansion. To pre-formal mathematics it is not. Set existence, 
however, is a whole other question, and with pre-formal thinking 
we are not saved from the possibility of fictionalism. But that 
question comes after pre-formal mathematics, and that is why we 
can concentrate in this work on the connection between (1) and (2), 
while being content to show that the level (3) exists, even if we 
cannot present a satisfactory philosophical theory concerning the 
nature of it.  
 It is a fallacy to think that we cannot discuss truth in 
mathematics if we do not know what mathematical objects 
ultimately are. After all, I am arguing here for Tarskian truth in 
mathematics, and Tarskian truth is (notoriously) ambivalent 
concerning verification principles and such. By itself, it does not 
give us anything in terms of finding out true sentences, or 
establishing them as true. Nor should it. It must be remembered 
that we are concerned with mathematical truth. However one 
                                                           
97 George Boolos (1998, pp. 73-85) has argued against this to the effect that 
his plural reading of second-order variables in second-order logic escapes 
such troubling ontological commitments. His solution has been contested 
among others by Michael Resnik (1988) and Philippe de Rouilhan (2002) 
on the basis that such plural readings may not be as ontologically innocent 
as they look. We will return to second-order logic later on in Chapter 5.4, 
and we will see that regardless of the success of Boolos’ suggestion, it will 
not provide us with anything resembling an unproblematic way to 
introduce truth for formal languages. 
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looks at it, and here the formalist and Platonist agree, it is the 
purpose of mathematics (formal proof, in the end) to establish true 
sentences. The difference comes in what we mean by “true”, or 
indeed, if we mean anything at all by it. That is an important 
question in the philosophy of mathematics, but it is not the same 
question as the nature of mathematical objects. However, from all 
that we have established so far, we must mean something by truth. 
The Platonist, structuralist, empiricist and reconstructive 
nominalist all agree on the set of true sentences. Clearly there is 
something about mathematical truth that does not change based 
on our philosophical leanings.98 The most natural way to start 
unravelling this is to figure out the relationship between formal 
and pre-formal mathematics. In the next chapters I will try to 
clarify this position. 
 
 
4.4 Another approach to mathematical thinking 
 
Perhaps it is understandable that the philosophy of mathematics, 
with the apparent a priori-nature of its subject matter, has remained 
the one area of philosophy of science where arguments based on 
the actual modes of practice of the science are rarely applied. 
Whatever practising mathematicians do is one thing, but there 
seems to be a widely accepted notion that there exists mathematics 
outside the work of mathematicians, and the former is the real 
subject matter of the philosophy of mathematics. This does not 
need to be Platonist – in fact, ironically, many formalists speak 
with equal aplomb about mathematics consisting of formal 
systems, without having much regard to the way these formal 
systems are actually created or presented. While the philosophy of 
physics is nowadays closely intertwined with the beliefs of the 
working physicists, there is a widely entertained implicit belief 
that a philosopher of mathematics has some kind of direct access to 
the subject matter of mathematics. In fact, surprisingly few 
                                                           
98 Although, of course, there are also philosophical programs like 
intuitionism that do change the set of true sentences. 
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philosophers seem to give the actual practice of mathematics any 
role in their theories.  
This is not to suggest that the philosophers of mathematics 
should be realists because the standard language of mathematics is 
realist-flavoured, or any such superficial connection. That is what 
Shapiro (1997, p. 38) calls “working realism”. Most mathematicians 
work as if realism were correct, using phrases like “there exists a 
function”, etc. Working realism is an interesting facet of the 
mathematical practice, but it should not be thought to have direct 
philosophical importance. However, mathematics does have a 
widely accepted methodology, which in addition to the formal part 
also gives us a more general paradigm of mathematical thinking, 
and mathematical practice. Whether we choose to appreciate this 
in philosophy or not, at the very least we should be aware of it. 
It must always be remembered that mathematics, whether its 
subject matter is considered to be Platonist, formalist or anything 
else, is a human endeavour as well as any other science. From 
absolutely no knowledge of mathematics it has been developed 
into unimaginable heights, providing along the way important, 
perhaps indispensable, tools for the other sciences. Mathematicians 
have also succeeded in finding out ways to pass this knowledge on 
to non-mathematicians for them to use to their own needs. 
Thinking back from the unknown first steps of mathematical 
thinking to the current educational system from universities to 
primary schools, it should be obvious that mathematics as a 
human endeavour is enormously widely spread, as well as highly 
advanced and complex. Of course this has not been an accident. 
Mathematics, probably more than any discipline of inquiry, has 
had universally established and explicit methods which have 
accounted for its success. These methods go beyond such obvious 
features as the accepted rules of proof. They include the whole 
accepted paradigm of mathematical thinking, including the 
language, practices, education and the connections to other fields 
of science. 
It seems that this is something most philosophers of 
mathematics do not recognize widely enough. Of course 
philosophy should not be confused with sociology and 
psychology, but to get a complete picture of mathematics 
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philosophically, we must look at mathematics as a human 
endeavour in all its facets. This is the approach I now want to take. 
So far we have only been studying formal theories, which of course 
form a crucial part in the complete picture of mathematical 
thinking. But as I see it, mathematics as a human endeavour must 
include two important disciplines beyond formal systems: the 
work of creative mathematicians, and the work of educators. The 
former is practised almost exclusively at universities, and it can be 
said to consist of making new mathematics. The latter is practised 
on all levels of education. Curiously, the former seems to be more 
often appreciated in the philosophical literature. It is not rare to see 
philosophers of mathematics use examples of mathematical 
discoveries (inventions, if one leans toward formalism) to make a 
point. It is an interesting subject, to be sure, as every theorem has 
at some point been a new discovery. However, it is also a 
notoriously difficult subject to study – the group of creative 
mathematicians is very small and mathematical discovery is 
obviously hard to achieve in anything resembling controlled 
settings. Instead of double-blind experiments we are limited to a 
handful of subjective post-discovery narratives. Even so, some 
material does exist from the quasi-psychological accounts of 
mathematicians, and we should definitely learn as much as we can 
from the studies we have.  
As interesting as that is, the more pertinent subject for us is the 
teaching and learning – understanding – of mathematics. 
Mathematical knowledge could not be possible if we did not have 
means of passing it on to other people, which brings us to the 
subject of education. As philosophers of mathematics, we should 
be very interested in how mathematics is taught and learnt.  In this 
work, however, I will not try to present or analyse psychological 
theories concerning the learning of mathematics. Those are no 
doubt highly interesting, but I will only need minimal 
psychological evidence for my argument. Fortunately this evidence 
is there for everybody to see, even if we totally dismiss all 
psychological theories. When we consider mathematics as a 
human endeavour, the first observation to make is that practically 
all human beings have learnt mathematics from textbooks, whether 
directly or indirectly. From the textbooks of mathematics we 
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should get strong enough evidence for one central aspect of the 
psychology of mathematics. All textbooks of mathematics have one 
important characteristic in common: they are not completely formal. 
Of course the level of formalism varies, but it is easy to notice a 
distinct pattern. Young children’s textbooks have a minimal level 
of formalism, while university textbooks can be mostly formal, the 
informal part being restricted to very little “narration”. Still, even 
the university students do not learn entirely formal mathematics. 
They need examples, diagrams, pictures and natural language 
explanations – the mixture of which depends on the subject. Why 
can we be so sure of this? All textbooks have them. Could there be 
any better evidence? This does not concern just the textbooks, 
either: even the articles in mathematical journals, which must be 
considered to be the most advanced form of mathematical 
communication, are not completely formal. In fact, we should feel 
safe in assuming that there are no human beings who process 
mathematics as computers do, that is, completely formally.99 I 
could be wrong – the possible counter-example sounds intriguing 
– but that would not change the general argument here.100 It is 
certainly true that if not everybody, at least the vast majority of 
people need something besides the formal part in order to 
understand and use mathematics. This could be called the informal 
part, but I prefer to call it pre-formal mathematics to emphasize the 




                                                           
99 I am not including here the possible savant-type exceptions. This has 
been suggested to me as a formal way of learning mathematics, as the 
savant may not have any reference to outer sources and still process 
mathematics at high levels. However, what they are doing is calculation. 
Mathematics is obviously quite a different thing, and while it remains a 
possibility, savant-type mathematicians have not been reported. 
100 Of course this concept of understanding must not be confused with 
what happens at the level of the brain. On a cellular level, our thinking 
could be ultimately like that of a computer. 
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4.5 Pre-formal mathematics 
 
The concept of pre-formal mathematical thinking is essential to this 
work, and it needs elaboration. The details that we attribute to pre-
formal thinking, however, should not be considered to be crucial 
for the arguments here. More important is the fact that the 
phenomenon of pre-formal thinking exists, and that it is bound to 
bear enough resemblance to the account here in its central facets. 
As it is presented in this work, pre-formal mathematics consists of 
two sides. First, there is the individual learning of mathematical 
concepts, to which we will return later. Second, even those who are 
familiar with mathematical formalism still use the pre-formal 
element in their thought process all the time, even when the results 
get a purely formal presentation. Constructing a mathematical 
proof is not only about mechanically grinding out the formalism; it 
also includes the crucial stage of discovering the connections and 
ideas that will be the basis for the formal presentation. One crucial 
part of this is the discovery of new mathematical theorems. Of 
course this only concerns a minuscule part of all the practising 
mathematicians, but that part is all the more interesting.  
Because of the elusive and heterogenic subject matter, 
comprehensive psychological studies of mathematical 
discovery/invention are obviously too much to ask. The best we 
have are the regrettably few accounts of the subjective experiences 
of mathematicians. Although obsolete in its psychological 
terminology, the mathematician Jacques Hadamard’s The 
Psychology of Invention in the Mathematical Field (1954) is probably 
still the most important work in this area. The bulk of that book is 
based on Henri Poincaré’s account of mathematical invention, 
where such matters as the unconscious element, mental images 
and the aesthetic aspects of mathematical discovery are given an 
important role. In Hadamard’s research he found out that most 
mathematicians shared similar experiences. The details of them are 
fascinating, but as such not central to this work. What is important 
is that Hadamard’s book gives us clear evidence that the 
psychology of mathematical invention is not reducible to the neat 
formal accounts that are the end product of mathematical studies. 
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Mathematical thinking as a human phenomenon is a vastly more 
complex and broad field. 
However, it must be remembered that Hadamard is concerned 
with the discovery of mathematical truths, which is only half of the 
picture. At least as important is the way that we justify believing in 
such supposed truths. That of course happens ultimately by 
proving them. Mathematical discovery/invention by itself could 
be thoroughly un-mathematical – which it of course is not – but as 
long as the discovered/invented theorems can be proven, the non-
formal elements included in the discovery could be philosophically 
irrelevant. But from Hadamard’s book we get a different picture. 
The psychology of mathematical invention is closely connected to 
the formal mathematics, and all our non-formal ways of processing 
mathematics make for an indispensable part of mathematics as a 
human phenomenon. I want to extend that conclusion to 
mathematical thinking in general, and not just the context of 
discovery.  
Of course this approach as such is nothing drastic: even 
extreme formalists would not claim that mathematics does not 
include a non-formal element. What they do claim is that in the 
philosophical accounts of mathematics this element is essentially 
superfluous. However, in this chapter I will argue that this is not 
the case. The recognition of pre-formal mathematical thinking is 
essential to the philosophy of mathematics. In the model proposed 
in Chapter 4.3, mathematics consisted of three parts. Starting from 
the end product, the part (1) is formal mathematics. The part (2) is 
pre-formal mathematics, which is our actual mathematical thinking, 
how we process mathematics “in our heads”. This part is 
essentially semantical, dealing with the meanings of the theorems of 
formal mathematics. That is why in the pre-formal part we use 
examples, diagrams and informal presentations – they give us a 
better understanding of the meanings of the formal concepts. The 
part (3) is the reference of pre-formal mathematics, that is, the 
subject matter of mathematics: what the theorems of mathematics 
ultimately refer to. 
How are these parts of mathematical thinking connected to 
each other? Proof is obviously in the realm of formal mathematics, 
and it is designed to correspond to our pre-formal ideas of truth, 
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which in turn corresponds to the part (3), the final subject matter of 
mathematics. In this way, there is a connection through all the 
stages. Had Hilbert’s program been established successfully, 
formal theories of mathematics could describe a direct 
correspondence between the parts (1) and (3). However, that 
would not have done anything to make the pre-formal thinking 
obsolete. In the practice of mathematics it would most likely have 
caused no changes. Certainly the completeness and consistency of 
formal systems would have been important results in the 
philosophy of mathematics: ultimately, they would have shown 
pre-formal thinking to be superfluous in the connection between 
formal mathematics and their references. But even so, it would not 
have changed the fact that human beings process mathematics 
semantically. Although the philosophical importance of pre-formal 
thinking may have been diminished, all three levels of 
mathematics would still have been needed to make a theory of 
philosophy of mathematics complete. Knowing what happened to 
Hilbert’s formalist program, it is all the more important to 
recognize all three levels.  
We will return to the problematic questions concerning the 
level (3) later on, but for now we are concerned with pre-formal 
mathematical thinking. It is of course an indisputable fact that the 
formal theories of mathematics did not just suddenly appear to 
human beings. We know that it took the work of some of the most 
brilliant minds in ancient Greece to find an unambiguous 
presentation for the mathematical knowledge of the time, which in 
turn was based on centuries, even millennia, of earlier study. 
Although this presentation was mostly written in a natural 
language, and would not be recognized as formal by a modern 
reader, it was still essentially formal mathematics. Ambiguous 
considerations based on observations were replaced by exact 
definitions, axioms and rules of proof. However, all this was based 
on something – it did not appear via an epiphany. Obviously no 
written account of the process exists, but we can safely assume 
that, for example, Euclid’s formal concept of the “point” as an 
entity without dimensions was not the original concept of “point”. 
Rather, it was an idealization that the mathematicians needed and 
developed. When we think of a direct route from one house to 
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another, we are essentially thinking of a line segment between two 
points. Of course houses are not points and routes are not lines – 
nothing physical is – but they correspond to the same idea.101 This 
idea of a straight line between two objects is quite clearly pre-
formal, just like the ideas of circles, natural numbers and 
probabilities are. We do not need to know anything about the 
formal mathematical presentations of these concepts to be able to 
have – and even successfully use – their pre-formal ideas. That is of 
course because formal mathematics was developed to be a 
maximally unambiguous study of such existing pre-formal 
concepts. Pre-formal concepts were not replaced by formal ones, 
they were clarified by them.102 
What kinds of areas belong to pre-formal mathematics and can 
we hope to give a satisfying account of it? Certainly these are not 
easy questions to answer, and I do not pretend to give a 
comprehensive explanation here. It seems that almost anything 
concerning mathematics as a human endeavour can be considered 
to belong to pre-formal mathematics – aside from the formal part, 
of course. In this way, every physical object is potentially an object 
of pre-formal geometry, and every quantity is an object of pre-
formal arithmetic, or some other area of mathematics. Pre-formal 
mathematics can be thought to include the unconscious element of 
mathematical invention, and it can be thought to include dividing 
a pile of apples into smaller piles. However, clearly not everything 
we do with such objects can be considered to be pre-formal 
mathematics: an activity only becomes mathematical once we are 
trying to find out general truths about the objects and the relations 
between them – the ultimate phase of this activity being the 
                                                           
101 Here I do not use the word “idea” in any Platonist sense, but rather in 
the most general sense we use it outside metaphysics. 
102 Tarski speaks about formalized languages, which corresponds to my 
argument here. In mathematics (for the most part) we are concerned with 
meaningful, interpreted languages, not arbitrary formal rules of symbol 
manipulation – which is what formal languages ultimately are for the 
extreme formalist. We will return to this question later. 
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formalization of mathematics.103 Even so, admittedly, these 
considerations make pre-formal mathematics a vast and somewhat 
vague field. But in lack of a better account, there should be nothing 
troubling about using the one given here. The point I want to make 
is that the domain of mathematical thinking is much larger than 
the mere formal part.104 This is important when we consider the 
problems of reference and truth in mathematics. The exact nature 
and scope of pre-formal mathematics should not matter a great 
deal, as long as we are more or less along the right lines. I do not 
believe it can be plausibly argued that we are not. 
The pre-formal element can be witnessed everywhere, but 
nowhere more visibly than in education. The examples here will be 
simplified and, again, in no way do I claim them to be accurate and 
complete descriptions of the learning process in mathematics. But 
they should be plausible enough to give us some philosophical 
perspective into mathematical thinking. How do we initially learn 
about, for example, triangles? The teacher draws a triangle on the 
blackboard and we start examining its properties. This way we 
learn that the sum of angles of a triangle is that of two right angles. 
But of course at this stage we never really deal with a mathematical 
triangle, only an imperfect drawing of one. We did not prove that 
the sum of the angles is that of two right angles, either – we 
probably just had a visual presentation that convinced us. 
                                                           
103 For an example, an illuminating one is a passage on mathematical knot 
theory by Crowell and Fox (1963 p. 3), quoted by Shapiro (2000a, p. 35):  
Mathematics never proves anything about anything except mathematics, and a 
piece of rope is a physical object and not a mathematical one. So before 
worrying about proofs, we must have a mathematical definition of what a knot 
is. […] The definitions should define mathematical objects that approximate the 
physical objects under consideration as closely as possible.  
In this quote the authors are quite clearly concerned with formalizing the 
pre-formal, in this case physical, concept of knots. 
104 For a reference in the psychological study of mathematics, one can 
consult Davis 1984, which emphasizes how people think about 
mathematics, how they process it through meanings. Also relevant is Tall 
(ed.) 1994, a collection of articles that focuses on advanced mathematical 
thinking and the role of various non-formal elements in it. For 
philosophical studies Lakatos 1978 is relevant when it comes to the 
classification of the different stages of mathematical thinking. 
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Moreover, this does not need to be visual. In Hadamard’s example 
(1954, p. 62): 
 
…everybody understands that, intersecting two parallel lines by two 
other parallel ones, the segment thus determined are equal two by two; 
everybody knows that […] But as long as it is not consciously 
enunciated, none of its consequences […] can be deduced. 
 
This purely verbal presentation seems to be perfectly valid. 
However, in both cases, in the purely formal sense, we did not 
acquire any mathematical knowledge – we did not prove anything. 
Still, it would not make sense to claim that we did not gain any 
knowledge. In the first example, we did learn a property of 
triangles that we did not know before. We just did not make the 
knowledge formally rigorous by proving it from axioms, which is 
what formal mathematics does. This gives us a characterization of 
the basic distinction between formal and pre-formal mathematical 
thinking: any mathematical thinking, and knowledge, that is not 
formally rigorous is pre-formal.105 This does not mean that we are 
unable to gain mathematical knowledge pre-formally. The sum of 
the angles of a Euclidean triangle, for example, is a mathematical 
truth that most of us initially learn pre-formally. We do not justify 
it rigorously in axiomatic systems until much later, but we 
undoubtedly have knowledge of it all along. Moreover, it is 
knowledge unlike memorizing a fact like “Nicholas II was the last 
Tsar of Russia”. Clearly we learn it by establishing general 
connections between concepts like triangle and angle, rather than 
relying only on an authority to give us correct information. Indeed, 
not surprisingly, the way these connections are established pre-
                                                           
105 Here we deal with the term “rigorous” somewhat loosely. It could be 
that the results of formal mathematics are not completely rigorous, either, 
due to problems like the unprovability of consistency. On the other hand, 
pre-formal mathematical thinking can also be rigorous, even though this 
may not be unambiguously established until it is formalized. 
Nevertheless, the distinction between formal and pre-formal rigor here 
should not be problematic, which I want to emphasize with the concept 
“formally rigorous”, which means proof from a specified set of formal 
axioms according to formal rules of proof. 
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formally mirrors the way they are proved formally. This is the 
important point here: formal mathematics is designed to prove just such 
mathematical truths. 
 
Let us think of a child learning mathematical concepts for the first 
time.106 From picture books and toys she sees a round shape. From 
her parents or other older people she learns that it is called a circle. 
For years she will deal with circles, perhaps learning some of their 
properties, like that any diameter will be equal in length, and that 
with a compass one can draw a circle. She, however, has no idea 
how these properties are presented exactly, or how they in fact 
relate to each other. This is the primitive phase, how we begin 
mathematical thinking, and it consists of getting ideas of the 
mathematical concepts.107 After this the child learns the exact ideas 
behind, and between, the concepts. The child learns that a circle is 
a line that forms from the set of all points at a fixed distance from a 
fixed point. Now she has an explanation for the fact that circles can 
be drawn with a compass, and why all the diameters are equal in 
length. This intermediate phase of mathematical thinking consists 
of forming explicit and general notions of the mathematical 
concepts; in other words, abstraction.108 
The final phase will come when she learns to translate these 
exact ideas into a formal mathematical language. She learns, for 
example, that any given circle can be expressed as an equation, and 
with this information she learns to treat geometric objects with 
algebraic tools. Now the child (or perhaps an adult by now) has 
the means of abstract mathematical thinking, and the ability to 
express it with maximal precision, that is, formally.109 
                                                           
106 This example corresponds in its central parts with the account in Davis 
1984, at its simplest given in pp. 8-20. 
107 This is called the “proto-mathematical” phase by Philip Kitcher (1983) 
in his account of mathematical knowledge.  
108 See Russell 1912 (pp. 119-121) for his account of the same phase in 
mathematical thinking. 
109 Imre Lakatos has made a similar distinction concerning mathematical 
proof (my account is about the whole phenomenon of mathematical 
thinking). According to him, there are pre-formal, formal and post-formal 
proofs. Compared to my account, both the pre- and post-formal proofs 
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What in this example is pre-formal mathematical thinking? The 
primitive phase is unquestionably pre-formal. While the 
intermediate phase consists of finding exact definitions, it is still 
done in a natural language, and thus cannot be considered formal 
in the strict sense that an extreme formalist would accept. It could 
be argued that the step from the intermediate phase to the final one 
is mere translation from informal to formal languages, the exact 
definitions being already in place. This is true up to some point, 
but it has to be remembered that the concepts themselves are still 
defined in a natural language, and are thus not entirely 
unambiguous. It is hence only the final phase that we can call 
formal in the strict sense. It goes without saying that thinking of 
mathematics only as this final formal phase gives us a highly 
incomplete picture also of the philosophy of mathematics. In fact, it 
would make mathematics impossible to learn or practise. However 
– returning to the semantical argument – that is exactly what the 
extreme formalist does when refusing us the right to expand 
formal systems.  
I suggest that this rough account holds for individuals learning 
mathematics, as well as – mutatis mutandis – the historical way of 
human beings developing mathematics.110 In addition, while for 
the developed mathematicians the primitive phase is largely 
forgotten, the intermediate phase is intimately present at every 
aspect of mathematical thinking. Obviously it is by no means easy 
to create a detailed account of mathematics as a human 
phenomenon, nor is this the purpose here. Rather than providing a 
comprehensive account of mathematical thinking, my aim has 
been all along to show that formal mathematics by itself will not 
                                                                                                                        
would count as pre-formal mathematical thinking. Otherwise Lakatos’ 
ideas are similar as far as the different stages of mathematical thinking are 
concerned. His ideas about the fallibility of mathematics should be seen as 
a whole other matter. For details, see Lakatos 1978, pp. 61-69. 
110 The historical development of mathematical thinking has been a very 
widely studied area. John Barrow (1992, Chapter 2) gives a good overview 
of the knowledge we have about the early development. The bibliography 
assembled by Barrow is particularly important. Boyer 1985 is a widely 
relevant work on the development of sophisticated mathematics.  
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suffice. Whether one agrees with the details or not, I hope the 
considerations here are enough to convince one of the need for 
expanding formal mathematics in order to have a complete picture 
of mathematical thinking.  
 
At this point we should think of the philosophical importance of 
all this when it comes to the subject matter of this work: the 
question of truth and proof. We remember that in the extreme 
formalist account the pre-formal element would be superfluous, 
and mathematics completely reducible to the formal part. 
However, once we acknowledge the role of pre-formal thinking, 
we see that this is not the case. In the pre-formal phases of 
mathematical thinking we have the notion of mathematical truth, 
and in the formal phase we have the notion of proof.111 We have 
also seen that the truth of Gödel sentences is established pre-
formally. That is why the semantical argument is valid: the 
Tarskian expansion corresponds to something existing in our pre-
formal mathematical thinking. In order to carry out the semantical 
argument we do not need anything more complicated than formal 
systems expanded with a Tarskian theory of truth, but of course in 
reality people have all kinds of semantical notions behind the 
mathematical concepts. Tarskian expansion is enough – that is the 
beauty of the semantical argument – but from pre-formal 
mathematics we see that it is not an expansion at all. As I see it, 
that should be enough to make the semantical arguments 
successful.  
This objection to Field seems to be very powerful, since in the 
extreme formalist philosophy there cannot be any substantial role 
for a non-formal part of mathematics. Clearly pre-formal 
mathematical thinking has an important role when we consider 
                                                           
111 Perhaps it would be better here to follow Tarski and talk about 
formalized interpreted languages of mathematics, to emphasize the 
connection between pre-formal and formal mathematics. However, since it 
is my contention that the formal languages we discuss in the basic areas of 
mathematics like arithmetic and geometry are always formalizations of 
pre-formal thinking, the difference between formal and formalized seems 
to vanish, and the distinction becomes unnecessary. 
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mathematics as a human phenomenon, and we cannot neglect it. 
But once we accept the existence of the pre-formal element, we can 
also establish the truth of Gödel sentences, so the role is also 
substantial. Moreover, it corresponds naturally to our intuition of 
the way we see the truth of Gödel sentences. This is no small 
matter. After all, we initially establish the truth of Gödel sentence 
through its meaning, not by considerations on expanding formal 
systems. That immediately gives us an apparent difference 
between the concepts of mathematical truth and proof – and it 
turns out to correspond to the difference between pre-formal and 
formal mathematics. In short: the existence of pre-formal thinking 
refutes extreme formalism, as is made explicit by the semantical 
arguments. 
So why has pre-formal thinking been left to such a small role in 
the philosophy of mathematics? While the terminology here could 
be foreign to many philosophers, most philosophers of 
mathematics do in fact recognize the pre-formal element. What 
they are not bound to agree on is the nature and especially the 
importance of pre-formal thinking. For philosophers that are 
campaigning for a specific realist theory, the existence of pre-
formal thinking does not carry particular philosophical 
importance. In the Platonist philosophy, for example, formal 
mathematical sentences are thought to ultimately refer to abstract 
ideas in an ontologically independent world. It is quite 
understandably not considered to be very important that this 
happens via pre-formal semantical thinking. The importance and 
difficulty of the ontological and epistemological questions far 
outweigh such matters. However, in this work I will not try to 
present a specific general theory of philosophy of mathematics. 
Instead, I want to use as minimal and as widely applicable theory 
of non-formalist philosophy as possible. In such a project the 
existence of pre-formal thinking is of great importance: it gives us 
a general framework that can be interpreted in various non-
formalist ways.  
Indeed, the account here should be compatible with all non-
formalist philosophical theories of mathematics. The intuitionist 
Michael Dummett has written about the role of formal systems: 
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…a formal system does not replace the intuitive proof as, frequently, a 
precise concept replaces a vague intuitive one; the formal system 
remains, as it were, answerable to the intuitive conception, and is of 
interest to us only in so far as it does not reveal undesirable features 
which the intuitive idea does not possess. An example would be 
Gödel’s theorem, which shows that provability in a single formal 
system cannot do duty as a complete substitute for the intuitive idea of 
arithmetical truth. (Dummett 1978, p. 172. Italics in the original.) 
 
Both Dummett’s example and his ideas on the status of the formal 
systems should sound familiar by now. What is remarkable is that 
Dummett as an intuitionist is still in agreement with the non-
intuitionist account given here. Formal systems originate on pre-
formal thought (intuition for Dummett), and the pre-formal 
element is always carried along with the formal systems. Of course 
we do not need to agree with Dummett’s idea on testing theorems 
by comparing them only to our intuition, but that is a feature of his 
intuitionist philosophy of mathematics. What I think we should all 
agree on is that any satisfactory account of philosophy of 
mathematics should include some explanation for the pre-formal 
element and its connection to formal mathematics. 
 
 
4.6 Philosophical importance of pre-formal mathematics 
 
Although we have glanced at the philosophical importance of pre-
formal mathematics, it should now be fully disclosed what it has to 
do with questions like mathematical truth. I think that the 
philosophical importance of pre-formal thinking can be divided 
into three parts. First, as we have seen, it is only with the inclusion 
of pre-formal thinking that we can draw a full picture of 
mathematical thinking. We should find it very surprising if this 
did not have any philosophical significance at all. Second, it 
immediately gives us a way to expand from formal mathematics 
into a more allowing conceptual realm. We can speak of Tarskian 
truth and the hierarchies of languages, we can speak of reference, 
and we can speak of the origins and nature of mathematical 
knowledge. In other words, we get all the conceptual richness we 
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need in order to show the substantiality of truth. This has been a 
factor up to this point, and it will be one for the rest of this work. 
Pre-formal thinking by itself does not solve the questions of truth 
and reference, but it gives us the conceptual tools to do so.  
Third, and importantly for all philosophical theories of 
mathematics, we get justification to speak about the philosophy of 
mathematics in the first place. One problem with the self-standing 
formal theories of the extreme formalist type is the connection 
between mathematics and philosophy. If the mathematical 
concepts do not refer to anything non-formal, how can we even be 
justified to discuss them in a non-formal context? What have our 
non-formal concepts such as “proof”, “axioms” and “numbers” got 
to do with the formal theories where such concepts are supposedly 
central? If the formal systems are all there is to mathematics, then 
any such talk is not only superfluous, but also misleading. 
Moreover, we have the problem of theory choice in an even 
stronger form. Even if we grant the formalist his criteria of, say, 
consistency and conservativeness as the basis for theory choice, 
how can we apply them to the formal theories? Indeed, how can 
we have any criterion of theory choice if formal systems are all 
there is to mathematics? At any given point we would have the 
contemporary set of accepted formal systems in mathematics, and 
that is all there is to mathematics. Strictly speaking, no means of 
choosing between them could exist, since these would have to be 
justified in a non-formal manner. 
This might sound like an unfair limitation to the formalist 
position, and in a loose way it is. But it goes on to show how 
limited the extreme formalist position actually is, if taken to its 
logical conclusion. If mathematics is about purely formal concepts, 
then what is the relation between them and their non-formal 
counterparts that we deal with in philosophy? If formal systems do 
not refer to anything, I do not see any other alternative than to 
deny the existence of any such relation. Strictly speaking, it cannot 
make sense for the radical formalist to speak of formal concepts in 
a non-formal context. The natural numbers, for example, are 
defined by the Peano Axioms, and it could not make sense to 
discuss them in a way that is not included in PA. In essence, such 
strict formalism would make all philosophy of mathematics 
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impossible. Since all formalists have been ready to publish work 
about mathematics in a non-formal presentation, we can be 
confident that such a radical formalist does not actually exist. 
All that notwithstanding, of course we should be generous 
enough to grant formalists the ability to deal with mathematics 
non-formally, and treat the writings as something akin to 
analogies. However, this obviously gives us a whole new 
vocabulary for the philosophy of mathematics, and the relevance 
of pre-formal thinking can no longer be denied. That brings us 
back to the second point: all the conceptual tools that pre-formal 
thinking gives us. We have the ability to talk about meta- and 
object languages, reference between them, and hence also about 
semantical truth. If we have such an ability, it would not make 
sense not to use it. Why insist on talking about mathematics only 
as the formal systems, when we can naturally include pre-formal 
mathematics to cover the whole phenomenon as human beings 
practise it? Of course most formalists are likely to accept this, while 
insisting that any such talk is superfluous since the formal systems 
are still all there is to real mathematics. However, that is not the 
case, since by including the pre-formal part we get tools that have 
relevance also on the formal part. Perhaps the most important of 
these is the ability to discuss theory choices. We can speak about 
axioms and rules of proof, their accuracy and their references, in a 
non-formal context. We can have criteria for the choices between 
them. In short: we can speak about truth. 
 
At this point we should examine what Tarski’s own image of the 
status of his definition of truth was, and how well it conforms to 
the account of pre-formal thinking here. The answer is obvious 
when looking at a passage from Tarski’s (1936, pp. 166-167, quoted 
in Woleński 2001, p. 72) famous article: 
 
It remains perhaps to add that we are not interested here in “formal” 
languages and sciences in one special sense of the word “formal”, 
namely sciences to which no meaning is attached. For such sciences the 
problem here discussed has no relevance, it is not even meaningful. 
We shall always ascribe quite concrete and, for us, intelligible 
meanings to the signs which occur in the languages we shall consider. 
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[…] The sentences which are distinguished as axioms seem to us 
materially true, and in choosing rules of inference we are always 
guided by the principle that when such rules are applied to true 
sentences the sentences obtained by their use should also be true. 
(Italics mine). 
 
This is more or less exactly what I have been arguing for. With 
mathematics we are always interested in interpreted languages – 
in meanings, and whatever formal tools we develop, our languages 
never lose that attachment to the meanings. For Tarski it was 
natural that formal languages have meanings, and by committing 
to the axioms and rules of proof we commit to the truth of them. 
As we have seen, that is also how we avoid the arbitrariness of 
formal systems. If formal systems are considered to be completely 
self-standing – that is, un-interpreted languages of pure symbols, 
empty of content – like Tarski noted, the question of truth becomes 
meaningless. That corresponds perfectly to the account of extreme 
formalism in this work.  
What Tarski does not say is what exactly is meant by 
“meaning” here. One thing we do know, however, is that in 
Tarski’s account meaning, and hence truth, was relativized with 
respect to languages. Woleński (2001, p. 72-73) points out that in 
the contemporary discussion it was suggested (by Maria 
Kokoszyńska) that such a theory of truth should be relativized 
even with respect to the meanings of expressions. In that way, one 
could argue that meanings in fact come before the truth conditions 
in the sense that we must first have a full grasp of the former 
before we can establish the latter. Here we run into a danger of the 
truth conditions getting too drastic a relativity – something I 
certainly want to avoid when it comes to mathematical truth. It is 
clear that a statement like “there exists a number n: 2 < n < 3” gets 
different truth-values depending on what set the concept 
“number” refers to, but in mathematics we certainly do not want to 
end up with the position that one concept can mean different 
things within one language. 
How big a problem is that? Certainly we do not want to lose 
any of the clarity and expressive power that formal systems have, 
and that is what any strong sense of relativity of the truth 
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conditions is bound to do. However, it must be remembered that 
while Tarski was concerned with formal languages, he was 
concerned with them as being formalizations of informal languages, 
not as empty formal languages in the extreme formalist sense. As 
Woleński (2001, p. 73) points out, the difference between 
relativizing truth to language and meaning vanishes if we only 
consider interpreted languages, which is indeed what we have been 
doing all along. When it comes to the philosophy of mathematics, 
we can focus on the interpretation of axioms and rules of proof, 
and get the meanings and truth conditions as the side product. In 
fact, this is what I have been suggesting all along. Truth is relative 
to language, and formal system, but there is nothing problematic 
in that. When it comes to mathematics, meaning and truth 
conditions come to play when we choose the axiomatizations, and 
the interpretations. After the choice is made, the truth conditions 
are fixed, and we escape the threat of strong relativity.  
Perhaps it is too strong a word to say that mathematical axioms 
“force” themselves upon us as true, but it cannot be denied that 
however we arrive at them, it tends to include a strong conviction 
where meanings and truth conditions are intertwined. The 
meaning of formal mathematics, of course, consists of our pre-
formal ideas, and it is carried along throughout the process of 
mathematical thinking. If there are conflicts between the truth 
conditions and our ideas of meaning, the axioms can be revised, as 
has been done numerous times. Certainly the relation between 
formal and pre-formal mathematics is a dynamic one, and the 
meanings of mathematical expressions can change. But they 
change via changes in the axiomatizations and definitions, not 
within the formal systems. Relativity in any problematic sense does 
not need to enter the picture, and we can retain all the exactness of 
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4.7 Priority of semantics over syntax 
 
All of the above has been presented as a way to stress the priority 
of pre-formal thinking over formal systems in mathematical 
thinking. It has been my purpose to take a wider angle into the 
whole picture of mathematics as a human endeavour, and thus 
gain evidence for the priority. However, that priority can also be 
looked at from another angle, and I believe this is the right point to 
address that issue. As we remember, although Gödel used 
informal presentations in his project by using concepts like self-
reference and truth, the actual proofs of incompleteness were 
completely syntactic. Clearly it was Gödel’s purpose to find a 
syntactic presentation for his pre-formal, semantical, ideas. That by 
itself counts as evidence for the priority of pre-formal thinking 
over formal mathematics – and hence, for semantics over syntax. 
Fortunately, we do not need to limit ourselves to such 
considerations. The same priority can be seen by studying the 
relationship between Tarski’s undecidability theorem and Gödel’s 
incompleteness theorems. Raymond Smullyan (1992, 2001) has 
made this approach famous in the literature. While Gödel’s 
theorems are often considered to be the more important result 
when it comes to the philosophy of mathematics, Smullyan has 
stressed the value of Tarski’s theorem. As Smullyan (2001, pp. 78-
79) notes, Gödel’s incompleteness theorems follow from Tarski’s 
undecidability theorem, while the opposite is not the case. From 
Tarski (1936) we know that a formal language cannot contain its 
own truth-predicate. Let us assume that a provability predicate PrT 
of a formal system T is sound. Now if it were also the case that PrT 
is complete, it would quite clearly follow that PrT is in fact the truth-
predicate of T, which contradicts with Tarski’s undefinability 
theorem. Since T was assumed to sound, there would have to exist 
some true but unprovable sentence in T.112 Thus Gödel’s first 
incompleteness theorem can be immediately reached from a 
Tarskian semantical starting point. 
                                                           
112 Here Gödel’s theorem gives us the extra strength of presenting the self-
referential formulation of the unprovable sentence, thus giving us an 
explicit sentence with which to go through the semantical arguments. 
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What we gather from Smullyan is another argument for the 
priority of semantics, and hence, pre-formal thinking. There are 
others, and the whole relationship between syntax and semantics 
presents many interesting questions in logic. I cannot go further 
into that area here, and I hope that this part of the thesis is already 
sufficiently established. Furthermore, even with all the logical 
arguments on semantics and syntax, the extreme formalist could 
always have the last refuge of denying everything other than 
simple syntax from the domain of mathematical study. Although 
the Tarskian approach to Gödel’s incompleteness theorems may 
seem unproblematic to us, for someone that only accepts formal 
systems consisting of primitive recursive functions in mathematics 
that could be a whole other matter. That is why I have wanted to 
stress that in mathematics we are not concerned with formal 
systems empty of meaning. When we acknowledge the existence of 
pre-formal thinking in mathematics, the semantical approaches 
like Tarskian truth present themselves to us as very intuitive and 
convenient tools – but most importantly as something that we 
simply must acknowledge in a philosophical investigation of 
mathematics, because mathematics without them would be quite 
different from the discipline we currently know. 
 
 
4.8 Truth, proof and reference 
 
From all that has been considered so far in this work, it seems 
indisputable that truth and proof are different concepts in the 
classical two-valued mathematics. The truth of Gödel sentences 
gives us a strong argument for the case, but it is not the only 
argument. The value of the semantical argument lies in its 
explicitness, and as such it is probably the strongest one. But even 
if we rejected it, there would still be no reason to conclude that 
truth and proof are the same concept. Deep down, my final 
assessment of the semantical argument only used the assumption 
that there exists pre-formal mathematical thinking. This is already 
a very weak assumption, as I have tried to show in the last chapter. 
But Gödel’s incompleteness theorems themselves lie on even 
weaker assumptions, ones that even the formalist absolutely must 
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accept. In classical two-valued logic there is of course the law of 
excluded middle, and if we equate truth with proof in formal 
systems, then the Gödel sentence of “our fullest mathematical 
theory T” clearly has a forbidden middle “truth-value”. By the 
very axioms of logic, either G(T) is true (provable) or it is false 
(disprovable). Since it is neither, we must either revise our logic, or 
otherwise conclude that truth cannot be just provability. 
In the next chapter we will look at the first possibility. But if we 
stick to classical two-valued logic, incompleteness already shows 
us why truth and proof are different concepts: all the arguments 
presented so far in this work are more or less only corollary to it. 
They are an important corollary, though, as we gain insight on just 
what the difference is, and how truth and proof are connected to 
each other. The work here aims to explain the difference between 
truth and proof; that there exists such a difference in classical two-
valued mathematics is already established by Gödel’s 
incompleteness theorems. 
There are other problems for the extreme formalist, as well. We 
remember that Hilbert’s goal was to formalize mathematics 
completely. This already should give us a hint that the extreme 
formalist viewpoint will turn out to be rather limited. For 
something to be formalized, it obviously has to exist first. This 
should never be forgotten. Even if Hilbert’s program had 
succeeded, it would not have shown that we do not process formal 
mathematical sentences through their pre-formal meanings, or that 
they do not have objective references. It would only have shown 
that mathematics could also be presented (even if not practised) 
completely without those meanings. Of course Hilbert himself 
recognized that mathematicians use meanings in their work113; 
only the latter extreme formalists have reached the problematic 
notion that formal mathematics could be the only mathematics we 
have. This needs to be stressed once more: formal mathematics is a 
tool created in order to introduce a maximally unambiguous 
                                                           
113 As we remember, Hilbert was aiming to save the old mathematics of 
abstract inferences from intuitionism, not to create new mathematics to 
replace it. See Reid 1970, pp. 155-157 for more on the basis of Hilbert’s 
program. 
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notation for mathematics. In the case of proof, it was always meant 
to be (and, with the small exception of the Gödel sentences, still is) 
the maximally unambiguous way of finding out true sentences, by 
proving them from true axioms. 
 
Then what is truth, the deflationist will ask: what is it that makes 
some of our pre-formal sentences true and some false – and how 
can we gain knowledge of that? Many philosophers have argued 
that the semantic theory of truth does not need to explain this. It 
gives us an account on what the true sentences are like, but it does 
explain what the concept of truth itself means. Dummett (1976, pp. 
51-54), for example, has argued for this idea. As far as the initial 
purpose of this work is concerned, I am ready to agree with that. In 
our account of mathematical truth, we have seen that the semantic 
theory of truth, understood as the relation between formal and 
pre-formal mathematics, gives us a satisfactory basis for 
mathematics as a human endeavour. We might not know what 
mathematical truth ultimately is, but we can know that a semantic 
notion of truth in mathematics is substantial – and that it should be 
accepted.  
When we consider the philosophy of mathematics as a whole, 
however, this is not satisfactory. If we use pre-formal thinking 
with Tarskian truth to make an argument, we must account for the 
reference of both the formal and pre-formal mathematical 
sentences. Pre-formal mathematics cannot rest on nothing, or we 
run into all the same difficulties of arbitrariness as the extreme 
formalist does with the formal sentences. In short, to make the 
approach here acceptable, pre-formal mathematical sentences must 
be saved from arbitrariness. Ultimately, this must mean that we 
have criteria for asserting some pre-formal sentences over others. 
While my approach of calling those criteria truth saves us from 
arbitrariness, this begs the question what it is that makes 
mathematical sentences true. The answer must be something non-
arbitrary: that (at least some) mathematical sentences have 
objective references. Showing what these references are, however, 
looks like a daunting task: such an account would have to answer 
all the highly problematic metaphysical and epistemological 
questions in the philosophy of mathematics. Essentially, that 
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would make any independent account of mathematical truth 
impossible.114  
Fortunately, however, we do not need to explain the nature of 
the reference of mathematical sentences here. It will be enough for 
the purposes of this work to convince the reader that such a 
reference – a reason for the objectivity of some mathematical truths 
– exists. Of course our luck continues because there only is one 
noteworthy point of view in the philosophy of mathematics that 
denies any reference for mathematical sentences, and that is 
extreme formalism/nominalism. In Chapter 6 I will argue that 
many doctrines that are called nominalism in the literature are not 
nominalistic in the strict sense required here, and are in fact 
perfectly compatible with Tarskian truth. Only formalism of the 
extreme type would conflict with the arguments of this work – and 
by now we should have a good idea how problematic extreme 
formalism is. If we manage to show that extreme formalism runs 
into arbitrariness, we must conclude that some objective reference 
for mathematics is needed. This way, other than extreme 
formalism, all accounts of philosophy of mathematics are 
compatible with the approach here. We may not know which 
objectivist philosophy of mathematics is correct, but we can still 
perfectly well know that the correct one must be some objectivist 
philosophy rather than extreme formalism. 
However, before we go deeper into nominalism we need to 
clarify one assumption that has been used throughout this work: 
that our theories of mathematics are in classical first-order two-valued 
logic. Many of the central results used in the arguments here, most 
importantly the undefinability of truth within formal languages, 
depend on us using classical first-order logic. Let us next examine 
some of the possibilities that other logics present us with. 
                                                           
114 This is not to suggest a form of quietism, according to which meaningful 
metaphysical debate is impossible. But I do contend that we should put 
such debate aside as long as we can. To exaggerate a bit, almost any form 
non-metaphysical explanation is bound to be more satisfactory than a 
metaphysical one. 
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5. Truth and logic 
 
5.1 Different logics 
 
So far Tarskian conception of truth and the semantical arguments 
have provided a strong case against extreme formalism and 
deflationism in the philosophy of mathematics, but that is due to 
us having to expand beyond formal systems in order to include an 
adequate definition of truth. If we could find a way of defining 
truth in formal languages within those languages, the question of 
truth and proof could be dramatically changed. Of course it would 
not change anything with regard to semantical thinking in 
mathematics, but it would change the way we look at the 
possibilities of formal systems. The whole point of semantical 
arguments, and the subsequent conclusion of the difference 
between truth and proof, is based on formal systems not being able 
to contain their own truth predicates. An adequate formal 
definition of proof within the object language would obviously 
change all that.  
The reason we have been so complacent in requiring 
expansions to formal systems is of course that Tarski (1936) proved 
that classical first-order formal languages could not contain their 
own truth predicates. First-order logic is complete, as Gödel had 
proved earlier. By adding a truth predicate to a first-order 
language we can formulate the liar’s paradox115, which is in 
conflict with the law of excluded middle. Hence, including a truth 
predicate implies the need for a metalanguage, just like it was used 
in the semantical argument. This seems unproblematic to us since 
the use of first-order classical languages is so deeply entrenched in 
the practice of mathematics, especially when it comes to the 
                                                           
115 “This sentence is false”. Obviously the first-order language in question 
must have enough expressive power to be able to express the liar sentence. 
Clearly we can establish neither the truth nor the falsity of the liar 
sentence, or at least one of its more sophisticated variants. There is of 
course a close connection between the liar’s paradox and the Gödel 
sentences, the main difference being that the latter are in fact not 
paradoxical but true. 
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question of the most basic mathematical theories. But are we in any 
way justified in making such limitations when we consider the 
philosophical question of truth and proof? We do, after all, have 
knowledge of many other useful formal languages in mathematics. 
If a change of the language can affect the semantical argument, we 
should certainly be aware of that.  
The basic position since Tarski has been that a hierarchy of 
languages (and formal systems) is needed for adequate definitions 
of truth. We can define an adequate truth predicate for a formal 
language L, but it must be done in a metalanguage M of L. 
Obviously M cannot contain its own truth predicate either, and 
therefore another metalanguage is needed. Such is the hierarchy of 
Tarskian truth, and if we limit ourselves to purely formal 
languages, it does not collapse at any point. If we accept classical 
first-order logic, and want to include a truth predicate, that kind of 
infinite hierarchy of formal languages is inescapably required due 
to Tarski’s undefinability result. Even if we use the strategy of this 
work, that is, introducing an informal metalanguage to collapse the 
hierarchy, we are still stuck with a minimum of two languages: a 
formal first-order object language and its partly informal 
metalanguage. This is, however, a somewhat problematic 
conclusion as far as its wider philosophical implications are 
considered. After all, the concepts of metalanguage and object 
language are in no way basic in the philosophy of language. 
Indeed, is it not the case that we all have one language within 
which we define truth, and enumerate the true sentences?  
Granted, Tarski’s undefinability theorem concerns formal 
languages, and our natural languages are always going to be 
informal. Obviously there is nothing in Tarski’s work that prevents 
us from defining truth within informal languages. But it must be 
remembered that before Tarski’s result, the monolingual approach 
was accepted also in mathematics, and it undeniably carries a 
certain amount of attraction in it. For the strict formalist it can be 
absolutely crucial, since we have seen how problematic the 
Tarskian hierarchy is in extreme formalism. If we run into an 
infinite regression of languages, the formalist program seems 
untenable. When we include pre-formal mathematical thinking, we 
do not have the problem of infinite regression in the same way, 
160 5. Truth and logic 
 
 
since our metalanguage can be (and of course actually is, at some 
point) informal. But even for us non-formalists the hierarchy of 
formal languages can sound like an unnecessary awkwardness. Is 
it really the case that there cannot be just one formal language of 
mathematics? As Jaakko Hintikka (2006, p. 708) points out, the 
notion of metalanguage has been “forced on” us, it is not 
something that the philosophers and logicians have desired. When 
we think about the practice of mathematics, there is all the more 
motivation to avoid hierarchies. Outside of logic, hierarchies of 
languages do not really enter the picture in mathematics. In fact, if 
it were not for truth predicates, the whole phenomenon of object 
languages and metalanguages would seem very much undesirable. 
Tarskian truth may mirror the relation between our formal and 
pre-formal mathematics, but within formal mathematics using a 
single language has obvious advantages over the infinite 
hierarchies. 
The basis for such a monolingual formalist project must lie in a 
different choice of logic. Classical first-order two-valued logic will 
not do if we want to include adequate truth definitions within 
formal languages – and that is indeed what we must do if we want 
to defeat the Tarskian hierarchy. For the choice of an alternative 
logic, three potential solutions have been proposed. The first, and 
the most famous one, is due to Saul Kripke (1975) and his use of 
the many-valued Kleenean logic. The second option is Hintikka’s 
(1996) and Gabriel Sandu’s Independence Friendly (IF) logic, a 
first-order many-valued logic.116 The third option is staying within 
the realm of classical logic, but expanding into second-order logic.  
 
 
5.2 Hintikka’s truth 
 
Let us now mix the chronology a bit and start from the most recent 
development, started by Jaakko Hintikka in his book Principles of 
                                                           
116 Hintikka does not use this classification, but at least for the purposes of 
this work IF is a many-valued logic, even if it must be distinguished from 
such many-valued concepts as truth-degrees. 
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Mathematics Revisited (1996).117 Hintikka has argued that his 
Independence Friendly logic not only contains its own truth 
predicate, but this predicate is also adequate – all this in a first-
order language. IF-logic has been much discussed recently, and it 
is not possible to go into all its general merits and problems here. 
What we are concerned with here is the question of truth and 
proof, in particular the method of defining a truth predicate for an 
IF-language L within L. Here Hintikka’s approach is revolutionary: 
the definition of truth for IF is a semantic one, based on game-
theoretic semantics (GTS).  
In GTS the truth-value of a complex sentence S is defined by the 
“verifier” Eloise trying to show that the sentence is true and her 
opponent “falsifier” Abelard trying to show that the sentence is 
false. The way this happens is, in propositional logic, that Eloise 
picks branches of disjunctions and Abelard branches of 
conjunctions. In predicate logic, in addition to that, Abelard picks 
values for universally quantified variables, and Eloise values for 
existentially quantified variables. In the case of negations in the 
formulas, the roles are reversed. The game goes on until an atomic 
sentence A is reached. If the sentence A is true, then Eloise is said 
to have a winning strategy, and the original sentence S is true. If A 
is false, then Abelard has a winning strategy, and the sentence S is 
false.118 
As Hintikka (ibid., pp. 25-26) points out, there is an apparent 
circularity in using the above GTS as a definition of truth since it 
contains reference to the truth and falsity of atomic sentences. 
However, it must be pointed out that Hintikka is concerned with 
semantic truth, that is, truth in models. GTS come into play after we 
have an interpretation of a first-order language, that is, when we 
move from an uninterpreted language into a model of it. That way, 
the truth-values of atomic sentences come with the interpretation. 
That is the first stage of truth in GTS. The other stage is how we 
arrive from the truth and falsity of the atomic sentences at the truth 
                                                           
117 Hintikka’s book is more of a philosophical introduction on the subject 
and not really suitable as a textbook for learning IF logic. The 
recommended, and only, textbook on the subject is Väänänen 2007. 
118 For more details, see Hintikka 1996, pp. 24-26. 
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and falsity of complex sentences. Those rules are defined by GTS, 
and one must notice the similarity to the Tarskian definition of 
truth.119  
As we know, however, Tarskian truth in the classical first-order 
logic requires metalanguages, while Hintikka wants to avoid them. 
For that purpose, it helps that IF is a richer logic than the classical 
first-order one – not by much, but with one crucial difference. The 
extra strength is carried by IF being able to express the 
independence of quantifiers from each other, and from free 
variables.120 While in first-order logic the existence of self-
referential “liar sentences” causes paradoxes that conflict with the 
basic laws of logic, in IF languages we have more expressive 
power to deal with them. Since truth is defined as the winning 
strategies in semantical games, the undecidable liar sentences, with 
the help of independence, are thought of as infinite symmetrical 
loops where neither player can win. This is the third “truth-value” 
in IF logic. With it the user of IF can avoid the liar’s paradox (see 
ibid., pp. 159-160), and thus Tarski’s proof of the undefinability of 
truth does not apply. 121 In fact, only the truth conditions given in 
game-theoretic semantics apply, and they are the definition of 
truth.  
Moreover, those conditions are presentable in the same first-
order IF language. This Hintikka does with the help of Gödel-
numbering and Church’s thesis, the widely held belief according to 
which (to be precise, one corollary of it, see ibid., p. 114) all 
                                                           
119 This hidden reference to truth can be considered a weakness in 
Hintikka’s theory, but since I am out to defend Tarskian truth, I do not 
hold that to be the case. In this work we are concerned with interpreted 
languages, so there should not be any problem in this sense. The use of 
model theory, however, will be seen to be problematic for Hintikka’s 
approach. 
120 This is equivalent with the ability to express Henkin quantifiers. Henkin 
quantifier over a sentence ϕ  is usually written in literature either as









yx  and it is defined as ϕ))'(,'),(,(' xgxxfxxxgf ∀∀∃∃ . 
Importantly, the selection of y depends only on x, and the selection of y’ 
depends only on x’. 
121 See, for example, Väänänen 2007, pp. 102-103. 
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mechanically decidable relations are representable in basic 
arithmetic. Since the rules of GTS are quite clearly mechanically 
decidable and IF can express basic arithmetic, according to 
Hintikka, an IF language can contain the definition of its own truth 
predicate. In other words, in a model of an IF language, the rules of 
GTS give us the extension of a truth predicate Tr. Since the truth 
conditions are expressible in IF languages, an IF language can 
contain its own adequate truth predicate. This is why Hintikka has 
claimed that he has “exorcised Tarski’s curse”; that we do not need 
to commit to a hierarchy of languages in order to give definitions 
of truth for formal languages.  
However, Philippe De Rouilhan and Serge Bozon (2003) have 
argued that Hintikka has not quite achieved everything he claims 
to have done. While they agree that we can define an adequate 
truth predicate Tr for an IF-language L within L, they also point 
out that we cannot escape the hierarchy of languages if we hope to 
recognize and use Tr as the truth predicate of L. Simply put, in an IF 
language L there is a predicate Tr which has the extension of the 
true sentences of L, but we can only show this to be the case in a 
language richer than L. The technicalities concerning IF can be 
found in De Rouilhan’s and Bozon’s article (ibid., pp. 689-698), but 
the crux of their criticism is that for Hintikka’s claim to hold, it 
would need to be the case that a completely monolingual speaker of L 
would be able to carry out the whole process involved in defining 
truth for L. This would mean, in addition to providing an adequate 
definition of truth for L, also coming up with the idea in the first 
place, expressing the concept of adequacy, having the tools to 
express the quasi-logical equivalences in T-sentences and having 
enough model theory and arithmetic to carry out the whole 
process. Most importantly, even if we did have at our disposal an 
adequate definition of truth for L, we would have to be able to 
show it to be such – that all the T-sentences of L are the logical 
conclusion of the truth definition – and do this totally within L. In 
short, De Rouilhan and Bozon argue, Hintikka manages to exorcise 
Tarski’s curse only if his whole project could be achieved within an 
IF-language. 
From Hintikka’s and Sandu’s work we do know that there is an 
adequate GTS truth predicate within L, but we know this while 
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operating in a metalanguage. To start with, Hintikka’s book is not 
written in the language of IF logic. Model-theory, in particular, is 
used throughout Hintikka’s work, but it is not expressed in IF 
logic. Hintikka also uses Gödel-numbering, and hence arithmetic, 
widely in his project, yet – as Jan Woleński (2006, p. 665) points out 
– it is not at all clear that in IF languages one can do all that is 
needed for arithmetic. Mathematical induction, for example, is not 
equivalent to any rule of GTS. In addition, there is the missing law 
of excluded middle to deal with. Truth predicates are a special 
case, but do we know that with IF logic we can define arithmetic in 
an otherwise equivalent way, or at least equivalent enough to go 
through all that is needed for the Gödel-numbering? It must be 
remembered that Hintikka has not actually defined model theory 
or arithmetic within IF languages. 
Finally, needless to say, first-order IF languages do not contain 
enough expressive power to carry out the sort of theorizing that 
Hintikka does in natural language. In this respect, De Rouilhan’s 
and Bozon’s criticism resembles my criticism of Field. It is all well 
to use axioms to define concepts in formal languages, but we 
should not forget that all this is initially done in our pre-formal 
languages. When we switch from pre-formal to formal concepts, 
we cannot fool ourselves into thinking that the former never 
existed. Moreover, we cannot forget that they are the reason why 
the formal concepts are possible in the first place. Similarly, 
Hintikka’s game-theoretic definition of truth for IF languages is 
adequate, but we cannot look at this result independently from all 
the background needed to establish it. De Rouilhan and Bozon 
argue that a first-order IF language itself is not able to express this, or 
any of the desired results around it. That is why Tarski’s hierarchy 
exists also in IF. For us to be able to say that the definition of truth 
for IF is adequate, we need to have a richer language. The main 
problem for Hintikka (as well as for others that want to escape the 
Tarskian hierarchy) is that everything needs to be done in a single 
language. De Rouilhan and Bozon call this the monolingual speaker 
problem, and it follows us wherever we go with projects like 
Hintikka’s. 
The problem of the monolingual speaker in its many facets is 
the most important difficulty with Hintikka’s claim of exorcising 
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Tarski’s curse. Aside from the more general considerations, De 
Rouilhan and Bozon (ibid., p. 697) also offer a technical argument, 
culminating in the conclusion that the model-theoretic concepts of 
logical truth, logical implication and logical equivalence are all 
definable in IF languages only in a very weak sense. Indeed, as 
they point out, here IF loses something from classical first-order 
languages where those concepts are fully definable. The difference 
comes from IF-languages having more expressive power than the 
classical first-order languages. As such, IF languages are inevitably 
incomplete.122 In addition, IF languages do not have contradictory 
negation. Both of these are properties which classical first-order 
languages possess. The excluded middle does not hold in IF, and 
thus we have the “truth-value” of undecidable to deal with. 
Obviously truth and falsity in IF do not behave as they do with 
contradictory negation. The problem for Hintikka, De Rouilhan 
and Bozon argue (ibid., p. 698), is that with these weak notions of 
logical truth, logical implication and logical equivalence, the 
monolingual speaker of an IF language cannot express an adequate 
definition of the truth predicate within L. In defining and showing 
that his GTS truth is adequate, Hintikka (1996, pp. 24-25, for 
example) uses quite a bit of model theory. The monolingual IF 
speaker, however, could only use very weak versions of the central 
model-theoretic concepts. Hence, we need stronger model theory 
to show Tr to be the truth predicate of L, and Tarski’s hierarchy is 
still with us. 
 
Hintikka (2006, p. 710) claims that this is not a problem, but his 
arguments are not ultimately very convincing. First of all, he 
dismisses the talk of logical truth and such as modal notions, and 
not relevant to the question of Tarskian hierarchies. Hence, 
according to Hintikka, the technical result of De Rouilhan and 
Bozon concerning concepts like logical truth does not show the 
kind of incompleteness they thought they had. In addition, 
Hintikka suggests that in order to discuss concepts such as logical 
truth we can enrich the IF language with contradictory negation. 
                                                           
122 Incompleteness follows right away from the ability to express Henkin 
quantifiers. See Hintikka & Sandu 1996, p. 177 for details. 
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The way to do this is by enumerating all the contradictory 
sentences (inconsistent formulas) and including an axiom that “all 
contradictory sentences are not true”. This can be done since the 
set of inconsistent formulas in an IF language is recursively 
enumerable (see Hintikka & Sandu 1996, p. 177). Now in this 
fragment of an IF language we can discuss logical truth in a new 
context, Hintikka claims (2006, p. 711), where there is no need for a 
separate metalanguage.123  
Be that as it may, I think Hintikka is too quick to dismiss De 
Rouilhan’s and Bozon’s results concerning model-theoretic 
concepts as modal notions and not relevant to IF. It is the same 
kind of undefinability that makes it impossible for us to use the 
truth predicate of an IF language L as such within L. Whether one 
agrees with that particular counterargument or not, the general 
argument against Hintikka’s claims of exorcising Tarski’s curse 
remains strong. Talk of modal notions aside, there seems to be a lot 
behind an IF language that is not done in that language – and 
certainly model theory, alongside arithmetic, seems like the most 
important of these. Hintikka (ibid., p. 707) has responded to De 
Rouilhan and Bozon by arguing that he used terms outside IF logic 
merely for the sake of intelligibility. The syntax of L can be (with 
the help of Gödel numbering) expressed in L, and hence the truth 
predicate for L can also be formulated. Whatever other languages 
(model-theoretic and second-order logic, for example) were used, 
it should not matter, as the same could have been done without 
them. The truth in a first-order IF language L could be formulated 
within L, and that is what matters, Hintikka argues. With Gödel 
                                                           
123 One unsatisfactory part of this strategy is that the contradictory 
statements are now false. Why false rather than true? The situation no 
longer seems to correspond to our intuitions about liar sentences. The liar 
sentence, unlike the Gödel sentence, gives us no reason to think that it is 
true rather than false. This is the strength of assigning the truth-value 
“undecidable” to such fixed points of the language. The liar sentence will 
get the same truth-value as its negation, which sounds intuitively 
satisfactory. So with Hintikka’s proposed strategy we gain some of the 
completeness of classical first-order languages, but with the price of losing 
a lot that is of value in IF languages. This is also the strategy suggested by 
Kripke (1975, p. 715) in order to avoid truth-value gaps.  
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numbering we can translate the other languages into IF, and so the 
problem disappears. 
However, one important part of the monolingual problem is to 
show that all this can be actually done. Hintikka has been content 
to assume that this is the case since IF sentences are equivalent to 





, where ϕ is a first-order formula. In ∑ −11 languages we 
can do all the required model theory and arithmetic, and hence – 
Hintikka claims – there is no need to go through the details in IF 
languages. But what is the basis of stating that for all IF sentences 
there are equivalent ∑−11 formulas? That indeed is the case (see 
Väänänen 2007, pp. 86-90), but to avoid the monolingual problem 
that equivalency would have to be shown completely within an IF 
language. There is an evident logical difficulty in defining IF as the 
basic logic, and then using non-IF model theory and arithmetic to 
show connections between IF and other languages. 
Overall, Hintikka skips an important step. We cannot be 
satisfied with simply avoiding Tarski’s undefinability result. This 
Hintikka has achieved. An IF language L can contain its own 
adequate truth predicate Tr; or at least there is nothing to make 
that impossible. But in order for us to use Tr as the truth predicate 
of L, we must be able to show that Tr is materially adequate; that 
all the T-instances of L are the logical conclusion of the truth 
predicate of L. And for this we need a metalanguage, as De 
Rouilhan and Bozon pointed out. While the truth predicate Tr for L 
could be formulated in L, we cannot show Tr to be the truth 
predicate in L alone. Hintikka’s reply concerns formulation of the 
truth predicate, but the more pertinent question here is showing 
that the truth predicate is in fact the truth predicate. For this 
purpose, the hierarchy of language must be brought in through the 
back door. 
However, while I agree with the criticism that we need a richer 
metalanguage to be able to recognize the definition of truth in L as 
such, it can be somewhat confusing to call it a hierarchy of the 
Tarskian type. The reason for this is that we arrive at the Tarskian 
hierarchy in a different way. Tarski proved that such a hierarchy is 
needed in classical first-order languages, and at the same time he 
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also showed why it is needed: because of the liar’s paradox. The 
reason for needing a metalanguage in order to recognize that Tr is 
the truth predicate of an IF language L is different. While a classical 
first-order language cannot even contain an adequate truth 
predicate, an IF language can. The problem is that an IF language L 
itself does not have enough expressive force to carry out 
everything we need in order to show that Tr is the truth predicate 
of L. We cannot escape the need for a metalanguage, and hence the 
hierarchies of languages. But this difference in the basis for 
hierarchies is important for us to acknowledge. Ultimately, I think 
this is the greatest problem with Hintikka claiming that he has 
exorcised Tarski’s curse. His result of avoiding hierarchy in the 
usual Tarskian way makes him confident he has avoided 
hierarchies in all ways.124 But as we have seen, this is not the case. 
 
 
5.3 Why IF logic? 
 
Above are the main problems in the case we accept IF as our basic 
logic. For us to show that the truth predicate of IF is materially 
adequate – and for us to use it – we must use some metalanguage. 
Essentially, Hintikka’s project demands first-order languages rich 
enough in arithmetic to carry out the Gödel-numberings, plus rich 
enough in model theory to carry out all the necessary theorizing. 
Granted, a lot of this is immediately translatable into IF languages. 
But not everything is, nor is translatability by itself enough, and 
hence the monolingual speaker problem remains unsolved. Simply 
put, to include and recognize a truth predicate in an IF language, 
we need to expand beyond that language. The situation with truth 
is not essentially different from classical first-order logic and the 
parts of set theory that the Tarskian expansion demands.125  
                                                           
124 This is not to say that there is any factual difference between the types 
of hierarchies of languages needed. But the arguments for arriving at the 
hierarchies are different, which is the important point here. 
125 Hintikka (1996, p. 29) mentions other problems of Tarski-type truth, 
such as infinitely deep languages. In this work, however, I must limit 
myself to standard languages and standard models. In any case, in our 
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However, it is another question whether we are prepared to 
adopt IF logic in the first place.126 If Hintikka were correct, in order 
to have an adequate definition of truth we would have two 
choices, provided that we stay within first-order logic. First, we 
can stick to the classical first-order logic. In that case we have to 
expand outside logic, most appealingly to set theory and Tarskian 
truth.127 Second, we can use IF, which is still a first-order logic.128 
Now what are the main differences between classical logic 
expanded with set theory and IF logic?129 In particular, what is the 
motivation for replacing classical logic with an IF one? Aside from 
the added expressive power to logic, I think that the key to 
Hintikka’s thinking is that he is very much committed to the 
logicist tradition of Russell. He believes that mathematics should 
be expressible in the language of logic. If we use set theory, we are 
immediately outside the logicist program, and commit ourselves to 
higher-order entities such as sets and relations. Of course one main 
motivation for logicism is its economical character ontologically: if 
one only needs to assume the domain of logic, in particular a first-
                                                                                                                        
pre-formal thinking we should have enough tools to distinguish between 
finitely and infinitely deep languages. Hintikka’s other objections (1996, 
pp. 110-113) to Tarski-type truth are based on its difficulties as the truth of 
IF, which is not the subject matter here. 
126 I understand that this is the most important question for Hintikka, as 
well as most of his critics. For Hintikka they key point is that he considers 
IF to be the correct logic. For his critics the step from classical two-valued 
logic to a many-valued one is never one easily taken. I must restrain from 
taking part into that discussion here, and focus only on the problem of 
proof and truth.  
127 It must be remembered that we are talking about quite a little set theory 
here, basically enough to carry out the ))()(Pr( xTrxx →∀ -type sentences in 
the metasystem of Tarskian truth. 
128 This has also been contested. See Feferman (2006) for an example. 
129 Of course my position is that because of the monolingual speaker 
problem IF logic must be expanded with set theory or other richer theory, 
as well, and Hintikka’s truth fails already in that. 
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order one, we greatly reduce our conceptual (and ontological) 
commitments.130 
 
Before we go deeper into that, we must distinguish between two 
kinds of logicism. While Whitehead and Russell were after a 
comprehensive program of deriving mathematics from logical 
truths, Hintikka’s logicism is of a considerably weaker type, as 
becomes evident already from his style of exposition. Hintikka (as 
well as Whitehead and Russell, of course) is after descriptive 
completeness for logical languages: that the formulas of 
mathematics could be presented also as equivalent logical 
formulas.131 This is naturally a factor behind the program of having 
a logic with more expressive power than the classical first-order 
one. We know that classical first-order logic will not suffice.  
However, there is also another difference between logicism of 
the Russell type and that of Hintikka – one not in Hintikka’s 
favour. Logic for Russell and Frege was the logic of old, that is, the 
classical two-valued predicate logic that is still the basis for most 
mathematics – almost all outside the field of mathematical logic. 
Essentially, it was also the logic for centuries (millennia, in fact) 
before Frege, and a logic that, in the first-order case, carries many 
desirable qualities, such as completeness. It was thus very natural 
to try to base mathematics wholly on logic – it was basing 
mathematics on something that was almost universally agreed 
upon.132 But Hintikka’s logic is different in this sense. It is a logic 
                                                           
130 See Hintikka 1996, pp. 183-210 for his views on logicism and the 
potential of IF in such projects. In that chapter it becomes obvious that 
even if successful, Hintikka’s IF logic, not being completely axiomatizable, 
is hardly suitable for extreme formalism and deflationist truth in Field’s 
sense. 
131 In Agustín Rayo’s (2005) division between different types of logicism, 
Hintikka’s is a mixture of language-logicism and semantic truth-logicism 
while Russell’s is probably best understood as a combination of language-
logicism and consequence-logicism.  
132 Of course this did not succeed, and Russell had to switch into type 
theory, which is a higher-order logic. In addition, to present such central 
set-theoretic concepts as equicardinality one needs second-order logic (or 
first-order set theory). 
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developed with the new (descriptive) logicist program in mind. It 
is not the logic that is used in mathematics – the main difference 
obviously being the lack of the law of excluded middle. It is not 
complete, and it is not compositional (the truth-value of a complex 
sentence does not follow syntactically from the truth-values of its 
components133). While the logicist program of Russell can be 
thought to have an advantage over, say, a set theoretic foundation 
of mathematics, it is not clear that Hintikka’s program retains this 
advantage. As far as the conceptual commitments are considered, 
IF may be more economical than set theory.134 But as far as 
intelligibility and the practice of mathematics are considered, it 
looks much more problematic.  
That prompts the question: why should we care only about the 
conceptual commitments? The traditional line of thinking is that 
conceptual commitments equal ontological commitments, 
following one form of Occam’s razor. But as far as the philosophy 
of mathematics in general is considered, this is a highly Platonist 
line of thinking. Postulating an object such as a set does not need to 
imply that we believe in its objective existence. In the Platonist 
sense, set theory can seem less economical than IF logic and thus 
get chopped off by Occam. But in the sense of us learning and 
practising mathematics, set theory (added to classical first-order 
logic) seems more intelligible. If we reject Platonism, it is not clear 
that logicist-based mathematical systems are any more 
ontologically economical than set theoretic ones. In such a 
situation, the intelligibility of mathematical theories seems like an 
important criterion – albeit one that has been often completely 
neglected in the philosophy of mathematics. 
                                                           
133 See Hintikka 1996, pp. 106-112. The lack of compositionality should not 
necessarily be considered a weakness of IF languages, but it is definitely not 
something that many mathematicians would be ready to accept in their 
basic logic. 
134 Even this is not at all clear when we consider the problem of 
establishing the truth predicate of IF languages as such. Feferman (2006) 
argues that this is equivalent to full second-order logic, which has 
considerable ontological commitments, as will be seen in the next chapter. 
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This is not to say that set theory is without any problems. The 
status of the axiom of choice (AC) is the most obvious one. 
Hintikka, for one, is extremely reluctant to allow set theory into 
model theory, and that way into the theory of truth. That was the 
whole motivation behind truth predicates for IF-logic: to have a 
first-order language with expressive power traditionally only 
available to second-order logic, and thus avoid sets and such 
mathematical concepts. But is Hintikka exaggerating the problems 
of set theory? The assumption of set existence seems to carry the 
main initial trouble for Hintikka (1996, p. 19). As set theory – like 
second-order logic and IF – lacks completeness, he seems to think 
that set existence forms insurmountable problems as the 
foundation of mathematics. For a non-Platonist philosopher, this 
might seem a bit odd. After all, where do we need the assumption 
that sets exist objectively? Could we not just assume that set theory 
is about possible collections of elements? In fact, this is the 
argument presented by philosophers like Charles Chihara, more of 
whom in Chapter 6.5. We will see that Chihara’s line of thinking is 
not without its problems, but the main idea seems agreeable 
enough: set existence does not need to be taken literally. 
Depending on the axiomatization of set theory (mainly concerning 
whether or not we accept the axiom of choice), we get explicit rules 
concerning the possible collections of elements. In this way, the 
question is not “do sets exist?”, but rather “if elements exist, can 
we collect them into sets?” Ontologically, this seems much less 
problematic. It is not formalism, either: it simply moves the 
ontological burden from the sets to the elements. If we choose such 
an ontologically weaker philosophy of mathematics, the 
motivation for logicism is much harder to see. 
However, even if we reject this line of thinking, Hintikka’s 
position seems to imply that we need full set theory with the axiom 
of choice in order to have a Tarskian definition of truth.135 This is 
not the case. The axiom of choice is not used in Tarski’s definition. 
What we need are essentially the set theoretic relations required to 
handle “the set of true sentences”. These are nothing more than the 
                                                           
135 See Hintikka 1996, p. 19 where the ”checkered history of axiom of 
choice” is mentioned as an example against the intuitiveness of set theory. 
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usual relations of set membership, inclusion, intersection, etc. The 
problems with axiom of choice of course exist, that must not be 
forgotten. Results like the Banach-Tarski paradox are a big obstacle 
to choosing ZFC as our meta-theory.136 On the other hand, the 
negation of axiom of choice produces at least as problematic 
results, and without the axiom of choice (or its negation) these 
kinds of problems could not be decided at all. I see problems of 
this type as the basis for Hintikka’s distaste for set theory, and it 
must be said that there is something quite understandable in that. 
For all its intuitive power, set theory has some potentially 
troubling aspects to it. But they do not need to come into the 
definition of truth. What we are after is an adequate definition of 
truth for PA (or for first-order logic), and for that purpose we do 
not need the axiom of choice. The downside is that now our 
metalanguage is not uniform: it is first-order logic expanded with 
parts of set theory. To the logicist mind this of course does not look 
pretty. But if we are concerned with mathematical truth, it should 
not be overwhelmingly problematic. 
Above are considerations of set theory and the axiom of choice 
mainly from the classical point of view. Interestingly, the status of 
the axiom of choice has some important consequences in IF logic. 
Thomas Forster (2006) has shown that the introduction of axiom of 
choice actually has an effect on the set of valid IF sentences, while 
it does not affect the set of valid classical first-order sentences. His 
article concerns deterministic and nondeterministic strategies in 
the semantic games. In Hintikka’s (Skolem-) semantics for IF-logic 
the strategies are assumed to be deterministic. If we hold on to that 
assumption, there is no problem. But Forster points out that if we 
accept nondeterministic strategies, the axiom of choice will have an 
                                                           
136 In set theoretic geometry it follows from the axiom of choice that in 
three-dimensional space we can take a solid ball, break it into non-
overlapping pieces, and proceed to form two balls equal to the original 
ball. Although this is called the Banach-Tarski paradox, it is not really a 
paradox, but rather an extremely unintuitive result. As such, however, it 
does work like a paradox, intuitiveness being a strong argument for set 
theory.  
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impact on the set of valid IF sentences. This becomes evident from 

















Now for the existential player Eloise to win the conditional (that is, 
for the sentence to be true), she clearly must have a winning 
strategy for the consequent every time she has a winning strategy 
for the antecedent. At this point the limitation to deterministic 
strategies has an impact. If we stick to deterministic strategies, then 
Eloise wins the antecedent only if there is a choice function that 
determines a choice of y for all x. If there is such a choice function, 
then Eloise also wins the consequent. So (*) is valid. However, if 
we allow nondeterministic strategies, the situation changes. If the 
interpretation of R has a choice function in a model M, then the 
consequent is true whenever the antecedent is. Now the 
interpretation of R can be true in M without a choice function if we 
allow nondeterministic strategies. But without a choice function for 
R Eloise loses the consequent, and (*) is not true. Thus, if we accept 
nondeterministic strategies in the semantic games, there are IF 
sentences that are valid if and only if we accept the axiom of 
choice. 
So there are two choices we must make in IF logic: first, 
whether we limit ourselves to deterministic strategies and if we do, 
second, whether we accept the axiom of choice or not. These 
choices could not be of greater importance: after all, they actually 
alter the set of valid IF sentences. There is a big difference between 
the classical first-order languages and IF languages here. The set of 
valid classical first-order sentences does not change with the 
introduction of AC. The set of valid IF sentences does. While 
classical first-order logic makes no commitment to set existence, by 
depending on the axiom of choice IF logic is more sensitive to such 
questions of ontological commitments. Since we do not need AC in 
order to use Tarskian truth, this difference also has a relevance to 
the question of truth predicates. Here Hintikka has the burden of 
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accepting AC (or not) to be able to have a truth predicate. This 
clearly adds to the problems of Hintikka’s truth.  
In fact, the above conclusion holds whether we limit ourselves 
to deterministic strategies or not. Although AC has the dramatic 
effect we have just seen if we accept nondeterministic strategies, it 
should be noted that the whole concept of deterministic semantic 
games requires the axiom of choice. Hintikka’s own approach 
(1996, p. 32; pp. 41-42) has been limited to deterministic strategies 
and he uses the axiom of choice in his game-theoretic semantics. 
Essentially, to account for the universal quantifiers in the T-
scheme137, Hintikka needs to include an infinite series of 
determinate choices for the existential player. But this is equivalent 
to the axiom of choice. Indeed, if we do not introduce the axiom of 
choice, the T-scheme and Hintikka’s GTS are not equivalent. 
Ironically, it seems to turn out that it is Hintikka, and not the 
Tarskian theoretician of truth, who needs the axiom of choice.138 
Hintikka’s (ibid., p. 42) response to this is that the evidence for GTS 
is at the same time evidence for the axiom of choice in IF. This 
seems agreeable enough: the intuitive notion of making choices in 
the semantic game ad infinitum is not problematic as long as they 
are deterministic. However, it sounds intuitively exactly as 
unproblematic as the axiom of choice in set theory. There does not 
seem to be any reason to accept one and reject the other. In any 
case, when it comes to the question of truth, if AC is a problem, it 
is that mostly for Hintikka and not for Tarski.  
We have seen that Hintikka does not succeed in exorcising 
Tarski’s curse of the hierarchy of languages. But even if he did, 
should we abandon Tarskian truth in favour of that of IF? As far as 
                                                           
137 After all, what Hintikka is doing is formulating a definition of truth 
extensionally equivalent to Tarski’s (when it comes to first-order 
languages). (see Hintikka 1996, p. 32) 
138 This holds only when it comes to truth. Of course the first-order logicist 
will need the axiom of choice when he moves to full set theory and 
beyond. In any approach like mine in this work, the axiom of choice is 
introduced via it being an important part of mathematical practice. 
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the status of truth139 is concerned, Hintikka’s program is 
interesting, but it is that mainly from a (one kind of) logicist point 
of view. If we do not cherish the premise that all mathematics must 
be expressible in a language of logic, the motivation for IF is not at 
all obvious. I do not see any serious problems in applying 
mathematical notions, such as those of set theory, when we are 
talking about mathematical truth. The great ease that we have with 
set theory and classical first-order languages should not be 
dismissed, either. These are the basic tools for almost all 
mathematicians. When the principles of mathematics are 
concerned, this is not without significance. Combined with the 
knowledge that Hintikka’s truth needs metalanguages, as well, I 
believe that we can safely continue to prefer Tarskian truth as the 
theory of truth for mathematics. 
 
 
5.4 Second-order logic 
 
Returning to two-valued logics, what prospects does second-order 
logic have when it comes to the question of truth? Outside such 
obvious properties as completeness, one main reason to prefer 
first-order logic to a second-order one is its apparent ontologically 
economical nature. As Hintikka (1996, p. 7) has pointed out, first-
order logic is basically the logic of a nominalist. One is only 
committed to the domain of elements, while relations, functions 
and sets are merely ways of describing possible collections of the 
elements. There are no sentences of first-order logic stating that 
“there exists a relation/function/set”. Thus we are restricted to an 
ontologically economical way of referring to mathematical objects. 
That is, of course, if we do not expand the first-order languages to 
include, say, set theory – which we indeed must do in order to 
include a truth predicate, or to do any interesting mathematics. 
Classical first-order languages, in addition to not being able to 
                                                           
139 It must be stressed that here I am only concerned about Hintikka’s 
contribution to the question of truth. This is only one aspect in the whole 
question of IF logic – the most important one being IF having more 
expressive power than the classical first-order logic. 
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contain their own truth predicates, also lack the tools of describing 
such essential mathematical properties as equicardinality. For that, 
either second-order logic or set theory is needed. We already 
glanced above at the ontological status of set theory. Against a 
somewhat common opinion in the philosophy of mathematics, I 
am not at all convinced that we should by any means possible try 
to avoid set theory. In fact, I am quite ready to commit to the 
opposite: if there is no real reason to reject quantification over sets, 
we should not try to get rid of set theory. The reason for this is 
simple: even with its problems, set theory is highly intuitive, as 
well as highly expressive. The intuitiveness is an asset for set 
theory when compared to IF, but as far as second-order logic is 
concerned, set theory does not carry such an advantage. With 
second-order logic we can do mathematics just as with first-order 
set theory, and the required constructions resemble closely the 
intuitive steps we make in forming collections and relations. 
While IF-logic is still a developing and somewhat under-
studied subject, second-order logic has been discussed widely. As 
we know, first-order logic requires (at least parts of) set theory in 
order to provide a basis for arithmetic. The problematic status of 
sets as mathematical objects is thus not possible to avoid in 
classical first-order languages. Second-order logic features 
quantification over properties, relations and functions, which give 
us the tools to define all the necessary arithmetical concepts 
without the need for set theoretic concepts. In addition, second-
order logic provides the tools to do set theory itself, and hence also 
all the required model-theory and proof theory. Tentatively put, 
with second-order logic we seem to have all the tools needed for 
mathematics.140 Compared to Hintikka, we in particular have the 
liberty of using as much set theory as we want.  
Of course second-order logic features its share of problems, as 
well – otherwise we would not be discussing any other options. 
One of the major difficulties is the incompleteness of second-order 
logic. This is a major disadvantage compared to first-order logic, 
but not compared to IF. If we wish to stay clear of set theory, our 
                                                           
140 See Shapiro 2005 for a good basic outline of higher-order logics as the 
basis for mathematics. 
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choices here seem to be IF (or other many-valued logic) and 
second-order logic. What ontological, logical or practical reasons 
can we have for choosing between them? More to the topic at 
hand, what do these reasons have to do with truth, and how do 
they compare to the Tarskian construction? 
As far as the mathematical practice goes, the question is simple: 
mathematicians will use set theory when it is applicable and 
second-order logic when higher-order quantification is needed. 
Neither is considered particularly problematic in most 
mathematical practice. For philosophical reasons the question is 
more relevant. The main motivation for a second-order foundation 
of mathematics is essentially logicist. Terms of set theory, like the 
membership relation ∈ , are very useful, and in practice 
indispensable. Thus, the motivation for the second-order 
foundationalist is not to abolish set theory, but rather to provide a 
logical basis for it and other mathematical theories. Second-order 
logic, the second-order logicist argument goes, has the tools to 
define set theory in purely logical terms. 
This approach has a few problems, even though it initially 
seems very appealing. The first problem concerns the notion of 
logical consequence. Classical first-order logic is complete, which 
gives us the neat feature that provability, derivability and logical 
consequence are all equivalent concepts. Once we move via set 
theory into arithmetic, we lose completeness.141 Because of the 
incompleteness, we can use semantic arguments against 
deflationism of truth, and the classical first-order deflationist is 
beaten by the semantical argument. But the deflationist can seek 
refuge from this non-conservativeness of truth in second-order 
logic. We remember that one crucial problem for Field’s 
deflationism was its inability to use mathematical induction over 
sentences concerning the truth predicate. Second-order logic, 
however, has the tools to present the induction principle, in fact in 
a single sentence: 
                                                           
141 It should be noted that, strictly speaking, completeness in first-order 
logic is not the same property as completeness in arithmetic. However, 
that does not affect the argument here, and we do not need to go into the 
details. 
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With the induction scheme we can avoid the problems of the 
deflationist defence presented in Chapter 3.3 against Field. Shapiro 
(1998, pp. 508-509) notes that once we add truth to the second-
order system S, we can use induction on it and derive the 
consistency ConS and the Gödel sentence G(S) without any 
problems. Of course this is not surprising: it is thanks to the 
mathematical induction in arithmetic that we could use the 
semantic argument in the first place. Other ways of presenting the 
induction principle are bound to have the same consequence. 
Indeed, Tennant’s soundness principle was enough for that 
purpose. However, this by itself does not change anything for the 
deflationist. G(S) as a sentence of arithmetic is of course 
unprovable (by Gödel), and so we have simply moved the 
semantic argument to a second-order framework.  
However, there is another option. The key phrase in Shapiro’s 
point above is “once we add truth”. Of course truth must mean 
provability to retain the deflationist argument.  In short, it is just 
the soundness principle ϕϕ →)(Pr
S
, except that we use the (now 
empty) notion of truth to present it as )()(Pr ϕϕ
sS
True→ . But we 
know that all true sentences of S are provable in a deflationist 
system, and this would have to include the Gödel sentence. This is 
the proof-theoretic version of truth, and it causes the semantic 
argument: it states that truth is not conservative over proof in 
arithmetic. When dealing with second-order logic, however, we 
have another option: model-theoretic truth. We skip some of the 
technical details of Shapiro’s argument here (for them, see ibid., p. 
509), but basically, it is possible to take a second-order system Γ 
that can express its own syntax, and add to it a truth predicate Tr 
to form a system that has as its consequences all the T-instances (as 
enumerated by Tr). Let us call this new system Γ’. Now we can 
extend all the models of Γ to be models of Γ’. From the T-sentences 
we get the extension of Tr in the language of Γ. Hence, Γ’ is 
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semantically conservative over Γ. In other words, if ϕ (in the 
language of Γ) holds in all the models of Γ’, it holds in all the 
models of Γ. That is, if ϕ is a logical consequence of Γ’, it is a logical 
consequence of Γ. Adding truth to Γ does not give new sentences 
as logical consequences. For the deflationist this looks like a very 
important result. Indeed, if we accept all the steps here, it is 
actually a valid refutation of the substantial notion of truth. 
Of course I would not have waited this far if I actually thought 
that deflationism works in second-order logic. The key here is that 
in the model-theoretic argument the important concept is that of 
logical consequence. This deflationist argument relies entirely on 
the use of logical consequence. However, logical consequence in 
second-order logic is nothing like the neat, complete, equivalent in 
classical first-order languages. It is an extremely strong concept, in 
fact a great deal stronger than that of arithmetical truth, which is 
what we are after here. Shapiro points out (ibid., p. 509): 
 
There are second-order categorical characterizations of just about 
every major mathematical structure, including the natural numbers, 
the real numbers, the first inaccessible rank of the set-theoretic 
hierarchy, and beyond, well into the hierarchy of large cardinals. 
Therefore, truth for each of those theories can be reduced to second-
order logical consequence. Moreover, there is a second-order sentence 
that is a logical truth if and only if the continuum hypothesis holds and 
another second-order sentence that is a logical truth only if the 
continuum hypothesis fails. 
 
This gives us a clear idea of what we are dealing with. We can 
indeed deflate arithmetical truth by second-order logical 
consequence, but by doing so we introduce practically all the 
problems of mathematical truth and provability that we can 
imagine. This is a Pyrrhic victory for the deflationist. The notion of 
logical consequence in second-order logic is too “deep and 
intractable”, as even the proponents of second-order logic like 
Shapiro (ibid.) and Church agree. In other words, it is just too 
difficult to adopt here, because it is much stronger than the concept 
– arithmetical truth – we use it to define with. Truth predicate 
reduced to the second-order logical consequence would give us the 
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true sentences of arithmetic, but at the same time it would also 
solve the truth (or falsehood) of the Continuum hypothesis. 
Something simpler is definitely needed. While a system of first-
order logic is essentially a deductive calculus – the axioms 
unambiguously determine the system – a system of second-order 
logic is not, because of the intractability of logical consequence in 
it. We can achieve the desired results with second-order logical 
consequence, but we do not really know what else we commit to at 
the same time.142 All we know is that it is an awful lot, much more 
than we wish for when discussing arithmetical truth. 
In addition, second-order logic runs into problems familiar to 
us from Hintikka. Tapani Hyttinen and Gabriel Sandu (2004, p. 
420) point out that we cannot define the concept of logical 
consequence in second-order arithmetic within second-order logic. 
We cannot express things like “is a logical consequence of a 
second-order theory of arithmetic” in second-order logic. The 
familiar monolingual argument arises. Can a monolingual speaker 
of a second-order language do everything she needs to deflate truth 
from the system? At least in Shapiro’s second-order logic, this is 
not even tried. He (2005, p. 771) uses rich set theory including the 
power set as the meta-theory for second-order logic.143 Of course 
Shapiro generally admits the need for metalanguages, so his 
system is perhaps not representative of those committed to 
deflationism. Still, it seems hugely problematic, if not downright 
impossible, to use just second-order logic to define second-order 
logic. It is safe to say, at least, that it has never been done. 
 
There is one final problem with second-order logic. Set theory, 
when rejected, is most often rejected because it carries the 
ontological burden of set existence. Especially the power set (the 
set of all subsets) seems to carry the maximal ontological burden 
that all sets exist. But does second-order logic avoid this problem? 
Famously, Quine (1986, p. 68) stated that second-order logic is “set 
theory in disguise”, that all the existential problems of set theory 
                                                           
142 Similar point is made in Jané 2005. 
143 See Shapiro 2000b for a book-length introduction into the subject of 
second-order logic as the basis for mathematics. 
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follow us into second-order logic. In second-order logic we can 
quantify over the basic domain, but also over the functions and 
relations of that domain. In what way do these second-order 
objects exist? Shapiro (1998) quotes Church (1956):  
 
[Second-order consequence] presupposes a certain absolute notion of 
ALL propositional functions.  
 
Church then defends this notion because it is presupposed also in 
classical mathematics, especially in analysis. This is an important 
point, although I probably make a different conclusion about it 
from the ones that Church would have wished. Church’s point is 
that if we accept second-order consequence, we do not really have 
any reason to restrict quantification to second-order entities. But 
when it comes to the ontological question, how can we distinguish 
between the existence of second-order entities and those of higher 
orders? It seems that either we decree that only functions over the 
basic domain exist, or we must admit that all functions exist, and 
make up for a whole hierarchy comparable to the problematic 
power set of set theory. However, the existence of all propositional 
functions seems ontologically no less problematic than the 
existence of sets, including the power set. 
Of course sets themselves are second-order entities in second-
order logic, which was the idea behind Quine’s original point. In 
this way, there does not seem to be any ontological reason for 
choosing between set theory and second-order logic. For a final 
measure, we can claim that only the entities of the basic domain 
exist, and quantifications over them are not real in the same sense. 
But this leads us into new trouble with such concepts as arbitrary 
choice. Hintikka (1996, p. 193) has elaborated on this subject. If we 
are to use second-order entities mathematically, we must commit 
to arbitrary sets and functions, as well as arbitrary choices from the 
basic domain. There could be a way out of this by a notion of 
higher-order choice of some type. However, at this point one must 
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ask whether starting from set theory is ontologically any more 
problematic?144 
Above we have followed Church’s notion that second-order 
logic means full second-order logic. The basic problem in this 
approach, as we saw, is that we have very little reason not to 
expand the logic to other higher-order logics, for every n:th order. 
This way quantification over all entities suggests the existence of 
all functions. Furthermore, the logical consequence relation in such 
systems becomes very much intractable and extremely strong. I 
believe that this is correct, but let us still look at what prospects the 
deflationist has if she rejects Church’s notion. Instead of full 
second-order logic, she can use a subfragment of it. There are 
various ways of using subfragments of second-order languages, 
and we can examine one commonly used candidate, the ∑ −11 logic, 
as the example here.145 It is a subfragment of second-order logic 
that is limited to ∑ −11 formulas, which are second-order existential 




, where ϕ is a first-order formula. 
Basically, it is a subfragment of second-order logic restricted to 
quantification over second-order entities. We escape higher-order 
quantification, and as a result the logical consequence-relation 
becomes weaker, and much less problematic. Deflationism and 
∑−11 logic are discussed in detail in Hyttinen & Sandu 2004 
                                                           
144 The choice between IF logic and second-order logic is not an easy one to 
make. One advantage of IF logic is the inclusion of the interpolation 
property, that is, whenever in a system of language L it holds that ψφ → , 
there is some formula θ  of L in the system for which it holds that θφ →  
and ψθ → . Second-order logic famously lacks this property, which is 
another example of the intractability of the concept of logical consequence 
in it. As far as the ontological commitments are concerned, IF logic 
initially looks more economical – but as we know, this is not necessarily 
the case when we want to include a truth predicate, and most importantly, 
show it to be one. 
145 The field of mathematical logic called reverse mathematics is concerned 
with the subsystems of second-order arithmetic. In reverse mathematics 
one tries to find the axiomatization required to prove theorems of 
mathematics. See Simpson (1999) and Friedman (1976) for more on the 
subject. 
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(Chapter 5). They show that ∑−11 logic has more expressive power 
than classical first-order logic, including ability to define its own 
truth predicate in the model theoretic sense (see ibid. 5.5). In the 
case of arithmetical truth, there exists a ∑−11 formula )(xΦ such that 
for all models M of PA and all ∑−11 sentences ϕ it holds that: )(ϕΦ
is the logical consequence of M if and only if ϕ is the logical 
consequence of M. Clearly )(xΦ is now the truth predicate of PA.  
We can benefit here from the knowledge that every IF first-
order formula is equivalent to some ∑ −11 formula. Not surprisingly, 
the problems we face with truth predicates in IF logic will also 
present themselves in ∑ −11 logic. For starters, just like IF-languages, 
∑ −11 languages cannot be closed under contradictory negation. The 
double-edged consequence of this is that Tarski’s theorem of 
undefinability of truth does not hold, but also that we cannot 
recognize the truth predicate of ∑ −11 languages as such within 
those languages. The result is familiar from other logics, as 
discussed in earlier chapters: we can define the truth predicate for 
∑ −11 logic within ∑ −
1
1 logic, but we need a metalanguage in order 
to show that it is the truth predicate. If we wished to escape that, 
we would need to do all the required model theory within the ∑ −11
languages. This cannot be done (see ibid. Chapter 6). Furthermore, 
we would face the other facets of the monolingual speaker 
problem that were presented in the previous chapter. Second-order 
logic neither in its full nor fragmented form seems to give the 
deflationist the tools that she needs – or it does, but provides too 
much additional baggage. 
 
 
5.5 Kripke’s truth and the potential of many-valued logics 
 
Let us now return to the argument that started much of this 
development. The most famous effort to define a truth predicate 
for a formal language L within L is Saul Kripke’s “Outline of a 
theory of truth” in 1975. Obviously Kripke can be no different from 
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Hintikka in that such a program cannot be accomplished in 
classical first-order logic. Kripke’s solution was to use Kleene’s 
three-valued logic to define a truth predicate. To handle the truth-
value gaps (that is, the paradoxes), Kleene’s logic has a third-value, 
which can be called “undecidable”. Kripke realized that such 
undecidable sentences are instances of the fixed-point theorem.146 
By enumerating these fixed-points inductively, Kripke could show 
that the truth predicate would follow the three-valued logic; the 
undecidable sentences being neither true nor false.147 
Kripke showed that such a Kleenean language L can indeed 
contain its own truth predicate. This is the same thing Hintikka 
and Sandu have shown for IF. But Kripke anticipated the kind of 
criticism that De Rouilhan and Bozon presented against Hintikka, 
and consented that L cannot contain an adequate definition of the 
predicate. Kripke (ibid., p. 714) admits, for example, that he had to 
use set-theoretic language in the induction over the fixed points. In 
other words, L can contain its own truth predicate, but we have no 
way of establishing within L that it is indeed the truth predicate. 
To have a satisfactory truth predicate for L, one would obviously 
expect us to be able to give it an adequate definition. Now the 
interesting question (also pointed out by De Rouilhan and Bozon) 
is whether Kripke’s and Hintikka’s truths are different in this 
sense? Kripke conceded that Tarski’s hierarchy is still with us after 
his truth predicate. Why would Hintikka’s approach be any 
different?  
The obvious difference would seem to be that Hintikka’s logic 
has game-theoretic semantics to contend with the Henkin 
quantifiers, while Kripke’s (Kleene’s) does not. Sandu (1996) in the 
Appendix of Hintikka’s Principles of Mathematics Revisited shows 
that a result equivalent to Kripke’s can be formulated for IF with 
the game-theoretic semantics. Because IF languages have more 
expressive power than standard first-order languages, the result is 
even stronger than Kripke’s, which should make a case for 
                                                           
146 See Chapter 2.6 for Gödel’s use of the fixed-point theorem in his proof. 
147 Or, alternatively, they are assigned the truth-value false, if we want the 
truth predicate to be completely defined (Kripke 1975, p. 715). We already 
saw the problems of this approach in Chapter 5.2. 
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Hintikka’s logic. Indeed, De Rouilhan and Bozon (2003, pp. 688-
689) show that Hintikka’s and Sandu’s truth predicate is adequate 
intensionally (in all models of IF) as well as extensionally (in the 
desired model), while Kripke’s is adequate only in the latter sense 
(in a model of Kleenean logic). 
Another reason to prefer IF languages to Kripke’s approach can 
be seen from the supervenience principle of semantics, as proposed 
by Michael Kremer (1988). In this line of thinking the sentences 
that fall under the concept “truth” are determined by, and only by, 
the interpretation of the non-semantic terms and empirical facts. 
This seems very reasonable: when we say that “snow is white” is 
true, it is obviously due to the interpretations of the words “snow” 
and “white” added to the empirical fact of snow’s colour. But in 
Kripke’s system this will cause a problem when we think of the 
truth-teller’s sentence: 
 
(TT) = “(TT) is true” 
 
In Kripke’s Kleenean logic (TT) gets one of the truth-values true, 
false or undecidable. An obvious feature of such three-valued 
semantics must be that the truth-value V of any sentence ϕ is the 
same as that of an interpretation of its theory of truth Tr(ϕ). That is, 
for every model there exists an interpretation such that V(ϕ) = 
V(Tr(ϕ)). However, for (TT) there are three such interpretations, 
one for each possible truth-value of (TT). The truth-value of (TT) is 
not determined only by the interpretation of non-semantical terms 
and empirical facts, and hence the supervenience of semantics is 
violated. This point was used by Anil Gupta and Noel Belnap 
(1993) to argue for their Revisionist Theory of Truth (RTT)148, but it 
also marks a difference between Kleenean logic and IF. The 
troubling part with Kleenean logic is the interpretation that (TT) is 
undecidable, that is, neither true nor false. This goes against the 
intuition we have about (TT), which is that it either is true or false. 
                                                           
148 In RTT one “revises” the hypothesis of truth-value once a contradiction 
is reached. If such a revision also implies a contradiction, the sentence is 
paradoxical. That way RTT gives a model of the way we recognize 
paradoxes. 
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In IF (as well as in RTT) this does not occur, since we have the 
game-theoretic definition of truth. While Kripke’s Kleenean logic is 
committed to the three possible interpretations of (TT), RTT and IF 
have the power to establish that (TT) is true or false depending on 
whether (TT) is true or false, respectively. Game-theoretically this 
is elementary. So also in this sense IF has the edge over Kripke’s 
approach.149  
Still, does it make a better case in the sense that one can 
adequately define the truth predicate within IF to escape the 
Tarskian hierarchy? This does not seem to be the case, as was 
argued earlier. The truth predicate of IF can be intensionally 
adequate, which is not a small matter, but this adequacy cannot be 
expressed in IF. While IF seems to have some edge over the 
Kripke-Kleene approach, I must agree with De Rouilhan and 
Bozon that it has not exorcised Tarski’s curse. As far as expressive 
power is concerned, it has important potential, but in the 
philosophical question of truth very little seems to change with the 
introduction of IF. The monolingual speaker problem would have 
to be solved and, in the end, in that respect IF does not fare much 
better than Kripke’s approach. 
 
How about other means of using different logics to define truth 
predicates? There is an interesting article by Ketland (2003) about 
the ability of many-valued logics to contain their own truth 
predicates. Ketland (ibid., p. 293) reminds us of the “Revenge 
Problem” (one is prompted to Haack 1978, pp. 147-148) of the 
many-valued approaches to semantic paradoxes. If we consider the 
strengthened liar sentence λ = “λ is not true” in a many-valued 
logic with the truth-values true, false and undecidable, λ will get 
the truth-value u. Now clearly if the truth-value of λ is u, it cannot 
be t. But when we think of what λ says, that is: λ is not true, we see 
that this is exactly the case. So in fact λ is true after all and the 
familiar contradiction arises. In many-valued logics there may not 
be the law of excluded middle, but sentences can hardly be true 
                                                           
149 Of course in two-valued logic such a problem does not occur, due to 
contradictory negation. 
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and undecidable at the same time. Adding the third truth-value 
changed nothing.  
The main result of Ketland’s article (ibid., pp. 295-296) is really 
just a corollary to the revenge problem. Ketland points out that in 
addition to being able to include its own truth predicate, a 
language L would also need to be able to discriminate between the 
truth-values and the other elements of its domain. Essentially, L 
would have to be able to establish that t, f and u are truth-values, 
and not among the “normal” domain of the language L. If such a 
distinction is not made, one can get a Tarski-type undefinability 
result by forming a contradictory self-referential formula also in 
many-valued languages, and hence show that the notion “truth 
degree (value) of a formula of L” is not definable within L. The 
only potentially problematic assumption one needs to make is that 
the identity relation in the language is bivalent, that is, we can 
distinguish between the three truth-values. But this is hardly a 
drastic presupposition, because denying that would mean that 
there exist formulas that are, for example, both true and 
undecidable at the same time. This result of Ketland’s is in line 
with our earlier conclusions. Many-valued languages may contain 
their own truth predicates, but they cannot contain everything 
needed to recognize and use them as such. 
Finally, we should consider the overall treatment of paradoxical 
sentences in many-valued logics. The strategy almost everywhere 
seems to be giving paradoxical sentences a truth-value 
“undecidable” or such. In this sense, many-valued languages can 
avoid the paradoxes, but with the cost that the semantic content of 
the liar (fixed-point) sentences is no longer followed. Here RTT 
and IF logic fare better than Kripke’s approach because from them 
we can see how the paradoxes are recognized. When it comes to 
liar sentences, this indeed seems like the ultimate success. But the 
matter is different when we consider Gödel sentences. While a liar 
sentence is indeed undecidable, we should want our theory of 
truth to recognize the Gödel sentences as true, like Tarskian truth 
does, not undecidable like many-valued logics do. 
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5.6 Collapsing the hierarchy with pre-formal languages 
 
At this point we must ask how Tarskian truth is better than the 
approaches considered in this chapter. As we remember, the most 
important problem with a Tarskian truth predicate is its demand 
for a hierarchy of languages. To be more precise, the main problem 
is that the hierarchy does not collapse. In the optimal scenario, like 
the one Hintikka is after, we would have one formal language and 
one truth predicate in that language. Tarskian truth contradicts 
with that on both counts: we cannot have just one formal language 
if we want to include truth in it, and no language can contain its 
own truth predicate. Not only that, but there is no way of ending 
this regression: to have a truth predicate for a language Ln we must 
always postulate a metalanguage Ln+1, and this goes for all n > 0. 
There is no way to collapse this hierarchy: for no n can we define 
its own truth predicate, and for no m < n will Lm define the truth of 
Ln. Even worse, within that hierarchy of languages, we cannot 
seem to have any valid method of ending the regression to 
introduce the “basic” metalanguage. Infinite regressions must be 
avoided, and Tarskian truth seems to imply an infinite regression 
of languages. This looks like a daunting problem for the notion of 
semantical truth. 
However, as suggested earlier, that is only a problem from the 
formalist point of view. For the non-formalist, there is a simple 
solution available. Tarski’s result of undefinability of truth 
concerns formal languages. Should we limit ourselves to formal 
languages, the hierarchy indeed cannot be collapsed, and we must 
commit to an infinite regression of languages if we hope to include 
a truth predicate. Of course at this point the formalist will rather 
dispense with the truth predicate. But why should we limit the 
domain of philosophy of mathematics to formal languages? I have 
argued earlier for the acknowledgement of pre-formal 
mathematical thinking, and the same arguments can be used here 
for the introduction of pre-formal languages into Tarskian truth. 
At any convenient point in the hierarchy, to define truth for Ln we 
can use a pre-formal language to do this. In this framework all the 
symbols and sentences of Ln and all the T-instances of it are 
included in the pre-formal metalanguage. In addition, the actual 
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definition of truth can be explicitly stated and the hierarchy 
immediately collapses. Moreover, we can discuss truth and do all 
the necessary theorizing and philosophising to go through the 
project. Although this approach might look a little too easy, there is 
nothing new or controversial here: this is in fact the way the truth 
predicate is actually defined in all accounts of Tarskian truth.  
The big question about the suggestion above is whether we 
want the pre-formal language to include its own truth predicate, 
and indeed, whether it can contain it. The latter question is 
somewhat problematic, as the pre-formal languages must include 
their own semantics and therefore suffer from the liar’s paradox. 
However, the concept of pre-formal language is wide enough to 
include considerations of the diagonal method on which all known 
paradoxes over truth are based, and it can definitely have enough 
expressive power to label such paradoxical sentences as 
undecidable. Indeed, pre-formal languages have all the expressive 
power we need in meta-mathematics and philosophy. This does 
not save them from paradoxes, but it gives us means to handle 
them in a manner that conforms to the way paradoxes are actually 
handled in the literature. However, one must ask whether we 
should even hope to include an adequate truth predicate for our 
pre-formal languages? In other words, should we hope to have a 
single truth predicate, instead of a language-dependent hierarchy? 
This will be addressed in the next chapter. 
Before we go into that question, we must emphasize the 
connection to the earlier considerations over pre-formal 
mathematical thinking. My point, of course, is that we actually use 
pre-formal languages all the time, whether it is implicit or 
explicitly acknowledged. The whole question of finding a 
metalanguage for a pre-formal language should never arise, since 
all the non-formal theorizing we do in mathematics and the 
philosophy of mathematics is done in a pre-formal language of 
mathematics. Mathematical languages can be divided quite 
naturally into formal and pre-formal ones, and both account for an 
indispensable part of the mathematical practice and theories. It 
should be obvious that in order to include truth in the formal 
language that we use in an area of mathematics, we must do it in a 
pre-formal language. And to remember the philosophical and 
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mathematical context we are concerned with here, this is what all 
non-deflationist theories of mathematical truth do.150  
 
 
5.7 Why logicism and single truth predicate? 
 
Second-order logic, IF logic and Kripke-Kleene logic are all forms 
of logicism – in one of the senses of the term – attempts to provide 
a purely logical foundation, or mode of presentation, to 
mathematics. However, none of them succeed in being completely 
free of extra-logical concepts, mainly set theory. For a language to 
be the basis for mathematics, it would have to endure against De 
Rouilhan’s and Bozon’s monolingual speaker question. None of 
the alternatives considered here quite manage to do that, which of 
course prompts one question: just how committed should we be to the 
logicist ideal? Logicism has an important history since Frege, 
Russell and Whitehead, but this history contains one important 
tragedy: none of the logicist programs have ever succeeded. In a 
spirit similar to that of Hilbert’s program, logicism would have 
been a maximally economical ontological foundation to 
mathematics. It failed, but even so, one must ask whether its 
success would have made much of a difference to mathematical 
practice? All the pre-formal concepts we use, and indeed must use, 
would almost certainly have remained untouched. In addition, 
most of formal mathematics would have continued as before. 
Mathematical practice does not seem to be that tightly connected 
with the theories concerning the foundations of mathematics. 
Hence, the logicist motivation is not as obvious as is often 
implicitly assumed. It is widely presupposed that logical concepts 
like the rules of valid inferences (that is, logical connectives and 
their truth tables), are somehow ontologically simpler and less 
problematic than the primitive mathematical ones, such as set 
membership, and moreover, semantical concepts like truth. 
However, the layman might not see much difference between the 
                                                           
150 In fact, all the deflationist ones as well, but they should not be called 
theories of truth in the first place, as the truth predicate exists only as an 
empty translation of proof. 
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rules of valid inferences and the truth they are supposed to 
preserve. Here it is hard to see why the layman would be wrong. 
In this chapter we have examined the alternative ways of 
defining a truth predicate in logic, and in mathematical theories. 
The whole problem of truth in mathematics seems to unravel 
nicely into a series of questions and answers. Do we need a truth 
predicate? A negative answer implies deflationism, and hence 
ultimately extreme formalism. If we answer positively, another 
question looms: do we want the truth predicate to apply to its own 
language? If yes, by Tarski’s proof we must commit to truth-value 
gaps or many-valued logic in the case of first-order logic, or else 
we need second-order logic. If not, we commit to a Tarskian 
hierarchy. The former have been discussed in the previous 
chapters. But what if we commit to a Tarskian hierarchy, that is, 
what if our truth predicates are always tied to specific languages 
(and their metalanguages) instead of there being a general all-
purpose predicate? How problematic is this intuitively? 
I think that the potential difficulties of an infinite regression 
and the non-intuitiveness of a Tarskian hierarchy of languages are 
exaggerated. First of all, there is the problem of defining truth in 
logic, even if we do not limit ourselves to classical first-order 
languages. Hintikka needs arithmetic plus he uses model theory 
and pre-formal concepts to establish that his predicate is indeed 
the truth predicate for IF. Second-order logic as the basis is 
altogether more difficult and has limited appeal over set theory. 
But there is also the questionable motivation for such all-purpose 
truth predicates. Kripke (1975, pp. 694-695) mentions the argument 
that we do not generally implicitly assume the “levels (hierarchies) 
of languages” when we utter things concerning truth. If we utter 
“snow is white”, we cannot specify (implicitly or explicitly) what 
language we are discussing here. Ultimately, for each of us, there is 
only one language and as such only one truth predicate for it. This 
is the predicate that theories of truth should be after, not some 
hierarchy of “truths in languages”. As we saw, this was also 
Hintikka’s motivation. We have seen the problems that this kind of 
approach implies when we considered single-system formalism in 
mathematics. But as far as the general pursuit of knowledge is 
concerned, at first this line of thinking seems intuitively appealing 
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– especially if we are committed to some version of the 
correspondence theory of truth. Truth as a kind of relation (or 
description of a relation) between our utterances and the world 
seems to imply that there can only be one truth predicate, just as 
there is ultimately only one language (for each of us) and only one 
world. 
However, that counterargument uses a very naïve version of 
the correspondence theory of truth, and the realism that usually 
follows it. Surely after all the scientific and philosophical work of 
the last century we do not expect a single scientific theory to 
explain everything there is in the world? It seems to me that as far 
as science (I am primarily thinking about physics here) is 
concerned, a Tarskian model-theoretic truth is exactly what we are 
after. Take the physical sentence “light consists of particles”. It is 
true in one model of physics, and false in another, according to 
which light consists of waves. Empirically, we have no reason to 
prefer one to another, and both are needed in the best theory of 
physical knowledge that we currently have. It seems that to 
account for this we need a notion of truth-in-model (and similarly, 
truth-in-language), and an all-purpose single-language truth 
predicate is not necessary. Furthermore, we need metalanguages to 
discuss these object systems, that is, the scientific models.151 In 
practice, our natural languages of course fulfil this function. 
Empirical science, just like mathematics, does not seem to conform 
well to all-purpose languages and all-purpose axiomatizations. 
This ideal seems outdated in the philosophy of science. I do not see 
any reason why we should stick to it in the theory of truth. 
The only reason I can see for advocating an all-purpose truth 
predicate is to have one for our natural language. After all, that is 
the one obvious case where we cannot rely on hierarchies and 
                                                           
151 Here one must remember that the concept of a model in empirical 
science can be very different from the one we have in logic and 
mathematics. However, as seen in the question of particle-wave dualism, 
there are also enough similarities to give grounds for the argument here. 
The problem of particle-wave dualism itself goes deep into the philosophy 
of quantum mechanics, and as such cannot be handled in detail in this 
work. See Omnès 1999 for a good introduction on the subject. 
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model-theory. But is it realistic to demand an explicit truth 
predicate for our vague natural language? Indeed, is it even 
desirable that we should have one? We have our own existing 
conceptions of truth that we use and we seem to give little 
attention to their intricacies. What do we lose if we restrict our 
philosophical investigations on the subject of truth to subject areas 
like mathematics and science? But this kind of discussion is going 
to be too far off from the matter at hand. My point is that the (often 
implicitly required) need for general all-purpose truth predicates is 
vastly exaggerated in some parts of the literature. This line of 
thinking usually includes the notion that there must be something 
inherently flawed in Tarskian truth since it does not fit well into 
such projects. We should not accept that reasoning too easily. 
Neither mathematics nor physics – not to mention the less formal 
sciences – can be feasibly presented as a single theory. In fact, 
given the need for pre-formal languages, Tarskian truth fits 
perfectly well with the subjects we should expect it to apply to: the 
philosophy of mathematics and science. The purpose of this last 
chapter has been to emphasize this point: as well as no motive 
inside mathematics, no motive outside mathematics should make us 
view Tarskian truth as fundamentally flawed. 
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6. Why not nominalism? 
 
6.1 Semantical arguments and the trouble with reference 
 
After discussing the possible logics and theories of truth for 
mathematics, we must return to the contention that started all this: 
that there is no truth. That is of course the deflationist and extreme 
formalist position. Unless we accept extreme formalism, the 
semantical arguments give us an explicit difference between the 
concepts of truth and proof in classical two-valued mathematics.152 
At its simplest, this happens once we expand the formal system 
with Tarskian truth. As we have seen, pre-formal mathematical 
thinking fits well together with Tarski’s theory of truth, and it 
gives us naturally the distinction between proof in formal systems 
and truth in pre-formal systems. As far as textbooks – and all other 
human works – of mathematics are considered, this is the implicit 
distinction used everywhere. No textbook of mathematics is purely 
formal, even if the formal presentation contains the core of them. 
From the literature on the subject, discussions with colleagues and 
personal experience, I have not encountered any evidence of 
human beings processing mathematical sentences completely 
formally. Moreover, it seems that even extreme formalists would 
accept this. The difference is that for them formal mathematics 
captures all there is to mathematical thinking, and the pre-formal 
part is only a heuristic tool. 
We know that the semantical arguments need expansions to 
formal systems in order to be carried out. In this work I have 
argued that when we consider mathematics as a whole, instead of 
just single formal systems, Tarskian truth is in fact no expansion at 
all. It is already contained in our pre-formal thinking. However, it 
must be acknowledged that this is only half of the picture. 
Tarskian theory of truth is also a theory of reference, and that is one 
aspect bound to trouble the extreme formalist. As we have seen, 
the formalist position is that formal mathematical systems are 
completely self-standing. In that picture there is no room for 
                                                           
152 As we saw, the situation is not much better for the deflationist in any of 
the other proposed logics. 
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references. Against this, I have argued that formal mathematical 
concepts refer to their pre-formal counterparts. The formalist 
response to this is easy to predict: what, then, are the references of 
pre-formal concepts? If they have no references, why could we not 
accept the formal concepts having no references? This is a perfectly 
valid question. While it is indisputable that people use pre-formal 
concepts, they could still be ultimately redundant. Thus pre-formal 
mathematics would simply be another way of looking at formal 
systems, the real domain of mathematics. It could be the case, the 
formalist is bound to argue, that we just cannot expand formal 
systems to include referential concepts like Tarskian truth; there is 
nothing out there that these expansions refer to. If that indeed were 
the case, Tarskian truth would have to be deflationary, and the 
semantical arguments erroneous. 
The above is ultimately the key question in the whole subject of 
semantical arguments. Without any appeal to the references of pre-
formal concepts the arguments would fail. We would have trouble 
distinguishing between truth and Tennant’s arbitrary soundness 
principle, and hence deflationism would survive unscathed. The 
incompleteness of formal systems would simply imply 
incompleteness of truth, and the apparent truth of the Gödel 
sentences would turn out to be an illusion. We have seen the 
problems with that line of thinking, but if all theories of reference 
fail, there would not seem to be any other option. Mathematical 
reference, however, is a highly problematic question, perhaps the 
most problematic one in the entire philosophy of mathematics. 
When it comes to the semantical arguments, the most troubling 
part is that from Gödel to Roger Penrose, some of the most famous 
proponents of them have used Platonism as the answer. For the 
philosopher who does not subscribe to Plato’s world of ideas, his 
philosophy of mathematics presents us with many serious 
problems. But even for a proponent of Plato’s ontology there is one 
big difficulty: Benacerraf’s dilemma, the problem of combining 
Platonist ontology and epistemology. Paul Benacerraf (1973) 
reminded philosophers of this important question: if mathematical 
objects exist in the Platonist sense, how can we ever get knowledge 
of them? His question is based on the causal theory of knowledge. 
If a subject S believes that a sentence P is true, there must be some 
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causal connection between S and the reference of P. In the Platonist 
philosophy of mathematics the reference of P is an abstract object. 
What can be the causal relation between an abstract, non-physical, 
object P and a physical subject S? Since Benacerraf’s work, an 
account of mathematical knowledge must be able to answer this 
dilemma.  
For a hard-line Platonist, this question seems to cause 
insurmountable trouble when it comes to the central question of 
theory choice. We cannot use the applications of mathematical 
theories in physical sciences – as well as all the direct applications 
– as an argument, because one can only get knowledge of the ideas 
by reason, not by observation. Basically, we would need to have a 
direct way of telling from an axiom (or a theorem) whether it is 
true or not, that is, does it correspond to a Platonist idea. Outside 
of some form of mysticism, there seems to be only one way of 
telling that: does it follow our intuition? In essence, this is the 
position that human beings have a special epistemic faculty for 
gaining mathematical knowledge. This point of view is endorsed 
by, among others, Gödel (1964b), Dummett (1978) and Penrose 
(1989, 1994) in more recent times. But even though quite popular in 
philosophy, mathematical intuition is a notoriously vague concept, 
and a prudent philosopher will be wise to steer clear of it. In this 
work I cannot accept the possibility of replacing extreme 
formalism with Platonism. 
Knowing the problems of Platonism that Benacerraf’s dilemma 
and other counterarguments reveal, all this can make the 
semantical arguments seem less attractive than they actually are. 
The main point to remember is that while without references the 
semantical arguments fail, with any theory of references they 
succeed. I will argue that there is only one theory in the philosophy 
of mathematics that does not include any reference at all to non-
formal concepts, and that is extreme formalism. All other theories 
include some references for mathematical concepts, whether they 
are the Platonist objects of Gödel, ante rem structures of Shapiro 
(1997)153, empirical concepts of Phillip Kitcher (1983) or the 
                                                           
153 Realism over mathematical structures, like the natural number 
structure, as opposed to entities such as numbers. 
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naturalist ones of Quine (1995). As long as there is something 
outside formal systems that our mathematical concepts refer to, the 
semantical arguments are sound. This does not need to mean that 
mathematical concepts or sentences refer directly to some outer 
objects. In the minimal form it is sufficient that we have any outer 
reason at all to believe that some mathematical statements rather 
than their negations are true. In Quine’s philosophy, for example, 
this can mean that a statement works better in physical 
applications. That is how wide a concept reference is. In this work I 
have argued that not believing in any reference means that we 
believe in the arbitrariness of mathematical theories. In this chapter 
I will clarify that argument by taking a closer look at the possibility 
of no reference for mathematical statements. 
So to answer our question about the references of pre-formal 
mathematical concepts we can twist the problem around. What 
reason would we have to believe in extreme formalism, that is, the 
position that there are no references for formal mathematical 
sentences? If we end up rejecting it, we know that we are accepting 
some sort of theory of reference, and we know that the semantical 
argument can be carried out. The references of pre-formal concepts 
can be Platonist, structuralist, empiricist, naturalist or some other 
option, but as long as we are rejecting extreme formalism, we are 
at least implicitly accepting one of them. It is my purpose now to 
show that this is indeed what we must do, since extreme 
formalism fails as a plausible philosophy of mathematics. 
Whichever ontological or epistemological theory we accept is 
irrelevant for the arguments in this work – as long as it is not 
extreme formalism. Of course this is not completely satisfactory, 
since it leaves open many of the most important questions in the 
philosophy of mathematics. Most worryingly, it can leave the 
impression that non-formalism in some way suggests Platonism. 
Against this, in the final section of this chapter I will give my brief 
outline of a non-Platonist, non-formalist approach. It should not be 
considered as central background for the arguments in this work – 
rather, it works as a reminder that the epistemology and ontology 
of mathematics is not exhausted by the two extreme positions. 
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6.2 Meno’s paradox and theory choice 
 
Gödel’s (1951, pp. 311-314) own contention was that the 
incompleteness of formal mathematics suggested a form of 
Platonism. According to him, mathematics cannot be our own 
creation because we cannot create properties that we cannot 
possibly know – that is, prove. This is of course highly dubious. 
Why not, one must ask? Formal mathematical systems can be 
highly complex and the axiomatizations can imply many sentences 
that we can neither prove nor disprove. It seems perfectly possible 
that some of those theorems are also undecidable in principle, due 
to the properties of formal systems. Indeed, if we have enough 
tools in our language to formulate self-referential sentences, this 
will happen.154 There does not seem to be any problem in us being 
able to formulate undecidable sentences. Clearly we must look 
elsewhere if we hope to refute formalism.  
It seems to me that the main motivation for extreme formalism 
can be illuminated by the ancient Meno’s paradox. The main flaw 
of that paradox is also projected into formalism. Meno’s paradox, 
concerning inquiry of knowledge, is the following:  
 
(1) If we know what we are inquiring, inquiry is not needed. 
 
(2) If we do not know what we are inquiring, inquiry is not 
possible. 
 
(3) Because we either know or do not know what we are 
inquiring, inquiry is either not needed or not possible. 
 
Now projected to mathematical truth and proof, the paradox gets 
the following form155: 
 
                                                           
154 It should be noted that there are also undecidable sentences that are not 
self-referential, Continuum hypothesis being one example. 
155 My argument here is motivated by one of Hintikka’s (1996, pp. 34-36) 
for different purposes. 
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(4) If we know what sentences we want to prove in 
mathematics, truth is not needed. 
 
(5) If we do not know what sentences we want to prove, finding 
out mathematical truths is not possible for us. 
 
(6) Therefore, mathematical truth is either not needed or not 
possible for us. 
 
I think this corresponds to the extreme formalist inference, even 
though in a rather unusual form. When we have our axioms and 
rules of proof, why do we need truth? If the axioms and rules of 
proof are correct, then we can use them without any reference to 
truth. After all, proofs in mathematics do not mention truth – 
except informally – outside the realm of logic. If the axioms and 
rules of proof are not correct, then we are not finding out true 
sentences to begin with. In either case, truth is not something we 
need to include in mathematics. Or so the formalist argument 
seems to go.  
Of course we should be quite sceptical over such paradoxes 
having direct relevance to a subject such as mathematical truth, 
and a modern formalist is not likely to use Meno’s paradox 
explicitly in an argument. Nevertheless, I claim that the formalists 
are doing something very similar in their actual deflationist 
arguments. That is why we can learn a thing or two from Meno’s 
paradox and its flaws. Obviously the main flaw in Meno’s paradox 
is that we do not differentiate between the types of things we are 
inquiring and the types of things we are finding out. If we consider a 
specific moon of Saturn, say Titan, then obviously inquiring the 
existence of a moon with Titan’s location and characteristics 
implies the paradox. But if we are looking for moons of Saturn in 
general, then we can find new knowledge and the paradox 
disappears. We can know that we look for moons of Saturn and 
gain knowledge of new moons, as is indeed done constantly in our 
times. But we do not know which particular moons we are looking 
for. Thus, “we know what we are inquiring” in (1) and “we do not 
know what we are inquiring” in (2) do not need to refer to the 
same object of inquiry, contrary to what is assumed in the paradox. 
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It is not the case that (3), that we either know or do not know the 
object of our inquiry. Hence, under analysis, the paradox is not 
really a paradox at all. 
That much is more or less elementary, but it gains new power 
when projected to the version about mathematical truth. Of course 
proof is the mathematician’s way of finding out true sentences. If 
we know which theorems we want to prove, truth is not needed. If 
we do not know which theorems we want to prove, truths are not 
possible to find out. Now is it the case that either we know or we 
do not know which theorems we want to prove? Obviously not, as 
was seen above in the original version of the paradox. Against (4), 
we do not know all the theorems that we want to prove in, say, 
arithmetic. We do not know if we want to prove Goldbach’s 
conjecture, because we do not know whether it is true or false.156 
But against (5), we know that we want to prove theorems that 
satisfy our choice of arithmetic, that is, the Peano axioms and rules 
of proof. We choose the axiomatizations of arithmetic that fulfil 
our basic intuitions and experiences over natural numbers – in 
other words, what we conceive as the basic truths of arithmetic. 
The object of proof in (4) is different from the object of proof in (5), 
and hence neither (4) nor (5) is the case. We do not know exactly 
what we want from our formal systems, but we do know 
something – in fact quite a lot – by making theory choices and 
requiring theorems to be consistent with them. 
One notices how we differentiate between truth and proof in 
the two cases. We have to – otherwise the paradox emerges. 
Indeed, when talking about proof and truth in the strict formalist 
way, we are always talking about the same concept. For the 
extreme formalist the paradox definitely arises, and as such truth 
could indeed be conceived as deflationary. If we want to prove 
provable sentences, quite clearly truth is a redundant concept. But 
can proving provable sentences be all we want? The answer should 
be obvious by now: of course not. All systems of mathematics prove 
sentences provable in them. Our mathematical knowledge, 
                                                           
156 It must be remembered here that we are talking about a strict notion of 
mathematical knowledge. Certainly it can be plausibly said that we have a 
good guess about the truth of Goldbach’s conjecture. 
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however, does not concern all systems of mathematics. It concerns 
a select few, and the choice between them and the other 
alternatives could not have been completely arbitrary. This is 
where extreme formalism is at its weakest, as was already seen in 
the discussion on Tennant and Ketland. The current chapter has 
been just another effort to illuminate the difficulty that the problem 
of theory choice presents for the extreme formalist. Clearly we are 
only interested in very few specifically constructed axiomatic 
systems, while the number of all possible axiomatic systems is 
infinite. It cannot be a simple matter of chance that we have 
stumbled upon the ones we use. This is the problem of theory 
choice and it is the most serious obstacle for extreme formalism. In 
fact, I claim that extreme formalism is refuted by it since the only 
remaining alternative for an extreme formalist is the arbitrariness 
of mathematics. 
If mathematics is a fiction without any outer reference, how do 
we explain theory choice? Since it cannot be because of anything 
outside the formal systems, the reasons behind theory choice must 
be internal. To be sure, internal criteria are used in mathematics all 
the time. Simplicity, for example, is generally accepted as one such 
criterion. But all the internal criteria only form one side of theory 
choice. We must never forget what the lack of any outer criteria in 
theory choice implies. It implies arbitrariness, and arbitrariness 
means that we could have just as well thought that 2 + 2 = 5. None 
of the evidence, applications in science, practice, and intuition – 
common sense, if you like – would matter: we would have to be 
ready to accept that it could have been possible to put two and two 
apples together and proceed to take one and four apples from the 
pile. That is an extreme case, but arbitrariness is an extreme 
position. Mathematics has highly sophisticated applications in 
other sciences, but grouping apples into piles is also an application 
of mathematics. No internal criterion will prevent us from thinking 
that 2 + 2 = 5 = 1 + 4, but to most of us it seems that some outer one 
quite clearly does.157 I contend that whatever we may want to call 
                                                           
157 If one wants to argue that a system where 2 + 2 = 5 = 1 + 4 is 
inconsistent, he must remember that the inconsistency only follows from 
the Peano (or some other accepted) axiomatization where 2 is the 
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the criterion for that choice, we might as well call it truth – for the 
purposes of this work it does not make a difference what the exact 
conditions of theory choice are. 
 
 
6.3 Benacerraf’s dilemma and nominalism 
 
I have mostly been using the term (extreme) formalism, as defined 
in Chapter 2.4, to refer to the philosophical doctrine that 
mathematical objects do not exist and mathematical sentences do 
not have objective truth-values. In the literature, the term 
nominalism is nowadays used more often, and essentially it is the 
same point of view. Nominalism by its very name is the position 
that mathematical objects do not exist – only their names do. This is 
exactly what extreme formalism is, applied to the specifically 
mathematical concept of formal systems. According to formalism 
only the formal systems exist, and since formal systems are human 
creations, this clearly implies nominalism.158 So the choice of 
terminology is not important here. However, we will see that the 
word “nominalism” carries a danger of misinterpretation, since it 
also refers to nominalism in physics, which has some quite 
different philosophical characteristics. Hence, I would like to 
continue using extreme formalism as the preferred term. But as it 
does not make a philosophical difference, I will conform to the 
established terminology, and use the word nominalism from now 
on. 
As John P. Burgess & Gideon Rosen (1997) have written in their 
comprehensive book on the subject, the modern history of 
                                                                                                                        
successor of 1, 5 the successor of 4, and they do not have other successors. 
In addition, most importantly, one would need to accept that all natural 
numbers have successors. But from all the possible axiomatizations, ones 
that satisfy these conditions form only a small fraction. Furthermore, due 
to Gödel, consistency alone cannot be a criterion for theory choice since we 
can never know it from formal systems of arithmetic. Finally, how can 
consistency be thought of as an internal criterion in the first place if it is 
something we informally require from formal systems?  
158 It also implies fictionalism, a term used mostly for Field’s 
nominalism/formalism. 
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nominalism in mathematics can be traced back to two 
philosophers. Nelson Goodman and W.V.O. Quine presented in 
1947 their nominalist program, the message of which was simple: 
they renounced abstract mathematical entities such as properties, 
relations and classes. Quine later gave up nominalism and 
Goodman’s arguments for it were shown to be very weak159, but 
the basic form of nominalism has ever since followed Goodman’s 
and Quine’s trail. The arguments have evolved and developed a 
wide heterogeneity, but basically nominalism is still the viewpoint 
that abstract mathematical entities do not exist – the exact 
formulations of the arguments do not change that.160 
Ironically, perhaps the most important contribution to 
nominalism was made by a non-nominalist. That is of course 
Benacerraf’s dilemma. Benacerraf’s article is a basic one for 
nominalism, but it is only that in the negative sense of being anti-
Platonist. Keeping in mind that Benacerraf is not a nominalist 
himself, it is hardly surprising that he did not offer any nominalist 
alternative. Unfortunately, presenting an alternative would have 
been highly relevant, because Benacerraf’s dilemma has the 
worrying potential of repudiating all philosophical interpretations 
of mathematical knowledge. The most important question left 
open is the one that the realist is bound to present first: if not an 
abstract object, then what sort of object is the reference of a 
sentence P that satisfies the causal connection? It is too often 
implicitly assumed that Benacerraf’s dilemma makes a case for 
nominalism. It does make a case against Platonism, but in what 
                                                           
159 One famous argument by Goodman (1956) was against the existence of 
classes (sets). In it he argued that the sets } }{ }{{ baa ,, and } }{ }{{ bab ,, cannot 
be different from each other since they consist of the same elements a and 
b. Thus sets cannot exist, because according to set theory the two sets are 
different. Of course, like Burgess & Rosen (pp. 27-28) point out, this is not 
unlike saying that a statue cannot be different from the lump of clay it is 
made of. After all, they consist of the same molecules. 
160 The term “nominalism” is sometimes also used to refer to the 
viewpoint that sets in particular do not exist. Here I will follow the 
definition given in Chapter 2.4, which conforms to the ones given by Field 
(1980, p. 1) and Burgess & Rosen (1997, pp. 13-25).  
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way does that imply success for nominalism? The enemies of one’s 
enemy are not necessarily one’s friends, and this is certainly the 
case with nominalism. It is not easy to see how a nominalist can 
account for the causal theory of knowledge in mathematics any 
more than a Platonist could.  
If not abstract, then mathematical objects – if they exist – would 
have to be concrete for the nominalist.161 How can we get 
mathematical knowledge of concrete objects? The only option 
seems to be by sensory perception, whether directly or indirectly. 
But in that case mathematics would be empiricist in the sense that 
Philip Kitcher (1983) has proposed. In Kitcher’s words, 
mathematics is “an idealized science of operations which we can 
perform on objects in our environment” (ibid., p. 12). This way, 
mathematics would not differ essentially from any empirical 
science. We get mathematical knowledge by observation, and the 
process is more or less similar to the one in other sciences. 
Kitcher’s theory has been shown to be very problematic, but that is 
a minor point here.162 The important point is that it is not nominalist 
in the strict sense we are concerned with in this work. Mathematics 
would clearly have a reference, and it would make sense to speak 
of the truth of mathematical sentences. In addition, if we get 
mathematical knowledge empirically, we have all the problems of 
general philosophy of science with us.  
                                                           
161 I will not go into the problematic details of the abstract/concrete 
dichotomy in here. I believe that the nominalist has more serious 
problems, ones that are unrelated to the exact nature of the dichotomy.  
162 Perhaps the most famous proponent of empiricism in mathematics was 
John Stuart Mill (1874), who claimed that mathematics is empirical in a 
very direct way (see Ayer 1946, pp. 74-75 for a good criticism of Mill’s 
philosophy). Kitcher’s philosophy is different in the sense that 
mathematics is a construction based on empirical evidence. The important 
point in both Mill’s and Kitcher’s philosophy is that mathematics loses its 
a priori-nature. Kitcher’s more sophisticated account is an appealing one 
when we apply it to the origins of mathematical thinking, but when it 
comes to developed theories like complex analysis, it is hard to retain the 
empirical connection. See Hale 1987, pp. 123-148 for further problems in 
Kitcher’s philosophy. The other famous proponent of empiricism in 
mathematics is of course Quine, for whom everything is empirical. 
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Here it is easy to confuse scientific nominalism in general and 
mathematical nominalism. At least as far as the subject of this work 
is concerned, mathematical nominalism can only be understood as 
Field has described it: fictionalism. There is clearly a difference 
between the scientific nominalist denying the existence of abstract 
objects in, say, physics, and the mathematical nominalist denying 
the existence of all objects of mathematics. While scientific 
nominalism is hardly a uniform position, one is not likely to find 
many modern nominalists who hold the outer world to be a 
fiction. The mathematical nominalist, however, must contend that 
mathematical entities do not exist at all if he wants to remain a 
nominalist in the strict sense required for deflationism over 
mathematical truth. If he did not, mathematics would clearly have 
a reference: our physical world. Perhaps we should not even begin 
to speculate what these physical mathematical objects could be, but 
evidently our mathematical statements would have to refer to 
something in those objects. As far as questions like truth, proof and 
the semantical arguments are concerned, empiricism would be no 
different from Platonism. Mathematics would clearly have a 
reference, and when our statements correspond to the state of 
affairs in this reference, it would make perfect sense to speak of 
them as true, and not only provable. This is something the strict 
nominalist obviously cannot accept. 
Evidently, mathematical objects cannot be concrete for such a 
strict nominalist. By the definition of nominalism they cannot be 
abstract. Only the third option remains: they cannot be anything, 
that is, they are fiction. That is what Benacerraf’s dilemma seems to 
imply when understood in a nominalist fashion. All theories of 
mathematics are simply conventions without any reference to 
anything other than conventions. But this is to say that all 
mathematics is, in one word, arbitrary. By now we should be 
familiar enough with the problems of this position.  
However, I do not think that nominalism is repudiated by this 
argument. I do think that the argument from causal theory of 
knowledge is flawed, but it is hardly the most appealing argument 
that the nominalist can make. After all, why should we accept a 
straight causal theory of knowledge, let alone for all types of 
knowledge? The background for Benacerraf’s problem is the causal 
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theory of knowledge by Alvin Goldman (1967). There is no need to 
go into all the details of that theory here, but it should be pointed 
out that the requirement of a causal connection between the subject 
and the object has not turned out to be as unproblematic as it may 
have once seemed. For a modern philosopher of science it is 
perfectly acceptable to speak of electrons in physics, yet we can 
never establish a direct causal connection between electrons and 
our beliefs about them. For mathematical knowledge, one would 
not know how to start applying Goldman’s theory. Basically, by 
not requiring a strict causal theory of knowledge for all 
knowledge, I contend that Benacerraf’s dilemma does not need to 
be the behemoth it is often thought to be.163 
This is not to say it is not important: clearly it does capture one 
difficulty in gaining knowledge by mathematical intuition, or other 
suggested ways of getting purely abstract knowledge. But we do 
not need to think that mathematical objects are abstract without 
any connection to the concrete. Mathematical knowledge can be 
conceived as recognizing patterns in the physical world, and 
abstractness can still be included in the structural reference of 
these patterns.164 We can think of the arithmetical structures as 
being abstract, and still believe that we get knowledge of them by 
studying collections of apples. There is no contradiction in that, 
and it seems to satisfy our basic experiences of learning 
mathematics. The nature of the connection between the abstract 
mathematical patterns and the concrete in such an account is of 
course one of the most fundamental questions in the philosophy of 
mathematics. However, it is simply too much to require that in 
order to be an anti-nominalist one needs to have a definite answer 
to that question. After all, whatever the proposed answer is, it can 
hardly be less plausible than the only seemingly completely 
nominalist explanation for mathematics: arbitrary conventions. 
                                                           
163 For more on the problems of the causal theory of knowledge in 
mathematics, see Burgess & Rosen 1997, pp. 35-39 and Maddy 1984. 
164 See Shapiro 1997, pp. 109-116 for a philosophical outline of pattern 
recognition. Also Resnik (1981, 1982) writes about patterns as the key to 
the epistemology of mathematics. See Davis 1984 for an example of 
pattern recognition in the psychological studies of mathematics.  
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Before we go into other nominalistic strategies, we need to 
address two appealing lines of thought. The first one is what 
Burgess and Rosen (pp. 97-122) call the geometric strategy to 
nominalism. According to this philosophy, all mathematical 
objects are ultimately geometric objects. Geometry, in turn, should 
take a wholly synthetic approach developed by the likes of Hilbert 
(1900) and Tarski (1959). What this means is that the domain of 
geometry is points: points, and only points, are the entities of 
geometry. All the other geometrical objects, and ultimately all 
other mathematical objects, should be constructed synthetically as 
relations between points.  
The advantages of the geometric strategy are instantly 
recognizable. First of all, the important connection between 
physics and mathematics is evident from the beginning: both deal 
within the domain of points of space, or space-time. Secondly, 
nominalism would be based on something: it would not make 
mathematics arbitrary. Mathematics would have as its foundation 
an explicit theory of existing entities, that of points in space-time. 
All the other entities, like lines, triangles, natural numbers and real 
numbers would be constructed synthetically from them. This 
greatly facilitates the explanation of the ontological status of 
mathematical entities. After all, geometry as traditionally 
understood was the study of the actual physical space, and even 
the developments of non-Euclidean geometries have not totally 
changed this premise. In fact, the connection between physics and 
geometry is the same for Newtonian and Einsteinian physics: only 
the geometrical theory that is applied is different. In this way, 
mathematics is intertwined with physical theories, and the choice 
of the best theory of mathematical geometry would depend on the 
choice of the best theory of physics. This would make the 
ontological questions of mathematics similar to the ontological 
questions of physics. The most reasonable answer to the existence 
of mathematical objects would be, somewhat simplified: whatever 
physics holds it to be. Consequently, Benacerraf’s problem would 
not exist – unless we consider it to exist in physics, as well. 
One problem concerning this geometric strategy is that it can be 
developed only when the existence of a continuum is presupposed. 
If space-time is presupposed to be discrete, we cannot use the 
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synthetic geometrical strategy to include real numbers.165 The 
continuum assumption may not be a problem for Newtonian 
physics or general relativity, but it could be highly problematic for 
quantum physics. If we cannot divide quantities into smaller 
measures than Planck units, we would not need the assumption of 
continuum in physics. It would seem that, with the geometric 
strategy of nominalism, we would not be warranted in making the 
assumption in geometry, either.   
The problem of the continuum assumption exists in the other 
direction, as well. In Field’s (1980, p. 31) nominalist program it 
follows from his axioms that the points of space-time exist, and 
that there are as many points as there are real numbers.166 This way 
Field’s program presupposes that there exist uncountably many 
points of space-time. His own contention is that this is much less 
problematic than postulating even a single abstract object. 
However, postulating a continuum (even the power set of the 
continuum, actually, see Shapiro 2000a, p. 232) of concrete objects 
is making a very definite ontological statement – one that may very 
well contradict with our best current theory of microphysics. We 
do not know whether our universe is even infinite, but we 
certainly do not know whether it forms a continuum. It does not 
seem at all clear that postulating abstract objects would be any 
more problematic. 
Even if the problems above were solved (and they perfectly 
well could be, as it is still a somewhat under-studied subject), in 
this work the geometrical strategy of nominalism is not a factor. 
That is because, like empiricism, it is not really nominalism at all in 
the sense relevant to the question of truth and reference. Strict 
nominalist truth is the deflationist theory that our axioms and rules 
of proof, and only them, determine which sentences are true. In this 
                                                           
165 Of course we can formulate them from the rational numbers as Cauchy-
sequences or Dedekind cuts, but one has to wonder whether it is 
acceptable to formulate such basic elements of universe in the geometric 
strategy. Essentially, we would be assuming a discrete universe to 
formulate the universe of continuum.  
166 Or to be more precise, as many points as the realist mathematicians 
claim there are real numbers. 
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philosophy the axioms and rules of proof have no references. They 
could not have – otherwise it would make sense to speak about the 
objective truth of them, which contradicts with deflationism. But in 
the geometrical strategy, even if most mathematical objects would 
not exist, the points of space-time would. Ultimately, the points of 
space-time would be the reference of mathematical theories. With 
this approach, it would make sense to present such questions as 
which geometry is the true one – do the points of space-time, for 
example, form a continuum? Hence truth and reference would 
play a role in the theory. In the usual sense in the philosophy of 
science this would be nominalistic, but not in the strict 
mathematical sense we are concerned with. The better term for this 
position is physicalism, as it makes mathematical concepts a subset 
of physical concepts. The possible confusion in taxonomy is due to 
nominalism in physics being the view that abstract notions do not 
exist, but not the stronger fictionalist doctrine that no objects exist. 
That is also why mathematical nominalism would be more 
appropriately called extreme formalism, as it carries the more 
sophisticated notion of formal systems, but not the connection to 
physical nominalism.  
 
Another related supposedly nominalistic theory has been 
suggested by Haskell Curry (1954, pp. 205-206). He proposed the 
concept of acceptability as a criterion for choosing between formal 
systems. Acceptability according to Curry can mean intuitiveness 
and consistency, but above all the usefulness of a theory.167 This is 
an empirical criterion designed especially for physics, which is 
why Curry calls his position “empirical formalism”. In short, if a 
theory is useful in physics, we have a reason to choose it over its 
competitors. Furthermore, we have a reason to believe that the 
theory is true. Yet we cannot call this approach nominalism any 
more than the empirical or geometric strategies. Clearly 
mathematical theories now have references, and again they are 
essentially the same one that the physical ones have. If empirical 
usefulness is a criterion in mathematics, does that make 
mathematics ultimately an empirical science? If so, what is the 
                                                           
167 This corresponds to Field’s ideas seen in Chapter 4.1 of this work. 
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ontological status of mathematical objects? How do we arrive at 
our axioms? Curry (ibid., p. 203) calls them conventions, but that 
only postpones the question. Conventions can arise in a number of 
different ways.168 These kinds of questions will inevitably be 
raised. Granted, we have come a long way from the mathematical 
realism of Plato – but Curry’s philosophy is still not nominalism in 
the strict sense, for the usefulness of mathematical theories cannot 
be explained by them being just conventions. Objectivity and truth 
once again creep in through the back door. 
In conclusion, there are two distinct positions we are concerned 
with here: one that mathematical objects are abstract and one that 
mathematical objects have references. In the first sense the above 
strategies have been nominalist, but in the second sense they have 
not. The actual classification into nominalism is by no means 
uniform in the literature, and the one used here is certainly 
somewhat unconventional. In this work, only the extreme form of 
nominalism is called nominalism. However, there is a reason 
behind this, and it has to do with the subject matter here. If 
empirical data is in any way the basis for mathematics, then it 
clearly makes sense to speak of mathematical truth, even if only in 
the sense that it is one branch of scientific truth. Certainly that is 
not Platonism, but it is not strict nominalism either, as the formal 
systems would now have a reference: our empirical data. It would 
make sense to speak about mathematical truth outside of our 
formal systems, and that would be enough to make the semantical 
arguments valid, and truth a substantial concept. We are 
concerned here with the type of nominalism that does not include 
any reference to truth. In only that kind of extreme nominalism will 
the semantical arguments fail, and truth and proof would be the 
                                                           
168 The extreme formalist, and the truly nominalist, position being that 
axioms are only conventions, and there is nothing behind them. This is the 
position I attribute to Field, but it is certainly held at least by Ludwig 
Wittgenstein (1976, 1983). Essentially, in Wittgenstein’s conventionalist 
philosophy, the status of the axioms and the rules of inference is like the 
status of language. But as such, conventionalism of course faces the 
problem of theory choice. 
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same concept. Above all else, it is my purpose to show that this 
sort of extreme nominalism does not make sense.169 
 
 
6.4 Field’s nominalism revisited 
 
All the considerations above bring us to my preferred choice of 
nominalism throughout this work: that of Hartry Field’s. Field’s 
position is, as we remember, deflationist and the utterance “truth” 
can only perform some light linguistic duties. Other than that, 
Field’s nominalism is best described in his own words:  
 
In defending nominalism […] I am denying that numbers, functions, 
sets or any similar entities exist (Field 1980, p. 1).  
 
We should not worry about the possible extensions of the term 
“similar entities”, as ultimately it can only mean other entities that 
do not exist. Such entities are generally called abstract, but as we 
know, the abstract/concrete distinction is not an easy one to 
formulate. In any case, Field’s position seems to be simply that 
none of the entities postulated in mathematics exist. 
In a way Field’s nominalism is a variation of the geometric 
strategy. That is how Burgess and Rosen see him and it comes 
across in Field’s (1980) own writings, as well. He holds that the 
points of space-time exist, and that they are concrete instead of 
abstract. In this way he is a proponent of the geometric strategy. 
However, I cannot agree with this completely. It is true that his 
                                                           
169 I also think that, when it comes to mathematics, this is the best way to 
do the philosophical taxonomy, and not just suitable for the purposes of 
this work. The basic meta-level argument of this work is that we can 
approach the question of mathematical truth prior to answering questions 
of mathematical epistemology and ontology. This way, the first question 
we should answer in the philosophy of mathematics is that of objectivity. 
Nominalism as a term may be tempting to use since it opposes Platonism, 
and this can be seen as one motivation for calling various philosophical 
programs nominalism. However, as I have argued, the nominalist 
strategies that ultimately lead to objectivism would be better labeled as 
something else. 
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strategy starts from (Newtonian) physics and the development of 
nominalistic mathematics for it, which might make it look like a 
part of the geometric strategy. But this does not go well with what 
was considered in the previous chapter and what we know about 
Field’s attitude toward truth in mathematics. After all, Field is a 
deflationist over truth and a fictionalist concerning mathematical 
entities. Only under the interpretation that the physical points of 
space are also fiction does Field’s fictionalist philosophy fit fully 
within the geometrical strategy. As was stated above, there are two 
distinct positions here: one that mathematical objects are abstract, 
and the other that mathematical objects have references. If the 
account given here is correct, Field must be against both if he is to 
remain a deflationist over truth, which is his most important 
contribution as far as the subject of this work is concerned. This is 
why I consider Field’s work straight fictionalism, and not a proper 
part of the geometric strategy. 
The possible difference in interpretations notwithstanding, 
Burgess and Rosen (pp. 41-49; pp. 191-196) have provided a very 
useful analysis on Field’s (1989) nominalism. Loosely following 
them, Field’s position can be dissected as follows. Field’s main 
criticism is targeted against the “reliability thesis of the anti-
nominalist”, that is, the position that when mathematicians believe 
something about the entities of mathematics, then that belief is 
true. This is something that Field does not accept. Instead, what he 
wants is an explanation for the reliability thesis. What reasons do 
we have to believe in it? According to the causal theory of 
knowledge, the beliefs of mathematicians must somehow causally 
follow from the entities of mathematics. But the latter are abstract 
which, following Benacerraf, makes justifying the reliability thesis 
impossible. Mathematicians in general believe, for example, in set 
theory. Moreover, they think that the axioms of set theory are true. 
Now what is the connection between the two? If the axioms of set 
theory are true, why are we justified in believing them? What in 
those abstract axioms can cause the mathematicians’ belief in 
them? 
The question is an interesting one. After all, it could very well 
have been that we do not believe in them. The axiomatizations, 
whether they refer to anything or not, are human creations. Had 
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history unfolded somewhat differently, we could believe in 
different axiomatizations. Indeed, not all mathematicians want to 
use the same axiomatization of set theory even now. Unlike the 
Platonists and intuitionists argue, true mathematical theories do 
not seem to force themselves upon us, which is also what 
Benacerraf’s dilemma points out. Mathematics may be something 
else on the side, but it is also a creative process, a human 
endeavour. We cannot think that we have necessarily come up with 
the current set of beliefs in mathematics and on these grounds the 
reliability thesis can indeed be questioned.  
However, we are asking the wrong question here. The real 
question does not concern us arriving at the mathematical beliefs – 
it concerns us coming to widely accept some beliefs. Mathematical 
discovery (or invention) is a complex phenomenon that is not 
really essential to our task at hand. For all we care, we could even 
grant that mathematical creativity is simple arbitrary guessing. But 
can we ever even begin to believe that mathematical justification is 
only arbitrary guessing? The justification may or may not follow 
the causal theory of knowledge. That question is open to 
interpretation, although Benacerraf’s dilemma may have enough 
power to suggest the latter option. However, it is the justification – 
not the discovery – that we should be concerned with. From all the 
competing axioms, why do we choose to believe in some rather 
than others? This is once again the question of theory choice, and it 
is just about the most important basic question we have in the 
philosophy of mathematics.  
 
Now that we have moved to justification, the deflationist position 
of Field shows itself in all its implausibility. Taken to its logical 
conclusion, it must imply that we cannot offer any outer 
justification for our mathematical theories. If we did, we would 
have some theory of reference for mathematical entities. After all, 
even the simplest instrumentalist justification “this theory works in 
practice” seems to tell us a whole lot about the connection between 
mathematical theories and the physical world. If nothing else, it 
would mirror our thinking about scientific theories in general. Of 
course we could use different terminology for evaluating theories, 
for instance words like “acceptability” or “usefulness” (like Field 
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1980, p. 15) but the situation would not be essentially different 
from calling some theories true and others false. Acceptability and 
usefulness by themselves, without any explanations behind them, 
look like empty concepts. Philosophically, it cannot be satisfactory 
to say that we prefer theory T to theory S because it is more useful 
in physics. The real question is why T is more useful than S, and 
why this reason is essentially different from what we call truth? 
The scientific status of mathematical theories is a matter of 
debate both in the philosophy of mathematics and the philosophy 
of science, but in any such account we could hardly remain 
nominalists in mathematics and realists (or some other alternative) 
in physics. That is one lesson we have learnt from Quine and the 
discussion following him: for a strict empiricist (or nominalist) the 
abstract entities in mathematics are not fundamentally different 
from the abstract entities in physics. If we wish to retain abstract 
entities in physics, we cannot easily justify dispensing with those 
of mathematics. In case we stick to concrete entities in physics, we 
lose concepts like electrons, force, weight and temperature. I do 
not want to advocate a Quinean view of science here, but if one 
rejects abstract concepts, it is hard to differentiate between 
electrons and the mathematical functions needed to describe them. 
In fact, depending on the interpretation, we can lose everything: 
how clear are the references of any of our terms, mathematical or 
non-mathematical, scientific or non-scientific? Facing this, one 
must wonder how far the fear of abstract mathematical entities can 
take us.  
It must be noted that while Quine’s philosophy can be useful in 
clarifying the relationship between the abstract concepts in 
mathematics and physics, there is another way in which the 
Quinean theory gives Field’s objection too much power. It was 
Quine’s indispensability argument that Field targeted his program 
against, and that is unsurprisingly the framework in which it 
works the best. If we only consider the best theories of science 
(physics, in particular), there remains the possibility that they do 
not include mathematics in any substantial way. That will most 
probably never happen in practice, but Field’s work with 
Newtonian physics is certainly not without merit. There is no 
question that modern theories of physics are thoroughly 
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mathematical in practice and in notation. But that is a different 
problem from the one that Field addresses, and the philosophical 
question should be kept distinct from the practical one. Before 
Field’s project, Newtonian physics was widely thought to be 
unfitting for a nominalist interpretation. Deep down, mathematics 
may not be as indispensable to other sciences as we often think.  
However, if we reserve the role for mathematics only as a part 
of theories of physical sciences, we do not get the full picture of the 
practical uses of mathematics. Certainly mathematical applications 
in other sciences form a highly important field, but there are also 
practical applications of mathematics that are not theories of any 
other science. Grouping apples into piles is not based on any 
theory of physics, but rather on what may be called directly applied 
arithmetic. Of course we would expect our “best scientific theory” 
to explain it, but that is going way too far into obscure dreams of a 
single-theory science. As for now, we should be very much 
justified in requiring a theory to explain why the grouping of 
apples conforms to the equation 2 + 2 = 4, and not 2 + 2 = 5. Do we 
want to go into the best scientific theories for such explanations 
and try to show them to be nominalistic, which is a pipe dream 
even with the current scientific theories? Or do we accept that the 
basic arithmetic is not a fiction; that a theory of mathematics can 
also explain the world? 
Furthermore, even if we dismiss all such direct applications of 
mathematics, Field’s program does not have all the power it 
initially appears to have. It cannot be enough for Field to show that 
the established mathematical theories of science can be translated 
into non-mathematical ones. That would only show that the 
mathematical notations are not necessary for science. In order to 
make a truly convincing case, Field would need to show that we 
could arrive at equally useful scientific theories without 
mathematical tools. Here Field’s sample case could not be worse: 
the historical fact that it was Newton’s invention of calculus that 
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made the theory of mechanics possible for him speaks volumes to 
the exact opposite direction.170 
This is the framework in which Field’s nominalism should be 
examined. The whole premise of fictionalism is extremely 
problematic, far beyond the problems considered in this work. As I 
have argued here, the mere implausibility of our time-tested feats 
of mathematics being simply arbitrary fiction should be enough to 
refute Field’s deflationism. But nothing has been said so far about 
the inherent problems in Field’s theory. Shapiro (1997, pp. 219-228) 
has made a number of important remarks on them. Two in 
particular stand out. The first one is on Field’s philosophical 
explanation for his “modal fictionalism” (meaning, roughly, that 
mathematics is a fiction that can be created for use in science). The 
second one concerns Field’s main technical project, his nominalist 
work of showing the conservativity of Newtonian mechanics over 
mathematics.  
The first remark is of utmost importance: Shapiro points out 
that everything in the fictionalist account can be translated into 
realist terms. If we are expecting our new modal account to 
provide a solution to the ontological and epistemological 
problems, surely it cannot be directly translatable into the realist 
terminology. As we will see, this is a powerful objection that will 
follow us wherever we go with nominalism. In the most naïve case 
we could replace “there exists A” with “it is possible that A exists”. 
In more sophisticated versions it can be replaced by “we can 
construct A” or “if there exists a mathematical system S, there 
exists A”. But all these are simply translations of the first, 
seemingly realist, version. All the instances of A perform 
                                                           
170 In addition, one should remember the considerations in Chapter 4.1 of 
this work. It seems particularly important to me that Field’s approach 
looks thoroughly mathematical, even if numbers are not used in it. Of 
course this is not to even fully concede that Field has managed to show 
mathematics to be conservative over scientific theories. Even his treatment 
of Newtonian mechanics is not without its problems (see Shapiro 1983 for 
the problem of Gödel sentences in Field’s system), and that is concerned 
with 300 year-old mathematics developed particularly for a theory of 
physics. Many of the mathematical tools of current science, especially the 
statistical and probabilistic ones, seem much less likely to be conservative.  
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equivalently in mathematical theories. It does not sound at all 
convincing that all the metaphysical and epistemological problems 
in the philosophy of mathematics are easy enough to solve by mere 
translation.171  
It seems quite clear to me that the ontological commitments of 
phrases “there exists A” and “it is possible that A exists” are in 
principle one and the same. For A to exist, there has to be a 
possibility for it to exist. It is hard to see how the other versions of 
nominalism escape this problem any better, without any theory of 
reference. If a modal account is to get anywhere beyond 
translation, it would need to explain why it is possible to construct 
A, and do this in a way essentially different from realism. The 
situation is similar for the other versions of nominalism. If the 
nominalist strategy is to think in purely formalistic terms, “is 
possible” would mean simply that “A does not cause a 
contradiction”. But why does A not cause a contradiction? It must 
be because we have selected our axioms and rules of proof in a 
certain way. Here we come again to all the problems of theory 
choice, reference and arbitrariness that we have discussed earlier, 
not to mention the new problem of unprovability of consistency in 
arithmetical systems, due to Gödel.  
The second problem that Shapiro (ibid., p. 227) points out is 
that Field uses mathematical theories, namely set theory, to prove 
his point. In other words, he uses mathematics to show that 
mathematics is a fiction. The logical difficulty here is evident, and 
if developed far enough, Field’s theory would almost certainly run 
into the same kind of trouble as Kripke’s and Hintikka’s 
definitions of truth. Many other problems would also arise. In 
                                                           
171 The one advantage I see with such translations is that, strictly speaking, 
a realist phrase “there exists A” is false in a fictionalist account, since 
mathematical objects do not exist. While this is certainly Field’s (1980) 
view, I work here under the interpretation that Field’s point of view is 
better understood as a case of extreme formalism, where mathematical 
sentences are considered to be meaningless rather than false. In the case of 
semantical arguments, for example, all Field’s considerations over the 
consistency of PA and other such matters would seem rather irrelevant if 
PA is considered to be false. 
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order to be sure that the nominalist interpretation is truly non-
mathematical, we would need to define what mathematics is. But 
can we define mathematics in any meaningful way without the use 
of mathematics? We remember that Field’s approach was to 
present science without numbers, but science completely without 
mathematics seems like a much more difficult task – while just as 
relevant. 
In addition, since Field uses mathematics in his account, one 
would wonder how we could use parts of fiction to prove an 
essentially ontological point. Perhaps this latter problem is one that 
Field could avoid, but we should know by now how difficult all 
these kinds of approaches are. Ultimately, Field would have to 
solve the monolingual speaker problem we discussed in Chapter 5. 
But this should not matter a great deal at this point, as it is 
certainly not the most difficult problem in Field’s theory. That role 
is reserved for the question of reference and theory choice, and 
their inevitable only truly deflationist counterpoint, arbitrariness.  
 
 
6.5 Modal reconstructivism 
 
Field’s nominalism – at least under the above interpretation of it – 
can be called destructive nominalism, as it is aimed to abolish 
mathematical entities from philosophy, but not to provide a 
surrogate solution. The other type is reconstructive nominalism, 
according to which we must construct mathematics in other ways 
to avoid all the ontological and epistemological problems. As I see 
it, the basic motivation for reconstructive nominalism comes from 
all mathematical sentences like “there exists A” being strictly-
speaking false if there did not exist any mathematical objects. 
Mathematics might not be true in any substantial sense, but it 
cannot be accepted that a great part of our accepted mathematical 
sentences are false, either. 
The most appealing form of reconstructivism is the one 
proposed by Hilary Putnam and developed by Charles Chihara 
(1973 and 1990), among others. Putnam (1967, pp. 297-301) 
presented the idea of translating our “Platonist” language of 
mathematics into the concepts of modal logic. The basic idea is to 
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replace phrases like “there exists x” and “for all x” with modal 
terms like “it is possible to select x” and “necessarily x”, usually 
written ◊x instead of ∃x and !x in place of ∀x. Similarly, functions 
and other mathematical objects are not thought to exist, but to be 
possible constructions. Both ways of doing mathematics, Putnam 
argued, are equivalent in the same way that the wave and particle 
interpretations of the electron are equivalent. This way the 
language of mathematics would be free of realist allusions to the 
actual existence of mathematical objects, and yet nothing from the 
“old” mathematics would be lost.  
What is the motivation behind such reconstructive programs, if 
they do not aim to change anything of substance in mathematics? 
The main reason seems to be a linguistic one, but with ontological 
results. Most mathematicians practise their trade as if realism were 
correct: they have no problem using phrases like “there exists”, 
even if many of them are not basing their use of language on any 
philosophical theory. This is Shapiro’s “working realism”, and it 
gives the practice of mathematics a seemingly realist, even a 
Platonist flavour. According to the proponents of reconstructivism, 
much of the popularity of realism in the philosophy of 
mathematics follows from using such realist phrases in practice. 
With a change in language realism would supposedly lose much of 
its appeal, and the philosophical questions concerning 
mathematics could be examined without the conceptual bias 
toward realism. 
Chihara’s (2005, pp. 499-500) position is perhaps the best-
known modern version of modal reconstructivism, and it is similar 
to Putnam’s. Instead of existential quantifiers, we should use 
modal quantifiers of the type “it is possible to construct”. This 
project Chihara calls “Constructibility Theory”. His motivation 
(ibid., pp. 507-508) is to defend the use of mathematics in science 
without reference to truth, that is, to show that we can justify the 
inferences of mathematics on a nominalist basis. In this work I 
have used the anti-nominalist argument that mathematics cannot 
be an arbitrary fiction since it plays such a crucial role in 
applications, both scientific and direct ones. Chihara wants to 
show that the same mathematics can be constructed in a nominalist 
fashion, and the applications of mathematics in no way depend on 
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mathematics being true. Basically, in the terminology here, this is 
equal to trying to find a nominalist answer to the problem of 
theory choice. If the Constructibility Theory can achieve 
everything that realist mathematics does, Chihara argues, the 
applications of mathematics cannot be used as an argument for 
realism – or truth – in mathematics. 
Another similar position is the modal structuralism of Geoffrey 
Hellman (1989). Structuralism is the philosophical view that rather 
than mathematical objects, mathematical structures exist. This 
approach has a lot of advantages. Instead of asking what the 
natural numbers are, and running into problems of definition, the 
structuralist can say that natural numbers are only places in the 
natural number structure. As long as a number serves the same 
purpose in that structure, it does not matter how we define it in, 
say, set theory. Now the ontological question follows us to 
structuralism. Do these structures exist? Shapiro (1997) is a 
proponent of a realist, ante rem, structuralism. But according to 
Hellman, we can avoid the ontological difficulties of realism in 
modal structuralism. Instead of saying that the natural number 
structure exists, we should say “it is possible that the natural 
number structure exists” or “it is possible for us to construct the 
natural number structure”. Hellman’s (2005, p. 553) formulation is 
a bit different, and technically more sophisticated, but this is the 
main idea. 
Whatever appeal these philosophies have, there is of course the 
familiar and disturbing matter in the whole modal reconstructivist 
project, whether it is Chihara’s or Hellman’s: the new basis for 
mathematics is essentially just a translation of the realist one. 
Shapiro (1997, p. 228) has pointed out the implausibility of a mere 
change into a vocabulary of diamonds and boxes solving the 
problems in the ontology of mathematics. Quite clearly, Chihara’s 
“it is possible to construct” is a simple translation of “there exists”. 
But if the languages are equivalent, perhaps it was not the realist 
language that was to be blamed for the problems after all? It is 
hard not to agree with Shapiro here. When we take the 
reconstructivist language at its face value, of course we must agree 
that it is possible to construct all the mathematical objects. That is 
just what mathematicians have actually done: mathematics did not 
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simply appear to human beings. All the notations are human 
inventions, and this is the case even if we hold there to exist a 
realist basis for mathematics. We have endless ways of formulating 
new vocabularies to construct mathematical objects and the 
philosophical problems cannot simply come down to a choice 
between equivalent vocabularies. 
The real question is why we have constructed the mathematical 
objects the way we have? Of course it is always possible to 
translate theories that already exist. The reconstructivist program is 
not about creating mathematical theories; it is about translating the 
existing ones, and for translation it is irrelevant whether 
mathematical objects exist. No matter what the ontological status 
of realism may be, the theories would be translatable into 
reconstructivist terms. The existence of mathematical objects and 
the objectivity of truth-values for mathematical sentences have 
nothing to do with them being translatable into a non-realist 
terminology. Indeed, we could have absolutely certain knowledge 
about the existence of mathematical objects, and we could still 
make the translation into any number of non-realist languages. But 
we should not be looking for a translation: whether mathematical 
entities exist or not may be irrelevant terminologically – but it 
cannot be that ontologically.  
One must remember that the case I have made against 
nominalism never relied on us using realist language in 
mathematics. Just like no proper argument for realism can be 
based on us using phrases like “there exists x”, no argument 
against realism can be founded on such phrases being translatable 
into a non-realist terminology. We could do the proposed 
translation into modal terms, but nothing would change. Indeed, 
had mathematics originally developed in a modal language, we 
would not think of making a case for realism by showing that all 
the modal terms are translatable into realist ones. This is not a 
matter of words and symbols, and translatability has got nothing 
to do with the philosophical problems involved. The real question 
the nominalist faces is that of theory choice: why we have the 
mathematical theories we have. Could mathematics have developed 
in a truly nominalist fashion? It does not matter that we use words 
like “exist” instead of “is possible to construct” – that can always 
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be changed. But why do we think that modus ponens is a valid rule 
of inference, the induction axiom of PA is valid, or – indeed – that 
2 + 2 = 4? So far this has caused insurmountable problems for the 
nominalist since without any outer reference our choice of 
mathematics seems to be completely arbitrary. The choice of 
language has got little or nothing to do with it.  
It seems that the only way to make the nominalist argument 
powerful is to lose this spirit of translation and show that the 
nominalist can achieve something non-realist with his program. If 
he is going to end up with the same theories of mathematics via 
translation, one has to question the role of nominalism in the 
argument. Indeed, if the exact same argument can be used for 
translations like “there exists a”, “it is possible to construct a” and 
“it is possible that a exists”, one is bound to wonder whether it is 
really modal constructivism and nominalism we are discussing or 
just the possibility of translation of quantifiers. In this way the non-
translational programs, like intuitionism, are more interesting, and 
their philosophical content much stronger.  
It must be pointed out once more that the realist language of 
mathematics does not make a case for anti-nominalism, and if this 
has ever been used as an argument, in this work I want to steer 
clear of it. Rather, the used language is irrelevant to the problems of 
truth and existence of mathematical entities. This cannot be 
stressed enough, as I suspect that this misunderstanding is the 
main motivation for programs such as Chihara’s. They want to 
show that the realist language is so deeply entrenched in the 
mathematical practice that it is inevitable that we start to think 
realistically in the philosophy of mathematics. This is an important 
point, to be sure, and not without a kernel of truth. It is not hard to 
predict that had the language of mathematics developed to be 
modal, the modal philosophies of mathematics would be more 
popular. The language does matter in that sense. But once we go 
beyond language into the real essence of mathematics, we must 
realize that the choice of language is irrelevant, as long as the 
options are equivalent in terms of translation. Only after that do 
the real problems of the philosophy of mathematics present 
themselves – and for the strict nominalist those problems are very 
224 6. Why not nominalism? 
 
 
difficult indeed. The translatability of languages is hardly relevant 
if arbitrariness of theory choice must be accepted. 
Considering all that, for the reconstructivist theories there is 
always one fundamental problem: that of motivation. Burgess and 
Rosen (1997, p. 60) raise this question. Other than for purely 
philosophical motivations, why should we want to reconstruct our 
mathematical theories? If there is something wrong with them, 
then why do we want to arrive at the exact same theories from a 
different background? If mathematical entities interpreted as 
abstract cause us problems, do we have any hope of solving those 
problems by interpreting those entities to be concrete or modal? It 
seems like the only motivation is that we have to deal with the 
intrinsic philosophical problems concerning the abstract entities. 
Abstract entities (or the postulation of them) work in mathematics –
most philosophers and mathematicians agree on that. According to 
the Quine-Putnam indispensability argument, we should use 
abstract entities because without them mathematics and science 
would not work. However, even when that argument is accepted, 
the way one deals with it can differ greatly. Quine’s position was 
that such abstract mathematical entities exist. The reconstructivist 
position is that we should find another interpretation for the 
abstract entities. This is bound to have a strong flavour of 
translation in it, but at least it retains all the power of the original 
mathematical theories. That is why from the nominalist theories 
the reconstructivist ones are by far the most acceptable ones: they 
do not change anything of value in mathematics. At the same time, 
that is also why the motivation for them is so hard to see. 
Finally, there is one crucial problem that concerns most of the 
supposedly nominalist endeavours: they are not as ontologically 
unproblematic as they claim to be. As we know, the ontological 
commitments of realist mathematics are the main motivation for 
developing nominalist alternatives. Usually with a crude form of 
Occam’s razor it is inferred that we do not need to postulate 
abstract entities if their names are enough. But of course the names 
by themselves are not enough, as we have seen. All the nominalists 
need translations for quantifiers, in the very least. One possible 
exception to this is Field, depending on the interpretation. If we 
consider him a strict fictionalist, then we do not need translations. 
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“There exists A” is simply a (somehow) useful fiction about a 
fictional entity A. If we follow the geometric interpretation, we 
need a translation, something along the lines of “from the points of 
space-time we can construct A.” Now exactly how ontologically 
unproblematic is this? After all, as we have seen, we need to 
assume a continuum of points of space-time in order to save all 
mathematics in the geometric nominalist strategy. Not only is this 
a strong ontological assumption, it is also one that is potentially in 
conflict with our best knowledge of quantum mechanics. The 
ontological simplicity seems to be greatly exaggerated.  
How about the modal strategies? The basic phrase “it is 
possible” of course implies a whole universe of possibilities, some 
of which are actualized while others are not. What is the 
ontological status of the unactualized possibilities? By the modal 
strategy, they have to exist – after all, we are making a direct 
reference to them. If all the possibilities were actualized, we would 
not need a modal strategy in the first place. But the unactualized 
possibilities cannot be concrete, by definition. What we must have 
is a whole universe of abstract unactualized possibilities. The 
ontological thinness turns out to be achieved by smoke and 
mirrors. Granted, the ontological burden of the nominalist 
reconstructions may not be as heavy as in full-fledged Platonist 
theories. Still, it is not at all the case that these reconstructive 
strategies are ontologically unproblematic. Only fictionalism is, 
and it has much graver problems of its own.   
 
 
6.6 The power of objectivity: Penrose’s question 
 
Benacerraf’s dilemma is the basic problem for a Platonist 
philosopher of mathematics. It is commonplace in the modern 
philosophy of mathematics that any account in the Platonist 
direction needs to answer this question. As a result – among 
philosophers – the Platonist philosophy of mathematics has 
perhaps never been less popular. The epistemological problem just 
seems insurmountable without appeal to a special epistemic 
faculty of mathematical intuition. Not many philosophers are 
prepared to appeal to this anymore. 
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Meanwhile, the nominalists have been let off much easier. 
Certainly, strict nominalism in the fictionalist sense has next to no 
epistemological problems. If mathematics is completely our own 
creation, surely there is no difficulty in getting knowledge of it. 
However, that kind of nominalism has two at least as grave 
problems as Benacerraf’s dilemma, both of them based on the 
arbitrariness of theory choice. The first one is the question of 
physical applications. Almost all sciences use mathematical tools, 
but perhaps nowhere are they more indispensable than in physics. 
Ever since Galileo famously stated that the book of nature is 
written in the language of mathematics, physics has been a 
thoroughly mathematical science. The Quine-Putnam 
indispensability argument carries a lot of weight: it seems that 
physics cannot be properly practised without mathematics. The 
main objection to this, of course, has been Field’s science without 
numbers. Much has been said about Field’s project, but one fact 
about it is beyond dispute: nobody practises Fieldian physics. Even 
if Field’s nominalistic physics were in principle possible, in 
practice mathematics has as big a role in physics as it has ever had. 
For the fictionalist, this role must be explained. In Hao Wang’s 
(1974, p. 239) words: 
 
…the close connection to the physical world is an essential feature 
which separates mathematics from mere games with symbols. 
Mathematics coincides with all that is the exact in science. 
 
It is all too easy to claim mathematics to be fiction and then explain 
this connection by praising it as “useful fiction” – indeed, noting 
that mathematics is useful is rather redundant.172 The connection 
between mathematics and our knowledge of the physical world is 
                                                           
172 At the first glance, terms like “useful fiction” may seem like an 
ontologically unproblematic way of rescuing the applications of 
mathematics. However, on a closer look one realizes that anything can be 
dubbed useful fiction in the same manner: we can be fictionalists over the 
general theory of relativity and explain its success as it being useful. But of 
course this is not an explanation at all, and no serious philosopher of 
physics would use it as an argument. I fail to see how the situation is 
different when it comes to the philosophy of mathematics. 
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something a philosophical theory of mathematics must explain, not 
just casually state. Hence Field’s nominalist program, even if 
successful, could not solve the problem of physical applications of 
mathematics for us. If mathematics is simply a fiction, why do 
certain theories work much better in physics than others? It is a 
question that has to be answered, and the fictionalist answer of 
arbitrariness cannot possibly satisfy us. However, this is not a 
problem only for the fictionalist. The applications in physics are 
also a problem for the Platonist. In a variation of Benacerraf’s 
dilemma, we can ask how the physical world can work according 
to (in part) abstract non-physical laws. The problem of physical 
applications seems to rule out both of the extreme positions in the 
philosophy of mathematics. 
 
The second problem of nominalism, however, is something that 
Platonism answers. It is also something that is remarkably often 
simply ignored. Keeping in mind how notoriously unreliable and 
inconsistent we as human beings are, how can it be that in 
mathematics we find such robustness, clarity and consistency? 
Roger Penrose (2004, pp. 12-13), for example, has explicitly 
presented this problem. As he is one of the few contemporary 
philosophers who can be called a Platonist, I will call the problem 
Penrose’s question.173 The question is more pertinent than may seem 
at first. One obvious answer could be that mathematical standards 
are all just man-made norms. But this by itself is unsatisfactory 
when we examine the kind of norms that we have. Man-made 
norms exist, and we know quite a bit about their nature, whether 
they are ethical, political, rules of games or some other type. For 
most people familiar with mathematics, the robustness of 
mathematics is quite obviously something different. No matter 
how one looks at it, practising mathematics just does not appear to 
                                                           
173 Of course Penrose has not been the first to ask this question, but 
Benacerraf was hardly the first one to recognize the epistemological 
problems of Platonism. 
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be comparable to solving a Sudoku puzzle.174 Both have explicitly 
laid out rules, both can be subject to the same kind of rigorous 
study, but unlike Sudoku, mathematics seems so clearly to be 
something other than an arbitrary game we have created.175 
Forgetting for a while all the ontological and epistemological 
problems, Platonism seems to have a good answer to that 
robustness. Indeed, this is probably the reason why most 
mathematicians are working realists. For most mathematicians, the 
subject matter of mathematics is something that they research and 
discover, not something that they create. The varied philosophical 
arguments notwithstanding, for many mathematicians it certainly 
seems to be the case that mathematics is objective.176 This is no 
small matter. Working realism is a large part of the convention of 
mathematics and the nominalist cannot dismiss the way we have 
arrived at our mathematical knowledge. In a philosophical account 
of mathematics, one cannot just throw away the ladder after 
climbing it. After all, we are looking for an explanation of 
mathematical knowledge. How can mathematics be just a 
subjective endeavour when there is so much in its practice and 
results that points to objectivity? Whether this objectiveness is an 
illusion or not is another question; but the problem of apparent 
objectivity is definitely something that the nominalist must 
                                                           
174 One entertaining counterargument against fictionalism is that 
mathematics is not make-believe like “playing Cowboys and Indians”. 
While altogether more amusing, this analogy has the problem of including 
a clear reference to something (formerly) existing, as well as being overall 
a bit unfair to the fictionalist. The philosophers of mathematics should be 
grateful for the current popularity of Sudoku in providing a perfect 
analogy to the extreme formalist mathematics. 
175 Of course the study of Sudoku patterns can be mathematical, as well. 
The point here is that not all mathematics is like that. Moreover, in the case 
of mathematical studies of Sudoku solutions, mathematics clearly has an 
outer object, although man-made and in its finiteness obviously different 
from most of mathematics. 
176 In the lack of research on the actual philosophical beliefs of working 
mathematicians, I cannot make the stronger claim that most 
mathematicians think this way. As a conjecture that sounds highly 
plausible. 
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answer. Any answer resembling arbitrariness is thoroughly 
unsatisfactory. 
Field (2001, pp. 315-331) has tried to explain this objectivity 
with the concept of logical objectivity. His contention is that what 
we mean by the objectivity in mathematics is actually only the 
objectivity of rules of proof, that is, logic. 
 
…logic, hence mathematical proof, is fully objective. And because proof 
is so important in mathematics, this concedes most of what we may 
have had in mind in calling mathematics objective. It ought to be 
obvious that if mathematics is objective only in this sense, then the link 
between mathematical objectivity and mathematical objects […] is 
wholly illusory: you don’t need to make mathematics actually be about 
anything for it to be possible to objectively assess the logical relations 
between mathematical premises and mathematical conclusions. (ibid, 
p. 317, Italics in the original).  
 
So according to Field, the objectivity that seems to force itself upon 
us when dealing in mathematics is only that of the accepted rules 
of proof, which can be thought to be fully objective. Obviously this 
is a very weak form of objectivity, only enough for the conclusion 
that mathematicians universally accept the formal derivation 
procedures. 
However, objectivity defined in this way does not really tie 
mathematics into anything. It is a good question whether this can 
be called objectivity at all, or just a form of conventionalism. There 
are two questions in particular that are immediately raised. First, 
Field speaks about the rules of proof, but what is the status of 
axioms? Second, if we are truly anti-realist in mathematics, why 
should we accept that the rules of proof are objective? The first 
question is a very difficult one, because contrary to my conclusion 
about his position, sometimes Field does not actually seem to 
accept arbitrariness. In fact, he (ibid., p. 322) accepts that 
“considerations of utility play a role in our selecting some 
mathematical axioms over others”. My immediate reply is one that 
Field anticipates: are we not bringing truth in through the back 
door by appealing to utility? Field claims that this 
counterargument fails since the concept of utility is relative to the 
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purpose at hand. To give an example, he mentions that the 
different axiomatizations of set theory can be useful in different 
situations. However, this goes profoundly against mathematical 
practice, for there is no denying the remarkable consensus on the 
choice of axioms in practically all areas of mathematics. If 
considerations of utility come into the choice of axioms, practice 
tells us that this choice has almost always been the same. In fact, 
Field’s example seems to make the exact opposite point from the 
one he wanted: if there were great diversity in the choice of 
axioms, Field might have a point. But as it happens, this could not 
be farther from the truth. Certainly there is not full consensus, but 
there is more of a consensus than in almost any other human 
activity. Either the appeal to utility must be resisted, or we must 
admit something objective into the choice of axioms. In the first 
case we end up with arbitrariness, in the second one truth. 
The second question is not any easier for Field. Why can rules 
of proof be considered objective if axioms cannot? While we are at 
conventionalism, it would seem possible to follow Wittgenstein 
(1983) into thinking that nothing in mathematics is objective, not 
even the process of drawing conclusions with formal derivation 
procedures. Field (2001, p. 316) dismisses such radical anti-
objectivism, but can he remain consistent in denying the objectivity 
of axioms? Of course Wittgenstein’s position sounds absurd to 
most of us, but it is the logical conclusion of the radical 
conventionalist line of thinking. In fact, when we remember 
everything we know about the disagreement over rules of proof – 
intuitionism, many-valued logics, etc. – the objectivity of rules of 
proof is not at all obvious. The objectivity of certain accepted rules 
of course holds, but that is a trivial matter. The objectivity of logic 
as such is a strong statement, and it does not go well with Field’s 
fictionalist program. 
When it comes to the subject matter of this work, by all the 
considerations above Field’s position is simply untenable. He 
wants to rid mathematics of objects but retain objectivity. He wants 
to include utility as a criterion of theory choice, yet he refuses any 
role for truth and reference. The motivation for this project is 
obviously to minimize the ontological commitments, which is an 
understandable goal. But one can only go so far with this strategy, 
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or one must go all the way. Either mathematics is arbitrary, or the 
objectivity must be tied to something. As we have seen, the latter 
option can refer to a number of positions – but all of them give 
grounds for truth and reference in the philosophy of mathematics.  
 
 
6.7 The power of nominalism and potential ways out 
 
All the variations of nominalism in mathematics seem to run into 
one of two difficult problems. Either they make mathematics 
arbitrary or they are translations of the old “realist” mathematics. 
The motivation for such translations is questionable and, as we 
have seen, the ontological problems are not much easier to deal 
with. Moreover, it is not at all clear that such strategies are really 
nominalist, at least not in the strict sense required here. Of course 
we should not expect anything more from a solution based 
essentially on translation. The reconstructive nominalist strategies 
do not end up with much appeal, as far as the subject of this work 
is considered. However, the first problem is obviously the more 
serious one. As I have argued, nominalism of the fictionalist, the 
only truly deflationist type is repudiated for good because of 
arbitrariness.  
Yet it must be asked what makes nominalism such a common 
(although, it has to be remembered, still mostly marginal) view in 
the philosophy of mathematics? I can see the motivation arriving 
mainly from the appeal of nominalism elsewhere in philosophy. 
Originally, nominalism was targeted against Plato’s idealism in 
ontology. It demolished the ontologically difficult world of ideas, 
and moved the focus to the empirical world. From a modern point 
of view this was obviously a step forward. Instead of “chairness”, 
we like to think that the individual physical chairs exist, and what 
connects those individuals is similarity in the use and design, 
which exist due to people. In the case of chairs, few would still 
claim that there exists an abstract idea of a chair, completely 
independently of us. When it comes to natural objects, that 
development was achieved by science. In place of the problematic 
concepts like “catness”, we can move into the domain of genomes 
and have an unambiguous and exhaustive nominalist replacement 
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for the earlier universal concepts. This way, when it comes to these 
kinds of classical examples of the universal-nominalist debate, the 
philosophical problems have been largely resolved.177 
Chairs, cats and the like, however, are not the only types of 
entities we deal with. Indeed, in a strict sense, it is highly 
anthropocentric to claim that even chairs exist. Chairs are 
constructed of molecules, which are constructed of atoms, which 
are constructed of protons, neutrons and electrons, the former two 
of which are constructed of quarks. All of these are ways of 
explaining phenomena in physics, and all of these can be modelled 
with the yet more fundamental micro-level laws of quantum 
mechanics. Which of these objects exist in the strict ontological 
sense? It is not my purpose here to go into all the problems that 
nominalism presents to us, but I do want to emphasize how 
nominalism even in physics is ultimately nothing like the neat 
theory that “physical objects exist”. Physics does not tell us 
unequivocally what exists in the nominalist sense. Seemingly 
theoretical concepts like “force” exist essentially in the same sense 
as seemingly empirical ones like “atoms”: they are all parts of 
theories about explaining measurable phenomena. In addition, of 
course the postulated entities and their relations are not all there is 
to physics. The other part is formed by the mathematical theories 
that play a crucial part in the explanations. Perhaps we do not 
need to go as far as Quinean holism, but it certainly does not seem 
easy to completely distinguish between the theoretical and 
empirical content in physics, at least as far as their ontological 
status is concerned. Mathematical theories are a part of physics, 
and the distinction between mathematics and physics in those 
theories should not be thought to be a straight-forward one, either. 
On the other hand, philosophically we seem to have a clear idea 
how such a distinction is made. Mathematical objects are abstract; 
they are non-temporal, non-spatial and causally inactive. There are 
other types of non-temporal, non-spatial and causally inactive 
objects, but none seem to be like the mathematical ones in every 
facet. Works of art (a novel, for example, as opposed to all the 
                                                           
177 Or – to be safe – at least they do not look like the kind of fundamental 
problems they once were. 
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printed copies of it) are non-spatial, but they are clearly temporal. 
If we reject extreme formalism, we cannot intelligibly ask when 2 + 
2 started to be 4, while from each work of art we can clearly ask 
when it was created. Species of flora and fauna are causally 
inactive (only their representatives are active), but evolution and 
extinctions make them temporal. Even ethical concepts seem to 
have a temporal context: according to most people they only 
arrived with the development of human of beings. Whether that is 
true or not, certainly they cannot be thought to exist before life 
evolved sufficiently. However, here we are quickly closing the gap 
to mathematical objects. While mathematical objects can seem to be 
non-temporal, obviously we can only inquire about them if we 
exist and have a propensity toward mathematical thinking. If there 
is something in human beings that makes mathematical 
explanations natural and successful to us, could we ever be able to 
distinguish this from an objective feature of the outer world? In 
both cases we would have objective mathematical truth and the 
mathematical entities would seem to be abstract. Yet in this 
anthropocentric view the ontological status of mathematical 
entities is much less problematic. They do not exist objectively in 
the outer world, but they do exist objectively in the way human 
beings acquire and process information of the world. 
In this sense, the empiricist approach developed by Kitcher has 
a lot of potential, but only if we apply it to our most basic 
mathematical knowledge, such as simple arithmetic and geometry. 
Simply looking at the education of young children, it seems clear 
that empirical knowledge forms a central part of primitive 
mathematical thinking. Certainly, from looking at some 
sophisticated fields of mathematical inquiry, such as topology, one 
is tempted to see it all as fiction. Up to some point, that could 
indeed be the case.178 But sophisticated mathematical theories are 
not self-standing: they have developed over time on top of more 
basic ones. Complex numbers, for example, were formulated to 
                                                           
178 For example, in the empiricist account, infinity is one concept that could 
turn out to be fiction, strictly speaking, if it could be established that the 
universe is finite. This does not concern only the more sophisticated 
theories of mathematics, but basic arithmetic as well. 
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resolve one particular limitation of real numbers179, just like real 
numbers were formulated in order to account for irrational 
numbers. That way, it could be argued, every step forward in 
mathematics brings us further away from the original pre-formal – 
and possibly empirical – concepts. As a result, mathematics may 
start to look more and more like fiction.  
However, it must always be remembered that (almost) all new 
mathematics is based on older theories. There is a continuing 
development from the primitive first steps of mathematical 
thinking into modern theories and their highly formal 
presentation, and in this way none of even the most sophisticated 
mathematical systems are completely self-standing. Obviously a 
complete account of mathematical reference would need to specify 
the ontological status of all such theories, but we cannot go into 
such pursuits here. For the purposes of this work it is sufficient to 
note that even the slightest general human propensity toward 
mathematical thinking can be considered to provide the basic 
mathematics with an objective reference. This could mean, among 
other things, categorizing observations into simple logical 
structures, geometrical constructions or quantities. Suddenly the 
ontological demands are vastly lighter, while – returning to the 
direct subject of this work – the same account of Tarskian truth can 
still be applied. 
I will shortly present a tentative outline of such a project, but it 
should not be thought to form the basis for any of the main 
arguments presented in this work. There are arguments for and 
against this kind of objective anthropocentricity. On the one hand, 
the fact that different cultures, the Mayas for example, developed 
mathematical theories independently of our culture seems like 
evidence for the theory. On the other hand, there are cultures 
where mathematical thinking did not develop. In this sense 
mathematics does not seem like the kind of universal human 
ability that language, for example, is. These are important 
questions, and empirical research can give us a lot of information 
on them – even though ultimately the question is bound to remain 
largely philosophical. The idea here is merely presented as a 
                                                           
179 That of negative real numbers not having square roots. 
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reminder that not all anti-nominalist theories need to be realist in 
any Platonic sense. It has been noted (by Chihara 2005, p. 512 for 
example) that anti-nominalism without any positive development 
of alternatives is hardly satisfactory. There is some truth in that, 
although the implicit idea often seems to be that anti-nominalism 
suggests Platonism. However, if nominalism fails, we can make 
philosophical conclusions even without presenting explicit 
alternatives. It is not completely satisfactory to leave open the 
question of which alternative to anti-nominalism we should 
pursue, but I hope that the approach taken here is enough for the 
theses in this work. After all, the subject matter here is Tarskian 
truth, which is a very widely applicable theory. It only requires 
that we can speak of some reference for mathematics. We can be 
Platonists, empiricists or structuralists in mathematics – and as we 
have seen, also modal reconstructivists and nominalists of the 
geometric strategy – and still be proponents of Tarskian truth. 
It has not been the purpose of this chapter to attack nominalism 
with other theories of mathematical knowledge. My aim has been 
to show that strict nominalism fails on its own: whatever we want 
from our philosophy of mathematics, it cannot lead to the 
conclusion that our preferred axioms and rules of proof are merely 
completely arbitrary conventions. We must always remember 
what kind of axioms and rules of proof we are talking about. From 
reading the nominalist literature one almost gets the impression 
that our established mathematical axioms are somehow elusive 
and contingent and we could have chosen their negations just as 
well. To see the evident fallacy in this, one can return – for example 
– to the Peano axioms of arithmetic and try to convince himself 
how we could accept the negation of one of them.  
To such claims of self-evidence of axioms one is usually 
answered with non-Euclidean geometries, where Euclid’s parallel 
axiom is abandoned. This counterargument is difficult to 
understand. After all, it was not the case that mathematicians did 
not know that there can be non-Euclidean geometries. By drawing 
lines on a balloon everybody realizes they have encountered one. 
Euclid was not shown to be wrong: the parallel-axiom still works 
perfectly well in plane geometry. What was realized was that there 
are also other geometries of interest. In a wonderful triumph of 
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physics and mathematics one of these geometries has been shown 
to be the best one to explain our universe on a macro level. 
Mathematics developed into new directions but Euclid’s geometry 
works as well as ever for planes and the Euclidean three-
dimensional spaces, which are still used as the physical model in 
most applications.  
Wherever we look, mathematics is on a much stronger basis, 
and much more self-evident than some of the nominalists like to 
admit. The problems we have in the fundaments of mathematics 
are over-magnified into something completely fantastic. Talk of a 
crisis in mathematics is not uncommon when dealing with 
concepts like incompleteness. Yet all such “crises” have been found 
within mathematics, and have in fact worked to clarify the formal 
mathematical theories. In addition, mathematical research has 
continued as before, and mathematical applications in science have 
proved to be as useful as ever. That usefulness is of course the one 
thing that the nominalists admit, but it is also something they 
cannot explain – at least if they want to remain nominalists in the 
strict sense.  
 
 
6.8 Ontology of mathematics: an alternative outline 
 
What, then, are mathematical objects? The following is no more 
than a brief outline, meant to work as a tentative example of a non-
Platonist, non-nominalist alternative. It must not be thought that 
the main arguments of this work depend in any way on the 
proposal here. However, it is an outline that is immediately 
applicable to the arguments here with minimal ontological burden. 
As such, it should work to remind us just how wide a field 
objectivism in mathematics is. But any objectivist philosophy will 
fit with the account of mathematical truth given here, and my 
proposal is just an example.  
After that clarification, let us begin. If mathematical objects are 
anything, it seems likely that some form of structuralism is the 
answer. As we remember, in structuralism numbers and other 
mathematical objects are thought to be places in structures, rather 
than existing independently. Structuralism, originally proposed by 
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Michael Resnik (1981 and 1982) and later developed by Shapiro 
(1997), provides a solution to the problem of defining concepts like 
natural numbers, tackled first by Frege. One famous example of 
the problems involved with such definitions is the so-called “Julius 
Caesar problem”. What reason do we have of saying that a natural 
number is the same as something and different from something 
else? For instance, how can we say that “Julius Caesar = 2” does 
not hold? Another example is the two ways of formulating natural 
numbers in set theory. Von Neumann presented the formulation 
that zero is the empty setφ , one is the set formed by the set of zero 
}{φ , two is the set formed by the sets of zero and one }{ }{ φφ , , three 
is the set formed by zero, one and two } }}{{{ }{ φφφφ ,,, , four is the set 
} }}{{{ } }}{{{{ }}{ φφφφφφφφ ,,,,,,,  and so on. In Zermelo’s account, we get 
the successor to each natural number by forming a set out of it. In 
this account, two is the set }}{{φ , three is the set }}{{{ }φ and four is 
the set }}{{{ }{ }φ . The obvious difference between the two accounts is 
that although both definitions are arithmetically equivalent, in Von 
Neumann’s account 42∈ , while in Zermelo’s account 42∉ . The 
structuralist can avoid this difficulty because both formulations of 
2 have equivalent roles in the natural number structure, and only 
the place in the structure matters. Similarly, if Julius Caesar 
somehow performed the same role in the natural number 
structure, it would be equal to 2. 180 
The Julius Caesar problem, plus Zermelo’s and von Neumann’s 
conflicting but arithmetically equivalent definitions of natural 
numbers are very strong arguments for structuralism. But there are 
even simpler ones, like the fact that we denote the natural number 
between 4 and 6 with all kinds of different names, including “5”, 
“101”, “V”, “five” and “cinque”. All these can be parts of 
equivalent (seemingly) self-standing mathematical theories, and 
outside of practical questions of simplicity and clarity of notation 
there is nothing to tell them apart. However, in different structures 
the names notate different objects. We cannot replace the decimal 
name “5” with the binary name “101” without changing the names 
                                                           
180 For more on the Julius Caesar problem, as well as von Neumann and 
Zermelo, see Shapiro 1997, pp. 78-81. 
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of all the other numbers in the structure. Hence it is the place 
denoted in the name-structure, not the name itself that matters.181 
In fact, this is the case especially if we lean toward nominalist 
mathematics, where names are not thought to have outer 
references. With Tarskian semantics we obviously have an easy 
way to deal with this. In a metalanguage, like we are doing on this 
page, we can discuss the different notations of natural numbers. 
But how can we in the nominalist mathematics say that the 
numerals “5” and “V” denote the same object? Of course we have 
to think of the object as fictitious and think of all the different 
names of “5” as a circle of translation where nothing refers to 
anything non-fictitious. Without a structuralist account this would 
be disastrous. In a strict nominalist account, where only names 
exist, binary mathematics would be different from decimal 
mathematics, even though they are completely equivalent in 
arithmetic content. So it must be the case that it is not really a 
name, but a “place in a name-structure” that the nominalist thinks 
numbers to be. That is also the case, mutatis mutandis, when it 
comes to Platonism. It is absurd to think that our current notation 
of numbers somehow refers to the existing natural numbers while 
other equivalent ones do not. Also in the realist accounts, 
structuralism seems to be the way to go. Indeed, the Zermelo-Von 
Neumann example has the maximal force when applied to 
Platonism. 
So we should focus on the structuralist accounts. In which way 
do these structures exist and how do we get information of them? 
Here everything we have learnt about Platonism and nominalism 
can be used. Structures cannot be arbitrary fiction, and we wish for 
something ontologically more economical than existence in a 
Platonist sense. With this background, forms of naturalism182 could 
                                                           
181 This point of course holds for all languages, not just those of 
mathematics. 
182 Naturalism in mathematics is fundamentally the viewpoint that 
philosophy can never contradict with mathematics. See Maddy 1997 for 
one kind of naturalist project. Quine is obviously the other famous 
proponent of naturalism, although his theory does not treat mathematics 
separately from other pursuits of knowledge. 
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be very tempting, but they have a tendency of sweeping the 
ontological problems under the rug by rendering them a part of 
mathematics. No doubt the practice of mathematics should give us 
a great deal of information on what exists, but unlike the strict 
naturalists, I also see a role for philosophy in this. Even if we think 
that mathematical entities exist, we do not need to think that all of 
them do. In Cantor’s (1883, p. 896) famous account of mathematics, 
every introduction of new concepts is justified as long as they are 
consistent and defined from earlier concepts. This freedom of 
mathematical thought, when given a naturalist interpretation, 
means that everything defined in such a manner exists. However, 
this is not something I am ready to agree with. When comparing 
natural numbers to complex numbers, I cannot help but notice a 
potential difference in their ontological, epistemological and 
pragmatic status. Natural numbers are used almost everywhere by 
everybody. When we notice a difference in sets with sizes of two 
and three, we are using a (perhaps primitive) notion of natural 
numbers. Animals can do this. Complex numbers, on the other 
hand, were specifically developed to enable calculations including 
the square roots of negative numbers. One is not likely to have 
such a direct comprehension over what a complex number is, or 
what complex numbers refer to in the world. 
I do not mean to suggest that such a difference is necessarily 
ontological. There is a direct line of definition from sets to complex 
numbers and it is not easy to see at which point we move from 
existing objects to the realm of fiction, or indeed whether we ever 
do. However, in practice many mathematicians tend to hold 
natural numbers to be more fundamental than complex ones, and 
hence I do not find the naturalist strategy of lumping everything 
together to the same ontological category satisfying. I believe that 
in mathematics we have the potential both to explain existing 
concepts and create fictitious ones – at least there is nothing 
inherently problematic in that, and the philosophy of mathematics 
should allow that possibility. An analogy in physics could be the 
macro world being ultimately a useful fiction while the micro 
world is the truly existing one – supposing that they can be 
combined completely. Not every theory of mathematics – even if 
true – needs to refer to existing objects; there is a lot in 
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mathematics that cannot be looked at as anything other than 
conventions.183 But that should in no way suggest that everything in 
mathematics is a convention, either. As I see it, there is no such 
thing as the “whole of mathematics” that should be neatly 
categorized under ontological and epistemological conditions. 
In such manner we should concentrate our efforts on the most 
primitive mathematical concepts, like the natural numbers and the 
objects of geometry. Here Kitcher’s empiricism could be a good 
starting point. However, Kitcher goes astray when he thinks of 
mathematics as another empirical science. For instance, 
mathematical theories are hardly empirically corroborated, at least 
not in the sense that physical ones are. Showing a statement to 
hold for every n < 1 000 000 is mathematically no better than 
showing it to hold for every n < 1000. Nevertheless, Kitcher does 
have merit in emphasizing the empirical part of mathematics when 
it comes to our very basic familiarity with mathematical concepts. 
In the learning of mathematics this is absolutely essential, yet it is 
often almost completely neglected in philosophy. Kitcher’s notion 
of mathematics as “an idealized science of operations which we 
can perform on objects in our environment” sounds very fitting 
when applied to the learning of basic mathematics. Initially we 
learn arithmetic – at least in part – empirically by grouping objects 
and counting. This is of course not truly mathematical in the sense 
that proving theorems is, but – as I have argued – it nevertheless 
gives us pre-formal mathematical information. Empirical 
information does play a role in mathematics, and Kitcher’s account 
can be useful in explaining this. However, this does not need to 
mean empirical in the sense of passive observation. Mathematical 
knowledge can develop via trial and error in fitting certain 
patterns into outer objects. This is empirical, as well, but it can also 
be distinguished from purely (or at least more purely) 
                                                           
183 One illuminating example is pointed out by Ian Stewart (2006, pp. 162-
163): that multiplying a negative number with another negative number 
gives us a positive number. Certainly there are good algebraic reasons for 
us to hold that convention, but as Stewart points out, no matter how 
obvious it sounds and how much sense it makes, it is still difficult to see it 
as anything else than a convention. 
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observational activity. Moreover, we need to remember the 
difference between the origins on mathematical thinking and the 
sophisticated theories we have arrived at. The former can perfectly 
well be empirical while the latter retain all that makes mathematics 
different from empirical sciences. 
Although I do not agree with his overall philosophy of 
mathematics, Ludwig Wittgenstein has the strength of recognizing 
the origins of mathematics as something distinct from our 
developed theories of it. Basically, I am ready to agree with 
passages like the following two: 
 
All the calculi in mathematics have been invented to suit experience 
and then made independent of experience. (Wittgenstein 1976, p. 43). 
 
[25 * 25 = 625] was first introduced because of experience. But now we 
have made it independent of experience; it is a rule of expression for 
talking about our experiences. (ibid., p. 44). 
 
It is quite natural to make the hypothesis that the origins of 
mathematical thinking were something similar. However, 
Wittgenstein (ibid., p. 22) moves from that into conventionalism, 
emphasizing how mathematics understood in such manner is not 
about discovery, but invention. This is not very convincing because 
the concept of experience is understood in a strangely insignificant 
fashion. Certainly in a weak sense mathematics is invention, but in 
the same sense physics is invention. Human beings create the 
theories, and the presented notations can always be understood as 
inventions. However, if arithmetical theorems help to explain our 
experiences, just like Newtonian mechanics explain planetary 
motions, how can we say we are not discovering something about 
the world, or at least about the way we perceive the world? We can 
think of the truths of mathematics as inventions and conventions – 
which they both are, in a way – but how are we to explain the fact 
that they continue to explain our experiences, and not only when it 
comes to simple arithmetical theorems?  
Wittgenstein’s approach has appeal when we consider the 
origins of mathematical thinking, but after that it runs into the 
problem of arbitrariness. Although mathematical theories do start 
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to live a life independent of their empirical origins, philosophically 
we cannot dismiss the fact that these origins exist. In fact, they 
could very well be the key to understanding the nature of 
mathematical reference. Although we can learn from both 
Wittgenstein and Kitcher, we must not follow their pursuits too 
far. If we acknowledge the role of experience in the development 
of mathematical thinking, the epistemological and ontological 
problems are much more manageable than in a Platonist project. In 
addition, the direct applications of arithmetic and geometry are 
instantly explained with such a theory. However, mathematics 
quite clearly has both a subject matter and methods essentially 
different from those of empirical sciences, and I do not think that 
any plausible study of the philosophy of mathematics can remain 
along Wittgenstein’s or Kitcher’s lines for longer than is needed for 
the origins. 
Now there remains the problem of connecting this “semi-
Kitcherian” account with structuralism. How does our operating 
with piles of apples give us information about an objective natural 
number structure? For explanation there can be two options: either 
the world is organized according to such a structure, or human 
beings have an objective tendency to observe and explain the 
world according to such a structure. The first Galileo-Newton 
viewpoint is perhaps the route traditionally more often taken. The 
second one, a form of epistemological naturalism, is a somewhat 
less studied position. In such a naturalist account, classifying 
experiences with basic mathematical structures would be 
comparable to seeing colours: an objective feature that most 
human beings have in experiencing and describing the world. 
Of course many philosophers would say that the two positions 
could not be distinguished from each other. In such Kantian 
philosophy we cannot discuss the world outside our categories of 
observation. When it comes to mathematics, that could very well 
be true, but the proposed account of mathematical ontology does 
not depend on it. Both options account for the objectivity of 
mathematics, and the choice between them would require solving 
the most basic ontological problem of the philosophy of 
mathematics – but also the problem of intersubjectivity of 
observations in general philosophy. The ontological problem is 
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indeed the most difficult one in an account like the one proposed 
here, and because of that the naturalist account looks more 
appealing. Whichever option we pursue, with semi-Kitcherian 
empiricism some of the epistemological problems – Benacerraf’s 
dilemma, in particular – are answered much more easily than in 
Platonism. In addition, we do not need to postulate a world of 
abstract mathematical ideas. However, most importantly, we can 
still retain objectivity in mathematics. 
In conclusion, a semi-Kitcherian account of the origins of 
mathematics combined with a structuralist and a naturalist 
account sounds like a very promising alternative to develop. It is 
not ontologically radical, at least no more than us having objective 
tendencies for observations is. Yet it gives us the means to talk 
about objective truth in mathematics. Perhaps, when we develop 
our ability to explain the brain, we will someday find evidence for 
such a viewpoint. If there is something in us that makes us think 
mathematically, it could be detectable in the structure of our brain. 
However, aside from making the hypothesis that we should look 
for such structures, that is a question for empirical science to 
explain. What I have wanted to suggest here is that such a theory 
sounds perfectly acceptable as a non-Platonist, non-nominalist 
alternative in the ontology and epistemology of mathematics. The 
choices are not limited to arbitrary nominalism and 
epistemologically impossible Platonism. 
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One interesting argument for Tarskian truth is based on its ability 
to deal with counterfactuals. Let us return to the basic example of a 
T-instance: 
 
“Snow is white” is true if and only if snow is white. 
 
Now according to the deflationist, this instance of the T-scheme is 
just disquotational and the mentioning of truth is redundant: 
everything in the T-instance is covered by stating “snow is white”. 
But what if we had learnt to use “snow is white” in a very different 
way, for instance, that it would have the truth condition of grass is 
red? Clearly the T-scheme now gives us the tools to say that “Snow 
is white” would be false, since “grass is red” is false. The 
disquotationalist, however, is not equipped with such tools, since 
all he can state remains to be “snow is white”. Strictly speaking, 
the disquotationalist can only claim that had it been the case that 
“Snow is white” has the same Tarskian truth conditions as “Grass 
is red”, he would be using the phrase “Snow is white” differently. 
However, this goes beyond a linguistic or quasi-logical concept of 
truth. Here Tarskian truth seems to carry more expressive power 
than its disquotationalist interpretation and it could be suggested 
as an argument for Tarskian truth.  
Naturally, Field (2001, p. 133) objects, stating that: 
 
In considering counterfactual circumstances under which we used 
“Snow is white” in certain very different ways, it is reasonable to 
translate it in such a way that its disquotational truth conditions 
relative to the translation are that grass is red. 
 
Field thinks that this is the “cash value” of the counterfactual and 
there is no problem for the disquotationalist. As far as this example 
goes, I must agree with him. To me it seems obvious that our 
expressions concerning the outer world are determined by 
observations on the conditions in the world and we use phrases 
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like “Snow is white” in a way that suits those observations. When 
it comes to the general theory of truth, counterfactuals are a matter 
of much debate, but I do not think that counterfactuals as such are 
enough to refute disquotationalism. Generally, there is a way to get 
around them, although it might require a bit more tinkering than is 
desirable. We might have to give up neat (quasi-)logical theories in 
order to accommodate counterfactuals, and along the way lose 
some of the immediate expressive power of the T-sentences. 
However, if one is an ardent believer in disquotationalism, it 
certainly sounds acceptable enough to claim that had it been the 
case that “snow is white” has the same truth conditions as “grass is 
red”, the disquotationalist would not be stating the former (as well 
as the latter) sentence. Even a moderate belief in our ability to gain 
knowledge of the world – and use language accordingly – results 
in that.  
In fact, when it comes to empirical sciences, we actually focus 
more on justification than truth. Roughly speaking, science tells us 
what the world is like, and had the world been different, science 
would have developed differently. There is nothing controversial 
about that, and aside from certain philosophical meta-level 
considerations, the deflationist can continue his pursuit largely 
unharmed. It is hard to see how a theory of counterfactuals would 
change the practice and results of empirical sciences. If our use of 
language does not conform with the empirical findings or new 
observations demand new concepts, we can rest assured that 
scientists will make the necessary adjustments. Aside from some 
proponents of Kuhnian philosophies, most of us should be ready 
to accept that in empirical science problems are primarily decided 
by observations – and with regard to observations counterfactuals 
do not seem to have the same power.184 Of course Tarskian truth 
gives us a philosophically convenient way of dealing with 
                                                           
184 This is not to belittle the effect that hypotheses and theoretical 
background have on empirical data. My contention is simply that 
empirical sciences are primarily empirical, and the theoretical element 
alone does not determine empirical findings in any such radical way as 
some philosophers following Kuhn (1962) have suggested. 
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counterfactuals, but to make a case for a substantial notion of truth, 
something more is needed.  
To that effect, here we once again find that mathematical truth 
has characteristics of its own and counterfactuals prove to be a 
much more serious problem for the deflationist. Let us think of the 
Banach-Tarski paradox (BT) in axiomatic set theory.185 The relevant 
T-scheme is: 
 
(I) “BT” is true if and only if BT. 
 
Of course in the deflationist account of mathematics, truth means 
provability and the T-scheme can be replaced by the mere 
utterance of BT. Now if we accept the axiom of choice (AC), then 
BT is provable. But if we do not accept the axiom of choice, BT is 
not provable. Clearly the provability and hence, for the 
deflationist, the truth of BT depends on the axiomatizations of set 
theory that we use. Now AC has been proven to be undecidable 
from the other axioms of Zermelo-Fraenkel (ZF) set theory, which 
leaves both options open. In other words, stating that BT is true 
includes stating that AC is true, and hence the truth conditions of 
BT are equivalent with the truth conditions of AC. This way, the 
relevant T-scheme can also be stated as: 
 
(II) “BT” is true if and only if AC. 
 
Now what does (II) mean for the deflationist? Quite clearly it must 
only say that BT is provable exactly when AC is provable. If we 
were deflationists and accepted AC, we would think that BT is 
true. If we did not accept AC, we would think that BT is false. This 
is of course all just basic mathematical knowledge, and mirrors the 
way the connection between the Banach-Tarski paradox and the 
Axiom of Choice is presented everywhere. 
Yet, however basic and fundamental mathematical knowledge 
it may seem to be, it is something that the deflationist cannot deal 
with. For him, there is no such thing as “accepting AC”. We must 
remember that for a deflationist like Field, as far the subject of this 
                                                           
185 See footnote 136. 
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work is considered, formal systems are everything there is to 
mathematics. Either we have ZF or ZFC, and consequently think 
that BT is false or true, respectively – but the choice between the 
two goes beyond formal systems. Most mathematicians currently 
accept AC and hence think that BT is true. However, the fact is that 
AC is undecidable from the ZF axioms and if we did not accept 
AC, BT would be false. Now let us think of the counterfactual case 
that AC turned out to have the truth conditions of a disprovable 
sentence of ZF. AC is undecidable in ZF, but outside of 
deflationism, that does not mean it could not be false.186 In that case 
BT would obviously be false. With Tarskian truth we can easily 
state such things and express all the mathematical knowledge we 
have about the subject. But what can the deflationist do? He can 
only assert BT or ¬BT, depending on his choice of axiomatization – 
which is, as we remember, a choice that he cannot express 
formally. Changes in axiomatizations can never reach the 
deflationist of mathematical truth. Even if we somehow got every 
reason to believe in the falseness of the axiom of choice, the 
formalist committed to ZFC could be none the wiser and would 
still continue to assert BT. 
Although that is a hypothetical example, the general case is not 
hypothetical. Changes in axiomatizations happen and the truth-
values of sentences change accordingly. Take the following 
sentence of geometry:  
 
(III) “The sum of the angles of a triangle is always 180°”. 
 
Obviously the truth-value of (III) depends on whether we accept 
the parallel axiom or not. As it happens, our best current theory of 
macro-level physics states that (III) is false, even though it was 
thought to be a necessary universal truth for thousands of years. 
Do we not wish that a theory of truth could deal with such 
interesting – in fact, crucial – parts of mathematical knowledge? 
Yet in the formalist account of mathematical truth we cannot 
                                                           
186 Of course the situation is not any easier under the deflationist 
interpretation, AC being undecidable in ZF (if ZF is consistent), and thus 
contradicting the law of excluded middle. 
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discuss truth outside provability. For the formalist mathematician 
who does not accept the parallel axiom, (III) was true – after all, it 
was a theorem of the only accepted geometrical system of the time 
– and then became false. The worrying part is that when a revision 
in the axioms or rules of proof means that previously true 
sentences can become false, the truth of mathematical sentences 
turns out to be a function of time.187 
For the non-formalist all this is very easy to explain. As we gain 
more mathematical knowledge, we correct our mistakes and admit 
that what we thought to be true in fact turned out to be false. The 
truth-value of the sentence itself never changed. The problem does 
not need to concern changes in axiomatizations, either. When we 
think of mathematical problems like Fermat’s Last Theorem (FLT), 
this is exactly what happened, the only difference being that in the 
strict formalist account the sentence was not considered to have a 
determinate truth-value at all before Wiles’ proof. In the 
deflationist account FLT’s truth-value changed as a function of 
time.188 In the Tarskian account FLT was true all along, but we just 
could not prove it. When it comes to mathematics, with its 
apparent image of a non-temporal subject matter, there should be 
no question which theory of truth satisfies our intuition better.189 
The deflationist clearly lacks some of the tools that Tarskian truth 
has; in fact, it could be argued that deflationism never seemed 
more problematic. Could we ever accept an account of 
mathematical truth according to which the truth-value of a simple 
sentence of arithmetic changes as a function of time? 
This mirrors the discussion on semantic realism in the 
literature, and I believe that the current approach can be very 
                                                           
187 Although strictly speaking, the formalist does not even have the tools to 
make changes in axiomatizations, since the choice of axioms obviously 
goes beyond formal mathematics. 
188 Or it acquired a determinate truth-value as a function of time, 
depending on the underlying logic for the deflationist.  
189 “Non-temporal” does not need to be understood in the strict abstract 
manner here. It is strange enough that a basic statement of arithmetic 
could change its truth-value mid-decade while the underlying 
axiomatizations remain intact. 
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fruitful in evaluating that debate. The opponents of semantic 
realism, such as Dummett (1977), hold that since we have no 
guaranteed method of determining the truth-value of sentences 
like Goldbach’s Conjecture, we cannot think that they have 
determinate truth-values. Dummett’s intuitionist approach against 
semantic realism is to challenge the notion that we can have 
knowledge of the truth of a sentence outside our ability to 
recognize that truth by providing a proof for it. To put it somewhat 
simplistically: since we do not know whether Goldbach’s 
Conjecture is true or false, we have no justification to call it either 
determinately true or determinately false. This has of course wide-
reaching consequences, the most important of which are probably 
the rejection of the bivalence of truth and the overall destructive 
nature that the approach has on mathematical realism. Both of 
these consequences go so deep into the basic premises of both 
mathematics and philosophy that they have the potential of 
making the arguments of this work seem like footnotes. However, 
whether one accepts the bivalence of truth or not, it is hard to 
justify the concept that simple arithmetical truths change as a 
function of time. Yet, once we reject semantic realism, this seems to 
be the immediate consequence of sentences like FLT. In this sense, 
combined with extreme formalism, Dummett’s approach has an 
ominous flavour of question-begging: one has to buy the idea of 
FLT changing its truth-value as a function of time in order to 
accept the idea that sentences of mathematics do not have 
determinate truth-values. For the approach of this work, the 
apparent absurdity of mathematical sentences changing their 
truth-values over time should be problematic enough – there is no 
need to go deeper into intuitionist logic and other such issues.190 
                                                           
190 Or how does “FLT became true in 1994, before which it was not true” 
sound in a textbook of arithmetic? This might seem facetious, but if one 
thinks that it is absurd, he will also have a lot of trouble accepting the 
extreme formalist rejection of semantic realism. Of course the arguments 
against semantic realism are not refuted by this – but I do propose that the 
argument here must be answered by the semantic anti-realist. Full-blown 
departure into an intuitionist logic, for example, is not a solution that 
many modern philosophers and mathematicians are ready to take. 
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How are these considerations of mathematical truth different 
from the general theory of truth and the counterfactual case of 
“snow is white” developing a different meaning and truth 
conditions? The most important difference between mathematical 
truth and that of empirical sciences lies in the status of justification, 
as well as that of the status of truth. Whereas physical sciences 
focus on providing justification for statements about the world, the 
justification of formal theories in mathematics is that of axioms and 
rules of proof. Once they are fixed, the justification of theorems is 
ipso facto inevitable. Whereas a deflationist physicist can find 
evidence contradicting the theory, this is simply not possible for a 
strict formalist mathematician.191 As such the physicist’s theories 
are fallible and counterfactuals can be resolved. In fact, the case is 
similar to errors in the theory. If the world were different, we 
would get different evidence and have different theories – just like 
erroneous theories are contradicted by new evidence. Deflationism 
in empirical sciences does not commit us to infallible theories, and 
as such it conforms to the practice of science.  
Contrary to this, mathematical theories are not fallible for the 
strict formalist. Axioms and rules of proof fix the formal system 
exhaustively and, if the system is consistent, theorems can never 
contradict them. If there were an error in the axioms or rules of 
proof, we could never find it out. That is why counterfactuals are 
such a huge problem for deflationist truth in mathematics. Outside 
inconsistency, the deflationist is immune to errors in rules of proof 
and axioms. If the axioms refer to something, then for the 
deflationist mathematician this reference is decided once and for 
all by the choice of axioms. In short, the strict formalist is stuck 
with whatever mathematical theory he once accepts, and if it 
turned out to be false he could never find this out. 
This difference becomes obvious when we consider the status 
of truth in the theories of empirical sciences and mathematics. 
Although the aim of empirical sciences may be truth, it is generally 
accepted that the best we can ever hope for is verisimilitude or 
probable knowledge. Even with the most basic laws of physics, 
                                                           
191 I am not including such obvious counter-examples as inconsistency 
here. 
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physicists still acknowledge the possibility that they turn out to be 
false. History has been a good teacher in this matter. This can also 
be seen in the justification of the sentences of empirical sciences. 
The more evidence we have in support of a theory, the more likely 
we are to hold it as true – yet in empirical sciences there is always 
the chance that a conflicting piece of evidence is found. In this way, 
counterfactuals do not present insurmountable problems for the 
deflationist. Mathematics is different. Once we fix the axioms and 
rules of proof, the possibility of conflicting evidence having an 
effect on the theory ceases to exist. For the non-formalist this is not 
a problem: he can discuss the axioms and rules of proof in an 
informal metalanguage. The strict formalist, however, is immune 
to conflicting evidence and hence unable to avoid the problem of 
counterfactuals. 
Can we accept such a state of affairs and be limited to whatever 
formal theory we have at hand? As far as the practice of 
mathematics is considered, this seems totally unthinkable. While 
the deflationist conception of truth always commits us to the 
provable sentences, Tarskian truth gives us the power to deal with 
the counterfactuals, the ability to discuss false sentences, as well as 
the concepts of truth and falsity of sentences. As we have seen, and 
will see, this is no small matter: in fact, it will be crucial whether 




7.2 Truth before reference or vice versa? 
 
Counterfactuals will play a part later on, but let us now move back 
to even more basic aspects of truth in mathematics. My argument 
so far has been that extreme formalism leads to arbitrariness. 
Moreover, I have contended that when it comes to the ontology 
and epistemology of mathematics, any alternative to arbitrariness 
will do, and hence the question of final reference (that of pre-
formal sentences) of T-instances can be left unanswered without 
damaging the case for Tarskian truth. Strict nominalism and the 
following deflationism fail; that is enough to warrant the use of 
Tarskian truth with its central concept of reference. I hope that by 
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now there does not remain much that is problematic with this 
conclusion. However, there remains one potential qualm the 
deflationist will have with this approach: the negative nature of the 
reasoning. That we are allowed to use reference and meaning in 
mathematics is not only a question of truth but a question of 
ontology, as well. With Tarskian truth we commit to the references 
of mathematical sentences. For formal mathematics this is no 
problem, the references of formal sentences being their pre-formal 
counterparts. But for the pre-formal sentences the commitment to 
references is clearly making an ontological commitment to 
mathematical objects, or at least the objectivity of truth-values of 
mathematical sentences. Obviously this is unacceptable for the 
nominalist, most likely up to the level in which arbitrariness is 
unacceptable for the non-nominalists. One could be accused of 
putting the cart before the horse: we are talking about reference 
and semantical truth before we know if there is anything for 
semantical truth to refer to. 
The conclusion would seem to be the one that Chihara makes: 
we need to present a positive development as well as the negative 
one. This sounds highly worrying remembering how heterogenic 
and vast a field non-formalist philosophy of mathematics is. There 
is the danger that in order to use Tarskian truth we are required to 
present an ontological and epistemological theory of reference. Of 
course that amounts to nothing less than providing a full 
philosophical picture of mathematics, an endeavour problematic 
enough to make all the considerations so far seem insignificant. 
But is the situation really that dire? Is there not any way we can 
talk about truth first and reference second? This is the question I 
want to answer in this chapter. 
Before we continue it must be pointed out that there are two 
different ways of discussing the order of truth and reference. While 
it is true that Tarskian truth presupposes reference, this must not 
be confused with presupposing something about the nature of this 
reference. All along I have argued that we can use Tarskian truth 
without having exact theories about the nature of mathematical 
objects. For Tarskian truth it is enough that there exists some 
reference for mathematical sentences. In this way, while Tarskian 
truth puts the existence of reference first and truth second, we can 
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characterize truth before we characterize reference. I will argue that 
there is nothing problematic in that. Nevertheless, it should be 
acknowledged that there is another way of discussing the order of 
truth and reference. In the neo-Fregean philosophy of mathematics 
we start directly from truth, and infer even the existence of 
reference from it. This is a considerably stronger argument than 
the one I make and if successful, it would make many of the 
considerations here unnecessary. 
Frege’s (1884) argument for the existence of mathematical 
objects was fundamentally very simple and it took the form of 
truth first and reference second. The stock example of this kind of 
“from truth to reference” inference is the use of existential 
quantifiers in mathematics. If a sentence of the form “there exists 
A…” is true, then the mathematical concept denoted by “A” exists. 
This is obviously a semantical connection where “A” stands in a 
referential position, and in Frege’s account it would be proof 
enough for Platonism to show that (at least some) such 
mathematical statements are indeed true. Given the lack of 
commitment to outer criteria and reference, the most promising 
route for this was obviously showing that mathematical theories 
are consistent and complete. We know what happened to those 
hopes.  
However, from Dummett (1956) to Wright (1983) and Bob Hale 
(Hale & Wright 2001), neo-Fregeanism (also called neo-logicism192) 
has had considerable popularity. The most interesting facet of it in 
the context here is the appeal to Platonist reference in mathematics. 
Matti Eklund (2006) has classified the different aspects of neo-
Fregeanism and the one we are concerned with in this work is 
called priority. Priority is the idea that “truth is constitutively prior 
to reference” which of course mirrors the subject of this chapter. 
Given truth, what will we end up with regard to reference? It 
sounds ominous for the purpose of this work that the neo-Fregeans 
end up with Platonism, as we have been trying all along to 
                                                           
192 Here we are not concerned so much with the logicist possibilities of the 
neo-Fregean program. That is a largely parallel subject, but the focus here 
is on the Platonist argument of neo-Fregeans. See Rayo 2005 for a good 
overview of the logicist argument. 
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minimize the ontological commitments – while being careful not to 
fall into arbitrariness. Platonism with its strict ontological demands 
is exactly the thing I want to avoid, while still retaining the 
privilege to speak about truth without a theory of reference to back 
it up.  
In addition to targeting formalist mathematics, the neo-Fregean 
line of thinking sounds potentially damaging to the arguments in 
this work. If successful, it would give us a way to introduce truth 
without an antecedent theory of reference. By itself this would be 
very welcome because once it is done, we could use a Tarskian 
theory of truth without worrying about the counterarguments 
concerning reference. But problematically, it would give this based 
only on logical principles, thus retaining the formalist flavour of 
mathematical sentences having completely internal criteria for 
truth. In addition, the Platonist conclusion is a highly undesired 
one. If taking truth before a theory of reference implies either of 
these positions, my argument is in trouble. We will now examine 





The main idea of Frege’s (1884) (as well as Whitehead’s and 
Russell’s) logicism was deriving the laws of arithmetic from the 
axioms of logic. However, the central concept of equinumerosity is 
not derivable from classical first-order logic – and without 
equinumerosity we cannot have a definition of a natural number. 
Frege’s famous strategy was to introduce what George Boolos 
(1998, p. 171) calls Hume’s Principle (HP): 
 
(HP): The number of Fs is equal to the number of Gs if and only 
if there exists a bijection (one-to-one correspondence) 
between Fs and Gs. 
 
Following the so-called Frege’s Theorem, from HP (a second-order 
sentence) and a set of definitions we can derive all the axioms of 
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second-order arithmetic193. This was the basis for Frege’s logicist 
program. As we know, it was popular for quite a while until 
Gödel’s proof of incompleteness came along. Second-order 
arithmetic is like PA in that the axioms are thought to give an 
implicit definition for the concept of “number”. It is quite 
reasonable to require that such an implicit definition needs to be 
consistent as well as complete in order to be acceptable. 
Incompleteness and unprovability of consistency being the 
behemoths they are, Frege’s program was left in the shadows for 
almost a century before philosophers returned to it. While the lack 
of consistency proofs was a problem for many, the neo-Fregeans 
contended that we could have analytic truth nevertheless. HP as 
the explanation of a natural number was the perfect example of 
this. In Frege’s (1884) Grundlagen §64 he writes about “carving up” 
the content of a concept in a different way and thus yielding a new 
concept. His example is that of the directions of lines: 
 
(D): The direction of line a = the direction of line b if and only 
if lines a and b are parallel. 
 
In a similar way, HP is considered to carve up the concept of 
number. Just like D is an analytic truth explaining the concept of 
direction, HP is the analytic truth explaining the concept of 
number.194 
When we look at the question philosophically from the 
standpoint of truth and reference, we see that priority is the central 
theme. HP being the explanation of the concept of number, what is 
the order of truth and reference in it? If we take reference first and 
say that there exist such things as numbers, HP is quite obviously 
true as an explanation of numbers. This is something everybody 
can agree on. The neo-Fregean point, however, is that the inference 
                                                           
193 One should remember that PA is a first-order theory of arithmetic, so 
the context is slightly changed with HP. However the philosophical 
conclusions made here will not depend on the stronger theory of 
arithmetic. 
194 See Hale & Wright 2001, pp. 91-116 for details. 
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can be reversed. In Wright’s (Hale & Wright 2001, p. 153) most 
simple characterization: 
 
Objects are what singular terms, in their most basic use, are apt to 
stand for. And they succeed in doing so when, so used, they feature in 
true statements. 
 
In a nutshell, the argument is that since HP is necessarily true and 
natural numbers are in a referential position in it, the natural 
numbers exist.  
The first question one is bound to ask concerns the concept 
“necessarily true”. This looks suspiciously too easy for the neo-
Fregean since it seems like we are in fact talking about a definition – 
and not just an explanation – of the concept of number. HP is 
necessarily true as an analytic sentence, but there is a strong air of 
it being trivially so. If there did not exist such objects as numbers, 
HP would ultimately be a characterization of a fictional class. Or so 
would one obvious anti-neo-Fregean argument go. 
The neo-Fregean, however, is not that easily repudiated. The 
crucial step for him is that we cannot discuss the concept of 
number outside the context of HP. This is based on Frege’s context 
principle, according to which words get their meanings only in the 
context of sentence. According to the neo-Fregean, it does not 
make sense to ask anything about numbers in a context outside 
HP. Numbers exist in the way that HP says and any questions 
about their existence beyond or before HP are presented in a 
mistaken context.195 The set of all sentences that use HP gives us 
the implicit definition of number, and we cannot discuss this 
definition in a context outside HP. In that account numbers get 
their meaning completely from their use in mathematics, and it 
does not make sense to talk about numbers in any other way. 
Hence the analytic truth of HP, and the fact that numbers are 
referred to in it, gives us the existence of numbers and truth has 
priority over reference.  
                                                           
195 See Hale & Wright 2001, pp. 335-397. Eklund (2006) gives a good 
general - and critical – assessment of the neo-Fregean program. 
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This should not be understood as priority in the sense of 
existence, but rather in the sense of conceptuality: we cannot discuss 
the concept of arithmetical reference before the concept of truth 
because the latter defines the former. HP together with logic is 
enough to give us second-order arithmetic; it is analytically true, 
and gives us the context of natural numbers. This is all something 
we could be ready to accept, neo-Fregean or not. But the step to the 
objective existence of numbers is overwhelmingly more 
controversial. The most important question is how we can know 
that we are explaining an existing concept and not defining a new 
one? By explaining equinumerosity we carve up the same content 
as the explanation of number. Could we not just as well define 
natural numbers with equinumerosity and end up with HP? The 
neo-Fregean idea drawing from the context principle is that this is 
the case because we have no other way of speaking about HP. Yet 
also this seems like a criterion befitting both a complete 
explanation and a definition. It does not take much trust in 
Occam’s razor to conclude that we are more likely to be discussing 
the latter. Something else is needed for the neo-Fregean account: 
something to distinguish between objective existence and fiction. 
So what is the value of HP to the Platonist case? Hale & Wright 
(2005 p. 172) argue that the neo-Fregean position is important 
because it can avoid Benacerraf’s dilemma. Since we do not 
postulate any causal connection from abstract numbers to HP, they 
argue, there does not exist any epistemological problem: 
 
the truth of [numerical] identities (and hence the existence of numbers) 
may accordingly be inferred. We thus have the makings of an 
epistemologically unproblematic route to the existence of numbers and 
a fundamental species of facts about them. (ibid.) 
 
For one unacquainted with neo-Fregeanism, quotes like this one 
could be almost shocking to read from 21st-century philosophers. 
How can providing a definition for the concept of number be an 
“epistemologically unproblematic route” to their existence? We 
will soon see that there are many more or less technical arguments 
against neo-Fregeanism, but one cannot escape the initial 
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amazement of how easily a definition – what is in essence a 
linguistic fact – is used to derive a radical ontological thesis.  
However, in one sense the thesis is perfectly understandable: in 
the neo-Fregean account we do get all our knowledge of the 
numbers in an epistemologically unproblematic way, that is, by 
defining them. Most importantly, this immediately does avoid 
Benacerraf’s dilemma. Unfortunately it also begs the original 
question of the existence of numbers. How can we get the meta-
level knowledge that numbers defined this way correspond to 
anything existing; that we are not just creating fiction? Granted, if 
numbers exist, HP would seem to be a true statement about them. 
But that is only half of the picture. What if we define numbers as a 
fiction that corresponds to HP? Would we have any way of 
distinguishing these two positions? It seems highly implausible 
that HP alone could have relevance to this question. As we will see, 
the neo-Fregean argument for Platonism is as epistemologically 
problematic as anything in the philosophy of mathematics. In 
essence, we have just moved the problem to a deeper level, one 
where we have to ask whether HP explains or creates the concept 
of number. HP may be an analytic truth, but as Boolos (1998, p. 
304) asks, how do we know that HP is not analytic in the same 
sense that the sentence “the present king of France is a royal” is 
analytic? 
There is always something alarming about linguistic facts being 
used to derive ontological conclusions, and ultimately that is what 
the neo-Fregean does. We will soon turn to some of the more 
technical arguments against neo-Fregeanism, but we should first 
glance at the general problem of using linguistic facts in ontology. 
HP is an explanation of the concept of number and as such it is not 
fundamentally different from other analytic truths like “all 
bachelors are unmarried”. While the existence of bachelors is 
uncontroversial, Field (1984) points out that the neo-Fregean 
approach has a notorious parallel in the history of philosophy: the 
ontological argument of Saint Anselm for the existence of God. 
This is a simple counterargument from Field, but initially it looks 
highly compelling. The jump from a linguistic matter into ontology 
is based on our language being infallible and having clear 
references. Certainly HP (or its equivalent) seems to be the only 
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way to explain the concept of equinumerosity, but similarly 
“nothing greater can be conceived” may seem like a valid 
explanation for the concept of God. The ontological argument is of 
course the culmination of rationalism in metaphysics. The neo-
Fregean use of HP to argue for Platonism has the very same 
flavour. But in any even slightly empiricist-influenced philosophy 
mere words are cheap; surely we have the ability to create and 
explain fictitious entities. Consider the sentence “Polonius is father 
to Ophelia if and only if Ophelia is daughter to Polonius”. Clearly 
this is an analytic truth and in the cast of characters for Hamlet this 
is all we learn about Ophelia. But it would seem very strange to 
make the ontological claim that there exists an Ophelia who is 
daughter to Polonius. For that we need something more: namely, 
the knowledge that Polonius exists. Of course analytic truths by 
themselves do not make objects exist, and the neo-Fregean case 
must be somehow fundamentally different from the proposed 
counter-examples here. 
For that purpose, we can first take the approach (see Hale & 
Wright 2001, p. 163) of analysing sentences into a more detailed 
form such as “there exists a Polonius who is father to Ophelia…”. 
Similarly, as Eklund (2006) points out, the neo-Fregean can claim 
that some definition of “God” could indeed refer to an existing 
entity and the ontological argument would be valid. Presumably, 
this could mean anything from a shared intersubjective idea of 
God to a metaphorical interpretation. These are good points, 
because HP is indeed different from the arguments concerning 
God and Ophelia. One can explain the concepts of God and 
Ophelia in other, non-equivalent ways, while all ways of 
explaining the concept of natural number seem to be equivalent to 
HP. In that way, as Wright (Hale & Wright 2001, p. 158) points out, 
unlike HP, the ontological argument is not a complete explanation 
of God, and therein lies the difference.  
However, there is another way in which the above argument is 
irrelevant, and that is the context of counterfactuals. What if HP 
had developed a different meaning, referring not to the existing 
numbers, but something else? Would HP be replaced by a different 
explanation for the concept of number? Simply put, if HP was not 
the complete explanation of numbers it is thought to be, could we 
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somehow find this out? If priority holds, that could not be the case, 
since HP is true before reference. Hence, in addition of HP being a 
necessary truth; its reference, the concept of number, would also 
have to necessarily exist.  
Conversely, what if HP did indeed explain the Platonist concept 
of number but we would not know it? HP may be an analytic truth 
but clearly not all equivalences where one side of the equivalence 
in HP is applied are analytic truths. As obvious as HP sounds, it is 
still picked from a whole class of possible definitions for the 
concept of number. Consider the following “Injection Principle”: 
 
(IP): The number of Fs is equal to the number of Gs if and only 
if there is an injection from Fs to Gs. 
 
While IP has the desired consequence of n(F) = 3 being equal to 
n(G) = 3, it also has the undesired consequence of n(F) = 3 being 
equal to n(G) = 4. Considering that HP is a fact, what if we 
counterfactually claim that IP is true? Clearly a natural number as 
defined by IP is a useless concept, but can we not claim it to be true 
– or even analytically true – if we have absolutely no antecedent 
criteria for the concept of number? Now – remembering that at this 
point we can only speak about truth, and not reference – what 
reason do we have for choosing HP over IP? Of course there are 
some obvious criteria for choosing HP, like the lack of symmetry in 
IP, but how do we come to apply such criteria in the explanation 
(definition) of numbers? The purpose of HP was to define natural 
numbers for us, but we must not hold the illusion that without any 
reference there is something we hope to capture with such a 
definition. The neo-Fregean argument is that truth comes before 
reference and that from the analytic truth of HP – plus the fact that 
numbers are in a referential position in it – alone we can infer the 
existence of natural numbers. How can we say that from IP we do 
not infer the existence of some existing set of numbers? 
All this seems to lead to the question of arbitrariness once more. 
As we remember, Wright’s (1992, p. 48) contention is that we are 
dealing with such deep-entrenched – superassertible – standards in 
mathematical practice that they need no outer justification. But in 
Chapter 4.1 we already found this viewpoint unsatisfactory. Why 
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are certain truths superassertible? We simply cannot accept the 
appeal to conventionalism here. Certainly HP and its equivalents 
seem like the only acceptable explanation for the concept of 
number, but that already presupposes that we desire something 
from a concept of number.196 In contrast to IP, we do not want 3 = 4 
to hold. But as I have argued all along, in this philosophical context 
it is not acceptable to think of the truth (or assertability) of such 
concepts in modern-day terms. We need to imagine the unknown 
first steps of mathematical thinking, and ask whether it was an 
analytic truth that originally gave us the concept of number, or 
whether it had something to do with reference – say, with 
explaining observations of the physical world. In other words: did 
truth come before reference after all? My conclusion here should 
be clear by now: we can speak about truth because there is reference 
for mathematical sentences – the pre-formal idea of a number that 
has given us the criteria which make us define numbers as HP 
instead of IP. It is the existence of reference that gives us the ability 
to use Tarskian truth in mathematics. Priority in the neo-Fregean 
sense fails for the same reason as formalism: if we do not tie our 
concepts to anything objective, there is nothing to prevent us from 
changing their content. 
Of course, given the problem of counterfactuals, this should be 
expected. Earlier in this chapter I argued against extreme 
formalism on the basis of counterfactuals, but with neo-Fregeans 
the matter is no different. Every time we take truth (or 
assertability) prior to reference, it is our set of true sentences that 
tells us what, if anything, exists. But from the problem of 
counterfactuals we see that we would still cling to these same true 
sentences even if there had been a change in their meaning, and 
hence also in their references. Either we must accept a kind of 
idealist account that our truths create their reference, or we must 
accept that reference can change our truths and priority in the neo-
                                                           
196 Indeed, picking up HP already makes a commitment to the underlying 
logic we want to use. Using the axioms of PA also gives us an equivalent 
definition of number. How are we to choose between such options? 
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Fregean sense is mistaken.197 Not surprisingly, it is only in the 
philosophy of mathematics that scientifically minded philosophers 
are still ready to make the former claim. However, we should 
know enough by now not to make the leap from deeply 
entrenched conventions into necessary truths. 
 
 
7.4 Bad company and neo-Fregean epistemology 
 
I have presented above some general informal considerations 
concerning neo-Fregeanism. It has been my purpose to stress the 
problematic inference from analytic truths to ontological 
statements. In one way, I think that nothing further is needed, as I 
will argue later on. Still, there is one big difference between HP 
and any of the examples above: unlike HP, the other analytic truths 
(if they are that) are not anything we would wish from a theory of 
mathematics. The most mathematical one, IP, is not even an 
equivalence relation and as such totally hopeless as a definition of 
numbers. It was an extreme example of a flawed definition, and 
some would (quite rightly) say it was too extreme. Strictly 
speaking, however, without any prior appeal to reference the neo-
Fregean does not even have the ability to distinguish between HP 
and IP. But let us grant that such considerations are possible, and 
we can speak about mathematical concepts in a non-arbitrary way. 
For that purpose we now move to a couple of more sophisticated 
counter-examples. 
Considering the more technical issues about HP, it has been a 
common argument against neo-Fregeanism to claim that if HP is 
indeed an analytic truth, then so are all other second-order 
abstraction principles of the type: 
 
f(F) = f(G) if and only if R(F,G), 
 
                                                           
197 The third option being the skeptic’s point of view that we are stuck 
with beliefs of which we can never know whether they refer to anything 
or not. 
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where f is a function from concepts to objects and R some relation 
of concepts. However, this by itself is false since there are 
abstraction principles that are not analytic truths. For example, one 
of Frege’s laws (Basic Law V): 
 
The value-range of F = the value-range of G if and only if, for all 
x it holds that F(x) if and only if G(x). 
 
is not satisfiable, because it causes Russell’s paradox.198 As such it 
cannot be considered an analytic truth. Clearly not all abstraction 
principles are analytic truths and the neo-Fregean must find a way 
to distinguish between HP and the undesired abstraction 
principles like Basic Law V. This is called the bad company objection 
to neo-Fregeanism in the literature.199 
Abstraction principles as such are not enough to refute neo-
Fregeanism, but they give us a good idea of how to find 
counterexamples. Surely HP cannot be the only such analytic truth, 
and there must be abstraction principles that have the same status 
as HP. While Frege’s Basic Law V is known to be inconsistent, 
there are also abstraction principles that are not. George Boolos’ 
(1998, pp. 214–215) example of parity principle is the most 
commonly used one in the literature: 
 
The parity of F = the parity of G if and only if F and G differ 
evenly (where two concepts differ evenly if an even number of 
things fall under one but not the other). 
 
Boolos showed that the parity principle is satisfiable only in finite 
domains while HP is satisfiable only in infinite domains. Hence the 
two supposedly analytic truths are incompatible. How are we to 
know which one is actually true? The neo-Fregean answer to this 
can be introducing new criteria for acceptable abstraction 
principles – conservativeness was one suggestion – but against all 
such criteria there have been presented counterexamples.200 
                                                           
198 See Boolos 1998, p. 173. 
199 Eklund (2007) presents a good overview of the bad company problem. 
200 See Eklund 2006, pp. 110-115. 
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Ultimately, we can think of analytic truths that by definition do 
not change anything mathematically, but are incompatible with 
HP. Eklund’s (2006, p. 112) preferred counterexample is that of 
anti-numbers. Anti-numbers are abstract objects that do not change 
anything in mathematics but have the feature of ruling out the 
existence of numbers. Now if the neo-Fregean conclusion is moved 
into anti-numbers, we can infer that the anti-numbers exist, in 
addition to numbers existing due to HP. Both numbers and anti-
numbers exist, but obviously they cannot exist at the same time. 
This is what Eklund calls the problem of incompatible objects. One 
might try some kind of indeterminacy move: that sometimes 
numbers exist and other times anti-numbers do. But the problem 
of counterfactuals gave us the conclusion that HP being a necessary 
truth, numbers would have to necessarily exist, which obviously 
goes against such indeterminacy.  
 
One more problem is noted by Boolos (1998, pp. 313-314), and 
although it looks innocuous enough, in the end it could be the 
most serious one of them all. In the way the neo-Fregean program 
is carried out, zero is the number of things that are non-self-
identical. By the same account there is also the number anti-zero 
n[x: x = x], the number of things that are self-identical, in other 
words the number of all the things that there are. But in the usual 
set theoretic (ZF) conception of defining natural numbers as sets, 
there is the restriction that there is no set of all sets, as it causes 
Russell’s paradox. So it seems that in addition to all the other 
problems, the neo-Fregean project seems to contradict with ZF set 
theory.  
Perhaps there is a solution to the problem of anti-numbers, as 
well as the parity principle, although they both seem very 
problematic. Boolos’ last objection definitely looks like something 
the neo-Fregean must answer and ditching ZF sounds like a 
Pyrrhic victory. But in any case, even if all that is solved, tinkering 
with the form of analytic sentences does not sound like a 
promising strategy in the long run. Even if the neo-Fregean could 
ultimately refute all the counterexamples in addition to the bad 
company of abstraction principles and incompatible objects, it 
would still not suffice to convince the anti-neo-Fregean when it 
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comes to the ontological side of the argument. The technical part of 
the debate is one matter, but the acceptance of the Platonist thesis 
goes way beyond that.201 It could be an endless pursuit to create 
new counterexamples for the neo-Fregean’s challenge, but there 
are also more general philosophical problems that we have to deal 
with. If one is not convinced that the truth of analytic sentences can 
imply the existence of their references, the particular formulations 
and differences between analytic sentences matter very little. 
Obviously mathematical sentences are the best candidate for the 
neo-Fregean strategy because they are maximally unambiguous 
and well-formulated. Nowhere else do we have the kind of 
complete explanations that HP gives us, and that can make neo-
Fregeanism seem more appealing than it actually is. 
However, if one is committed to any kind of empiricist and 
scientific epistemology, there is no argument that will be enough to 
convince that a linguistic fact can imply ontological facts in the 
neo-Fregean way. If, on the other hand, one is prepared to give 
room for such a rationalist ontology, then HP is merely an efficient 
way of stating this belief. In this way, I think that the structure – 
even if not the content – of Field’s argument about the ontological 
proof of God’s existence already carries much of the power against 
the neo-Fregean. The assumption of epistemological rationalism is 
much stronger than the conclusion of ontological Platonism. If we 
have a way of knowing objective mathematical facts via pure 
reason, surely it is not any more problematic to think that there 
exists a domain for such facts? It must be remembered that this is 
not only a question of the nature of mathematical objects (if any). 
Indeed, as Rayo (2005, Chapter 4) points out, to make the neo-
Fregean Platonist claim from HP implies that there are infinitely 
many natural numbers, which in turn requires an infinite universe. 
                                                           
201 It could be said that the technical side which concentrates on the 
abstraction principles is more about the logicist side of neo-Fregeanism, 
while the Platonist side is more or less independent of it. Wright (1983) 
seems to follow this distinction, as Eklund (2007) notes. Indeed, given the 
problem of absolutely no reference, the logicist side sounds like a much 
more promising venture – aside from the problem that it is not at all clear 
that HP is a sentence of logic (see Boolos 1998, p. 216). 
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We might or might not accept the infinity of the universe, but few 
of us are ready to do it based on a definition in mathematics. 
Clearly for such requirements as infinity we need antecedent 
justification – and at that point the neo-Fregean thesis is obviously 
redundant.202 
As was noted earlier, the above problem has a lot to do with the 
neo-Fregean choice of terminology. In fact, I am convinced that 
most problems of neo-Fregeanism are more or less linked to the 
choice of the central term used to characterize HP. Wright (1983, p. 
153) writes: 
 
...the fundamental truths of number theory would be revealed as 
consequences of an explanation [HP]: […] a statement whose role is to 
fix the character of a certain concept. 
 
It is quite clear that the second half of the quote is characterizing a 
definition. Then why does Wright talk about HP being an 
explanation? Also Boolos (1998, pp. 310-311) suggests that what HP 
really is for Wright is an analytic definition. Of course the flavour 
we get from the word “explanation” is that of explaining 
something existing, and that seems to be what Wright is after. If 
we call HP a definition, it suddenly gets the more constructivist air 
of fixing a concept, whether it refers or not. But a definition it is, 
there is little doubt about that. Ultimately, I do not think that HP 
can be understood as anything other than an implicit definition for 
the concept of natural number. Whether this definition refers to 
anything existing or not is another question, one that requires 
antecedent (to HP) justification for the reference. Considering the 
possibility that no mathematical objects exist, logically speaking, 
we would still be able to define numbers with HP. That could not 
be the case if the neo-Fregean argument were sound. 
That is the case when we think of HP as a constructive principle 
defining numbers. But Hale & Wright (2001, pp. 147-148) have 
                                                           
202 The ontologically unproblematic way of dealing with the infinity of 
natural numbers is to consider them to be a potentially infinite sequence. 
With the Platonist twist, however, we move from potential to completed 
infinity – an altogether more problematic position ontologically. 
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another question to ask. They respond to the demand of 
antecedent knowledge of reference by asking how else could we 
know that the natural numbers exist and have the characteristics 
they have; that, for example, they constitute an infinite series? 
Simply put, according to Hale & Wright, knowledge about natural 
numbers antecedent to HP is not possible. In their account, all 
knowledge of numbers follows from HP and this gives the neo-
Fregean argument the power to avoid Benacerraf’s dilemma. I 
think that this is a very good question, although one that is 
primarily targeted against the non-neo-Fregean Platonist. Of course 
here one has to remember that the axioms of PA will define the 
same numbers as HP does. We can convince ourselves about the 
characteristics of numbers in other ways than HP. But PA is no 
different from HP in any positive sense, either: it gives us an 
implicit definition for the concept of number. For the antecedent 
knowledge of the existence of numbers we would need something 
different. 
However, it seems to me that Hale & Wright do not sufficiently 
recognize that our antecedent knowledge about numbers does not 
need to have all the characteristics that PA or HP give them. In an 
empirical account of the origins of mathematical knowledge, for 
example, we do not get knowledge of all the properties that the 
natural numbers have – but we do get knowledge of some of them. 
We can use PA (or HP) to explain our antecedent (perhaps 
empirical) pre-formal knowledge of natural numbers and go on to 
study what other qualities they have according to the axioms of PA. 
Of course not only can we do this, but most likely this is the way 
arithmetic has been actually developed: PA and HP are both quite 
modern ideas that follow sophisticated antecedent knowledge of 
natural numbers. Indeed, perhaps the best way to answer the 
question of Hale & Wright is a factual one: to see how we can get 
knowledge of the natural numbers outside of HP, we must look at 
how it is actually acquired before devices like HP come along. If 
HP is the only way of getting knowledge of the natural numbers, 
then before Frege (or Hume) we could not have had any 
knowledge of them. Likewise, those currently unfamiliar with HP 
could not be said to have knowledge of natural numbers. But that 
is just absurd. Even if we may lack a definition, we certainly can 
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have ways to use natural numbers to great effect, in practice and in 
theory. After all, most of arithmetic dates from times before Frege. 
In my account, we can count all this as antecedent knowledge.203 
Finally, there is the question of HP being an analytic truth in the 
first place. In addition to such nominalist/Platonist problems as 
the phrase “…there exists a function…” in HP, the original 
problem with Frege’s logicist program remains: we cannot know 
the theory of arithmetic to be consistent. I do not see this as much of 
a problem, as argued earlier, but my grounds for accepting 
arithmetic are different. Half the idea behind the neo-Fregean 
program is that arithmetic is derived purely from the truths of 
logic, plus the (according to Boolos) non-logical axiom of HP. In 
this respect the lack of consistency proof is definitely a drawback. 
Platonism or not, for HP to be an analytic truth, we should expect 
it to define a consistent system of arithmetic. It sure looks like an 
analytic truth, but is that enough in the strict logicist game that the 
neo-Fregean commits to? After all, we are talking about radical 
ontological statements made based on HP being true and without 
consistency that truth is not established.204 
 
 
7.5 Two kinds of priority 
 
I have claimed above that priority in the neo-Fregean sense fails. In 
addition to all the technical considerations, it is simply too difficult 
to accept the leap from linguistic facts to ontological conclusions. 
But this sounds potentially problematic for the arguments in this 
work, as well. After all, it is priority of truth that I have argued for 
all along: that we can use Tarskian truth and its appeal to reference 
                                                           
203 Of course it must be noted that the idea of equinumerosity predates 
Hume and Frege, and is intimately present in our pre-formal conception of 
number. But already by noting this we are moving into a more allowing 
field of mathematical knowledge, and into a conception of natural 
numbers antecedent to HP. 
204 Boolos has written (1998, pp. 301-314) at more length about the 
problems concerning the supposed analytic nature of HP. See also 
Wright’s answer to Boolos (Wright & Hale 2001, pp. 307-332). 
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even if we do not have a comprehensive theory for that reference. 
However, here we must remember the lesson of Chapter 6: it 
cannot be accepted that all theories of reference fail, because that 
leads to extreme formalism and arbitrariness. Some theory of 
reference is needed and this demand for reference is prior to truth. 
This way, the kind of priority I argue for is essentially different 
from the neo-Fregean priority. We can characterize truth before we 
characterize reference, but we cannot make the ontological claim of 
reference based on truth. This is a very important distinction to 
make. We can only believe in substantial Tarskian truth in 
mathematics if we have antecedent justification to believe that 
there exists a reference for mathematical sentences. The way I have 
argued for this has been to argue against extreme formalism and 
its arbitrariness.  
However, that argument cannot be applied by the neo-Fregean, 
because Tarskian truth is much too weak for his purposes. With 
Tarskian truth we do not need to commit to any particular 
characterization of reference: most importantly, there is no 
mathematical sentence that is necessarily true due to Tarskian truth. 
The problems of neo-Fregean strategy cause no damage to the 
arguments of this work when we remember to distinguish between 
priority in the neo-Fregean sense and the Tarskian sense. In this 
work I speak of truth before reference, but it only means that I 
believe in the possibility of mathematicians finding out true 
sentences that refer to something non-arbitrary. This is a very weak 
form of priority, and most definitely not priority in the conceptual 
or ontological sense.205 With neo-Fregeanism the case is vastly 
different. 
When we look at the big picture, neo-Fregeanism actually bears 
a lot of resemblance to extreme formalism. In both theories we 
neglect the origins of mathematical thinking and start explaining 
the current mathematical theories. However we arrived at them, 
we have arrived at them, and that is enough for a starting point. 
                                                           
205 In fact, when fully interpreted languages are considered, priority 
between truth and reference in the conceptual sense would not seem to 
matter much. 
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This way both the formalist and the neo-Fregean206 try to find out 
criteria for assertable sentences, whether they are axioms of formal 
systems or analytic truths like HP. These criteria can include 
consistency and conservativeness, but they are always internal 
conditions and never refer to anything outside mathematical 
theories.207 That the neo-Fregean chooses to call these conditions 
“truth” and the formalist “assertability” is, in this way, only a 
minor difference.  
It is only when we consider the ontological conclusions that we 
see the major difference. While an extreme formalist will consider 
HP assertable, the neo-Fregean considers it to be an analytic truth. 
So far, this is hardly more than a question of terminology, even 
directly translatable ones. The difference in ontological conclusion, 
however, could not be more drastic – and it must be said that here 
the extreme formalist comes across as much less problematic. 
Priority in the neo-Fregean way needs the existence of reference to 
escape arbitrariness – and if we are ready to accept arbitrariness, 
we should have no problem in rejecting Platonism. However, as 
always, we must be careful not to throw the baby away with the 
bathwater. When rejecting Platonism, we cannot be accepting 
extreme formalism. Simply considering the content of HP, it may 
seem tempting to say that if not grounds for Platonism, it must be 
grounds for fictionalism. After all, HP is an instantly acceptable 
definition of natural numbers. There is a temptation to conclude 
that if numbers do not exist based on HP, then numbers do not 




                                                           
206 See Hale & Wright 2001, pp. 117-150 for an example. 
207 Here I must once again neglect Field’s criterion of usefulness; it being 
so obviously against the doctrine of non-reference in the strictly fictionalist 
mathematics. 
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7.6 Non-Platonist reference: Linnebo 
 
My argument against neo-Fregeanism has been that we need to 
first assume a domain of mathematical objects in order to make 
ontological conclusions concerning the reference of mathematical 
sentences. Obviously this does not mean that we should dispense 
with the Fregean notion of reference, or the objectivity of 
mathematical truths that comes with it. In fact, Frege’s theory of 
truth before reference fits perfectly well with the general Tarskian 
account I have been trying to defend in this work. What I claim is 
simply that we cannot make the ontological claims the neo-
Fregeans do based on the theory of reference.  
However, while not necessary for the introduction of truth, a 
theory of reference is undoubtedly something we should wish to 
have – and there Frege’s work is potentially helpful. Neo-
Fregeanism does avoid Benacerraf’s dilemma and that is no small 
feat for a realist strategy in the philosophy of mathematics. There 
exists a sizable literature on the subject among neo-Fregeans as 
well as their critics – much of it concentrating on the technical 
matter of finding a satisfactory theory of reference. But the 
technical details of such pursuits are not crucial for the matters in 
this work. It is more interesting to see whether a Fregean pursuit of 
reference can be satisfyingly constructed without the Platonist 
conclusion, but just as importantly, without succumbing to 
nominalism and fictionalism. It must be remembered that 
nominalism is the obvious first alternative that we have for 
explaining HP. As we saw, strict nominalism and neo-Fregeanism 
are actually closely related viewpoints until the ontological 
conclusions are made. Clearly numbers defined by HP refer to 
some set of objects. If not Platonist, it is natural to argue that the set 
is fictional. Indeed, the counterarguments so far have been 
destructive more than constructive and fictionalism has been the 
big winner. But once again, this is to make the wrong dichotomy of 
Platonism and nominalism. Let us now look at the possible ways 
of including a Fregean theory of meaning before reference without 
ending up with Platonism or nominalism. 
Øystein Linnebo (2006b, 2007) in his Fregean project presents a 
theory of reference that resembles the neo-Fregean ones, but does 
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not end up with a “thick” Platonist ontology of mathematical 
objects. However, Linnebo does not end up with a nominalist 
account, either, as his theory allows reference and objective truths 
of arithmetic. Since his conclusions resemble my arguments here, 
we will now examine Linnebo’s argument as an ontologically 
sensible alternative in the field of Fregean mathematical reference. 
Linnebo’s (2007) strategy is to use Frege’s argument for 
Platonism as the starting point to develop a kind of structuralist 
conception of reference for natural numbers. To establish this, 
Linnebo argues that the nature of mathematical reference is 
fundamentally different from the standard physical conception of 
reference. His example is the concept of “roundness” in physical 
objects. The truth of the statement “this body is round” depends on 
the statement having a particular semantic content, but also on the 
non-semantical state of affairs in the world. But the truth of a 
mathematical statement like “2 directly precedes 3” is, Linnebo 
argues, different. Everything we use to decide the truth of “2 
directly precedes 3” is semantical, from the places of “2” and “3” in 
the natural number structure to the meaning of the expression 
“directly precedes”. While the truth of physical statements depend 
both on semantical and non-semantical facts, the truth of 
mathematical statements does not depend on any completely non-
semantical facts.  
In addition, the beliefs that make mathematical beliefs true also 
explain why we have those beliefs in the first place, thus answering 
Benacerraf’s dilemma. To show this, Linnebo compares the 
accounts of reference for physical bodies to those of natural 
numbers. His approach is to think of the way a robot learns to 
assess statements of the physical world. With physical bodies the 
robot gets information perceptually and uses some equivalence 
relation to conclude whether two parts belong to the same body. 
Similarly, Linnebo suggests, the robot uses the equivalence relation 
of Frege’s equinumerity to conclude that two numerals (names of 
numbers) refer to the same natural number. The difference, as was 
stated above, is that with mathematical truth the equivalence 
relation by itself is sufficient, and non-semantical facts do not need 
to come into the picture. 
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So far this pretty much follows the usual Fregean strategy, but 
Linnebo makes interesting conclusions out of it. Continuing with 
the Fregean tradition Linnebo holds that, unlike physical 
descriptions, mathematical descriptions are by themselves enough 
to give all the information of their references. While a statement 
“the mass of x is m” cannot be decided by observing x alone, 
statements concerning the natural numbers can be completely 
decided from their numerals. What we can know of “4” in the 
decimal sequence of numbers is all there is to its reference, the 
number 4 of the natural number structure. This is obviously 
reductionist and if we reject neo-Fregeanism, it looks like a victory 
for the nominalist. Indeed, if the names (numerals) are enough, 
why do we need to postulate the reference (numbers) anymore?  
However, Linnebo disagrees with this reduction. He claims that 
we must dispense with the physical notion of reference here, and 
turn to one more suited for mathematics. This reference he calls the 
semantic values of numerals, and it corresponds to the familiar 
Fregean (1892) idea of difference between sense and reference. 
Famously, the expressions “morning star” and “evening star” have 
a different sense, but the same reference, the planet Venus. So the 
reference of a concept is distinct from its sense. This reference 
Linnebo calls the “semantic value” of an expression. In a true 
Fregean way, it is the principle of compositionality that tells us 
when the semantic values are the same. If the expression “Louis 
XIV” has the same semantic value as the expression “The Sun 
King”, then “Louis XIV had the longest tenure of any European 
monarch” must have the same semantic value as “The Sun King 
had the longest tenure of any European monarch”. 
This concept of semantic value saves Linnebo’s Fregean 
argument from nominalism. Now the numerals “5” and “V” have 
the same semantic value, and they function in a manner similar to 
how “Louis XIV” and “The Sun King” function in the English 
language. Clearly the latter two names have a reference, so why 
not the numerals? Against this, it could be argued that now that 
we have the reduction to numerals, why do we need to bother with 
the semantic values? But Linnebo (2006b, Chapter 4) rejects this 
objection based on the possible difference between the type of 
reduction and the semantic analysis given here. We may have 
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arrived at the reference – and the following reduction – via some 
other means such as perception. As such, we cannot equate between 
the reduction of the reference and the reduction in the semantic 
analysis of numerals.  
So what ontological conclusions can be made out of Linnebo’s 
analysis? In his own account Linnebo states that while natural 
numbers are “thinner” than physical objects, via semantic values 
they still have legitimate references and hence do not conflict with 
Platonism. This is of course to define Platonism in a very weak 
way. Such a thin notion of natural number is hardly what Frege 
was after. For the purposes of this work, however, the conclusion 
sounds perfect. With legitimate reference we can instantly move to 
Tarskian truth, and the semantical arguments for the substantiality 
of truth apply. I see only one major gap in Linnebo’s argument so 
far and that it is the answer to the reductionist objection. If the 
semantic analysis gives us the semantic values, must we continue 
using them if another analysis shows that these semantic values can 
be reduced to numerals? One must appreciate the (potential) 
reductionist argument that it does not matter which way we arrive 
at the reduction, as long as the reduction can be done. The semantic 
values of numerals are of course natural numbers, and if numerals 
are enough, one could argue that the semantic analysis is no longer 
needed. 
What we need to complete Linnebo’s account is some argument 
to the effect that semantic values are indeed needed and that they 
are never completely redundant. Fortunately, it seems to me that 
Linnebo has had this in his argument all along: it is the very fact 
that “5” and “V” have the same semantical value, that of the natural 
number 5. That “5” explains everything there is to 5 can be 
redundant, but that we can explain this is not. In this way, to use an 
understatement, “5” simply happens to be a very good explanation 
of the natural number 5. Linnebo (2006b, Chapter 2.3) seems to be 
after the same thing with his distinction between semantics and 
meta-semantics. To make sense of the whole phenomenon of 
numerals referring to natural numbers is a question of meta-
semantics, and in this sense the natural numbers are not 
redundant.  
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The best argument for objective semantic values seems to be 
that without them we cannot explain the phenomenon of “3”, “III” 
and “three” having the same semantic value. This problem can be 
seen in all its seriousness when we consider teaching numerals in a 
language that does not have them. How does a missionary explain 
the numeral “5” to people whose indigenous language does not 
contain such numerals?  To state an example closer to home: how 
can a child learn to use the numeral “five” if all there is to “five” 
consists of just an independent circle of translations between “5”, 
“V”, “five”, etc.? Of course the answer is familiar to everybody: it 
is done ostensively by pointing out groups of five objects and 
letting the student realize the connection between them. Frege 
defined natural numbers this way and it corresponds to our most 
basic understanding of them. That is why HP works as a definition 
of natural numbers, and that is also why the neo-Fregean plan has 
whatever appeal it has. HP seems to be so obviously true even in 
our most primitive thinking, and numbers defined by it seem to 
refer to an objective natural number, a place in a natural number 
structure, or in the very least an objective semantic value. 
However, if we reject that objective reference, what are we left 
with? Nothing other than an empty system of translatable 
languages without references; languages which can somehow be 
learnt without any prior knowledge of them, developed to include 
new concepts, and used to great effect in scientific as well as in 
direct applications. 
That system of translations is obviously the fictionalist plan, 
and we know all the serious problems behind it. But as such, 
Linnebo’s arguments do not necessarily conflict with it. He shows 
that it makes sense to speak about semantic values even if they are 
already completely explained by the numerals, but obviously this 
by itself is not enough to show that there are semantic values. The 
nominalist accepts all kinds of talk, like that of truth, but he cannot 
accept referring to any objectively existing mathematical truths. 
Field’s thesis is not that it does not make sense to speak about 
truth, but that truth is deflationary and as such philosophically 
superfluous. Similarly, I see nothing in Linnebo’s argument that by 
itself shows that the semantic values of numerals are not 
deflationary. That way, as well as obviously being against 
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Platonism, it could also be seen – alarmingly – as proposing 
nominalism and fictionalism. If we hold all talk about reference to 
be fiction, then everything in Linnebo’s strategy can be given that 
notorious nominalist term “useful fiction”. Going deeper into 
philosophy we need something more, and here the old questions 
of theory choice and arbitrariness come in handy. Once again, 
deflationary semantic values would mean arbitrary mathematics. 
We could change the semantic values of numerals as we like, and 
aside from it conflicting with our conventions, the deflationist 
would not be able to point out a problem with this approach. For 
mathematics, however, it would be disastrous. 
It seems that wherever we go with philosophy, the backbone of 
anti-nominalism is the denial of arbitrariness. This should not be a 
surprise: if we did accept arbitrariness, then clearly nominalism 
and fictionalism could be instantly accepted. But it is important to 
realize just how strong the problem of theory choice is. Any reason 
for choosing one theory over another contradicts arbitrariness, and 
hence any such reason already takes us away from extreme 
formalism. One cannot stress enough the need to tie semantic 
values into something objective. Looking at a flock of birds the size 
of n, we must be able to count the birds from 1 to n without gaps in 
the semantic values of the numerals. But if the semantic values are 
not objective, what is there to prevent us from stating that “3” and 
“4” have the same semantic value 3, and between that and 5 there 
is no semantic value? In a self-standing system of translatable 
numerals such changes are possible. That is why we need to 
postulate objective semantic values for numbers. 
However, that is only why we need semantic values, not why 
we have them. As I see it, Linnebo’s arrival at thin but existing 
natural numbers cannot be all there is to natural numbers. We 
avoid such problems by choosing HP or PA to the define natural 
numbers, but this choice must be explained somehow. There 
remains the question of arriving at the natural number structure, 
and the equinumerity to explain it, in the first place. The origins of 
mathematical thinking are left alone in Linnebo’s approach. Still, 
Linnebo does give an argument for the need of something 
objective – the semantic values – in a Fregean project of 
mathematics, without making the full Platonist claim. Between 
7. Truth and reference 277 
 
 
neo-Fregeanism and nominalism – with a little tinkering – we now 
have a third option which gives us justification for the use of 
reference, and as such for Tarskian truth. At this point it seems 
obvious enough that the Fregean strategy can be used to make all 
kinds of philosophical conclusions, and the most important 
problems will most often not be related to the technical details, but 
rather to larger epistemological and ontological considerations. 
Linnebo’s case shows that the project can be carried out with 
minimal ontological burden, yet without losing the need for 
reference of mathematical concepts. It is not a complete picture, 
but it does give us a Fregean framework to develop moderate non-
nominalist projects like the one described in the end of Chapter 6. 
 
 
7.7 Neo-Fregeanism and Quine 
 
When we consider the neo-Fregean ontology, one important 
observation to be made is that the set of true sentences tells us 
what exists. Rather than being an argument for Platonism, as the 
neo-Fregean thinks, I have claimed that this is better understood as 
demanding a Platonist ontology. But there is one troubling thing in 
my approach here, and that is the apparent conflict between 
mathematical and other scientific truths. When rejecting neo-
Fregeanism we seem to be rejecting that the true mathematical 
statements tell us what exist. In any realist ontology that respects 
the achievements of science it is commonplace to think that it is 
indeed the set of true scientific sentences that tells us what exists. If 
not truth, then a milder concept like verisimilitude or probable 
knowledge takes this place. In any case, with advancements in 
science we come closer and closer to true sentences about world, 
and this way truth has priority over reference. In this work we 
have used the scientific applications of mathematics as an 
argument against arbitrary formal theories, so it is reasonable to 
demand that this putative difference between mathematical and 
physical truth is explained.  
Of course the simplest way to deal with the relationship 
between mathematics and physics is the Quinean strategy of 
thinking of it all as one theory. We return soon to this approach, 
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but let us assume for now that there is a difference (as well as a 
connection) between mathematical and physical knowledge, and it 
makes sense to speak of them independently of each other. My 
argument is that Tarskian truth fits both disciplines, and whatever 
differences there may exist, they are differences in the ontological 
nature of the subject matter. So how can we reserve for physics the 
role of telling us what exists, while refusing it for mathematics? 
The short answer is that we do not, and the whole conception of 
such difference is mistaken. As was said in the previous chapter, 
reference comes before truth, but only in the sense that there exists 
a reference. No specific characterizations concerning it were made. 
Some interpretations of quantum theory notwithstanding, there is 
a clear consensus in physics that there is a world “out there” that 
scientists are trying to explain. Just what means and theories are 
the best for this job is up to physics to decide, but the existence of 
an objective world is an implicit assumption that is ubiquitously 
made.  
I argue that with mathematics the situation is exactly the same. 
Mathematical theories have evolved to include new domains like 
complex numbers and there are (perhaps valid) doubts about the 
existence of them. But there can be valid doubts about the 
existence of, say, electrons, as well. The important question is 
whether there can be valid doubts about the existence of the whole 
domain of the subject matter. Here the difference between physical 
and mathematical truth no longer seems acceptable. It is a return to 
archaic philosophy to insist that philosophers qua philosophers can 
explain which physical objects exists. However, a philosopher of 
physics can study the assumptions made in physics and the 
existence of an objective reality is one assumption that cannot be 
dismissed. Similarly, if we are not ready to accept arbitrariness, we 
cannot deny the existence of some reference for mathematical 
theories. Scientific theories, both in physics and mathematics, tell 
us what they refer to – as long as we assume that they refer to 
something. Philosophically there is nothing problematic in that, and 
we reserve the same role for mathematics that the neo-Fregean 
does; only the Platonist conclusion is replaced by a more allowing 
array of ontological alternatives. 
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How about the Quinean (1995) view that the physical sciences 
and mathematics actually form one theory that tells us which 
sentences refer to existing objects? Eklund (2006) has clarified the 
distinction between the Quinean and the neo-Fregean ontology. 
Both theories endorse the viewpoint that true sentences tell us 
what exists, but the difference can be seen when we think about 
what the theories say about arithmetic. The neo-Fregean obviously 
thinks that the natural numbers exist. The Quinean, on the other 
hand, will hold that the natural numbers exist if our best theory of 
science needs them. Unlike the neo-Fregean, the Quinean is not 
committed to any particular ontological statement. In this way, the 
existence of natural numbers is something for science to find out, 
not a trivial question to be answered based on an analytic truth.  
How does this Quinean conclusion compare to the theses in this 
work? Obviously the big difference lies in whether we include 
mathematical terms at all in our best theory of science. Unlike 
Quine claimed in his indispensability argument, for the Quinean it 
actually seems possible to end up with the Fieldian possibility of 
rejecting the existence of mathematical objects. In fact, this was the 
whole motivation for Field: he tried to show that the Quinean 
theory of indispensability fails and we do not need to include 
mathematics in physics. Field’s achievements aside, with 
everything we know by now about his project, we cannot accept 
this possibility. Not that it is likely that our best theory of physics 
could ever actually be void of mathematics, but starting from basic 
arithmetic and geometry, mathematics has too many applications 
outside the developed theories of physics to be just arbitrary 
fiction. By all the considerations in this work, we must include a 
theory of reference in the philosophy of mathematics. Of course 
this does not mean that we cannot have different conceptions over 
which mathematical sentences refer to existing objects – not to 
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8. Loose ends 
 
8.1 Non-standard models 
 
One subject that must be addressed in a work like this is the 
existence of non-standard models. As we know from the 
Löwenheim-Skolem theorem, the classical first-order languages 
considered in this work – in addition to having the standard 
(intended) infinite models – also have non-standard ones (that is, 
ones not isomorphic with the standard model), in fact uncountably 
many of them. In PA the main feature of non-standard models is 
that, as well as satisfying all the true statements of the standard 
model of PA, they also satisfy new ones. This has obvious 
consequences when we think of the semantic arguments 
concerning PA expanded with Tarskian truth. In addition to 
establishing the true sentences of the standard models, in order to 
be completely adequate, the truth definition would have to 
establish all the true sentences of the non-standard models. In 
essence, the axioms of first-order PA do not give us only the model 
of arithmetic that we want (pre-formally), but also an 
(uncountably) infinite number of models of arithmetic that we do 
not want. It goes without saying that if we have no way of 
distinguishing between the standard and non-standard models, it 
would – among other things – have a lot of relevance to the 
question of truth. 
Jody Azzouni (1999, pp. 543-544) has used the existence of non-
standard models to argue against Shapiro’s semantical argument. 
According to him, Shapiro’s argument, especially the part 
concerning mathematical induction over formulas containing the 
truth predicate, only holds if the Peano axioms somehow pick out 
the standard model. There are non-standard models, Azzouni 
argues, for which such induction will not apply. Hence the 
arithmetical truth that Shapiro is talking about is the truth of the 
standard model and – in order to accept Shapiro’s argument – the 
deflationist would need to accept that the Peano axioms somehow 
implicitly pick out the standard model, which of course they do 
not.  
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For the non-formalist, however, one question is immediately 
raised: why should we ever come to the strange conclusion that we 
could not distinguish between the standard and non-standard 
models – unless we are already committed to strict formalism? 
After all, the whole question of non-standard models is discussed 
all the time in both mathematics and philosophy, with little 
thought spent on whether we can formally separate them from the 
standard model. As Shapiro (1997, p. 133) has noted, we have in 
the informal (in my terminology, pre-formal) language of 
mathematics the resources to distinguish between the two. For a 
strict formalist who does not have these resources (or who rather, 
under my interpretation, pretends not to have them) this might 
indeed be a problem. For the rest of us, the fact that non-standard 
models are spoken with ease in higher-order languages, as well as 
in pre-formal languages, should be enough.208 
That is the reason why there was no need to bring up the 
question of non-standard models earlier as part of the Field-
Shapiro-Azzouni debate. After all the problems of formalism we 
have seen, Azzouni actually seems to reveal another flaw in 
extreme formalism: the fact that we cannot distinguish formally (in 
PA) between the standard and non-standard models. This is of 
course, like many aspects of strict formalism, in a clear conflict 
with the actual practice in mathematics. That is why we should be 
able to restrict all the results here to concern the standard models 
of arithmetic without damaging the arguments.  
All that considered, perhaps in place of “truth” we should be 
talking about “truth in the standard model of PA” to avoid 
confusion. However, that seems like an unnecessary complication. 
                                                           
208 Indeed, the second-order version of Peano Axioms only has the intended 
model. However, this is the case only if we apply standard second-order 
semantics, which have the problematic feature of assuming the entire 
power set of the universe in discourse. This subject is discussed in Shapiro 
2000b, pp. 80-96. At any rate, such a choice of standardness is again 
something for which we have no purely formal criteria, so the conclusion 
made here from the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem holds also for the 
higher-order languages. We never arrive at the standard model purely 
formally, yet pre-formally we always manage to pick it out while 
practising mathematics.  
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All along I have been arguing that we are after a particular, non-
arbitrary, set of sentences when we study truth in mathematics. 
When it comes to arithmetic, to clarify that to mean our intended 
model of arithmetic is hardly necessary. Indeed, it should not be 
unreasonable to ask that the ones researching truth also in non-
standard models use the extra clarification. In any case, it is the 
formalist who finds himself lacking in means to distinguish 
between the standard and non-standard models. For the 
arguments presented here, the existence of non-standard models is 
– if anything – more ammunition. 
 
 
8.2 Another semantical argument 
 
The Gödelian argument of Shapiro and Ketland is not the only 
semantical argument for the substantiality of truth. Hyttinen & 
Sandu (2000) show that introducing a truth predicate into a 
Henkin-hierarchy of languages also causes an undefinability result 
and a hierarchy of languages that will not collapse.209 To see this 
we need to define a hierarchy of languages in the following way: 
Let ωωL be a classical first-order language. Hyttinen and Sandu 
(ibid., p. 520) define a hierarchy of languages )(HLn  as follows: 
 






n ∈=+ ϕϕ  
=+ )(1 HLn  the closure of )(1
*
HL
n+  under negation, disjunction 




HL is then a classical first-order language extended with 
Henkin quantification over the classical first-order formulas. As we 
remember, having the added expressive power of Henkin 
quantifiers, and only them, )(1
*
HL is equivalent to an IF-language.  
                                                           
209 To be exact, the truth predicate is a way to show that such a hierarchy of 
languages does not collapse. 
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The important thing here is, as we remember from IF-logic, is that 
a language )(1
*
HL is not closed under contradictory negation.  
The following table represents the hierarchy thus defined: 
 
 
The language on the left side on Level 1 is defined by extending a 
classic first-order language with Henkin quantification, that is, 
over the formulas of the language on the Level 0. The language on 
the right hand side on Level 1 is defined as the language on the left 
side under the closure of negation, disjunction and existential 
quantifier. The language on the left on Level 2 is defined by 
Henkin quantification over the formulas of the language on the 
right on Level 1, and so on, ad infinitum. 
What Hyttinen and Sandu prove (ibid., pp. 520-521) is that on 
every level, the language on the left side defines its own truth 
predicate210 while the language on the right side does not. One 
corollary of this (ibid., p. 522) is that the hierarchy of languages 
)(HLn does not collapse: for no m, n such that n > m, is it the case 
that )()( HLHL mn ≡ . The language on the left includes its own 
truth predicate, but once we close the language under negation, it 
                                                           
210 Of course we must remember that we cannot recognize the truth 
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cannot contain its own truth predicate any more. Either we must 
dispense with the closure under negation or we commit to a 
hierarchy of languages.  
The above result is not restricted to Henkin-hierarchies. The 
same has been proved for many other hierarchies. For example, 
Azriel Levy (1965) has proved that for a hierarchy of formulas in 
set theory, we can have a truth predicate for each level of the 
hierarchy, under the condition that the class of formulas is not 
closed under negation. If we close the level under negation, a 
hierarchy is needed for the truth predicate. The Tarskian hierarchy 
is of course the most obvious case where the truth predicate and 
closure under negation cause the liar’s paradox and the hierarchy 
of languages will not collapse. For an extreme formalist this is 
definitely a problem. Infinite non-collapsing hierarchies of 
languages are not the kind of mathematical theories that formalists 
are after.  
Yet dispensing with the negation is equally problematic: 
essentially, we must deal with a many-valued, or incomplete, logic. 
The proof procedure for such logics is bound to be incomplete, and 
we must commit to using game-theoretic semantics, the intractable 
logical consequence of second-order logic, or other such 
alternative. In any case, the proof procedure is bound to be 
essentially semantical, not the syntactical formal one of classical 
first-order logic. This is why the argument presented in this 
chapter can be called another semantical argument. The truth 
predicate requires a hierarchy of languages when the languages 
are closed under negation, and it requires a semantical proof 
procedure when they are not. In both cases truth is substantial: 
because of the truth predicate formal languages must be expanded 
from the classical first-order ones. 
The conclusion seems clear enough: either by the liar’s paradox 
we commit to a hierarchy of languages or else we must dispense 
with contradictory negation to avoid the liar’s paradox. Whether 
we can ultimately avoid the liar’s paradox even that way is not 
always clear (see Ketland’s point in Chapter 5.4), but in the very 
least we are committing to much less formal mathematics than the 
extreme formalist could accept. After all, formalism in the 
Hilbertian tradition meant totally syntactical, consistent and 
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complete way of proving theorems according to rules of classical 
logic. Consistency and completeness proved to be impossible. 
From all we know about the possibility of formalist programs by 
now, it seems that also classical logic and syntactical proof must be 
abandoned – or expanded – and even so we are left with a variety 
of problems. The most important of these is the question of theory 
choice. Whatever appeal strict formalism still retains, it is a long 




8.3 Gödelian fallacies 
 
One would imagine that a work titled, “Truth, Proof and Gödelian 
arguments” is bound to trigger skepticism in some circles, 
especially as the Gödelian arguments are seemingly used to make 
deep philosophical conclusions. Generally speaking, this is a 
healthy attitude: one must remember that Gödel’s incompleteness 
theorems are a sophisticated result of mathematical logic which is 
reached very much on purpose by a known paradox-raising trick – 
the diagonal procedure. One must be extremely careful about 
making far-reaching conclusion from Gödel’s theorems into other 
areas of mathematics, let alone areas where consistent formal 
systems containing arithmetic are nowhere to be found.  
Alas, among philosophers, both lay and professional, there has 
been a constantly surfacing trend to read too much importance 
into Gödel’s incompleteness theorems.211 Gödel himself did exactly 
that by believing that he had found evidence for Platonism212; 
others have made similar mistakes after him. It is not uncommon 
to read allusions to “limits of mathematical knowledge”, “crisis in 
mathematics” or even “arbitrariness of mathematics” with 
reference to Gödel’s theorem in the non-philosophical literature. 
This is not helped by the widely known fallacious Gödelian 
arguments by philosophers. It must always be remembered that 
                                                           
211 See Franzén (2005) for a good book-length introduction to the subject. 
212 Gödel’s views on mathematical truth, intuition and Platonism are best 
described in Gödel 1964b.  
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Gödel’s incompleteness theorems are a result concerning 
consistent formal systems of mathematics containing arithmetic – 
and only them. One has to be very careful with the philosophical 
conclusions, especially when we acknowledge the rather vague 
connection between mathematical logic and the subjects it has been 
claimed to concern. These range from the mechanical model of 
mind (Lucas) and artificial intelligence (Penrose) to poetry 
(Kristeva) and sociology (Debray).213  
While the latter two mainly provide comic relief for any serious 
student of Gödel’s theorems, the first two arguments were well 
constructed and concerned areas that are not too far from formal 
mathematical systems. In fact, both of them are based on the direct 
application of the concept of Turing machine to Gödel’s theorem. 
From Alan Turing’s work it is commonplace to believe that what 
we mean by formal systems (in this work, primitive recursive 
functions) can be identified with algorithmic, mechanical 
procedures and thus with the so-called Turing machine, an ideal 
model of a digital computer. This contention is known as the 
Church-Turing thesis and it is as widely accepted as anything non-
proven in mathematics. Turing showed that we can never know 
from a Turing machine that it can prove all the theorems of a given 
formal system. The result is obviously very much like Gödel’s 
incompleteness theorems. What we gain from Turing is that the 
same problem can be understood in terms of mechanical 
procedures, and hence, machines.214 
The important point in both John Lucas’ (1961) and Roger 
Penrose’s (1989 & 1994) arguments is that a human being can 
“beat” the Turing machine by seeing the truth of Gödel sentences, 
in a manner seemingly very much like Shapiro’s and Ketland’s. 
Lucas uses this to conclude that the human mind cannot be 
mechanical, Penrose to claim that a computer cannot even in 
                                                           
213 For the Gödelian misuse by Julia Kristeva and Régis Debray see 
Kristeva 1969, pp. 189-190 and Debray 1983, pp. 169-170. See Sokal & 
Bricmont 2003 for a good overview of such arguments. 
214 For details, see Penrose 1989, pp. 40-97; Wang 1987, pp. 169-170 and 
Gödel 1964a, pp. 369-370. For Turing’s original article, see Turing 1937, 
and for the philosophical conclusions of it, Turing 1950. 
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principle simulate a human brain completely – the inescapable 
difference being in the Gödel sentences. Naturally this does not 
mean any Gödel sentence, since there is no problem in mechanical 
models and computers proving Gödel sentences of other formal 
systems. The weight of Lucas’ and Penrose’s arguments lies in the 
contention that a human being can beat any Turing machine 
(formal system) that is supposed to completely represent our 
mind, the human thought. Here the healthy dose of skepticism 
must be taken in. How could a result of mathematical logic 
possible imply that a computer could never be a complete model of 
the mind? From what we know by now, the flaw of both Lucas and 
Penrose is not hard to see. When it comes to Gödelian 
incompleteness, we are always talking about consistent formal 
systems. Obviously we like to believe that human thinking is 
sound, but to assume that the human brain (Lucas) or human 
thinking (Penrose) is consistent is scientifically and philosophically 
fantastic. We still know quite little about the workings of the brain, 
but in the sense of comparing it to formal mathematical systems 
we basically know nothing. That is why Lucas’ line of thinking is 
bound to fail until there is empirical evidence for it. We just cannot 
hope to answer questions about the consistency of the brain (or the 
mind). Until that, Lucas’ argument gets the form “if we know the 
human mind to be consistent, then by Gödel’s incompleteness 
theorems…” – obviously as speculative a conditional as there can 
be. 
Penrose’s argument has somewhat more potential since it 
concerns the output of the brain, the human thinking. It seems 
much more plausible that human thinking could be consistent. In 
areas like mathematics there are people who have come very close 
to consistency, perhaps even reached it. However, that is 
considering the mathematical output, and human thinking as a 
whole is a different thing. We are talking about the philosophical 
question of artificial intelligence, ultimately the ability of 
computers to simulate human thinking completely. That is a 
phenomenon as complex as the human behaviour in all its facets, 
not just that of mathematical knowledge. How could we ever 
know that this is consistent? Furthermore, how could we ever now 
from a proposed formal system that it actually captures the human 
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thinking? Until these questions are answered, also Penrose’s 
argument takes the form of a conditional where the antecedent is 
extremely speculative. 
We see the danger in applying Gödel’s incompleteness 
theorems in fields other than formal mathematics. What about 
Shapiro’s and Ketland’s semantical arguments? Are we not falling 
for the same thing? Mathematical truth, after all, is not a formal 
question – it is a deep philosophical one. However, although the 
conclusions here are philosophical, there is an important difference 
from the arguments of Lucas and Penrose: we are still only 
concerned with consistent formal mathematical systems containing 
arithmetic. The question with semantical arguments is not whether 
Gödel’s theorems can have relevance to something physiological 
(the brain) or psychological (human thinking). It is whether 
Gödel’s theorems have relevance on the very thing they concern: 
formal mathematical systems. Obviously we should be quite 
surprised if the incompleteness of all formal systems did not have 
any philosophical importance, given that it has such a big 
mathematical importance.  
As it happens, if the semantical arguments were not valid, that 
philosophical importance would be all the more drastic. If formal 
systems are all there is to mathematics, then by Gödel’s result 
mathematics (presented as a single system, which is the only way 
extreme formalism can be ultimately conceived of) is incomplete: 
there are fundamentally undecidable sentences. As far as results in 
the philosophy of mathematics go, there cannot be many more 
radical ones. This is something that has been obscured along the 
decades after Gödel presented his result, but it must be stressed 
here. Compared to fundamental undecidability, the philosophical 
conclusion of the semantical arguments – the substantiality of truth 
– seems much weaker, and much easier to accept. There is a 
difference between truth and proof, which is due to the 
incompleteness of formal mathematics. However, this does not 
imply that there are fundamentally undecidable sentences: 
different axiomatizations have different Gödel sentences. It is the 
formal systems, not mathematics as a whole, that are affected by 
Gödel’s incompleteness theorems – which is exactly what the actual 
theorems tell us. To get a fuller, practical and a more realistic 
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picture of mathematics, we must expand beyond the formal 
systems. This is what we do in the semantical arguments and 
Tarskian truth gives us a convenient way of completing the picture 
when it comes to truth and proof. As far as mathematical thinking 
is concerned, Gödel’s incompleteness theorems do not show that 
we can beat formal systems: they simply show that formal systems 
cannot be everything there is to mathematics – which is something 
we should have suspected anyway, Gödel or no Gödel. So when it 
comes to the philosophy of mathematics, the semantical Gödelian 
arguments actually draw weaker conclusions from the 
incompleteness theorems than extreme formalism does. There 
should be no danger of a Gödelian fallacy here. 
 
 
8.4 Conclusion: what does “substantial” truth mean? 
 
Throughout this work we have (following earlier discussion) used 
the term substantial (as well as robust) for the point of view 
opposing deflationism. If mathematical truth is not deflatable, it is 
not metaphysically thin, and thus it is substantial. This has been 
the line of thinking. The negative nature of this definition is 
obvious and has clearly worked in favour of the theses presented 
here. It has been claimed that mathematical truth is indeed 
substantial, but the exact nature of this apparently metaphysical 
property has not been clarified. Indeed, what can be the nature – 
the essence – of the property of mathematical truth? 
We should examine this problem now. Tennant’s whole 
argument was based on the view that a robust property cannot be 
derived from other properties, or to be exact, a property is not 
robust if everything we can achieve with it can also be achieved 
with other properties. Tennant claimed that Ketland’s argument 
for the robustness of truth does not hold because the Gödel 
sentence could also be asserted with the help of a soundness 
principle. Since Tennant’s argument is so far the strongest one for 
the deflationist cause, we can take this as our starting point.  
In Tennant’s account, with the soundness principle we could 
assert the Gödel sentence which is not assertable in the formal 
system. Hence, by assuming a soundness principle we could 
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derive all the assertable sentences we could with truth. We can 
derive the extension of mathematical truth from the soundness 
principles215, and in Tennant’s account, soundness principle is thus 
a robust property and truth is not. However, this could be only a 
temporary state of affairs, since the soundness principle may also 
be derivable from other properties. Indeed, as we saw from 
Ketland’s and Shapiro’s work, the soundness principle can be 
derived from a Tarskian notion of truth, which was thought to be 
robust. But there is something wrong with this picture: when it 
comes to the choice between soundness and Tarskian truth, no 
matter which concept we adopt as the robust one, extensionally 
speaking, we can derive the other from it. Basically, there seem to 
be two options: either both of the properties can be robust, or 
neither one can. 
However, there is also a third option: that our concept robust 
needs fixing. I think we have seen enough to conclude that this 
indeed is the case. Ketland argued that Tennant misunderstood his 
argument. His point was not that a robust notion of truth was the 
only way to establish the truth of Gödel sentences. Truth is robust 
because it is the best, most natural, way. This is the crucial point. Of 
course we could adopt a soundness principle, but as I argued 
earlier, adopting a Tarskian notion of truth is a more plausible 
extension. This seems to be the only means we have of defining 
robustness in any satisfactory way: a property can be called robust, 
not because it is not derivable from other concepts, but because it is 
the most plausible of the competing alternatives. This could be 
understood ontologically, epistemologically or pragmatically. But 
it must not be understood only logically. Truth is, at best, a concept 
with the extension of the quasi-logical T-sentences. The equivalent 
extension can be achieved also with soundness principles, but that 
is not the question here. It is the intension of the preferred concept 
that we must base our decision on, and that intension must fit 
together with a satisfactory epistemological and ontological 
account of mathematics. In this work, the decision in favour of 
Tarskian truth is based on two arguments. First, I have argued for 
                                                           
215 The intensional difference is obvious, however, and quite clearly the 
one that matters more here, as we will see. 
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the existence of our pre-formal thinking, and that semantical truth 
is not an expansion at all in that fuller picture of mathematical 
thinking. Second, I claim that the epistemological alternative is 
arbitrariness, which we cannot accept of our mathematical 
theories. 
The basic terminological problem here is that robust truth is 
often misunderstood to imply a radically realist philosophy of 
mathematics, usually an archaic version of Platonism. This is 
something we have to rid the philosophy of mathematics of. The 
question of truth in mathematics is not the same question as the 
existence of mathematical objects, or even that of objective truth-
values. Of course truth can be conceived as the correspondence 
between mathematical statements and mathematical objects in 
Platonism, just like truth can obviously be seen as the property we 
refer to with objective truth-values. However, the question of truth 
comes up before all these metaphysical questions when we try to 
construct a comprehensive philosophical account of mathematics. 
Everything considered in this work points to that: Tarskian 
undefinability, Gödel’s incompleteness theorems and the 
semantical arguments based on them, Hintikka’s and Kripke’s 
truth, second-order logic, pre-formal thinking, the impossibility of 
extreme formalism and the hierarchies that follow from truth 
predicates. At no point have we had the need to make any 
metaphysical or epistemological considerations even remotely 
resembling Platonism. This is an extremely important point: we 
have arrived at the need for a robust (once again, defined as non-
deflationary) truth predicate with the absolute minimum of 
presuppositions – ultimately insisting only on that mathematical 
theories are not arbitrary. The highly problematic metaphysical 
and epistemological problems concern the nature of truth. Those 
are of course some of the most important questions in the 
philosophy of mathematics – but they are not the question whether 
truth and proof are the same concept. We need robust truth 
primarily because deflationary truth fails in mathematics. Perhaps 
we could arrive at the robustness of truth in other ways – possibly 
more constructive ones – but the destructive argument here on 
extreme formalism seems just as valid nevertheless.   
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Of course the negative nature of the definition of robustness 
remains, but this should not be seen as a problem. The exact nature 
of mathematical truth is bound to continue puzzling philosophers, 
whether it is thought in terms of Platonism, conventionalism, 
naturalism, empiricism or in some other way. What mathematical 
truth is, and how the manifold physical and direct applications of 
mathematical theories can be accounted for, are probably the two 
most difficult questions in the philosophy of mathematics. 
However, although quite clearly relevant, ultimately they both fall 
outside the scope of this work. The problem studied here is 
whether mathematical truth can be viably seen as the same concept 
as formal proof, and from all we have seen, the answer is no. It 
should suffice here to conclude that the road of explaining 
mathematical truth is indeed the one to take, rather than trying to 
deflate mathematics completely into formal systems, and 
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